Marketing and corporate social responsibility (CSR) are crucial factors that affect closed-loop supply chain network (CLSCN) equilibrium. And the environment of enterprises’ behaviors often occurs during durations and dynamics. To explore the optimal marketing and CSR strategies in a dynamic multi-period CLSCN system, this paper investigates the dynamic multi-period CLSCN equilibrium problem considering marketing and CSR. A multi-period CLSCN system includes manufacturers, retailers, recyclers, and demand markets. Based on Nash non-cooperative game theory and variational inequality, we design the optimal behavior and equilibrium conditions of members. Then, a new equilibrium model of a multi-period CLSCN is constructed. In this model, marketing is the responsibility of manufacturers and retailers, and CSR is the responsibility of manufacturers. Numerical examples are provided to verify the effectiveness of the model and analyzed to describe how marketing and CSR affect equilibrium results. We find that the retailers are responsible for marketing, and the level of CSR activities of the manufacturers is higher during the early period, which is most beneficial to the multi-period CLSCN system and social welfare. Based on the conclusions of this paper, the management enlightenments from the perspectives of enterprises and government are also proposed.
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