Uzbekistan. Collins argues that neither of the two currently popular approaches to regime transition-identified as the preconditions and the transitions schools, respectively-is adequately equipped to explain regime dynamics in Central Asia. The preconditions school, represented by such authors as Barrington Moore (1966), has a hard time explaining the period of democratization in an economically, socially, and culturally unprepared Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, the transitions school, pioneered by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986), considers democratization possible in all countries in which the elites consciously renounce authoritarianism, most typically through an intraelite pact. Yet, Collins is critical of the applicability of this approach to Central Asia. Pacts, she argues, made between clan elites, are not a mode of transition to democracy, but an informal agreement that fosters the durability of the state, irrespective of the regime (p. 10). Collins states that three conditions present in Central Asia made the persistence of clans possible: late state formation, late formation of a national identity, and the absence of a developed market (which implies the presence of what Collins calls an economy of shortages in which clans thrive). In societies organized around the principle of clans, which are networks of individuals connected by a subjective understanding of kinship (p. 17), the power of elites is constrained by clan interests. As the case of Kyrgyzstan shows, even though a short-lived divergence of regime trajectories is possible in such societies, the eventual conformity of regime types can be explained by the predominance of clan politics over the formal regime structures. The regime collapse in Tajikistan-in the absence of a powersharing agreement among the various clans-likewise testifies to the significance of clan deals for regime durability. According to Collins, the contrasting trajectories in these cases make sense when one realizes that clan politics is devoid of ideology. Thus, interclan pacts do not presuppose a certain type of political regime, only its durability. Clans are interested in their own self-preservation and prosperity. Clan members in influential positions negatively affect state development by patronizing and promoting their kin regardless of merit, by stripping state assets at a fast pace because of the
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