It is a great pleasure and honor to have the opportunity to elutriate the criticisms of my book by three distinguished economists. Since two of the three reviews expressed some discomfort about either the general purpose and/or the basic orientation of the book, I will start out with a brief restatement about what it is supposed to be. This seems particularly necessary because my name is still associated by too many with Abraham Maslow and The Challenge of Humanistic Economics (written in the 1970s), while my subsequent work is much less known. To cut a long story short, in the early 1980s Ken Lux and I found it desirable to put our ethical economics on a more durable philosophical foundation inspired by Kantian moral philosophy and Amartya Sen's questioning of utilitarianism and welfarism.1 In the process, the hierarchy of basic human needs was de-emphasized, and its place taken by the notion of a dual self, the idea that humans have not only a (phenomenal) acting ego, but also a higher or aspirational self (akin to a moral self or the self we would want to be). Formally, this new device allowed us to rework rationality based on firstand second-order preferences, to recognize moral commitment, to help pioneer multi-utility frameworks, etc.2 It also paved the way for integrating the idea of human dignity into normative economics, together with human rights, the notion of economic democracy and principles of a more sound ecological economics. I mention this because one reviewer, Steve Pressman, seemed unaware of this