This paper examines “film as a medium of religious experience and moral imagination” in contemporary Russia through the legal–moral politics of “insulting religious feelings.” Using the controversy over Aleksei Uchitel’s Matilda (2017) as a case study, it analyzes how the portrayal of Nicholas II’s premarital romance was construed as sacrilegious and mobilized by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and State actors to police the boundaries of the sacred and public morality. Read alongside the Pussy Riot (2012) and Tannhäuser (2015) scandals, the case illuminates how claims of offense structure ROC-Kremlin bargaining over “traditional values”, showing how these values are articulated through references to Romanov memory and the sacralized figure of Nicholas II. Drawing on ROC statements, appeals to historical memory, and State responses to protests, the article reassesses what the film, and its reception, reveal about Church-State equilibrium in post-Soviet Russia.

This article analyzes the strategic vision of the Renovationist movement in the USSR during the 1920s, which sought a radical transformation of global Orthodoxy (and subsequently of world Christianity) through the mechanism of regularly convened and democratically elected “ecumenical councils”. Initially, the Renovationists planned to rely on Greek reformers when convening such a council. Later, however, they envisaged using the state resources of the Soviet Union to integrate this project into the broader process of world revolution through a comprehensive revision of Christianity. In this sense, the initiative functioned as a messianic project aimed at sacralizing revolutionary modernity. The institution of the “ecumenical council” was conceived as the final stage in the construction of a system of ecclesiastical electoral democracy. The project was to begin with the ecumenical legitimization of the decisions of the so-called Second All-Russian Local Council of 1923, which introduced a married episcopate and permitted second marriages for clergy. However, the Renovationists’ ambitions extended much further. Their proposals included strategies for the permanent transformation of Church Tradition, a complete restructuring of canon law, the creation of a new “official confession of faith”, and, ultimately, the reduction of dogma to the minimalist formula “Jesus Christ is the Son of God”. Although the planned “ecumenical council” would not have been a genuine Ecumenical Council in the canonical sense, unanimous support from the participating Local Churches could have made it a powerful instrument for dismantling global Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the uncompromising stance of the New Martyrs and Confessors of the Russian Church (who, even after the death of Patriarch Tikhon, categorically refused to consider union with the so-called Renovationist “Russian Orthodox Church”), prevented the movement from presenting itself as the legitimate fullness of the Russian Church before the wider Christian world. In this way, the act of moral courage of these figures became a means of preserving Orthodoxy itself.

This article analyzes the transformation of state confessional policy in the late Soviet Union, examining its causes and consequences. Drawing on archival materials, it demonstrates significant shifts in state–church relations that occurred on the eve of the millennium of the Christianization of Rus' and in the period following the official celebrations. The analysis shows that the weakening of state pressure on the Church was largely driven by the political considerations of the Soviet leadership. However, the liberalization of state–church relations initiated in the late 1980s became the foundation for a fundamental reassessment of the role of the Church in the life of Russian society and the state. The dismantling of the system of total state control over the Russian Orthodox Church and the abandonment of state atheism required formal legal regulation. New legislation was developed within a secular and liberal framework, without sufficient regard for the cultural and historical specifics of Russian state formation. This, in turn, created the risk of further secularization of the Church and the deepening fragmentation of a weakened post-Soviet identity. The active stance of the Church, its current Primate Patriarch Kirill, and a number of deputies of the State Duma made it possible to revise Soviet-era legislation and to ensure a gradual shift in the Russian state’s approach: from a secular-liberal model of state–church relations toward a historically rooted symphonic model.

The Church, alongside the state, has always been considered an influential actor in the socio-political process, shaping public opinion, defining moral values, and setting the ideological benchmarks for society. Currently, in the Russian Federation, the Russian Orthodox Church is successfully adapting to new realities, including digi-talization and globalization. Modern transformational processes are reflected in the interaction between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church, particularly in the area of protecting traditional values and countering ideas of westernization. State authorities are interested in building long-term, close relations with this religious organization, as it actively supports the political course of the ruling class in both domestic and foreign poli-cy. Representatives of the church play an important role in making socio-political decisions and in promoting ideas of patriotism.

The issue of the interaction of religious institutions and state foreign policy seems to be one of the most inter-esting and insufficiently studied aspects of modern international relations. When we talk about the “soft power” of the state, we usually mean cultural programs, educational exchanges, and media influence. However, the religious dimension of foreign policy deserves special attention, since it appeals to people’s deep values and is able to form stable ties that go far beyond pragmatic interests. Russia is a unique case in this regard. The coun-try, which has experienced seven decades of official atheism, in the post-Soviet period not only returned to reli-gious traditions, but also turned them into one of the tools of its international positioning. The Russian Orthodox Church, Islamic organizations, and Buddhist communities have all been involved to one degree or another in processes that can be described as religious diplomacy. The aim of this article is to analyze the mechanisms by which the religious factor is used to promote Russia’s national interests in the international arena.

According to the Constitution Russia is a social state, the main purpose of which is to take care of its people. One of the areas of such care is social assistance to those in need. The state social policy should be based on traditional spiritual and moral values. The ideological basis of social work, aimed primarily at the welfare state implementation, has been analyzed. The historical past shows that the ideological basis of social work is born from church social service, which is based on Christian commandments. Church social service and social work, their interrelationships, similarities and differences, current state, and social partnership of the Russian Orthodox Church and the state in helping those in need have been studied. A theoretical analysis of the social service and social work concepts, their basic principles, as well as legal consolidation has been carried out. There is an ideological unity between church social service and state social work and a need for close cooperation between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church in such work.

Current trends in Russian political and social life are directly influenced by transformational processes that have arisen under the influence of a number of geopolitical factors and domestic political realities. The position of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as an influential social institution plays a key role in this context. Church-state relations, representing a diverse set of forms and types manifested in all spheres of public life, express the state of the socio-political space. The current stage of development of interaction between the two institutions is often viewed in the context of a «symphonic» type of relationship. Top Russian officials, senior hierarchs of the Orthodox Church, and public figures have stated that close ties, expressed in close cooperation, have been established between the ROC and the state. This phenomenon not only influences socio-political processes but also demonstrates the value vector of Russia’s development. The purpose of the study is to characterize church-state interaction at the current stage as a political phenomenon. This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the positions of the Church and state on the issue of establishing a «symphony» and provides assessments from authoritative experts in the field of church-state relations. Specifically, it examines B.K. Knorre’s work, «Russian Orthodoxy: Post-Secular Institutionalization in the Space of Power, Politics, and Law.» In it, the author thoroughly analyzes the current state of church-state relations, paying particular attention to the institutional aspects of cooperation. Knorre’s study introduces the term «sovereign-Orthodox project,» which comprehensively interprets the current stage of church-state dialogue. Patriarch Kirill, who succeeded Alexy II, became the main actor in the ideological changes within the Russian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan John (I.M. Snychev), in his work «Overcoming the Time of Troubles,» presents the position of the orthodox part of the Orthodox Church. In his understanding, Russian power is incapable of functioning without a religious component, which the Russian Orthodox Church fosters in Russia. According to the hierarch, divine law is primary; it is on its basis that secular laws exist. One of the most authoritative researchers of church-state relations, D.V. Uzlaner, in his work «The Post-Secular Turn: How to Think About Religion in the 21st Century,» identifies key trends and aspects of the interaction between church and state institutions. According to D.V. Uzlaner, this cooperation has been transformed, which is manifested through the prism of public life by the Church’s growing influence and its expanding role in the country’s socio-political life. The combination of these interpretations confirms the relevance of the «symphony» theme in the context of church-state relations. Clearly, the interaction between the state and the leading religious actor primarily influences the socio-political sphere, shapes the ideological landscape of Russian society, and expresses significant value foundations.

ABSTRACT Teaching about the culture of the target language is an important part of world language education. This is clear in the ACTFL Standards, in which one of the ‘Five Cs’ is ‘Cultures.’ While there is no question about the importance of culture in world language education, teaching about culture can be deeply problematic. An example of how teaching about culture can be precarious in the context of the Russian as a foreign language (RFL) classroom is with respect to the concept of the Русский мир. In this article, we discuss the challenges presented by the idea of the Русский мир as a component of contemporary Russian culture. We begin with an analysis of the concept of the Русский мир before turning to discussions of the place of the Russian language in the Русский мир, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the promotion of the concept of the Русский мир, the Русский мир as a manifestation of Russian ‘soft power,’ and last, the Русский мир and its implications for the situation in Ukraine. The article ends with a discussion of how the concept of the Русский мир can be addressed in the RFL classroom.

<div> This report documents the destruction of houses of worship in Mariupol that occurred due to Russia's siege of the city between February 24, 2022, and May 20, 2022, and the rebuilding, reuse, expropriation, and legal registration of these structures during the city’s occupation from May 20, 2022, to November 7, 2024. This report is the result of exploiting fully remote sources: commercially available satellite imagery (Maxar) and open source information. From a pre-invasion total of 55 houses of worship identified in the city, the number of damaged houses of worship confirmed by this study is 39, or 71%. By November 2024, entire faiths and denominations present in Mariupol before the siege no longer have houses of worship, including Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Reformed Protestants, and Roman Catholics. Other faiths, including OCU Christians and Protestants, have only a small number of houses of worship left, and it is not clear in every case that these spaces are still available to their original congregants. </div> <div> <br> </div> <div> After capture, Russian occupiers began carrying out a master rebuilding plan developed by high level officials in St. Petersburg, including inventorying buildings, determining property ownership, clearing wreckage, and rebuilding structures. Fifteen houses of worship showed no signs of reconstruction or repair up through October 2024. In this same timeframe, 21 houses of worship have been rebuilt, although not every rebuilt structure is being used for its original religious purpose. The occupiers instituted mandatory legal registration by which the authorities can screen out “undesirable” faiths, banning these groups from owning property or distributing religious literature. This process has resulted in many groups being registered as Russian Orthodox. All Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) churches, and at least one Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) church, have been re-registered and/or consecrated as Russian Orthodox. </div> <div> <br> </div> <div> Religious communities that Russia considers undesirable, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, or who do not want to come under the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church, have few good options for reclaiming their houses of worship. Their properties may be declared abandoned property and can be seized by the state. The requirement to register or face expropriation, alongside the willingness of Russian organizations to rebuild certain houses of worship while leaving others unrepaired, suggest occupation policies advantage certain religious faiths over others. </div> <div> <br> </div> <div> Our findings should be considered alongside evidence of Russian persecution, filtration, torture, and murder of Ukrainians of faith documented by human rights organizations and war crimes investigators. Bureaucratic procedures have altered the city’s religious landscape by allowing the occupiers to identify religious groups that Russia deems to be undesirable and to impose state control over the religious practices of residents. Russian intolerance for Ukrainian religious pluralism is part of the process of Russification, the forced physical and social transformation aimed at repressing Ukrainian identity. In place of religious pluralism in Mariupol, one church – the Russian Orthodox Church – now crowds out the others. </div>

The subject of this study is the state-religion relations in Crimea during the 1922 campaign for the seizure of church valuables. The research focuses on the trial of the Orthodox clergy of Simferopol in November-December 1922. The author examines the prerequisites for organizing the trial, detailing the individuals who found themselves in the dock, their brief biographical data, and identifies the legal grounds that led to their conviction, release from punishment, and amnesty. The source base of the study consists of materials from the case of the pardon of the ruling archbishop of the Taurida Diocese Nikodim (Krotkov), and other Orthodox clergy of Simferopol, stored in the State Archive of the Russian Federation. The discovered documents allow for a more comprehensive reconstruction of past events that had a significant impact on the history of the canonical Orthodox Church in Crimea. In writing the article, the author employed both general scientific research methods and special (historical-genetic, biographical historiography and narrative) methods. The novelty of the research lies in the author's introduction of previously unpublished archival documents into circulation. The diagrams clearly identify the entire range of participants in the trial of the Simferopol clergy, which took place in 2022, and structure their religious and social affiliations, personnel, age, and level of education. The main conclusions of the study indicate that the number of defendants in the trial makes it one of the largest after the second Moscow and Petrograd trials of 1922. The confessional affiliation of 80% of the defendants (59 out of 73 individuals) with the Russian Orthodox Church suggests that the main blow of the young Soviet power in Crimea was directed specifically against it. The removal of Archbishop Nikodim (Krotkov) from the administration of the Taurida Diocese, who represented the old church (Tikhon's or, in other words, patriarchal) orientation and was a key figure in the trial, significantly affected the weakening of his supporters' position and the subsequent rise of the renewal movement in the territory of the Crimean Peninsula.

The article highlights some aspects of the state and processes taking place in the uncontrolled territory of Donetsk region within and around the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the period from February 2022 to mid-2025. The situation is considered in the context of processes that began in 2014, since a large part of Donetsk region has been occupied since 2014, and since February 2022 newly occupied territories have been added to it. Accordingly, when dealing with the situation within the UOC-MP, it is taken into account that the processes taking place there began long before 2022, at the same time, they have changed significantly after 2022. In particular, statistical data are analyzed and an attempt is made to find out exactly how many religious communities and other organizations of the UOC-MP remained in uncontrolled territory, what their network is. Processes in the administrative and managerial sphere are analyzed, in particular the issues of the canonical, administrative status of the Donetsk and Horlivka dioceses and the resolution of their fate on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church. Processes related to the status of the bishops of this church operating in uncontrolled territory are also analyzed, what is the policy towards them on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church. First of all, the situation that developed around the replacement by Moscow of the ruling bishop of the Donetsk eparchy, Metropolitan Hilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol, and the consequences of this act. The processes that began to occur after this replacement are analyzed and how this affected the situation within the eparchy.

The article analyses the humanitarian components of the Russian Federation’s anti-Ukrainian information operations as a distinct dimension of hybrid aggression in which the key goal is not territorial control but the transformation of identity, collective memory and value orientations of Ukrainian society. Three interrelated dominants of this strategy are singled out: the civilisational and ideological doctrine of the “Russian world”, the revisionist redefinition of historical memory and cultural heritage, and the linguistic-digital infrastructure that ensures the everyday reproduction of pro-Russian narratives. The article shows how the “Russian world” is institutionalised through the activities of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Russian Orthodox Church and doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation, in which Russia appears as the “core” of a separate civilisational community endowed with “special rights” vis-à-vis neighbouring states. On the basis of an analysis of propaganda campaigns, reports by international analytical centres and Ukrainian studies, the article reconstructs mechanisms of manipulating historical memory, using religious discourse to legitimise aggression, and exploiting the Russian-language digital space, bot networks and “filter bubbles” to create a sense of the inevitability and lack of alternatives of occupation in temporarily occupied territories. Particular attention is paid to Ukraine’s humanitarian counter-strategies enshrined in the Information Security Strategy and related resilience policies; the article emphasises the need to move from purely repressive tools to comprehensive support for vulnerable groups, the development of critical thinking skills, inclusive humanitarian practices and international co-operation capable of ensuring sustainable humanitarian development in the post-conflict period. The scientific novelty lies in conceptualising humanitarian aggression as a structured system of impacts on specific social groups and in identifying criteria for assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian countermeasures.

The appeal to the historical experience of pre-revolutionary Russia, where the institute of military and naval clergy operated, and Orthodoxy was part of the state ideology, became one of the factors that led to the beginning of the process of its revival in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the early 1990s. In 1995, the coordinating council for cooperation between the clergy and the military personnel was established in Samara Diocese, and in 1996 – the diocesan sub–department for cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which later became a department. The interaction of Samara Diocese with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2011–2019 seems to be a topical issue for research, since at that time the educational work of the Russian Orthodox Church with the army structures was improved, mutually beneficial cooperation was conducted, which strengthened the authority of the church in the army and the society, on the one hand, and on the other, it allowed the army structures to fill the ideological vacuum that had formed after elimination of the communist ideology dominance. The purpose of the study is to examine the activities of the department for cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of Samara Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2011–2019. Materials and methods. The archival materials of the departmental archive of Samara Diocesan Administration, namely the reports made by the administrator of Samara Diocese to Moscow Patriarchate, give the opportunity to analyze the interaction between Samara Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2011–2019 most objectively. The research methodology was based on the method of analyzing documents and their scientific description and the historical and systemic method, which made it possible to compare the functions of the military clergy of the pre-revolutionary and the period under consideration. A statistical method was used to analyze data related to the construction of temples in military units in 2011–2019. The methodological basis of the research was the principle of historicism, which allowed us to explore the stages of interaction with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Samara Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as evolvement of a special diocesan department for interaction with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Results. The forms of interaction between Samara Diocese with military units in 2011–2019 are examined. It was established that the priests of the department were engaged in spiritual and educational activities and pastoral care for military personnel. They conducted classes on socio-political training, according to the staffing plan in the units, worked with officers, contract and conscript soldiers, with family members, worked with civilian personnel, participated in the work of committees at units and actively fought against negative manifestations of hazing in the military collective. The mutually beneficial nature of such cooperation was proven, as Samara Diocese managed to raise its profile in society, and the Armed Forces were able to rely on its centuries-old experience, which was very important in the context of searching for ideological paradigms in those years. In 2011–2019, the clergy of Samara Diocese established cooperation with military units based in Samara region. Conclusions. The ministry of the clergy in military units contributed to the growth of the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church among the staff of military units, contributed to the improvement of the moral climate, formation of stable and time-tested life goals and values. The army command recommended the program for the spiritual and moral education of military personnel and their family members developed by the diocesan Department for use throughout the Central Military District, which can be considered as recognition of the role and authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The practical significance of the study is that the experience of Samara Diocese’s interaction with military units can serve as a positive example for other regions of Russia.

Topic: The article examines the historical and legal aspects of the legislative framework governing religious education in the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods of Russian state and legal history. It identifies the key features of doctrinal understanding, legislative regulation, and the application of laws on Orthodox education across different historical stages. Goals/objectives: The main goal of the study is to identify the principal features and historical patterns that shaped the evolution of legal policy in the sphere of religious education in Russia. Methodology: The research employs general scientific methods (dialectical, analytical, and synthetic), as well as specific legal methods, including formal-legal, historical-legal, and comparative-legal approaches. Results/conclusions: The study argues that the scholarly examination of the legal regulation of the educational activities of the Russian Orthodox Church within a historical-legal discourse is particularly relevant today, given the substantial transformation of legal consciousness in contemporary Russia, which builds upon national legal traditions supporting balanced, sustainable, and effective legal development. It is further determined that, at various historical stages, state legal policy in the field of religious education was formulated with consideration for the moral and ethical dimensions of the spiritual and educational mission of religious associations and its social effectiveness.

The article analyzes the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan during the Great Patriotic War, its role in political life and historical significance, as well as the restrictions on church activities and the renewed intensification of anti-religious policy in the early postwar years. Based on the reports of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and the representatives for religious affairs under the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, the study examines the relationship between the state and religion, the emerging problems, and their possible solutions. The aim of the research is to explore the history of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Great Patriotic War, its role in Joseph Stalin’s foreign policy, and its contribution to the victory. The main objectives include analyzing the features of the state policy toward the Church during the war years, identifying its patriotic activity and place in society, and examining the processes of restricting church activity in the postwar period. Information on the Church’s patriotic work, its contribution to the victory, and the collection of clothing, funds, and food for the Red Army is based on archival documents. The study reveals that during the war, a temporary compromise emerged between the state and the Orthodox Church, and religious policy was partially eased. Following a meeting with the archbishops, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was established. In the early postwar years, the opening and functioning of churches was restricted, and state control intensified. The Soviet government, having used religion for its own purposes during the war, did not permit most churches in Kazakhstan to resume their activities afterward.

The article provides a brief historical and bibliographic overview of reference publications, including information on various departmental districts of the Russian Empire (military, judicial, educational, border, Ministry of Railways), as well as on the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Synodal period. The quantitative, geographical and chronological characteristics of the corpus of these sources are given, general information about their structural and substantive features is provided, and the informative possibilities of the publications under consideration for conducting research on Russian historical regionalism are shown. Information is provided on the composition of departmental districts of various types, on the number of dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church.

This article analyzes the first phase of church policy during the Khrushchev's Thaw in the Rostov region in 1954, characterized by an atheistic propaganda campaign and increased oversight of clergy compliance with religious legislation. In the Rostov region, the propaganda campaign in the periodical “Hammer” was generalized, focusing on the history of the formation of atheistic ideology. Relations between the diocesan bishop and the authorized representatives of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the Rostov region continued to develop within the established framework of Stalin's “pragmatic course”, which envisioned cooperation between state and church authorities. Closed prayer houses in the Rostov and Novocherkassk dioceses were few, and violations of religious legislation by the authorized representatives were noted by the clergy, leading to recommendations to avoid them in the future. The internal life of the Rostov and Novocherkassk dioceses was distinguished by its vigor. On the initiative of Metropolitan Veniamin (Fedchenkov), congresses of deans and advanced training courses for clergy continued to be held.

The article examines the complex interactions between religion, state, and civil society across three regional contexts: Armenia, Russia, and Western Europe. Through a comparative political science and philosophical approach, the study analyses how historical and legal contexts shape church–state relations, contrasting models of identification, separation, and cooperation. It draws on constitutional provisions, sociological data, and academic literature to explore the roles of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, and various European churches in public life. Results indicate that Armenia’s constitution grants a privileged status to the national church, leading to both collaboration with and opposition to government, while Russia’s quasi‑symphony between the state and “traditional” religions consolidates power but marginalizes other faiths. Western European countries exhibit more secularized societies and diversified models, balancing religious freedom with public oversight. The discussion highlights how these differences influence civil society, secularization, radicalism, and social cohesion. The study concludes that a sustainable relationship between religion, state, and society requires maintaining secular principles while recognizing the positive social capital that religious institutions can contribute

Представлены некоторые факты биографии архимандрита Даниила (Дмитрий Петрович Сивиллов, 1798-1877), участника 10-й Российской духовной миссии в Пекине, первого заведующего первой в России кафедрой китайского языка в Императорском Казанском университете, настоятеля монастырей в Москве, Казани, Забайкальском крае и Ярославской епархии. Проводятся сопоставления с биографией наиболее известного и заслуженного российского китаеведа, разжалованного в монахи архимандрита Иакинфа (Никита Яковлевич Бичурин, 1777-1853). Различия в церковной карьере не повлияли на их мировоззрение и научные достижения. The article presents, clarifies and discusses biographical facts of the Russian sinologist, Archimandrite Daniil (Dmitriy Petrovich Sivillov, 1798-1877), related to his place of birth, social origin, education, career in the Russian Orthodox Church and the time of his death. Fr. Daniil was a member of the 10th Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing, the first head of the first Chinese language department (cathedra) in Russia at the Imperial Kazan University, rector of monasteries in Moscow, Kazan, the Trans-Baikal Territory and the Yaroslavl Diocese. Comparisons with the emblematic figure of the Russian Sinology in the first half of the 19th century Archimandrite Hyacinth (Nikita Yakovlevich Bichurin, 1777-1853) demoted to monks, but obtained acclaim both from the Russian and European scholarly communities, convince that Fr. Daniel and Fr. Hyacinth had shared common traits of their background, education, and early church careers. Hence, they ought to share the Orthodox worldview, and the ‘confrontation’ between Fr. Hyacinth and the Russian Orthodox Church, which is emphasized in the Soviet historiography, is somewhat exaggerated. Monastic status of the both influenced their personal lives, but the priorities of the sinology pursuits of these two talented people were recognized by the Church, so it left them enough space to engage in Chinese studies. In general, the inconsistency of the methodology of modern Russian historiography of 19th-century Russian Chinese studies is noted, since formally priority is given to historiography as the history of academic historical studies, but mostly published works that had been in the public historical knowledge domain are taken into consideration. At the same time, most of the professional works of this period remain in the archives and have not been made public, that is, they have not received the status of historiographical facts either in the narrow or in the broad sense of the definition of historiography.

Render Unto Caesar …? The Russian Orthodox Church’s Social Activities and Its Perception in the Context of World Politics