Social Epistemology Research Articles (Page 1)

Addressing marginalization in modern society, Julia Kristeva reconstructs the concept of “Share” in her post-structural feminist ethics by analyzing the causes of able-bodied people’s exclusion of disabled people. This reconstruction can be understood at three levels: ontology, epistemology, and axiology. The death anxiety of able-bodied people is an internal cause, so Kristeva advances sharing the ontological basis of “Vulnerability” to promote mutual care among each other. The personal model epistemology of able-bodied people is an external factor. Therefore, Kristeva proposes sharing the “Singularity” as a social model epistemology to dissolve discrimination against disabled people. From the perspective of human relations, Kristeva propounds the relational model of “Love of Maternal Reliance” as a shared value paradigm. By practicing “Interactions” based on “empathy” rather than “sympathy,” and “co-creation” rather than “independent creation,” she aims to rebuild social bonds grounded in emotional connection and meaning creation.

Abstract Many artificial intelligence tools replace or stand to replace human activity, via automated decision-making, recommender systems and content generation. The more artificial intelligence (AI) replaces valuable human activity, the more it risks deskilling humans of their human capacities. This paper argues for applying a structural perspective to this phenomenon. It introduces the concept of ‘capacity-hostile environments’ to identify instances where AI mediation impedes human capacity cultivation. The analysis moves beyond individual responsibility that agents have to cultivate their human capacities, demonstrating how AI’s influence creates systemic conditions that could inhibit the development and exercise of human capacities by undermining the process of capacity cultivation. Drawing on the philosophy of skill as well as social epistemology, this paper argues that capacity cultivation (skilling) includes acquiring agential control over the capacities, inculcated through a long, gradual process of habituation. Habituation, in turn, depends on learning from others: the ‘know how’ of the skill, as well as a shared understanding of the value of the skill. AI mediation risks undermining the quality of the conditions for capacity habituation, leading to capacity impoverishment. By exploring the role of AI in mediating human activity, the paper highlights the need to evaluate AI applications based on their conduciveness or hostility to capacity cultivation. Ultimately, it calls for a critical reflection on the values inherent in AI socio-technical systems and emphasizes the societal obligation to foster capacity-conducive environments in the age of AI.

The impetus for writing this article was a lecture by the German professor Alfred Nordmann titled “Hermeneutics of Science and Technology” delivered at the aca­demic seminar “Problems of Rational Philosophy” at the RAS Institute of Phi­losophy. Among other arguments, the professor presented a number of com­pelling reasons why hermeneutic methods of text analysis are inapplicable to scientific statements. This is due to the nature of scientific discourse, which presupposes unambiguous and definitive judgments that do not require additional interpretation. In my view, this conclusion calls into question the very existence of a number of philosophical disciplines concerned with such hermeneutic tasks. The thesis that scientific texts cannot be read hermeneutically effectively under­mines the epistemological status of fields like social epistemology and STS (Sci­ence and Technology Studies). Social epistemology demonstrates that the forma­tion of true scientific claims depends not only on their correspondence to facts but also on the social contexts of scientific communication. These contexts act as an additional causal factor in the production of knowledge and must therefore in­evitably be taken into account in its interpretation. In this article, I will attempt to defend the position of social epistemology.

This contribution focuses on the relevance of Schütz’s essay The Well-informed Citizen for social epistemology. This writing discusses the role of information through testimony, the problem of epistemic disagreement and the normative role of the person as a citizen with respect to superficial information and the specialist knowledge of experts

This contribution introduces the comprehensive framework of epistemic welfare to discuss how public service media (PSM) can engage with algorithmic recommender systems in a manner in keeping with PSM's foundational principles. We contextualize PSM algorithmic recommenders in their tradition of content curation and discuss the challenges PSM face in implementing these systems. We introduce epistemic welfare, a framework based in social epistemology and welfare studies, defined as concerned with creating and maintaining conditions and capabilities for epistemic agency of citizens in the public sphere. We discuss the epistemic standards of reliability, power, fecundity, speed, and efficiency and illustrate the framework's operationalization for the design and implementation of recommenders and its relevance for governance by and of PSM's algorithms. Ensuring that algorithmic recommender systems fit epistemic welfare, we argue, allows PSM to help tackle the epistemic disruptions in the digitalized public sphere.

Artificial intelligence and algorithms today are not limited to producing technical solutions; they are increasingly positioned as new epistemic apparatuses that regulate the processes of social knowledge production. This development has brought fundamental questions back into focus, particularly within the social sciences—questions about how knowledge is produced, by which normative criteria it is legitimized, and who gains epistemic authority in the process. This article aims to critically examine the transformative impact of AI technologies on the epistemology of the social sciences through the lens of a critical social epistemology, centered on the concept of algorithmic authority. The theoretical framework draws on Michel Foucault’s analysis of knowledge-power relations, Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory explaining the social construction of scientific knowledge, and Shoshana Zuboff’s theory of surveillance capitalism. These three approaches allow for an understanding of algorithmic systems not merely as technical operations but as structures that shape the normative and ideological dimensions of knowledge regimes. Contributions from thinkers such as Tarleton Gillespie and Nick Seaver, who conceptualize algorithms as cultural production tools, complement the article’s conceptual foundation. Methodologically, the study employs critical literature review and comparative theoretical analysis. The article explores the application of digital methodologies in the social sciences through case studies such as sentiment analysis, social media research, and ethnographic text processing. It highlights key issues that emerge in these processes, including algorithmic bias, methodological reductionism, and lack of transparency. In conclusion, the role of AI in social knowledge production emerges as not only a technical issue but also a political and normative one.

Abstract I propose a novel account of epistemic reputation as the social standing of agents, groups, and institutions based on their epistemic profiles within a community. Using a functionalist approach, I argue that epistemic reputation is pervasive in our societies because it facilitates navigation within social epistemic networks. Consequently, it holds significant importance as second-order evidence in testimonial belief formation. This proposal integrates reputation research, which has traditionally been relegated to the periphery of social epistemology, into the core of epistemology of testimony. As a result, we gain a deeper understanding of the burden and epistemic responsibility associated with epistemic injustice. This approach also promises to illuminate the concept of humility for experts in a new light.

ABSTRACT Some social institutions have clear epistemic aims: to create, accumulate, exchange, and disseminate knowledge, understanding, and other epistemic goods. While much recent literature in social epistemology has focused on identifying and analysing epistemic wrongs in these institutions, less attention has been paid to how institutions can realise their epistemic aims and correct for epistemic harms, wrongs, and mistakes. To this end, we introduce a framework for thinking about institutional epistemic responsibilities, which we argue social institutions incur because they have epistemic power. Our account is inspired by Michel Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge, and we discuss the university as a prime example. We introduce four dimensions of epistemic power: to influence 1) epistemic norms, standards, and values, 2) the status of genuine knowers and epistemic authorities, 3) agenda setting, and 4) the dissemination of knowledge. Universities should use their epistemic power responsibly to achieve their epistemic aims and to right epistemic wrongs, mistakes, harms, and injustices. We illustrate the fruitfulness of our framework by focusing on two case studies: a case of research misconduct at the Tilburg University in the Netherlands and a case of integration and inclusion of indigenous knowledges in the University of Auckland in Aotearoa, New Zealand.

Research into psychical phenomena such as telepathy and spiritualism in the 19 th century was so much hampered by fraudulent mediumship that researchers and the subjects found themselves caught up in what Watzlawick called a ‘pragmatic paradox’, i.e. the only way for a researcher to prove that their medium was ‘real’ consisted in trying to expose them as ‘fakes’. This had consequences for the epistemic claims both parties could make. By the early 20 th century, both researchers and mediums freed themselves from this paradox and redefined their respective practices as ‘parapsychology’ and ‘performing telepathy’, and simultaneously reconsidered their epistemic claims. In this article, I shall argue that it is necessary to explore the intricate relations between the epistemic claims raised by mediums and researchers, their social identities, and the struggle to appropriate the object of knowledge by both parties, approached here from a social epistemology perspective. I shall try to answer the question why it may have been reasonable for psychical researchers and parapsychologists to not give up on their research endeavors – even when seemingly insurmountable obstacles stood in the way of gaining knowledge – by referring to the concept of ‘perseverance of ignorance’.

Abstract Recent work in social epistemology has discussed obligations to engage with challenges to our beliefs like climate change denial or anti-vaccine sentiment, and the potential benefits and dangers for both the engager and the engaged from doing so. The spotlight being trained here, however, has elided a key issue: the possible risks from engaging for third-party observers, not merely the engager and the engaged. In this paper, I argue that not only are these risks an underappreciated aspect of engaging that should be discussed, but also their neglect is especially concerning as the potential negative epistemic fallout threatens to overwhelm any possible benefits that may be gained from engaging, regardless of how the engagement actually goes. I close by drawing out the theoretical and practical implications from this and sketch a few strategies to conceivably avoid said risks.

ABSTRACT The study aims to explore the epistemological underpinnings of news reporting in Ethiopian digital journalism, drawing on the context of 57 Ethiopian Media Authority (EMA)-registered digital platforms. Taking social epistemology as an analytical framework, the study draws on rigorous, in-depth qualitative interviews with journalists and experts from EMA to make sense of the epistemic position of journalists and the practice of digital journalism more broadly. The results highlight epistemological shifts, including the prevalence of sensationalism and click-baiting, the dominance of undiversified voices and perspectives, the subjective-pole and analytical model of news reporting, market-driven agenda setting, and echo chambering and polarization in Ethiopian digital media journalism. The finding urges policymakers, media regulators, and journalism educators to collectively address these challenges to uphold the integrity and credibility of the news media and to ensure that digital platforms fulfill their democratic role of fostering an informed and engaged citizenry.

Abstract The notion of epistemic reparations has recently gained increasing attention in social epistemology. These are reparations due to victims of distinctively epistemic wrongs attaching to gross human rights violations. An example of such a wrong is not having the true story about yourself known due to being wrongfully convicted of murder (Lackey, 2022). In the last few years, several authors have proposed accounts of epistemic reparations under various labels (Almassi, 2018; Lackey, 2022; Hull, 2022; Song, 2021). Although these views gesture at structural ways in which victims can be wronged, we do not yet have an account of how accepting this structural dimension might introduce distinctive features or difficulties for the notion of epistemic reparations. In this paper, I argue that certain structural wrongs, such as the epistemic wrongs of colonialism, turn out to be irreparable on the existing backward-looking epistemic reparations framework. A more promising model for redressing such injustices, I argue, is Iris Marion Young’s social connection model, supplemented by some tools from the group responsibility literature. The arguments bring into dialogue three bodies of scholarship that are currently not talking to each other—on epistemic reparations, structural injustice, and collective agency. This dialogue will not only be of mutual theoretical benefit to all three but will also up our chances of attaining epistemic justice.

Aims This study explores how Educational Psychologists (EPs) understand and implement Community Psychology (CP) within their professional practice. Rationale Responding to ambiguities in how CP has been defined and applied in educational psychology, the research aimed to clarify how CP is conceptualised and operationalised by practitioners. Method A relativist ontology and social constructionist epistemology were adopted, in keeping with CP values. Twelve EPs who self-identified as incorporating CP into their work participated in three focus groups. Data were analysed using Reflexive Thematic Analysis, alongside Critical Thematic Analysis. Findings Three overarching themes were identified: Head (theoretical understanding), Heart (ethical and emotional aspects), and Hands (practical application). CP was described as dynamic and evolving, with participants emphasising the importance of democratising psychology, systemic change and community-led approaches. Tensions emerged between aspirations and the constraints of practice, including ethical complexities and pressure for measurable impact. Limitations Participants were self-selected and aligned with CP principles. Demographic data were not collected, limiting intersectional analysis. Focus groups had uneven sizes, which influenced group dynamics. Focus groups carry inherent limitations such as the potential for dominant voices to shape discussion or for participants to align with perceived group norms. Conclusions Practical suggestions for EP practice are offered, supporting a call for a critically engaged community educational psychology. The study has implications for individual practice, systemic reform, and the integration of CP into Educational Psychology Services and EP training programmes. Optional tools are included in the appendices as illustrative resources to support reflection on embedding CP principles into practice and training.

Abstract This article critically examines the pedagogical potential of a territorially grounded approach to human rights education. To do so, it analyses the work of the Luiz Gama Human Rights Clinic (CDHLG), created in 2009 by law students at the University of São Paulo to reconnect legal education with the surrounding urban reality and the lived experiences of homeless populations in downtown São Paulo. Anchored in the theories of situated learning and education as the practice of freedom, and grounded in social constructionist epistemology and action research, this study explores two pedagogical experiences developed by the CDHLG between 2021 and 2023: (i) field visits conducted with the São Paulo City Council’s Human Rights Commission to observe public services for homeless people; and (ii) the development and implementation of Walking with Maria, an educational game based on local narratives. Data were collected through participant observation and field notes. Findings demonstrate that a territorially engaged legal education can foster experiential, critical, and politically committed learning. CDHLG’s work also shows that integrating community voices and spatial context promotes collective knowledge production and inspires innovative methodologies for human rights education and advocacy. The article argues that such practices hold transformative potential for human rights education and underline the importance of bridging academia and territory through sustained dialogue and social engagement.

Misinformation, trust, and health: The case for information environment as a major independent social determinant of health.

ABSTRACT This article explores the conceptualization of communication as both instrumental/pragmatic and constitutive with focus on environmental communication education. Drawing on research on professional development and environmental communication practitioners, the study examines the experiences of students and graduates of a international Master’s program in environmental communication based in Sweden. Drawing on seven focus groups with 25 participants, the analysis reveals that many new students struggle with the implications of understanding communication as constitutive and the related social constructionist epistemology, while graduates often face challenges in explaining their new epistemic insights to potential employers or applying them in their work. The article suggests to conceptualize understandings of communication as instrumental and constitutive in a productive, dialectical relationship and glued together by reflection — a key skill in environmental communication. The article concludes with recommendations for environmental communication education on the constitution of communication, practical experiences, reflection across the curriculum, and support for environmental communication graduates.

Sexual function is a fundamental aspect of sexual health, yet migrant and refugee women from Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) often face unique challenges in navigating intimacy and sexual function post-migration. While sociocultural norms, migration-related stressors, and healthcare access influence their experiences, yet these perspectives remain underexplored. This qualitative exploratory study explored the perspectives and experiences of sexual function among first-generation migrant and refugee women from low- and middle-income countries residing in South Australia. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 reproductive-aged cisgender heterosexual women from diverse cultural backgrounds, recruited through multiple culturally appropriate approaches including community organisations supporting migrant and refugee populations and online outreach via the purpose-built RISE website. Although multilingual support and professional interpreters were available, all participants opted to be interviewed in English. Interviews were conducted by a trained qualitative researcher with shared migrant background, and reflexive, inductive thematic analysis guided by social constructivist epistemology was used to identify key influences on sexual health and intimacy. Participants reported that cultural norms, sociocultural expectations, and migration-related stressors shaped their sexual experiences. Many described difficulties in navigating cultural taboos, communication barriers, and limited access to culturally sensitive healthcare services. Conversely, while migration provided opportunities for increased sexual autonomy, self-discovery, and improved partner communication, deeply ingrained cultural beliefs and emotional struggles continued to impact their sexual well-being. The findings highlight the need for culturally sensitive, gender-appropriate sexual health services and the removal of financial, linguistic, and systemic barriers to healthcare access. Healthcare providers, policymakers, and community organisations play a crucial role in fostering inclusive environments that support migrant and refugee women's sexual health and well-being.

ABSTRACT Epistemic standards have attracted some attention in recent discussions in social epistemology and philosophy of science. Yet these discussions typically lack a more general approach to what standards are and how we develop and assess them. Here we propose a Craigian-functionalist approach to epistemic standards. This approach helps to get a clearer view of tensions between universalist and particularist requirements for epistemic standards and highlights the need for a compromise. This has consequences for our understanding of concrete scientific episodes where epistemic standards have been debated such as recent discussions of the 5-sigma criterion in particle physics.

Abstract What is the point of inquiry? Some say that the aim of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer; others, that the aim is to attain justified belief, epistemic improvement, or some other coveted epistemic status. Still others eschew “aim” talk altogether, and instead formulate norms governing inquiry. However, virtually all extant work on inquiry has agreed on at least this much: the aims or norms of inquiry can be specified in terms of the epistemic states of the inquirer (i.e., the agent conducting the inquiry). This paper argues that this conception of inquiry struggles to account for some central features of what is arguably the most successful form of inquiry in the modern era: scientific inquiry. We show that scientific inquiry is governed by several distinctive norms that are difficult to explain if inquiry is all about achieving epistemic benefits for the inquirer. Instead, many inquiries aim to confer epistemic benefits on others. This “inclusive” conception of inquiry has important advantages and implications. It avoids some pressing counterexamples for standard conceptions of inquiry; it allows us to reconcile the epistemology of inquiry with relevant upshots of work in the philosophy and sociology of science; and it brings the “zetetic turn” within the fold of social epistemology.

Purpose The epistemological and institutional legitimacy of futures studies/foresight has been a long-standing topic of debate. This paper explores how the field can generate reliable knowledge about plural and uncertain futures, not through prediction or certainty, but through reliable processes of knowledge production and a commitment to the institutional norms, mechanisms and structures of science. Drawing on developments in social epistemology – particularly social reliabilism – this paper aims to provide a robust theoretical foundation for futures studies and related foresight practices, helping to strengthen their scientific credibility. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts a conceptual approach, engaging with theories of truth and knowledge from epistemology and science and technology studies. It critically analyzes how social process reliabilism can serve as a framework for evaluating the reliability of futures methodologies. It also considers the institutional norms required for legitimate scientific knowledge production in the futures field. Findings The analysis shows that futures studies/foresight can generate reliable knowledge when its methods are grounded in consistent procedural and structural standards, even in the absence of predictive accuracy. The integration of social reliabilism supports a shift from forecasting to exploring possible, probable and preferable futures in ways that remain epistemically reliable. The paper also identifies key institutional shortcomings and proposes pathways for aligning the field with broader scientific standards. Research limitations/implications As a conceptual paper, this work does not present empirical findings but lays the groundwork for future research testing the epistemic robustness of futures methodologies. It also highlights the need to carefully distinguish between exploring preferred futures and advocating for them, emphasizing that the process must be methodologically reliable and institutionally accountable to maintain scientific legitimacy. Practical implications This paper proposes how to enhance the reliability and scientific character of knowledge production in futures studies at three levels: individual, methodological and structural. At the individual level, the field needs tools to assess and improve the reliability of participants involved in futures studies processes. At the methodological level, existing methods should incorporate reliability indicators and be evaluated comparatively to identify ways to improve their epistemic robustness. At the structural level, futures studies must revisit and reorganize its scientific infrastructure to better support reliable and institutionally grounded processes of knowledge production focused on the futures. Social implications By enhancing the scientific foundations of futures studies, the field can more effectively support decision-making in critical areas such as climate policy, technological governance and long-term innovation. A commitment to reliable knowledge production and institutional standards may also increase public trust and societal impact. Originality/value This paper contributes to the theoretical foundations of futures studies by applying the lens of social reliabilism to the challenge of generating reliable knowledge about the futures. It presents a novel argument for aligning participatory foresight methods with the institutional and epistemic standards of scientific inquiry, helping to position futures studies as a rigorous and reflexive academic field.