The article aims to outline the changes in foreign policy priorities of post-totalitarian states after 2022. After the collapse of the USSR, they were shaped to a noticeable extent by the colonial interdependence on the Russian Federation. The article attempts to verify the following hypotheses: Russian aggressive policy has produced the opposite effect from what was intended. Post-totalitarian states that were considered by Russia to be within its sphere of influence started to create new strategic partnerships that balance or neutralize Russian influence. The intersection of interests of powers and international entities within post-totalitarian states provides these states with greater opportunities for expanding economic, military, or cultural cooperation that is not associated with Soviet or Russian dominance. Post-totalitarian states strongly emphasize their subjectivity and autonomously declare preferred directions of foreign policy, where the Russian vector is just one among many. The methodology of the presented considerations is based on the analysis of selected documents regarding the foreign and security policy of post-totalitarian states. This also includes scientific dissertations, reports, statistical data and press information. To analyze the specifics of the foreign policy of post-totalitarian states, the theory of neorealism was turned to, as the theoretical framework organizing the problem highlighted in the title. Verifying the hypotheses, it was found that post-totalitarian states, taking advantage of Russia’s weakness and its involvement in the war against Ukraine, more decisively implement their priorities in foreign policy, which significantly diverge from those that had been dictated by Russia for years.

This article presents a draft of the State Language Transliteration Standard designed to ensure a scientifically grounded, fully reversible, and internationally compatible Romanization of Ukrainian texts from all historical periods. The study addresses the urgent need to harmonize the Ukrainian linguistic space with European norms – above all, with ISO 9:1995 – and to overcome the long-standing dominance of Russian and English practical transcription systems that contradict transliteration principles and distort the authentic Ukrainian writing tradition. Particular emphasis is placed on the historical and existential dimensions of the problem: the Latinization of Ancient and Old Ukrainian texts is crucial for preserving the continuity of Ukrainian written culture and strengthening national identity within global scholarly discourse. The proposed Standard encompasses a comprehensive set of rules, including transliteration for the Ancient Ukrainian, Old Ukrainian, and Modern Ukrainian alphabets (with two parallel systems: System A with diacritics and System B without them), a phonemic transcription scheme for contemporary Ukrainian based on the International Phonetic Alphabet, and Latinization rules for phonetic symbols used in the Soviet phonetic tradition. The article specifies functional domains for each system – from academic publications, cartography, and cultural heritage documentation to telecommunications, multilingual digital platforms, and identity documents. The Standard is fully aligned with Ukrainian legislation and with UN resolutions on the use of authentic national forms of geographical names. The results demonstrate that implementing this Standard is essential for the integration of Ukrainian into modern Natural Language Processing technologies, for enhancing its global visibility, for ensuring accurate citation of historical sources, and for unifying Ukrainian names in international information systems. The article outlines the need to develop an automated Romanization tool and identifies key directions for further research in computational linguistics, phonetics, and language standardization.

One of the most striking dimensions of the Russian Empire's expansionist policies towards the Turkestan region was the discursive and strategic framework constructed around the practice of slavery. Throughout the long-term process extending from the 16th century to the late 19th century, the issue of Russian captives held in the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva consistently occupied a central position in the agenda of the Russians. However, diplomatic negotiations concerning prisoner exchanges or the release of captives largely failed, paving the way for Russia to activate military options. Russia’s military intervention in Turkestan was legitimized through a discourse that portrayed the Tsarist ideology and the imperial rhetoric of the period as committed to the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless, archival documents, travel accounts, and contemporary testimonies reveal that this discourse was largely based on political manipulation. Although slavery was officially abolished following the Russian domination of the Khanate of Khiva in 1873, it is evident that the slave trade and practices of captivity in the region continued for some time. For the khanates, the existence of Russian captives was not merely a matter of war booty; rather, it functioned as a strategic instrument providing negotiating superiority against Russia. This situation transformed the phenomenon of captivity from a mere economic activity into a crucial component of politics and diplomacy. On the other hand, for Russia, this issue was positioned at the very center of the argument of “humanitarian intervention” that justified its policy of conquest in Central Asia; yet in practice, it became clear that the primary motivation of this intervention did not go beyond the liberation of Russian captives. Russia did not aim for a profound transformation of the social and economic infrastructure of slavery in the region, a fact that became evident in its colonial practices. The role of the Turkmen groups in the slave trade constituted another complex dimension of this process. The entanglement of ethnic, sectarian, and economic factors in this structure not only shaped Russo-Turkestan relations but also formed an essential part of the internal dynamics between the khanates. Ultimately, the abolition of slavery in Turkestan was not so much the direct result of Russian intervention as it was the consequence of local resistance movements, internal rebellions, and broader processes of social transformation. The strategy of the Tsarist administration to present itself as a “liberator” was essentially a discursive construction that masked its imperial expansion. In this context, the question of slavery evolved into an ideological apparatus skillfully designed by Russia to legitimize its military and political expansion in Central Asia, becoming a striking example of the classical tension between imperial politics and humanitarian rhetoric.

Abstract The author examines Ľudovít Štúr’s controversial book Slavdom and the world of the future (1867) from a new perspective. He formulates two hypotheses regarding the intentions that led Štúr to write this work. According to the first hypothesis, Štúr’s book was about a pragmatic political calculation on how to secure the future of the Slavs, including the Slovaks, in the new political order of Europe after the revolutions of 1848–1849, namely under Russian domination. Within the second hypothesis, the author examines to what extent Štúr’s book can be read as a dystopia of the future of the Slavs under Russian domination. In conclusion, the author states that the second hypothesis seems more likely in the contemporary geopolitical context (Crimean War) in which Štúr’s book was written.

Abstract While in postcolonial contexts the language of the former imperial power is often associated with modernity and prestige, in Lithuania, which has a history of Russian domination, the Russian language indexes backwardness and vulgarity. In this article, I argue that this semiotic inversion is due to the coexistence of competing chronotopes linked to divergent political orders, the functioning of languages as indexes of chronotopes, and linguistic alignments precipitated by the Russia–Ukraine War. Based on ethnography and interviews, this article shows how linguistic practices can become charged sites of chronotopic contestations and exclusions in contexts situated along the intersection of geopolitical orders.

Reframing Reflexivity

Abstract This article explores the socio-political landscape of Donbas through a lens of post-colonial studies, revealing the Russian colonial past and neo-colonial ambition. By uncovering the interplay of cultural, political, and economic challenges the author identifies the key elements of the region’s identity and draws on historical analysis and personal reflections on the Russo-Ukrainian war. The article explores how Russia managed to dominate the discourse in Donbas, as well as the reasons why a significant part of the Donbas people accepted Russian dominance over the region and the creation of self-proclaimed states without great resistance. The study underscores the necessity to work on the decolonization of Donbas’ identity as the pivotal point for fostering reconciliation processes in the long-term occupied territories of Ukraine.

В статье анализируется функциональное развитие якутского языка в условиях языкового сдвига в полиэтничном городе Якутске и моноэтничном Усть-Алданском улусе Республики Саха (Якутия). В основе анализа социолингвистическое исследование, проведенное среди молодежи саха (якутов) в 2023-2025 гг. Динамика языкового сдвига в молодежной среде является индикатором устойчивости функций языка. Якутский язык является основным этническим маркером идентичности для молодежи саха (якутов), играя роль этнического символа. В моноэтничных районах РС(Я) среди молодежи саха (якутов) наблюдается высокий уровень языковой компетенции на родном языке, который способствует высокой символической мощности языка. В полиэтничных районах наблюдается противоположная ситуация – при высокой символической мощности якутского языка как символического маркера идентичности у молодежи саха (якутов), наблюдается сужение сфер функционирования якутского языка, и, соответственно, снижение языковой компетенции. Молодёжь саха (якуты) являются билингвами, однако, наблюдается снижение активного владения якутским языком в городской среде, что обусловлено доминированием русского языка в сфере образования и медиапространстве. Русский язык воспринимается как язык социальной мобильности. Интерференция в речи молодежи саха (якутов) обусловлена функциональным доминированием русского языка, снижением языковой компетенции в урбанизированной среде, что делает её естественным проявлением контактного двуязычия в Якутии.

Power Transition in Central Eurasia: China-India Competition and the Erosion of Russian Dominance in Turkistan

The article examines the problem of modeling the interaction and development of energy cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) for the period 2020-2025 in the context of global instability. The purpose of the work. To investigate the problem of modeling the interaction and development of energy cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia. Methodology. The research uses methods of historical and economic analysis, theory of industrial and technological balance of the economy, system paradigm, evolutionary and institutional theory, expert and analytical assessments. Results. It is shown that after the reduction of the European market, Russia reoriented part of the gas and electricity supplies to the east, and the region, faced with shortages and deterioration of infrastructure, turned to Russian suppliers. The main directions of interaction are considered: the growth of gas supplies through the reverse of the Central Asia – Center gas pipeline, the expansion of electricity exports and the connection of Russian operators to the unified energy system of the region, plans for the construction of nuclear power plants and small hydroelectric power plants, as well as joint hydropower projects. The analysis of the scenarios "Stable diversification", "Strengthening of Russian dominance" and "External diversification" has been carried out, the risks and opportunities of each of them have been identified. Conclusions. It is concluded that there is a need to move from raw materials to technological partnerships, modernize infrastructure and harmonize the regulatory framework for sustainable development.

This study examined proficiency levels in Karachay, Kyrgyz, and Russian among Karachay people in Kyrgyzstan through a sociolinguistic survey in Chuy. Four language skills, reading, writing, speaking, and listening, were assessed. The findings indicate that Karachays have the highest proficiency in Russian across all skills, compared to Karachay and Kyrgyz. There is a notable language shift towards the Russian language, especially among the younger generations. The study highlights the "seven generations’ tradition, which limits intra-ethnic marriages and fosters linguistic assimilation. Research suggests a risk of Karachay language loss due to Russian dominance in communication and increasing interethnic marriages.

The recent intensified challenges to Georgia’s democratic development, which since the fall of the Soviet Union has been recognized as a democratic beacon among post-Soviet states in Caucasus area for its’ continued path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, have in fact revealed to an unprecedented degree, the extreme lack of real geopolitical choices. The story seems as simple as never before, with either an option to enter and embrace the Russian domination zone, or to seize the absolutely unique opportunities for unprecedented rapprochement with the EU and realistic prospects for accession to the European Institutions, as well as for enhancing the multidimensional relationship perspectives already established with the United States, opportunities which, along with other factors, have emerged decisively due to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War. Our academic inquiry also examines the erosion of the concept of neutrality, as well as the Realpolitik discourse.

The Ukrainian nation emerged out of European ties, global processes, and twentieth-century violence that shaped its resistance to Russian domination.

This essay examines the formation of national identity in Azerbaijan during the early twentieth century through an analysis of works by Azerbaijani authors. This period was a crucial time for the country as it faced significant historical changes that challenged its sense of identity. Azerbaijan was situated between the Islamic and Christian worlds and had been under the control of the Russian Empire for many decades, making the search for national identity difficult. The essay analyzes the writings of two prominent Azerbaijani thinkers, Kurban Said and Ahmed bey Aghaoghlu, to reveal the main tendencies in Azerbaijani society during this period. The authors’ suggestions for building a better society serve as insights into the tendencies and atmosphere at that important time. The essay argues that these works may chronicle the formation of the national identity during a historically obscured time when the Soviet regime erased all traces of identity issues. The study draws on Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, which emphasizes the role of discourse and media in forming and transforming national identities. The essay discusses the importance of understanding national identity in crucial historical periods and how it aids in the process of its formation. Finally, the essay provides historical context on Azerbaijan’s situation at the beginning of the twentieth century, including its short-lived independence, the influence of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious values, and the challenges of Russian domination, cultural restrictions, and falsification of historical facts.

Based on the fundamental statement that the Russian immigrant community in Northeast China in the late nineteenth – mid-twentieth centuries was a diaspora, this article examines the process of transformation of the nature of the Russian diaspora and the peculiarities of its functioning at certain stages of its existence. The research is based on the conceptual ideas of Imperial and Diaspora Studies. There are four stages of the existence of the Russian diaspora in Manchuria, which differ in the nature of the interaction of Russian immigrants with a foreign cultural environment, due to the sociolegal, economic, and political situation of the diaspora, as well as sociopolitical and sociocultural conditions of the living environment. The Russian immigrant community was formed as an imperial diaspora during the period of Russian domination in Manchuria. Despite the decline of the political and legal status and the marginalization in the early 1920s and later the split into politically antagonistic Soviet and Emigrant colonies, the diaspora retained elements of imperial consciousness and the desire for national and cultural autonomy. In the case of the Soviet colony, this was accompanied by attempts at a new “imperial” expansion in the form of Sovietization of the former alienated zone of the CER. In its turn, focused on the Sinification of the former alienated zone, the policy of the Chinese authorities led to a conflict of interests and hindered the process of integration of Russian immigrants, which was already complicated by the cultural and religious alienation of the living environment. The capture of Manchuria by the Japanese and the creation of the state of Manchukuo, which led to the disappearance of the Soviet colony, actualised the problem of the Russian diaspora’s integration into the multinational community of Manchukuo. Implemented within the framework of the Japanese pan-Asian national policy, the integration led to the strengthening of national defence tendencies and a significant numerical decline of the Russian diaspora. After 1945, the Russian diaspora, which was subjected to political repression, experienced intensive Sovietization and turned into an instrument of Soviet policy in Northeast China. The history of the diaspora ended with mass repatriation and remigration of 1954–1961.

Prior to the 2022 “special military operation” (according to Putin’s view) carried out by the Russian military in Ukraine, in 2008 Russia had another target in sight along its borders, residing in the infamously unstable region of Transcaucasia, Georgia. In an eerily similar fashion to what the current conflict unfolds in terms of Russian military prowess and display of warfare, in August 2008 the Russo – Georgian War marked the beginning of Russia’s reemergence as a military power for both the West as well as its former Soviet constituent states and further deepened the conflict between the NATO block and Russia. The latter plunged into initiating a long streak of instabilities inside the former Soviet states that broke away from the USSR. Many see the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War as manifestations of a renewed geopolitical rivalry between major world powers. Both wars have been driven by a desire to assert Russian dominance and control over the regions in question and have led to various consequences that have had profound implications for the nations involved. In the case of Russia, the invasion of Ukraine has been seen as the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of The Cold War. However, for the first part, the Russo-Georgian war solely lasted for 5 days, (stretching from the 8th to the 12th of August), albeit tensions were carried out from earlier that year and turmoil was about to spread at any moment. The primary purpose of sending Russian troops to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was to support these pro-Russian regions’ armies against the Georgian military hidden under different pretexts (i.e., “humanitarian aid” sent to repair a railway in the region of Abkhazia). For the second case, this perspective cannot be applied in the current Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite sporting a similar battle tactic in achieving its goal (keeping in mind that the conflict debuted as early as 2014 with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as the Donbas region by sending Russian troops under the pretext of defending the local “repressed” minority from the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, see Fig.No.1), the Russian military has marked only temporary victories at the cost of a staggering number of casualties. This comes to show that Moscow’s war plan carried out in Ukraine might become a lesson for future aggressors in regard to undermining opponents and show how miscalculations can overturn primary predictions, despite the fact that it is a major power with a bristling arsenal. Looking back at the Russo-Georgian War case, the Russians' success had permanently dented Georgia’s image in the long term. It halted the country’s progress of aligning itself with the West by adopting for the first time in 2004 under Mikhail Saakashvili’s residency a pro-European stance, as well as deterred it from aspiring to join the EU and NATO, by solely remaining a PFP member since 1994. In the case of Ukraine, also a PFP member, but from 1995, their military has undergone training in this NATO partnership and collaboration from that period up to nowadays. Moreover, its geopolitical location, size, and implicated political and economic agents active on its territory also make it a much more valuable pawn on this imaginary chessboard between Russia and the West. NATO and the EU continue their support of Ukraine through the means of its member states that send weapons, ammunition, and many types of light and heavy military equipment, including anti-tank and air defense systems, howitzers, and drones. The Georgian example comes to show that the Russian rhetoric cannot be trusted and that it further continues to spread disinformation, this time around, by accusing Ukraine of staging military provocations in the Eastern Donbas region. Ironically, the Ukrainian government hasn’t had intentions of changing the status quo throughout its eight years of the ongoing war in Donbas by intervening in the occupied Lugansk and Donetsk regions, thus making it even less plausible that Kyiv would have taken such a risk amidst Russia’s largest military mobilization in decades. Putin has gone further, issuing “genocide” claims regarding killings allegedly taking place in the said region. In 2014, the Kremlin justified its military offensive by claiming ethnic Russians were being threatened in eastern Ukraine. Similar accusations were also at the forefront of Russian information warfare in 2008, when the Kremlin blamed Tbilisi for committing ethnic cleansing—a charge later dismissed by a ruling of the European Court of International Rights. This paper aims to draw a comparison between the similarities of the Russian forces’ applied strategies during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and the 2014 Annexation of Crimea and Donbas region with aftermaths in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war respectively, as well as question what were the factors that determined the major differences in the way these two states were perceived by the West, eventually leading to such a different timeline. Furthermore, I will attempt to analyze if one country had more probability to appease to Western political and economic interests, as well as if the geopolitical location and size of Ukraine were of more importance than Georgia’s. I will attempt to justify if Georgia was perceived as a scapegoat that prepared Ukrainian troops for similar future conflict escalations on behalf of Russia, and finally if Russia’s victory in Ukraine is even possible and what the aftermath of that action would be.

On November 16, 2023, Dr. Ibrahim Muradov presented The Russo-Ukrainian War: What Does it Mean for Russia, Ukraine, and the West? at this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed were that Ukrainian society's push for a pro-Western policy has shaped its foreign relations, despite international reluctance to integrate Ukraine into Western structures; Ukraine's strong protest culture, especially in western regions, has significantly influenced its political direction and resistance to Russian dominance; and Ukraine developed a long-term strategy for economic, military and identity strengthening and this long-term strategy precipitated the full-scale invasion and forced the Kremlin to act before the strategy was complete.
 
 Received: 01-07-2024
 Revised: 01-26-2024

The unresolved conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most concerning unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region, both because it involves two independent countries and because the three main regional powers—Russia, Turkey, and Iran—all have different stances. This situation undermines security across the Caucasus and the Black Sea region, polarizing countries and their allies, and creating a security vacuum that encourages the proliferation of transnational security challenges. Besides the severe security risks the region may face, the South Caucasus has already experienced significant economic pressure due to war and, primarily, the extensive sanctions against Russia. The South Caucasus has a long history of conflicts and varying degrees of Russian dominance, which may now persist and even worsen. However, there is also the possibility that the shock of Russia's actions in Ukraine and the shift in the international order may alter historical behavioral patterns. Research findings indicate that Russia and Iran are considered Armenian allies, while Turkey and Israel support Azerbaijan. Russia remains a major stakeholder in the region concerning the conflict. Historically, Moscow has been linked to the conflicts due to the shared heritage of the Soviet Union. The Russians are also primarily credited by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh for their continuous involvement in various peace processes in an attempt to find a peaceful solution. Turkey has a strong relationship with its Turkic brothers in Azerbaijan and views it as a gateway to the region. This war has significantly changed the balance of power in the region. While Azerbaijan now clearly dominates the regional political and military scene, Armenia's power and influence have been severely weakened.

The object of the article’s research is the policy of Anglicization in the field of education. The purpose of the article is to reveal the problem of anglicization on the basis of the official educational documents «Conceptual principles of state policy regarding the development of the English language in the field of higher education» (2012) and «Methodological recommendations for ensuring high-quality study, teaching and use of the English language in higher educational institutions of Ukraine» (2023) as threatening the state status of the Ukrainian language. Among the tasks is to analyze the nature of Anglicization in the educational and legislative field of Ukraine. The subject of the study is the principles, methodological recommendations and legislative initiatives of Anglicization in the educational field of Ukraine. In the research, we apply the national principle of assessment of sociolinguistic phenomena and the analytical-descriptive method, which makes it possible to reveal the xenophilic nature of language policy in the conditions of war. As a result of the adopted «Conceptual principles...» (2014), «Methodological recommendations...» (2023) and a number of other proposals, the English language acquires the highest level of prestige, eliminating the state Ukrainian language from apriority position in the field of education. The neutralization of the Ukrainian language occurs from within and without: from within - through the introduction of courses in professional disciplines in English, English for professional purposes and for academic purposes with passing exams as a condition for the career growth of the teaching staff; from without - through the planned transformation of the status of the English language in the legislative field of Ukraine. The spread of the English language should by no means narrow the scope of the Ukrainian language in its own state, and not only because the Ukrainian language has nowhere else to develop as in Ukraine. The officialization and protection of the Ukrainian language in the educational field is a preserved national identity. It is the imbalance between the state Ukrainian language and the dominance of both Russian and English that causes reasonable concern about the independence of our Ukrainian perspective and the subjectivity of Ukraine on the world political chessboard.

This article focuses on the changing nature of Russia-Turkey energy trade relations. The main argument of the article is that climate change, as well as EU institutions and environmental protection regulations, have been decisive in the long-term transformation of bilateral natural gas relations. The EU favors competitive market structures to combat climate change, and the EU Green Deal sets ambitious targets for renewable energy consumption. These variables establish grounds for legitimacy among EU members in the face of Russian dominance of the EU energy market. However, as discussed in this paper, the Russian government’s main strategy to counter this opposition from the EU side is to circumvent the EU’s institutional arrangements through its relations with Turkey. The final point to be discussed in this paper is the impact of the EU energy and environment policies on changes in Russian perceptions of Turkey.