ABSTRACT Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s “hermeneutical marginalization” and Martin Meeker’s “sexual communication network,” this article retraces how the adoption and therefore the existence of queer identities are predicated on the availability of alternative models of understanding sexuality. “Loci of increased human connection,” such as cities, media, and the Internet, are recognized as disseminators of hermeneutical resources and catalysts for “sexual communication networks.” By following this throughline, this article provides a framework for the social ontology of sexual orientation that is intended to be usable across history. The author renegotiates the debate about the applicability of sexual orientation lingo to queer pre-modern history by iterating on William Wilkerson’s emerging fusion theory of sexual identity. Sexual orientation is a self-interpretation of desires, which emerge, or remain hermeneutically marginalized, under the available social models that are specific to each society (and time). Historiography, in this way, can realistically enquire about sexual preference in its search for “gay history”; particular focus must be put, however, on “loci of increased human connection,” because they are the most likely sites where hermeneutically underserved desires might emerge explicitly as alternative social categories. These alternative categories might have lived only in limited contexts before the invention of modern communication technologies.

Abstract This study takes seriously Octavia Butler’s Parable series as an unfinished treatise of processual social philosophy. My analysis highlights Butler’s skillful weaving of a wide range of processual traditions, from the mystical atheism in the Chinese classic Daodejing , to the kinship worldview in Africana processual-relational ontologies, to the practice of relational nondomination inspired by womanist philosophies. It further demonstrates how Butler’s art of storytelling enfleshes this philosophy of relational nondomination into a collaborative, decentralized liberation movement: by inventing a fictional religion, Earthseed, Butler formulates a processual atheist theology that unshackles human imagination from the substance metaphysics–informed question of how to build a better society with flawed building blocks such as selfish human beings or selfish genes. In doing so, Butler’s processual social philosophy raises a paradigm-shifting inquiry: how to build a friendlier future with new patterns of collective actions, relations, and organizations despite flawed human beings. After all, if nature selects not only genomes or biological individuals but also relations or holobionts, then Butler’s social evolutionary theory encourages us as humans to self-select into new patterned relationalities among ourselves and our lifeworlds. Simultaneously, Butler skillfully assembles what Brook Ziporyn terms “compensatory” and “emulative” atheisms. The Books of the Living (a collection of opening verses from the chapters of the Parable series), as the seed of an atheist experiment, has the concrete yet conditional purpose to cohere people—that is, to start Earthseed in other solar systems. It likewise enacts a global mimesis of purposelessness—a self-conscious masking of its ontological indeterminacy as an open-ended interstellar travel adventure and a womanist story of how humans can leave the nest and grow up to break the cycle of violence and domination and start a new cycle of noncoercive co-becoming. This atheist experiment calls into being a Buddhish womanist subjectivity of nonduality-cum-nondomination, reconceiving of subjectivity and agency as an emergent phenomenon interconditioned among an infinite yet dynamic network of human and nonhuman, sentient and non-sentient factors. The Parable series convinces readers the truth of its philosophical insight and the viability of its vision through the art of storytelling and thereby has initiated many cautious yet hopeful collaborative liberation movements intending to lead humanity out of the dualistic epistemic trap of “either we need ‘more God’ or ‘less religion’,” which Ziporyn identifies as a dilemma endemic to academic conversations. By taking seriously the Parable series as a philosophical treatise, this study contributes to two trends shaping a broader effort: first, to decenter academia as the main site for doing philosophy; and second, to turn to relational-processual ontology in quantum physics, biology, feminist anthropology, and social justice organizing by opening a new subfield—processual social ontology.

For philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists, folk psychology is a theory of social cognition that explains other people's behaviour by referring to their beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states. Although discussions continue about how the ability to understand others works, current research indicates that no single explanation is clearly better than others. I describe how everyday understanding, phenomenology, social ontology, and neuroscience come together to explain how nurses learn in clinical settings. A case study written by an ICU nurse provides a real‑world example of why folk psychology relies on non‑representational, embodied, and contextually situated social cognition. After clarifying the role of propositional attitudes in folk‑psychological reasoning, I draw on Edith Stein's phenomenology of empathy to describe the process through which the nurse decided to engage a distressed family to encourage them to donate their loved one's organs. I use Stein's social ontology and relational ethics to explain why the nurse found the situation she describes morally salient. Drawing on current debates in social cognition theory, I demonstrate how embodied attunement, affective resonance, and mirror-neuron mechanisms explain empathy and its development into sympathy and, potentially, compassionate nursing care. I conclude that social cognition theories integrate Stein's concepts of empathy and social ontology within a neuroscience-supported view of knowledge and relational ethics in nursing practice.

ABSTRACT This article develops a philosophical framework for understanding transgenerationality as a foundational concept for intergenerational justice. Drawing on social ontology and the philosophy of action, it introduces the notion of transgenerational civitas —a temporally extended community composed of past, present and future generations. The paper argues that transgenerational actions, characterised by epistemic and agentic asymmetries, require a diachronic conception of justice that moves beyond reciprocity. By integrating ontological commitments with normative reasoning, the article proposes a model of vertical justice capable of addressing long‐term collective responsibilities and mitigating the populist risks inherent in democratic systems.

Organizations don’t have a mind and can’t have goals if we follow a microstructural approach that builds on methodological individualism. Yet, paradoxically, the existence of a normatively binding, shared organizational goal is typically a definitional criterion of what makes a group of individuals an organization. Building on the recent philosophy of social ontology, I answer this puzzle by demonstrating how agents within an organization believing in a shared goal make such a shared goal epistemologically independent, while ontologically emergent and dependent on individual beliefs. Through this collective belief, organizational goals become functionally real and normatively binding, and part of the most predictive theories to explain how individual agents behave in an organization. I also analyze how the deontic duties and rights of within-organizational roles aim to ensure that every member is either inspired, obliged, or channeled to engage in activities serving those goals, while also determining how much each member can influence the shared goals. This helps to bridge the micro-macro gap in organizational research by providing an account of the normative microfoundations for how individual agents come to adhere to organizational goals and together form a “group agent” capable of having goals and being morally responsible for them.

How can a democratic society forget its autonomy and fall back into heteronomy? This article adds to the existing literature on the end of democracy by critically examining what changes in the imaginary of a society such a transition entails. It does so by revisiting Cornelius Castoriadis’s social ontology and theory of radical democracy to create the concept of ‘heteronomization’. It then explores the ontological stakes and affective dimensions of the heteronomization process. The analysis reveals two tensions between autonomy and enjoyment on the one hand, and between autonomy and mastery on the other, which inscribe the risk of heteronomization at the heart of the project of autonomy. Understanding the process of heteronomization stresses the crucial role of affects in the transition from autonomy to heteronomy and highlights that, because of these two tensions, the democratic society always carries within itself the possibility of its reversal.

Abstract In this paper, I introduce the concepts of ontic erasure and moral social kinds to account for a type of ontological injustice that extends beyond Katharine Jenkins’s notion of ontic injustice. While much of critical social ontology has focused on how oppressive structures constitute wrongful race and gender kinds, this paper explores how oppressive structures constitute wrongful forms of seemingly neutral moral kinds, such as the refugee. Moral social kinds are anchored in practices that function to manage justice-related resources according to operative conceptions of justice, with the kind ‘refugee’ as a paradigmatic example. Ontic erasure refers to situations where moral social kinds are wrongful because they also track features that are irrelevant from the perspective of justice, and as a result, often only safeguard the moral entitlements of those who are socially privileged. Ontic erasure wrongs individuals who, due to this bias, fail to be socially constructed as members of a moral social kind. At its worst, ontic erasure, like ontic injustice, amounts to moral injury that puts people at risk of life-threatening violence and destitution.

Abstract Recently, social philosophers have argued for a practice-based social ontology that can furnish a robustly social account of oppression and, in turn, illuminate the obstacles to and possibilities for social change. This paper argues for an intersubjective approach to oppressive social practices. Oppressive meanings constitute relationships between agents in ways they neither choose nor decide on; agents uphold those meanings through their relationships to others. This approach, I argue, can illuminate a critical case of an oppressive social practice that revolves around struggles for recognition and the dynamics of social change.

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to contribute to critical discourse on mindfulness in education through Heidegger’s notion of Besinnung and what I have called an “appropriative approach” to selfhood and social ontology. In particular, I focus on the “contemplative turn” towards the self as a crucial site of contestation and debate within the current literature on mindfulness in education. In the process, I show how Besinnung as an extension of the appropriative approach can provide the basis for an account of mindfulness as desubjectivation which, according to Michel Foucault, has “the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution”.

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on social structural explanations of injustice and the ontological commitments of theorists who develop them. I first show that theorists can develop structural explanations and social position concepts without committing to a critical social ontology of oppression or to a view of race and gender as constitutively socially constructed kinds. I also develop a pluralist account of social position concepts that can accommodate the full range of social ontological commitments that theorists may hold. Then, I argue that structural explanations of injustice developed from a position of oppression agnosticism are morally and epistemically problematic. They carry a high risk of perpetrating identity-based hermeneutical injustice, and perpetuate an understanding of structural intersectionality that has been widely problematised. Even ethically motivated oppression agnosticism, as an attempt to respond to one’s situated ignorance and to practice epistemic humility, is therefore problematic.

The relevance of this research is due to the systemic crisis of representative models in the social sciences, triggered by the "ontological turn" and related to the reaction to the exhaustion of dominant epistemological paradigms, the influence of interdisciplinary fields of knowledge, and the striving for "new realism." Despite the declared abandonment of constructive reductionism, dominant approaches, including the strict social ontology of philosopher Brian Epstein, remain "trapped" in the paradigm of statics, reducing social reality to a set of fixed facts and relationships. Such "architectonic" models, while effective for analyzing stable states, are fundamentally unable to conceptualize the inherent processuality, creativity, and continuous becoming of the social world. Overcoming this conceptual "deadlock" requires turning to a radically different ontological tradition that is adequate to the dynamic complexity of social existence. The methodological approach of the research is built on the consistent application of the method of comparative-critical analysis. The primary object of critique is Epstein's social ontology, which is subjected to systematic analysis through the lens of key categories of the process philosophy of Gilbert Simondon. The methodology is implemented in three stages. First, the reconstruction of the epistemological architecture of Epstein's model through the prism of the opposition of the "static and the processual." Second, the transductive transfer of Simondon's categorical apparatus into the field of social ontology problems. And finally, the assessment of the heuristic potential of both paradigms through their ability to represent the dynamic aspects of social existence. This approach allows not only the comparison of the two theories but also the identification of the internal boundaries of the structural-analytical approach and the justification of the necessity of a process-oriented epistemology for an adequate description of social reality as a permanent becoming. The novelty of the article lies in the systematic critique of the epistemological foundations of Epstein's project through the lens of Simondon's processual ontology. It is argued that such key Simondonian categories as individuation, transduction, and pre-individual reveal the internal limitation of Epstein's epistemic stance, which is aimed at the "justification" and "fixation" of already established entities. In contrast, it is proposed to view the social not as a structure but as an unfinished process, where the "individuals" and "institutions" themselves are not starting points but temporary and problematic results of a continuous process of individuation.

ABSTRACT The Taliban’s resurgence to power after two decades of war on terror alongside an increase in global rates of terrorism since 9/11 not only impugns our counter-terrorism measures but also solicits a return to the question that has recurrently engaged scholars in postcolonial studies: How do we respond to the global situation of ‘terror’?. Elleke Boehmer identifies two responsive modalities in postcolonial literature: a ‘hybridizing’ and a ‘resistance’ inflection embodied respectively in the magic realist and national narratives. While both engage with neocolonialism, the former often comes to collude with globalization’s imperio-capitalist processes which are subverted by the latter through ‘nation narration’ (2010, 143). Analyzing Kamila Shamsie’s Burnt Shadows via Judith Butler’s theorization of a nonviolent ethics, this paper identifies Shamsie’s response to terror as a departure from Boehmer’s model. Debunking ‘capitalist-driven colonialism’ and ‘neo-imperial globalization’, Burnt Shadows also contests ‘the nation’ to endorse an ethico-politics of relationality anchored in shared human loss. This article argues that Burnt Shadows narrativizes a relational historical consciousness indispensable to apprehending our mutual constitution in vulnerability; in doing so, it advances a new paradigm of postcolonial resistance that demands a re-evaluation of ‘terror’ through our interdependent global history, informed by the continuities of empire, in order to reconceive politics within a relational social ontology that can forfend cycles of violence.

Abstract The term ‘commitment’ plays a central role in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of action, and social ontology. Despite its centrality, the meaning of this term is seldom made explicit. It is not always clear what different authors mean when they use the term. This lack of clarity is especially apparent when using phrases like ‘shared commitments’ or ‘mutual commitment’. I argue that the term ‘commitment’ is used in at least two ways, which I call “private commitments” and “public commitments”. These senses can be distinguished by their different types of normative product. I then explicate different notions of the term ‘shared commitment’ derived from the two main notions. Finally, I apply these distinctions to try to make sense of paradigmatic uses of the term in the literature.

Debates in public health ethics have been dominated by the assumptions of Western liberalism: a priority given to liberty and autonomy over other values, an individualistic view of social ontology, a focus on personal responsibility, a minimal set of obligations (only created through consent), and a marginalization of social, cultural, and religious context. Examining issues in public health ethics from the perspective of a different moral tradition reveals that such assumptions are not timeless truths, but rather choices that require justification. In this paper, we briefly outline a view of Confucianism and explore how this approach can be used to articulate a critical approach to much contemporary public health ethics. Confucianism suggests a radically different perspective toward obligations, agency, and responsibility, as well as a more relational conception of social ontology and a shared notion of well-being. Of course, some discussion in public health ethics, within the constraints of Western traditions, has pushed in this direction before. In offering a Confucian perspective on public health ethics, we are not suggesting that Confucianism is the one true approach to ethics and that everyone should become a Confucian. We are, however, seeing our discussion as a source of epistemic critique of Western liberalism, exposing the need for more active defense of assumptions at its core, as well as providing an opportunity to broaden the set of values that inform justifiable public health policy.

In this article, we propose meta-subjectivity and ideational analysis. Meta-subjectivity is a philosophically grounded social ontology that posits the self as a dynamic intersubjective and relational environmental process. Ideational analysis is a sociohistorical abductive method for studying the generation of collective belief systems and their structuration. We critique contemporary epistemologies found within the humanities and social sciences, such as Smith and Searle’s critical realism. Building on Storm’s metamodernism, we offer our perspective as innovation. We conclude with a call for greater interdisciplinarity and methodological plurality in the humanities and social sciences, in the spirit of Storm, Feyerabend, and Kuhn.

ABSTRACT This paper builds on R. Scott Kretchmar’s contention that game play – not simply complex language – served as a primary generator of culture over the course of human evolution. Kretchmar’s ‘games-first hypothesis’ challenges the dominant privileging of language as the sole prerequisite for conventions forming our social institutions. On this view, ‘game acts’ – not ‘speech acts’ – stand at the root of what social otologists such as John Searle call ‘social reality’. Oldham makes the case that we hold game acts – more specifically physical game acts (i.e. sport) – as mechanisms par excellence for the development and display of trust and trustworthiness, fundamental elements of social institutions including language. Anchored thus in ontologically objective evolutionary processes, ‘game acts theory’ not only presents a novel solution to social ontology’s persistent problem of irreducibility to brute facts, but opens up a significant new perspective in the debate concerning value and meaning in sport and games. It is here, in fact, with a question about value – Does the Olympic Oath carry a moral obligation? – where the paper begins. The search for an answer launches an exploration of the origins of social conventions on an evolutionary time scale, decentring language and laying the groundwork for a new ontological understanding of sport.

The correlation of two competing research traditions in the multidisciplinary field of civilizational analysis is reconstructed: the metahistorical and the sociological. In each of them, there are groups of theories based on both a unitary and a pluralistic concept of civilization. In the middle of the 20th century, the metahistorical paradigm of civilizational analysis, better known as the theory of local civilizations, crystallized and took a dominant position. The conceptual limitations of the metahistorical paradigm have prevented the full-fledged institutionalization of the research field of comparative study of civilizations into an autonomy scientific discipline. The civilizational turn in sociology in the 1970s led to a break with the metahistorical civilizational paradigm at the level of fundamental metatheoretical premises. In contrast to the traditional substantialist view of local civilizations as empirically predetermined objects of research, the contemporary sociological paradigm of civilizational analysis bases social ontology on a paradoxical combination of the principles of analytical autonomy and mutual constitution in relation to fundamental categories, common dimensions and special spheres of social life. As a result of the metatheoretical analysis of the civilizational approach in sociology, a trinitarian conceptual scheme of social ontology has been constructed and its logical inconsistencies have been identified. To overcome them, a new four-categorical conceptual scheme of social ontology has been developed. The conceptualization of culture and power as commensurate and mutually dependent ontological categories implemented at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries in the sociological version of civilizational analysis laid the foundation not only for consolidating civilizational analysis beyond the opposition of unitary and pluralistic concepts of civilization, but also for reorienting sociological theory beyond all types of functionalism, reductionism and determinism.

Anthropological analysis has long rested on the premise that cultural borders were somehow linear, based on bounds between people who essentially shared a common culture, with particular differences distinguishing each cohort from all others. Accordingly, identity bounds would possibly find direct representation in geopolitical borders. Mainstream public discourse absorbed such a perspective, reproducing the simplistic view that geographical borders and social isolation of aggregates were the critical factors in defining cultural diversity and similarity between peoples. Social anthropologists, for their part, obliquely supported such a vision by adopting a highly vague concept of “society.” The work of Fredrik Barth, among others, marked the transition to a new era of ethnographic studies, parting with anthropological notions of cultures as isolated entities and ethnicity as a primordialist bond. From then on, analysis of categorical ethnic distinctions did not depend anymore on the absence of mobility, contact, or interaction, but rather on the ongoing negotiations between communities as a key factor structuring identity bounds. African post-colonial studies provided the most valuable materials for the consideration of the social ontology of ethnicity, which is here analyzed with a particular focus on Rwanda. Such analytical tools, here integrated with a post-structuralist discourse theory, are still crucial to prevent essentialism, ethnicism, racism, and culturalism as means of social discrimination in the context of the ethno-states.

Heidegger’s Fluid Self and the Conditions of Social Ontology

Abstract In this paper, I defend a version of aesthetic contextualism by examining the aesthetic practice of creating and appreciating diss tracks. Section 2 introduces three core concepts from ontology and social ontology: grounding, anchoring, and social practices. Section 3 employs these concepts and argues that the aesthetic practice of creating and appreciating diss tracks ‘anchors’ a ‘frame’ in which the negative moral properties of an artwork directly ground its positive aesthetic properties. Section 4 expands the discussion and shows how we can use these concepts to clarify and evaluate existing positions in the moralist debate. The upshot is that we should do more substantive aesthetic theorizing and pay closer attention to a wider variety of aesthetic practices. Doing so can have payoffs that go beyond the moralist debate in aesthetics.