One of the most consequential territorial disputes today is the South China Sea (SCS) dispute, involving Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Drawing on Communication Geography and a qualitative framing analysis of 533 English-language news articles from state-affiliated outlets in these six countries, this article shows how media actively reshape the definition and contestation of geographical space. The analysis reveals that Chinese state media project stability and a preference for peaceful resolution, while other claimants remain skeptical and carefully avoid actions that might provoke Beijing, given its global influence. Across outlets, naming practices and repeatable symbolic devices are used to align the SCS with national interests, reinforcing competing territorial imaginaries and amplifying the salience of the dispute. Focusing on state‑affiliated English coverage highlights how official media articulate policy positions, signal diplomatic red lines to international audiences, and shape the legal and rhetorical resources available to negotiators.

ABSTRACT Studies have concluded that Laos is a ‘satellite’ or ‘vassal’ state of China due to its increasing dependence on China’s financial investments over the past years. Therefore, the expectation is that, during Laos’ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chairmanships in 2016 and 2024, Laos would take a stance similar to Cambodia's in 2012, slightly siding with China on the South China Sea dispute. However, such expectations never came to fruition, as Laos surprisingly leaned more towards the ASEAN Way by remaining neutral in its role. Bridging social psychology’s uncertainty-identity theory can offer unique interpretations of Laos’ foreign policy, revealing ideational facets uncommon in the existing literature. This explanatory empirical case study examines Laos’ ASEAN chairmanships over the past 10 years and bridges the uncertainty-identity theory to identity, self-categorization, and entitativity. The study found that: (1) A sense of uncertainty in identity surfaced due to Laos’ concerns over the discourse of China’s ‘predatory’ lending practices in the region; (2) the deliberate self-categorization to abide by the ASEAN Way by associating with the regional grouping’s prototypical attributes and displaying neutrality; and (3) ASEAN as a high entitativity regional grouping, motivating Laos to align further with the regional grouping’s norms and goals.

ASEAN plays a vital role in maintaining political stability in Southeast Asia, yet its effectiveness is often limited by policy implementation challenges. This study adopts a qualitative approach, utilizing literature review and policy analysis to assess ASEAN’s mechanisms for conflict resolution. Through case studies on the South China Sea dispute and the Myanmar political crisis, the research highlights ASEAN’s diplomatic limitations, the impact of political diversity among member states, and the constraints of its non-intervention principle. Findings suggest that ASEAN’s consensus-based model weakens its ability to address regional conflicts decisively. The study recommends strengthening policy enforcement mechanisms, enhancing international cooperation, and reconsidering the non-intervention policy to improve ASEAN’s conflict resolution effectiveness. Reforming ASEAN’s governance structure is essential to strengthening its role in regional stability and global diplomacy. Keywords: ASEAN; Conflict Resolution; Non-Intervention; Political Stability; Regional Security

Abstract How does China strategically allocate foreign aid to increase its influence on South China Sea disputes? We posit that China uses foreign aid as a tool of strategic appeasement to manage militarized interstate disputes, particularly targeting claimant states with smaller winning coalitions that are more susceptible to aid influence. The results of our empirical analysis show that China is more likely to allocate aid to the ASEAN SCS claimants with a smaller winning coalition. These findings not only support the notion of foreign aid as a strategic tool employed by China to mitigate tensions in the South China Sea but also highlight the vulnerability of certain recipient states. This article contributes to the foreign assistance and conflict literature by examining the conditionality of claimant donors’ decisions to provide foreign aid to other claimant recipients.

This study analyzes the Philippines' foreign policy in the South China Sea dispute during the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. era using the Rational Model. The results show a significant transformation of the Rodrigo Duterte era to a concordance strategy with the United States during the Marcos Jr. era. The failure of Duterte's pro-China approach, which actually increased the aggressiveness of the Chinese Coast Guard and did not provide the expected concessions, became a policy lesson for the Marcos Jr. administration. The concordance strategy was shown through the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the intensification of military exercises, the modernization of military capabilities, the institutionalization of intelligence sharing, and active participation in multilateral forums. This qualitative research, with data triangulation, reveals that the Philippines' chosen strategy reflects a rational calculation that aligning with the United States provides greater benefits for securing maritime sovereignty and regional stability than confronting China.

The South China Sea territorial conflict emerged following the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) claim over the Ten-Dash Line, which overlaps with the maritime entitlements of several coastal states, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Natuna area. China bases its claim on historical grounds, a position strongly contested, particularly by the Philippines through arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013. Despite the arbitral award, the dispute remains unresolved and continues to generate legal and political tensions. This study employs a normative legal research method to examine the legal implications of the Code of Conduct (CoC) and the Joint Development Agreement (JDA) in managing the South China Sea dispute under international law. The analysis is conducted through examination of international legal norms, principles, and relevant instruments, particularly the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The study finds that neither the CoC nor the JDA constitutes a legally binding dispute settlement mechanism. Instead, both function primarily as conflict management instruments aimed at preventing escalation and facilitating cooperation. Consequently, reliance on these mechanisms alone is insufficient to ensure certainty or resolve sovereignty disputes.

The South China Sea Areas of the sea have proven reserves of oil and gas and are a hot spot with high potential. However, it is the South China Sea’s weight as a geopolitical strain that sets it apart as a potential theater of conflict. It is a dispute between China, Indonesia, Taiwan, the Philippines (which had brought the case), Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Vietnam due to overlapping territorial claims as well as China’s unilaterally drawing of the Nine-Dash Line. Brunei Darussalam is seen as a claimant state which does not make an overt claim to the Spratly Islands. Brunei Darussalam is also among the countries that have agreed on some of China’s projected cooperation schemes. China is a partner that can support Brunei, and it indirectly influences its political position by doing so, thus challenging ASEAN’s unified action on the South China Sea dispute.

The South China Sea (SCS) is a crucible of overlapping sovereignty claims, strategic rivalry, and valuable maritime resources. This article examines the principal challenges that the SCS disputes pose to regional stability—great power rivalry, ASEAN fragmentation, militarization and gray-zone coercion, and limitations of international law enforcement—and explores opportunities to mitigate tensions through diplomacy, legal instruments, confidence-building measures, and regional capacity-building. The study uses recent empirical evidence on trade flows, energy and fisheries significance, maritime incidents, and legal outcomes (notably the 2016 arbitral award) to assess the prospects for stability. The analysis argues that while legal rulings and multilateral norms provide an essential normative framework, political commitment, robust ASEAN coordination, and pragmatic, enforceable mechanisms (including an effective Code of Conduct) are necessary to transform the South China Sea from a chronic flashpoint into an arena of managed cooperation.

The Indo-Pacific region has become the strategic theatre for twenty-first century great power rivalry between the United States and China. The paper aims to analyze the dynamics of Sino-US strategic competition and its implications for regional stability, security architecture, and the agency of local actors. The article addresses key flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region that includes the South China Sea disputes, East China Sea tensions, the Taiwan issue, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These challenges contribute significantly to heightened insecurity, maritime tensions, and the risk of escalation. The paper also analyzes the responses of key regional states -India, the Philippines, and Pakistan as these three countries pursue distinct approaches. The findings suggest that the Indo-Pacific is more than a geographic theater of US-China rivalry. It is the crucible of the emerging global order. The outcome of this competition will not only determine regional security but also influence the character of international politics in the twenty-first century. The interplay between great power strategies and regional responses is therefore essential for anticipating future challenges and opportunities in an evolving multipolar world.

The South China Sea dispute stands as a complex intersection of international law, geopolitics, and regional security, involving competing territorial and maritime claims from China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Central to this thesis is the analysis of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling, which declared China's expansive “Nine-Dash Line” claim incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Despite the ruling’s clear legal reasoning and reaffirmation of UNCLOS principles, China’s refusal to recognize and comply with the judgment highlights the critical limitations of international legal enforcement when challenged by major powers. This study examines the effectiveness of the PCA ruling in shaping state behavior, the role of international and regional organizations such as ASEAN in dispute resolution, and the broader tension between legal norms and geopolitical interests. Drawing from legal theory, compliance studies, and international relations perspectives, the research reveals how the South China Sea case illustrates the fragile authority of international law in constraining powerful states. It further explores the implications for regional stability, maritime governance, and the evolving balance between law, sovereignty, and realpolitik in international order. The findings emphasize that while international law remains a vital framework for peaceful dispute resolution, its success ultimately depends on political will, diplomatic engagement, and multilateral cooperation.

The debates about geopolitical competition between major powers in this multipolar world will always consider the presence of the United States and the rise of China. Therefore, this study attempts to examine the implementation of the United States' offshore balancing, especially in the Donald Trump Administration, to contain China in the South China Sea dispute. Although there were previous studies that discuss the United States – China strategic competition in the South China Sea, the time span is limited until 2017, and has not yet reached the specifications for the implementation of the offshore balancing by the United States. Therefore, this study will use the offshore balancing theory to identify the reasons for the United States’ deterrence against China. This study will use qualitative–deductive methods and triangulation data analysis techniques from official documents and statements, previous research, or internet sources. This study found that China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has caused the implementation of United States’ offshore balancing regardless of geographical distance. Guided by the Freedom of Navigation Operations that escalated during Trump’s, offshore balancing was implemented by encouraging other countries to control China in the South China Sea dispute, and to intervene only when necessary.

This study aims to analyze Indonesia's foreign policy in dealing with the South China Sea dispute and formulate a consensus-based neutrality diplomacy model from the national defense and security perspective. Although Indonesia is not a claimant country, the escalation of the conflict in the South China Sea, especially unilateral claims that overlap the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea, directly threatens Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and national interests. This study uses normative legal research methods to examine how the neutrality principle can be reformulated legally into a more operational and responsive active neutrality approach. The study results indicate that the current neutrality diplomacy approach has not been sufficiently institutionalized to respond to complex geopolitical dynamics. Therefore, a legal reformulation model is proposed that integrates the principle of active neutrality into the legal framework of Indonesia's foreign policy. In conclusion, by institutionalizing consensus-based neutrality diplomacy, Indonesia can strengthen its position as an impartial but constructive mediator, protect its sovereign rights, and actively contribute to the peaceful and legal resolution of disputes in the region, in line with the mandate of the constitution and international law.

This study aims to examine the impact of the dynamics of the South China Sea dispute on the national interests and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. This study uses a qualitative research method with data analysis techniques consisting of data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions. The theories used in this study are the theories of sovereignty, national interests, and geopolitics. The results of this study indicate that the dynamics of the dispute in the South China Sea region have shown signs of escalation that encourage the formation of expansionist geopolitics in regional countries. This condition can ultimately disrupt the achievement of the national interests of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and can threaten the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, especially in the Natuna waters. The Government of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is considered necessary to strengthen the maritime military, in this case the Indonesian Navy or TNI AL, to ward off traditional and non-traditional security threats, and optimize diplomacy through a regional approach to encourage the formation of a Code of Conduct (Coc) in the South China Sea region as soon as possible.

What are the prospects for the relationship between Trump 2.0 and Southeast Asia? The ties between the US and this region have been inconsistent, with periods of intense engagement but also moments of US distraction or preoccupation with other regions and issues. Given this historical context and the current challenges of discerning a clear strategy toward the region, this article evaluates the possible approach of Trump 2.0 toward Southeast Asia through a series of scenarios: maintenance of the status quo, increased competition, and retrenchment (either by accommodation or by withdrawal). The three scenarios are explored through foreign policy approaches and multilateral platforms, as well as through the South China Sea dispute. We argue that the status quo scenario is the most plausible, but that increased competition is also likely.

Abstract: The essay examines the surprising outcome of the 12 May 2025 elections in the Philippines and, more broadly, the emerging political landscape in the vital Southeast Asian nation. The stakes were extremely high as evident in the historic turnout, especially among the younger Gen Z generation. The race pit the country’s two powerful dynasties—Duterte and Marcos—against each other, but was also an indirect showdown between the world’s two superpowers. While China has been accused of backing Duterte-aligned elements in hopes of restoring a more friendly regime in Manila, the second Trump administration has largely stood by the Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration, which has rapidly expanded defense ties with traditional Western partners and adopted a tougher stance in the South China Sea disputes. The senate race was particularly crucial, since the legislative body is deliberating the potential impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte on charges of corruption and abuse of power. Though the Marcos camp heavily underperformed in the senatorial race, barely winning half of the 12 seats up for grabs, it was not a straightforward victory for the Dutertes. The shocking success of liberal-progressive candidates, most notably former Senators Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino and Francis Pangilinan, has raised hopes of a potential “third force” in Philippine politics. With three major camps vying for power ahead of the 2028 presidential elections, the Philippines has entered a new twilight zone.

This paper examines the military cooperation between Brunei Darussalam and the United Kingdom, as well as its impact on regional stability in Southeast Asia, focusing on Brunei's non-alignment strategy as a small state. Using a descriptive analytic method based on a literature review, this paper explores descriptive data on the dynamics of Brunei's foreign policy strategy in building bilateral relations, the role of the UK post-Brexit through the Global Britain strategy in strengthening bilateral relations with ASEAN member countries, and the implementation of Brunei and British military cooperation in maintaining regional security stability through the presence of British Forces Brunei since 1963. This is supported by historical ties and the Garrison Agreement to strengthen the security of the country and the region without confrontation. Therefore, this paper shows that Brunei has managed to balance military cooperation with the UK and economic cooperation with China in the midst of great power rivalries and tensions over the South China Sea dispute, as well as its implications for regional stability.

The Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail (KCJB) project is one of the strategic infrastructure initiatives resulting from the output of cooperation between Indonesia and China following the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) policy. Although the project is promising in improving transportation efficiency, reducing carbon emissions, and the potential for regional economic growth, its implementation is inseparable from various challenges, one of which is geopolitics. This research aims to find out the geopolitical dynamics that arise due to China's incentives in financing and mastering KCJB technology, and also examine Indonesia's position in the midst of regional conflicts, one of which is the South China Sea dispute. The method in this research is qualitative based on literature study. This research reveals that the KCJB project is not just technical cooperation, but reflects a struggle for strategic influence. Indonesia's dependence on financing and technology from China creates potential asymmetry in bilateral relations and risks to sovereignty. The findings are expected to enrich the discourse on foreign policy and national infrastructure in the face of increasingly complex regional or global challenges.

International treaty law, while playing a crucial role in keeping states in check with one another, remains flawed both in terms of its procedural and enforcement measures. States are incentivized not to engage with international actors, like the International Court of Justice, instead choosing to avoid or outright ignore international attempts at dispute settlements for political or sovereignty-based reasons. The South China Sea dispute, involving several states in the Asia-Pacific vying for control over the region, serves as a key example of how nation-states have chosen to take advantage of weaknesses in both international judicial institutions and international law as a broader governing structure. This article seeks to analyze the effectiveness of international law and assess its legitimacy by using the South China Sea arbitration case to identify shortcomings in the procedure and enforcement of international law. It will also delve into how international law and treaty enforcement can be strengthened, including recommendations for changes in dispute resolution procedure as well as the establishment of stronger enforcement mechanisms.

The source of conflict in the South China Sea (SCS) is based on overlapping claims involving China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian Countries. The waters which are rich in natural resources also have a strategic location as an important international trade route. Complexity of issues was due to external party interest and power competition. The discussion on conflicting parties’ position in the South China Sea and efforts of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy were examined to demonstrate complexity of the issues. Despite its position as a major organization within the region, the central issue is inability of ASEAN to resolve the conflict. Moreover, Indonesia having the most significant role as the President of the Organization in 2023 also fails to accommodate different interests. The research answered the question on “how was the role of ASEAN and Indonesia as “a bridge over troubled water” to resolve the problem”. Previous researches on ASEAN focused more on the issues rather than the organizational aspects such as criticising the “consensus” requirement, which hindered the organization’s ability to find a solution. This research argues that due to division of interests among members countries, beside emphasizing its centrality, ASEAN needs to modify the mechanism to “majority of votes”. Only then the organization would be able to manage the dispute and to find the best possible solution. To fight against China’s “nine dash lines” claim, ASEAN and Indonesia could play a bridging role to overcome the trouble water of South China Sea conflict.

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute has been a contentious issue in the Asia-Pacific region, with multiple claimants vying for territorial control and access to its abundant resources. This study examines the ASEAN approach towards the SCS dispute and China's soft power response from 2010 to 2022. The “Soft Power” theory of Joseph Nye has been adopted to analyze the ASEAN approach towards the SCS dispute and China’s response to influence the member states. Moreover, the Qualitative approach has been used for collection of data through primary and secondary data sources. John Scott's model of documentary analysis is used for data analysis. This study explores ASEAN's multilateral diplomacy, consensus-building mechanisms, and conflict resolution frameworks utilized to address the dispute. Additionally, it investigates China's deployment of soft power tools, such as economic investments, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic engagements, aimed at influencing the regional changing dynamics. The research findings shed light on the effectiveness of ASEAN's approach in managing the SCS dispute and evaluate China's soft power response within the context of its regional ambitions. Ultimately, this research offers insights into power dynamics and potential future developments within the SCS region.