Semantics Of Demonstratives Research Articles

What Does “This” Mean? Deixis and the Semantics of Demonstratives in Stoic Propositions

Cet article vise à comprendre la théorie stoïcienne de la deixis afin d’expliquer l’importance accordée par les stoïciens aux pronoms démonstratifs et aux énoncés qu’ils composent, c’est-à-dire les propositions dites définitives. Nous montrons que ces propositions sont privilégiées pour des raisons à la fois ontologiques et épistémologiques en raison des propriétés sémantiques de leur sujet. Elles sont privilégiées d’un point de vue ontologique parce que la deixis grâce à laquelle leur sujet fait référence au réel crée une relation privilégiée à la matière, la catégorie ontologique stoïcienne fondamentale. De plus, ces sujets requièrent que leur référent existe et soit présent et saisissable. Ces énoncés sont d’autre part privilégiés d’un point de vue épistémologique parce qu’ils sont fondamentaux dans l’acquisition de la connaissance. Nous suggérons enfin que tous les énoncés apparemment définis ne le sont pas en effet, et considérons quand et sous quelles conditions une référence déictique est réussie.

Semantic domains of demonstratives and articles: A view of deictic referentiality explored on the paradigm of Croatian demonstratives

We argue that the meanings of demonstratives and articles can be analysed in terms of a combination of the spatial domain and a small set of semantic domains. We propose that deictic terms have a ‘fast semantics’ in the sense that they get their meaning in the course of the communicative act, as a result of an interaction between the interlocutors, which ultimately leads to referential anchoring. We focus on the semantics of demonstratives, presenting a case study of the very rich paradigm of Croatian demonstratives. We submit that articles refer to an ‘epistemic’ domain that forms part of the semantic space of the common ground that is built up during a discoursive act. Finally, we compare the semantics of deictic expressions with the specificatory and predicative functions of adjectives.

The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives

Demonstratives have different semantic values relative to different contexts of utterance. But it is surprisingly difficult to describe the function from contexts to contents (i.e. the character) which determines the semantic value of a given use of a demonstrative. It is very natural to think that the intentions of the speaker should play a significant role here. The aim of this paper is to discuss a pair of problems that arise for views which give intentions this central role in explaining the characters of demonstratives. As will emerge, these problems lead quickly to a foundational question about the semantics of demonstratives and many other context-sensitive expressions: the question of whether, in explaining their characters, we need to understand them as sensitive, not just to facts about the psychology of the speaker of the context, but also to facts about the audience of the context. I critically examine Jeffrey King’s theory of demonstratives, which answers this question in the affirmative, and argue that it ultimately collapses into a purely speaker-based view of the character of demonstratives. I then show how to develop a much simpler speaker-based theory which both handles all of the cases handled by King’s theory and avoids some of the more serious problems which King’s theory faces. Towards the end I consider how we might solve the very difficult problems which result from cases in which speakers use demonstratives with conflicting referential intentions

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Demonstratives in Philosophy and Linguistics

Smith on Indexicals

In this paper, I advance a new view of the semantics of indexicals, using a paper by Quentin Smith as my starting point. I make use of Smith’s examples, refined and expanded upon by myself to argue, as Smith does, that the standard view, that indexicals refer to some prominent features of the context according to an invariant rule called the character, does not agree with a wide range of phenomena. I depart from Smith, however, in denying that we need more complex rules, which he does not give, called metacharacters to account for all the deviations, and instead argue for a view of indexicals as just being special cases of demonstratives. I show how demonstratives can be substituted for indexicals to support this view, and I adduce recent work in the semantics of demonstratives to explain how it can work.

Deixis and subjectivity: the semantics of demonstratives in Old French (9th–12th century)

Abstract Several recent studies have led to a re-examination of the semantic values of demonstratives in many languages where the traditional (distal vs. proximal) interpretation had been considered as accurate, even if it did not account for all attested uses. This is particularly true for the oldest period of French (ninth century–end twelfth century). In Old French, demonstratives are organized around the opposition between two paradigms, CIST and CIL. These were not distinguished from one another by their grammatical category, as in Modern French, since both forms could function as either pronoun or determiner. Rather, they were differentiated in terms of their meaning. Several attempts have been made to account for the difference between the CIST and CIL series. We show that none of the previous hypotheses has been totally satisfactory. Our own interpretation is based neither on a spatio-temporal conception of deictics (the traditional interpretation), but on the pragmatic analysis of the use of demonstratives in the texts of this earlier period of French (ninth century–twelfth century), in terms of ‘speaker’s sphere’. We will argue that this approach alone can account for those uses in Old French which have posed a problem until now.

Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Part 1 Language and meaning: the thought - a logical inquiry, Gottlob Frege excerpt from The Blue and Brown Books, Ludwig Wittgenstein translation and meaning, Willard Van Orman Quine Utterer's meaning and intentions, Paul Grice truth and meaning, Donald Davidson what model-theoretic semantics cannot do, Ernest Lepore what is a theory of meaning? Nichael Dummett elucidations of meaning, James Higginbotham knowledge of meaning and theories of truth, Richard K. Larson and Gabriel Segal. Part 2 Logical form and grammatical form: some remarks on logical form, Ludwig Wittgenstein the logical form of action sentences, Donald Davidson semantic structure and logical form, Gareth Evans deep structure as logical form, Gilbert Harman logical form as a level of linguistic representation, Robert May. Part 3 Definite and indefinite descriptions: descriptions, Bertrand Russell on referring, Peter F. Strawson reference and definite descriptions, Keith S. Donnellan speaker's reference and semantic reference, Saul A. Kripke context and communication, Stephen Neale referential and quantificational indefinites, Janet Dean Fodor and Ivan A. Sag indefinite descriptions - in defense of Russell, Peter Ludlow and Stephen Neale. Part 4 Names: on sense and reference, Gottlob Frege proper names, John R. Searle reference and proper names, Tyler Burge lecture II of Naming and Necessity, Saul A. Kripke the causal theory of names, Gareth Evans. Part 5 Demonstratives: truth and demonstratives, Scott Weinstein dthat, David Kaplan Frege on demonstratives, John Perry understanding demonstratives, Gareth Evans individuation and the semantics of demonstratives, Martin Davies. Part 6 Attitude reports: the method of intention, Rudolph Carnap on synonymy and indirect discourse, Israel Scheffler vagaries of reference, Willard Van Orman Quine on saying that, Donald Davidson opacity and scope, Barbara Partee sententialist theories of belief, Stephen Schiffer a puzzle about belief, Saul A. Kripke direct reference, propositional attitude and semantic content, Scott Soames the prince and the phone booth - reporting puzzling beliefs, Mark Crimmins and John Perry interpreted logical form, Richard K. Larson and Peter Ludlow intentional transitive verbs and concealed complement clauses, Marcel den Dikken et al.

Individuation and the semantics of demonstratives

Obsessed by the cases where things go wrong, we pay too little attention to the vastly more numerous cases where they go right, and where it is perhaps easier to see that the descriptive content of the expression concerned is wholly at the service of this function [of identifying reference], a function which is complementary to that of predication and contains no element of predication in itself (Strawson [1974], p. 66).