As the H5N1 avian influenza virus races across the globe, leaving in its wake dead wild and domestic birds in many parts of Asia and Europe in the autumn of 2005, we may recall the not so distant memory of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. During the initial outbreak period in Southern China in the early months of 2003, the withholding of epidemiological data by health authorities due to political reasons has made it difficult determine an exact number (see Davis 2005, 69), but it is estimated that eventually 8069 people were confirmed as infected and at least 773 died in a global SARS epidemic that spread mostly between large, global ized metropolitan centres in East Asia and North America. In Toronto, 44 people succumbed to the previously unknown corona virus, 213 were con firmed infected cases, thousands were quarantined, while millions of dollars were lost in business. What can the experience of how this disease was iden tified, monitored, controlled and ultimately beaten tell us about what we can expect in a major H5N1 outbreak? Admittedly, there are differences between the two diseases. Local SARS transmission was mostly limited to the hospital setting, with community infection rather rare although the role of 'super-spreaders' was an important mechanism for disease spread at the global level. Although both diseases had their origin in animals, SARS spread readily from humans to other humans. H5N1 does not (yet). It needs the vector of migrating or transported birds and seldom infects humans. Mike Davis names a few more differences: although SARS produces similar symptoms, it is not nearly as 'subtle' as influenza . . . SARS needs about five days to incubate and does not usually become contagious until well after the onset of fever and dry coughing; infectiousness takes about ten days to peak, and research has found few asymptotic infections without sickness. The old-fashioned tactics of isolation and quarantine, if ruthlessly implemented, can work effectively against such a slow-developing virus whose symptoms consistently signal infectiousness. (2005, 78)