Run-up In Oil Prices Research Articles

Crude inventory accounting and speculation in the physical oil market

This paper uses inventory data from financial accounts to explore whether companies involved in the physical oil market were speculating in the run-up to 2008. Using quarterly inventory data over the period 1990Q4 to 2012Q1 and a sample of 15 of the largest listed oil companies in the world, we derive an Index of Scaled Physical Inventories (ISPI). We find declining ISPI up to the early 2000s is consistent with firms minimizing inventory for efficiency sake; then ISPI starts to increase, suggesting physical inventories could have contributed to the run-up in oil prices between 2003 and 2008. Highlighting heterogeneity in inventory behaviors amongst the large oil companies, the structural break test on the ratio of inventory to sales and the days to sales for individual companies shows that five companies had positive structural breaks during the speculation period, while the other companies had no or negative structural breaks. Contrary to declining inventory expectations due to a tightening oil market, the positive structural breaks suggest speculative behavior. We also examine the relationship between changes in profitability and changes in oil inventory over the pre-speculation and speculation period. Though some coefficients for inventory do switch from negative to positive over the two periods as hypothesized, they are only significant in a few cases. However, aggregate measures of inventory do switch and are significant, suggesting that, on average, inventory holdings negatively affected profitability in the pre-speculation period and positively affected profitability in the speculation period.

Crude Inventory Accounting and Speculation in the Physical Oil Market

This paper uses inventory data from financial accounts to explore whether companies involved in the physical oil market were speculating in the run-up to 2008. Using quarterly inventory data over the period 1990Q4 to 2012Q1 and a sample of 15 of the largest listed oil companies in the world, we derive an Index of Scaled Physical Inventories (ISPI). We find declining ISPI up to the early 2000s is consistent with firms minimizing inventory for efficiency sake; then ISPI starts to increase, suggesting physical inventories could have contributed to the run-up in oil prices between 2003 and 2008. Highlighting heterogeneity in inventory behaviors amongst the large oil companies, the structural break test on the ratio of inventory to sales and the days to sales for individual companies shows that five companies had positive structural breaks during the speculation period, while the other companies had no or negative structural breaks. Contrary to declining inventory expectations due to a tightening oil market, the positive structural breaks suggest speculative behavior. We also examine the relationship between changes in profitability and changes in oil inventory over the pre-speculation and speculation period. Though some coefficients for inventory do switch from negative to positive over the two periods as hypothesized, they are only significant in a few cases. However, aggregate measures of inventory do switch and are significant, suggesting that, on average, inventory holdings negatively affected profitability in the pre-speculation period and positively affected profitability in the speculation period.

Speculation in the Oil Market

The run-up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commodity markets and increased price co-movement among different commodities. We assess whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a dynamic factor model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small-scale vector autoregression is not informationally sufficient to identify the shocks. The main results are as follows. (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price fluctuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a significant role in the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. (iii) The co-movement between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global demand shocks. Our results support the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global demand but that the financialization process of commodity markets also played a role.

Speculation in the Oil Market

The run-up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commodity markets and increased price comovement among different commodities. We assess whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small scale VAR is not infomationally sufficient to identify the shocks. The main results are as follows: (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price fluctuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The comovement between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global demand shocks. (iii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a significant role in the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. Our results support the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global demand but that the financialization process of commodity markets also played a role.

Oil Efficiency, Demand, and Prices: A Tale of Ups and Downs

The macroeconomic implications of oil price fluctuations vary according to their sources. Our estimated two-country DSGE model distinguishes between country-specific oil supply shocks, various domestic and foreign activity shocks, and oil efficiency shocks. Changes in foreign oil efficiency, modeled as factor-augmenting technology, were the key driver of fluctuations in oil prices between 1984 and 2008, but have modest effects on U.S. activity. A pickup in foreign activity played an important role in the 2003-2008 oil price runup. Beyond quantifying the responses of oil prices and economic activity, our model informs about the propagation mechanisms. We find evidence that nonoil trade linkages are an important transmission channel for shocks that affect oil prices. Conversely, nominal rigidities and monetary policy are not.

Understanding the Crude Oil Price: How Important Is the China Factor?

This paper employs monthly data on China’s net oil import from January 1997 to June 2010 to assess the role of China’s net import in the evolution of the crude oil price. Based on a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, we find that the growth of China’s net oil import has no significant impact on monthly oil price changes and there is no Granger causality between the two variables. The historical decomposition indicates that shocks to China’s oil demand have only played a small role in the oil price run-up of 2002-2008. We also calculate the price changes implied by China’s net oil import growth from a longer-term supply and demand shift perspective. doi: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol32-No4-4 “Surging Chinese demand is underpinning the recent spike in the price of oil, figures from the International Energy Agency (IEA) show. This ‘China factor’ has more bearing on oil prices than the ‘risk factor’ coming from global tensions, some experts say” —CNN (2004) “The price of crude oil could soar to $200 a barrel in as little as six months, as supply continues to struggle to meet demand . . . Soaring global demand for oil is being led by China’s

Oil and the Macroeconomy in a Changing World: A Conference Summary

Analysis of oil-price movements is once again an important feature of economic policy discussions. To provide some background for this analysis, this paper summarizes a conference on the oil market held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in June 2010. Four cross-cutting themes emerged from this symposium, which included scientific experts, market participants, business leaders, academics, and policymakers. First, the decline in real oil prices that followed the 1970s’ oil shocks is unlikely to be repeated today, because there are fewer ways in which oil-importing countries can reduce oil demand or expand domestic supplies in response to higher prices. The second lesson of the conference, however, is that any prediction about oil markets is highly uncertain, a fact illustrated by the wide confidence intervals that result when futures-market data are used to quantify forecast uncertainty. Third, there is little consensus on whether new financial investment in commodity index funds has increased the volatility of oil prices. Finally, changes in oil prices still have large effects on the economy. Some research suggests that the rapid run-up in oil prices in 2007–08 may have significantly weakened the U.S. economy in the early stages of the Great Recession.

Understanding the Crude Oil Price: How Important is the China Factor?

This paper employs monthly data on China’s net oil import from January 1997 to June 2010 to assess the role of China’s net import in the evolution of the crude oil price. Based on a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, we find that the growth of China’s net oil import has no significant impact on monthly oil price changes and there is no Granger causality between the two variables. The historical decomposition indicates that shocks to China’s oil demand have only played a small role in the oil price run-up of 2002-2008. We also calculate the price changes implied by China’s net oil import growth from a longer-term supply and demand shift perspective.

Identifying the oil price–macroeconomy relationship: An empirical mode decomposition analysis of US data

This paper employs the empirical mode decomposition (EMD) method to filter cyclical components of US quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) and quarterly average oil price (West Texas Intermediate—WTI). The method is adaptive and applicable to non-linear and non-stationary data. A correlation analysis of the resulting components is performed and examined for insights into the relationship between oil and the economy. Several components of this relationship are identified. However, the principal one is that the medium-run component of the oil price has a negative relationship with the main cyclical component of the GDP. In addition, weak correlations suggesting a lagging, demand-driven component and a long-run component of the relationship were also identified. Comparisons of these findings with significant oil supply disruption and recession dates were supportive. The study identifies a number of lessons applicable to recent oil market events, including the eventuality of persistent oil price and economic decline following a long oil price run-up. In addition, it was found that oil market related exogenous events are associated with short- to medium-run price implications regardless of whether they lead to actual supply losses.

Did Easy Money in the Dollar Bloc Fuel the Global Commodity Boom?

Among the various explanations for the runup in oil and commodity prices of recent years, one story focuses on the role of monetary policy in the United States and in developing economies. In this view, developing countries that peg their currencies to the dollar were forced to ease their monetary policies after reductions in U.S. interest rates, leading to economic overheating, excess demand for oil and other commodities, and rising commodity prices. We assess that hypothesis using the Federal Reserve staff's forward-looking, multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model, SIGMA. We find that even if many developing country currencies were pegged to the dollar, an easing of U.S. monetary policy would lead to only a transitory runup in oil prices. Instead, strong economic growth in many developing economies, as well as shortfalls in oil production, better explain the sustained runup in oil prices observed until earlier this year. Moreover, a closer look at exchange rates and interest rates around the world suggests that the monetary policies of many developing economies, including in East Asia, are less closely influenced by U.S. policies than is frequently assumed.

The 2006–2008 oil bubble: Evidence of speculation, and prediction

We present an analysis of oil prices in USD and in other major currencies that diagnoses unsustainable faster-than-exponential behavior. This supports the hypothesis that the recent oil price run-up was amplified by speculative behavior of the type found during a bubble-like expansion. We also attempt to unravel the information hidden in the oil supply-demand data reported by two leading agencies, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA). We suggest that the found increasing discrepancy between the EIA and IEA figures provides a measure of the estimation errors. Rather than a clear transition to a supply restricted regime, we interpret the discrepancy between the IEA and EIA as a signature of uncertainty, and there is no better fuel than uncertainty to promote speculation! Our post-crash analysis confirms that the oil peak in July 2008 occurred within the expected 80% confidence interval predicted with data available in our pre-crash analysis.

Did Easy Money in the Dollar Bloc Fuel the Global Commodity Boom?

Among the various explanations for the runup in oil and commodity prices of recent years, one story focuses on the role of monetary policy in the United States and in developing economies. In this view, developing countries that peg their currencies to the dollar were forced to ease their monetary policies after reductions in U.S. interest rates, leading to economic overheating, excess demand for oil and other commodities, and rising commodity prices. We assess that hypothesis using the Federal Reserve staff’s forward-looking, multicountry, dynamic general equilibrium model, SIGMA. We find that even if many developing country currencies were pegged to the dollar, an easing of U.S. monetary policy would lead to only a transitory runup in oil prices. Instead, strong economic growth in many developing economies, as well as shortfalls in oil production, better explain the sustained runup in oil prices observed until earlier this year. Moreover, a closer look at exchange rates and interest rates around the world suggests that the monetary policies of many developing economies, including in East Asia, are less closely influenced by U.S. policies than is frequently assumed.

The Price Is Wrong for Oil Shale and Tar Sand Tech

The huge run-up in oil prices over the last several years, reaching a peak of close to US $150 per barrel this past summer, has given energy companies a big incentive to find new ways of harvesting unconventional oil, especially in North America. Technology firms targeted oil from tar sands in Canada and from shale, a sedimentary rock abundant in the western United States. But in the fourth quarter of 2008, oil prices plummeted, and that could put the brakes on the development of new extraction technologies, say experts.

Extra Credit

This article focuses on petroleum industry that is on the cusp of an incredible youth movement. It is because of the steep run-up in oil prices in the past few years, which has created a demand for engineers who can tap into the increasingly hard-to-reach fields. Halliburton has invested in simulator training facilities and creating a space on the Internet for workers in the field to share best practices. The goal is to have a consistent level of quality through the organization. With the average petroleum engineer closing in on retirement age, the students in Camp Bevo are going to be decision makers very early in their careers. Forming a positive impression now could reap enormous benefits for Halliburton down the line. It is a strategy that consumer products companies have long known—early brand associations can be the most enduring.

Food vs Biofuel

Food vs Biofuel

THE FUTURE OF ENERGY FROM A BIOLOGICAL ENGINEER’S PERSPECTIVE

The challenge of supplying the world with cheap, abundant and reliable energy will no doubt mark the history of the 21st century. Momentarily sidelined by 10 dollar barrels of crude oil in the 1990’s, the recent run-up in oil prices coupled with the increasingly appreciated oncoming crisis of global warming demands serious consideration for alternative and still highly speculative energy solutions. We believe that maturing technologies in genetics and molecular biology are opening the door for highly efficient biologically inspired energy sources. Humans have in a way exploited biological fuels for all of recorded history, burning organic materials from renewable (biomass) to limited (fossil fuels) whose primary origin could be traced to solar energy. At present we are in large part dependent on these biological mechanisms that transform solar energy to more useful forms, supplanted in part by modern energy converters such as solar panels, hydroelectric plants and a few solar-independent sources such as nuclear fission.

Inherent Difficulties in Producer-Consumer Cooperation

In August/September 1990 we experienced the first oil crisis brought on by the actions of consumers. That oil price run-up reflected the novelty of importing nations banding together to refuse to purchase oil -- rather than the unwillingness or inability of producer nations to supply oil. A writer from the United States, which until September 1990 was the world's second largest oil producer, might in the past have been expected also to speak the producer countries. Now, however, America's appetite for energy has reached the point that it already imports one-third or more of the oil moving in international trade. At one time America's crude oil-production capacity could cushion the impact of supply interruptions on its partners. That was the case in the Suez crisis. But those days are long since gone. One must also recall that, in the days when the United States was the major supplier nation, its role was not always the benign one of cushioning the effects of supply interruptions. President Roosevelt's decision to cut off oil supplies to Japan in August 1941 may have precipitated Japan's decision to go to war.