Role Of Intellect Research Articles

Critical study of Tafsir Al-Manar (interpretation of the Holy Quran) regarding the miracles of Prophet Ibrahim (PBUH) and Prophet Moses (PBUH)

The role of Intellect or Aql in the interpretation of the Holy Quran has been greatly considered by Islamic scholars through history. Some past and contemporary scholars have attempted to interpret the Quran using reason, such as Tafsir Al-Manar (the interpretation of the Holy Quran) written by Mohammad Rashid Rida. Since the perception of Muhammad Rashid Rida and his teacher Muhammad Abduh regarding the prophets’ miracles are different from many commentators, it is important to examine Al-Manar’s interpretive concerning the miracles of prophets including Prophet Ibrahim (AS) and Prophet Moses (AS). This article examines Tafsir Al-Manar with a descriptive-analytical method in order to assess the accuracy of Muhammad Abduh’s and Rashid Rida’s comments. In examining Mohammad Rashid Rida’s point of view, we found that his rational interpretations are inconsistent with the Quran’s appearance, Shiite and Sunni commentators. The interpretations also lack attention to the purpose of the story. The denial in their interpretations indicate their improper use of a rational interpretative method, which otherwise, would not have led to the denial of the prophets’ miracles.

¿Qué significa actuar por un fin? La respuesta de Francisco Suárez en el ms De beatitudine (1579) y en el tratado De ultimo fine hominis (1628)

La influencia de la obra y doctrina de Francisco Suárez (Granada, 1548-Lisboa, 1617) en la conformación del pensamiento moderno ha sido ampliamente estudiada en áreas como la filosofía política y del derecho, la metafísica o la epistemología. Sin embargo, la filosofía moral de Suárez, en concreto aquella que, como él mismo explica, habrá de servir de base a sus tratados de teología moral, está todavía por analizar. El objetivo de este trabajo es traer a luz algunos aspectos de la teoría suareciana sobre la causalidad final en los agentes libres, confrontando su doctrina sobre la causalidad del fin en dos comentarios, escritos en distintos períodos, a las cuestiones I-IIae de la Suma de Teología de Tomás de Aquino: el manuscrito inédito De beatitudine (1579) y el tratado De ultimo fine hominis, publicado por Baltasar Álvares (1628). La cuestión aquí analizada —qué significa actuar por un fin— se asume como un instrumento heurístico para dar a conocer sea estas dos fuentes estudiadas, sea el interés filosófico de las doctrinas de Suárez a respecto de la causalidad final. Las conclusiones apuntan a los siguientes aspectos: i) la proximidad, aun con dudas, de Suárez a la doctrina tomista de la causalidad del fin, en el comentario de 1579; ii) la asunción parcial de la doctrina tomista en cuanto a la función del intelecto en el actuar libre, y la afirmación de que el locus finis es la voluntad, en el comentario de 1628. Trabajando con estos matices hemos querido establecer algunos puntales de encuentro que permitan hacer visibles los puentes que emergen entre una tradición escolástica que enfrenta una nueva imagen del hombre, y la filosofía moral inmediatamente posterior que despojando aquella de su fundamento teológico, avanza con paso firme hacia la modernidad.

Induction and Natural Necessity in the Middle Ages

Drawing the complex terrain of the theories of induction and of the various ways to ground inductive knowledge in the middle ages is the aim of this paper. There have already been two excellent attempts to draw this terrain. The first is by Julius R. Weinberg (1965) and the second by E. P. Bos (1993). My attempt differs from theirs in two major respects. The first is that it is more detailed in the examination of the various theories and their relations. The second is that I focus on the role of natural necessities in induction. In particular, I try to place the various conceptions of induction within a network of issues that relate to the problem of universals, natural necessities and a power-based approach to activity in nature. Here is the road map. Section 2 explains Aristotle’s views of induction, as this were mainly developed in Posterior Analytics Book II.19 and states what I take it to be the main dilemma of induction, as this was described by Sextus Empiricus: induction is either perfect and impossible or imperfect and unjustified. In section 3, I move to Thomas Aquinas and his own attempt to justify induction and the actuality of general and necessary principles based on experience by an appeal to the natural light of reason. In section 4 I discuss John Duns Scotus’s reliance on a self-evident maxim to bridge the gap between imperfect and perfect induction. Section 5 moves to William of Ockham’s peculiar attempt to justify single-instance inductions. Then, section 6 offers a detailed account of Jean Buridan’s ground-breaking re-conceptualisation of induction and the role of intellect in it. Section 7 discusses the critique of induction by Nicolaus of Autrecourt. Finally, section 8 offers a brief account of Pseudo-Scotus’s move from knowledge to opinion.

Imaging Islam: Intellect and Imagination in Islamic Philosophy, Poetry, and Painting

AbstractThis essay introduces the pioneering approaches of four classical Muslim thinkers (Ghazali, Biruni, Farabi, and Ibn 'Arabi) to the understanding of Islam and of religion more broadly, together with the subsequent artistic mirroring of their perspectives in two later masterpieces of Islamic mystical poetry (a ghazal of Hafiz) and painting (an illustration of the same poem by the early Safavid artist Sultan Muhammad). The discussion begins with the ways each philosopher's distinctive emphases on the relative roles of intellect, inspiration, and imagination highlight different but complementary dimensions (social, political, ritual, intellectual, and spiritual) of religious life and experience. The concluding section then illustrates how, just as in Plato's Symposium, each of those archetypal philosophical outlooks are powerfully dramatized and memorably integrated in the most influential poetic and artistic traditions of the Islamic humanities.

Platonic Cosmologies in the Dialoghi d’Amore of Leone Ebreo (Judah Abravanel)

The Spanish-Jewish exile in Italy Judah Abravanel, or Leone Ebreo, wrote a philosophical dialogue on the topic of love, a major part of which is devoted to several cosmological themes in which Plato’s Symposium and Timaeus are utilized and interpreted to accord with Jewish cosmological thought. Initially adopting Plato’s doctrine, as interpreted by Aristotle and the medieval philosophers, of creation out of eternal matter along with the role of a paradigm, Leone proceeds to develop a theory of how these cosmological factors are generated out of God, the creator. Eventually the thrust of his argument leads him to relegate matter to the background in favor of a Plotinian narrative that emphasizes the roles of Intellect and the World-Soul in the creative process. Nevertheless, Leone doesn’t entirely exclude matter, but reintroduces it into his metaphysical scheme by “redeeming” it through love.

Porphyry, Universal Soul and the Arabic Plotinus

Scholars working in the field of Graeco-Arabic Neoplatonism often discuss the role Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus, must be credited with in the formation of the Arabic Plotiniancorpus. A note in thiscorpusapparently suggests that Porphyry provided a commentary to the so-calledTheology of Aristotle, i.e., parts of some treatises ofEnneadsIV-VI. Consequently, Porphyry has been considered as responsible for the (sometimes relevant) doctrinal shifts which affect the Arabic Plotinian paraphrase with respect to the original text. This article aims at submitting this hypothesis to trial on a specific doctrinal point where Porphyry parts company with Plotinus: the relationship between the Demiurgic Intellect and World Soul. The ancient doxographical sources testify that Porphyry, in his conviction to be in agreement with Plotinus, in fact parted company with him in so far as he merged the World Soul into the Demiurgic Intellect, while Plotinus always kept them apart. There are in theEnneadssome baffling passages where the role of Intellect as the Demiurge of the sensible world is not clearly distinguishable from the role of World Soul. Notwithstanding that, these passages in the Arabic paraphrase do not bear any trace of the characteristically Porphyrian merging of World Soul into Intellect. The Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus’ writings never confuses Intellect and World Soul, as Porphyry did. This fact seems to disprove, at least on this point, the hypothesis of Porphyry's intervention as the explanation for the doctrinal differences between the original Plotinus’ text and its Arabic tradition.

The Role of Intellect and Fortuity in Legal Change: An Incident from the Law of Slavery

The Role of Intellect and Fortuity in Legal Change: An Incident from the Law of Slavery

Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics

Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference? This "two notion" interpretation is motivated by the following three considerations: i. Aristotle's good or virtuous agent is said (NE 2. 11o5a28-33, cf. NE 6. 1144ax8-2o ) to choose actions for their own sakes; but, according to the This paper is derived in part from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the University of Michigan in January of 1979. 1 would like to express my gratitttde to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Nicholas P. White, for his comments and criticisms on the relevant sections during the preparation of my dissertation and to theJHP's anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms and queries. ' It has often been pointed out that things which are pros an end are not necessarily "means," in the ordinary sense of the word. E.g., constituents of an end are pros the end, but they are not means to it. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, trans. Leonard H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o9), pp. 46-47, 53ff.: and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1o-22. ' Among the many proponents of this "two notion" interpretation are William D. Ross and Donald J. Allan. See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, t953), p. 2oo. See Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 197o), p. 132; idem, "Aristotle 's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," Xlth International Congress of Philosophy 12 (1953):124; idem, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote, Studies for A. Mansion (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1955). Richard Sorabji, in "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 l t973-74]:t t6), says that he has noticed sixteen commentators who take this view. [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY so-called formal account of prohairesis (NE 3. 2-3, 6. 2), the object of choice is what has been decided upon by deliberation (bouleuais), and what is decided upon by deliberation is a "means" to an end. 2. Aristotle says that choice is "closely bound up with virtue" and "discriminates characters better than actions do" (1 1t lb5; cf. t i lob3t, 1117a 5, 1163a22, 1t64bi); but commentators argue that these claims about choice are false unless choice is "of ends." 3. Though Aristotle holds that the impetuous akrat~s (incontinent agent) does not deliberate (e.g., t 152a 18-19), he says that the akrat~s' choice is good (1152ax5--17; cf. l l51a5-- 7, 29--32); and this appears to contradict his position in Book 3 that the object of choice is what is decided upon by deliberation, s In this paper I shall show that only one (philosophically significant) notion ofprohairesis is employed in the NE, namely, the notion developed in the "formal account" of deliberation and choice (3- 2-3, 6. 2), according to which choice is specifically of things which are pros ends. This point has several interesting applications. For example, it makes it easier to find in Aristotle (as I shall briefly explain) a comprehensive theory of practical reasoning or inference rather than several unconnected accounts of what practical inference is like in different types of cases; and it is helpful in clarifying what is involved in the evaluation of character on Aristotle's view (see Sec. ~). However, though I do think that the main point to be made...