Sense-datum Theory Research Articles

A Defense of Locke and The Representative Theory of Perception

This paper is a defense of the “representative theory of perception” in general, and Locke's views about perception in particular. It is intended only as a limited defense, but one against those objections which recently have been taken thoroughly to discredit both the general theory and Locke's particular position. The chief of these objections is that the representative theory leads inevitably to skepticism about the existence of objective material things. George Pitcher finds this objection to the representative theory completely persuasive and so well established that it scarcely requires discussion:It is just here [in the area of justifying perceptual knowledge of the world] that the most serious and notorious deficiencies of sense-datum theories are encountered. If the sense-datum theorist maintains the existence of physical objects, … as ordinarily conceived, then his claim that sense-data are metaphysically distinct from anything in the physical world commits him to a version of representative realism. The enormous epistemological difficulties [due to their skeptical consequences] faced by theories of this kind are well known, and I shall not say anything about them, except that I regard them as insuperable ….

Perception: A Philosophical Symposium by F. N. Sibley

168 BOOK REVIEWS Perception: A Philosophiccil Symposium. By F. N. SIBLEY. London: Methuen and Company, 1971. (Distributed in the United States by Barnes and Noble, Inc.). Pp. vii and 193. This book is the proceedings of a colloquium held at the University of Lancaster some five years ago. There are four major papers published substantially as presented at the colloquium and four responses, some more detailed than others. Some of the participants, like G. J. Warnock, William Kneale, Godfrey Vesey and Bernard Williams, are philosophers important in mid-century British analytic philosophy. This is a very technical work and in its present published form probably of interest only to those philosophers actually involved with the current discussions regarding perception theory. The papers and responses contained in the book are a logical development of the concerns about perception expressed by philosophers like Russell, Moore, and others central to the foundation of analytic philosophy in the beginning of the present century. Hovering behind three of the major papers is the ghost of the sense datum theories so common to epistemological accounts of perception by analytic philosophers a quarter century ago. That the concern with sense datum theories is now moribund is apparent from only a cursory reading of this book, which represents current work by analytic philosophers. Given the disdain with which the sense datum theory is viewed today, it is difficult for the contemporary student of epistemology to realize why it was so thoroughly and tenaciously held by so many not so long ago. Although there are no explicit refutations of the sense datum theories in these papers, nevertheless the theory's demise has prompted new problems, especially the claim that the " acquisition of beliefs " is a necessary condition for an adequate analysis of perception. This " epistemic " or " propositional " view of perception plays an explicit role in the papers by G. J. Warnock, J. W. Roxbee Cox, and F. N. Sibley. On an unrelated topic, Brian O'Shaughnessy's paper provides a new yet fairly difficult analysis entitled " The Temporal Ordering of Perception and Reaction." O'Shaughnessy's analysis appears a bit out of place, given the " epistemic " theme considered in some form or other in the other three papers. Since these three papers have a common theme, the major part of this review will be devoted to them. In his paper entitled " On What is Seen," Warnock discusses the nature of some of the insights regarding perception theory attributed to the late John Austin. That Austin was no friend of the sense datum theory is well known by anyone even vaguely familiar with his work. Using Austin's remarks from Sense and Sensibilia as a spring board, Warnock continues the demolition of the appearance/reality distinction made by representative realists, and a fortiori by advocates of the sense datum position. Warnock BOOK REVIEWS 169 spends much time in discussion of the validity of the following argument form: A sees X. XisP. # AseesP. Insofar as the conclusion attributes the property "P" to what is perceived as "X ", this implies that an epistemic dimension is part of the perception process. Throughout his discussion, I suspect that Warnock has blurred the important and useful distinction found in Aquinas between the object of perception known via the sensus communis (which I take to be a composite of proper and common sensibles), and the object known via the vis cogitativa (which I take to be an awareness of an individual object as a concretum-what both Aristotle and Aquinas refer to as the " incidental object of sense ") . I find this Thomistic distinction quite useful although it is commonly blurred in contemporary discussions of perception theory. Interestingly enough, in responding to Warnock, D. M. Taylor attributes the same structural blur to Warnock's analysis which I have suggested (cf. p. 18 ff.). The second and third papers and their corresponding responses explicitly deal with questions concerning the epistemic nature of perception. Insofar as Sibley's "Analysing Seeing" is in some sense a more general treatment of this problem, editorially it could well have been placed before Roxbee Cox's "An Analysis of Perceiving in Terms of the Causation of Beliefs." Given the logical priority of Sibley...

The Status of Sense Data

In the present state of philosophy in the English-speaking world, to choose to talk about sense data may seem perverse. What could be more boring for one's audience than to attempt variations on so threadbare a theme? And worse, what could be more unfashionable in the aftermath of Wittgenstein and Austin? My reasons for selecting this unpromising topic are twofold. First, the general theme of this series of lectures is empiricism. And whatever meanings we put upon that ambiguous word, it is clear that as a matter of history the problems of perception have been important problems for nearly all those philosophers who would consider themselves to be empiricists. And however unsatisfactory sense datum theories of perception may now be held to be, such theories have been central to the empiricist tradition. Secondly, it is important not to be too much impressed by the fact that a particular philosophical opinion is fashionable or unfashionable. The former certainly does not guarantee its truth nor the latter its falsity. It has often been remarked that philosophical opinions are very rarely refuted. Instead they fall out of vogue only to return some years later in another guise. It is perhaps time to take another look at the notion of sense data. The most ingenious and persistent attacks on analyses of perception in terms of sense data have been at best indecisive, as Professor Ayer showed in his reply to Austin's Sense and Sensibilia.

The Status of Sense Data

In the present state of philosophy in the English-speaking world, to choose to talk about sense data may seem perverse. What could be more boring for one's audience than to attempt variations on so threadbare a theme? And worse, what could be more unfashionable in the aftermath of Wittgenstein and Austin? My reasons for selecting this unpromising topic are twofold. First, the general theme of this series of lectures is empiricism. And whatever meanings we put upon that ambiguous word, it is clear that as a matter of history the problems of perception have been important problems for nearly all those philosophers who would consider themselves to be empiricists. And however unsatisfactory sense datum theories of perception may now be held to be, such theories have been central to the empiricist tradition. Secondly, it is important not to be too much impressed by the fact that a particular philosophical opinion is fashionable or unfashionable. The former certainly does not guarantee its truth nor the latter its falsity. It has often been remarked that philosophical opinions are very rarely refuted. Instead they fall out of vogue only to return some years later in another guise. It is perhaps time to take another look at the notion of sense data. The most ingenious and persistent attacks on analyses of perception in terms of sense data have been at best indecisive, as Professor Ayer showed in his reply to Austin's Sense and Sensibilia.

A. J. Ayer on the Argument from Illusion

In his paper “Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?” A. J. Ayer contends that the argument from illusion calls attention to perspectival distortion, perceptual misidentification and elusive perceptual belief only in order to establish the possibility of perceptual error. Pointing to our occasional perceptual failures reminds us that perceptual error is always logically possible—that any particular perceptual belief to the effect that one is perceiving a physical surface could be mistaken. This in turn is thought by Ayer to show that the ordinary belief that we perceive physical surfaces requires qualification—along lines urged by sense-datum philosophers—to the effect that even in those situations properly described for non-philosophical purposes as perceptions of physical surfaces it cannot be physical surfaces that are literally present to one's senses. Ayer believes that this can be established, for any given case, by the possibility of perceptual error alone.

Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?

Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?

The Reification of Appearance

By all indications, the popularity of the Sense-Datum Theory is definitely on the wane. This once-proud theory, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature of British Philosophy during the first half of this century, has been attacked from so many different sides that even its foremost protagonists have either accepted the very watered-down version according to which it is just an alternative language for speaking about the facts of perception or else they hold their peace and let the youngsters play. There are still some diehards who carry on as if nothing had happened, but they are an insignificant minority.

THE SENSE DATUM THEORY. I

British Journal of Statistical PsychologyVolume 15, Issue 2 p. 165-168 THE SENSE DATUM THEORY. I R. J. Atkins, R. J. AtkinsSearch for more papers by this author R. J. Atkins, R. J. AtkinsSearch for more papers by this author First published: November 1962 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8317.1962.tb00099.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume15, Issue2November 1962Pages 165-168 RelatedInformation

THE SENSE DATUM THEORY. II

British Journal of Statistical PsychologyVolume 15, Issue 2 p. 168-169 THE SENSE DATUM THEORY. II W. F. Hutton, W. F. HuttonSearch for more papers by this author W. F. Hutton, W. F. HuttonSearch for more papers by this author First published: November 1962 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8317.1962.tb00100.xAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume15, Issue2November 1962Pages 168-169 RelatedInformation

Phenomenal Organization and Perceptual Mode

In recent years sense–datum theories have received much criticism, but there is one type of error frequently involved in the sense–datum concept which is in need of further consideration. This error consists in a category confusion of such a nature that what is properly regarded as perceptual mode is treated as though it were the attribute of a thing. The mode or manner of perception is mistakenly transferred to the sense–datum with results which a little careful reflection shows to be absurd. In what follows a specific case of this error connected with the notion of phenomenal organization will be discussed.

VI.—THE NATURE OF THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY

VI.—THE NATURE OF THE SENSE-DATUM THEORY Get access E. M. ADAMS E. M. ADAMS University of North Carolina Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume LXVII, Issue 266, April 1958, Pages 216–226, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXVII.266.216 Published: 01 April 1958

Is a Sense-Datum Language Necessary?

The sense-datum theory of perception has been under heavy attack in the last two decades. Recently, by way of counterattack, some of its defenders have accused what they take to be its chief rival, the “theory of appearing”, of various deficiencies. In particular, they have claimed that there are some perceptual, or pseudo-perceptual, situations, such as hallucinations and dreams, of which the theory of appearing can give no adequate account. For in these cases, they argue, the question, “What is it that is appearing?”, can be given no satisfactory answer. The conclusion is then drawn that only a language containing sense-datum terms is generally adequate to our perceptual experience. Moreover this line of argument has been taken seriously by at least one partisan of the theory of appearing, Professor Virgil C. Aldrich, who has been driven to the expedient of suggesting that in these cases it is an image which appears.

Epistemology and Anti-Metaphysics

PROF. DAWES HICKS and Mr. Adrian Coates agree in their decisive rejection of any form of subjective idealism and in their vigorous repudiation of an idealistic interpretation of physics. They both expend much trouble upon criticizing various forms of sensum or sense-data theories; they are both concerned to deny that a sense-datum is an object, and they seek to draw important conclusions from this denial. They diverge, however, so widely in their respective conceptions of, and methods of approach to, philosophical problems that, even when they reach the same conclusions, the grounds upon which their acceptance of these conclusions are based are entirely different. (1) Critical Realism: Studies in the Philosophy of Mind and Nature. By Prof. G. Dawes Hicks. Pp. xxiv + 346. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1938.) 15s. net. (2) A Basis of Opinion By Adrian Coates. Pp. xvii + 461. (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1938.) 16s. net.