John and Mary have fully consensual sex, but they do not want to have a child, so they use contraception with the intention of avoiding pregnancy. Unfortunately, although they used the (generally reliable) contraception in the way in which it is supposed to be used, Mary has become pregnant. The couple decides to have the baby, whom they name ‘Ernie’. Now we fill in the story a bit. The universe is (we suppose) causally deterministic, and 30 years later Ernie performs some action A and thereby brings about event E. We also stipulate that Ernie meets plausible compatibilist conditions for acting freely (in performing A). That is, we suppose that there are no uncontroversially freedomand responsibility-undermining conditions present in the context in which Ernie performs A, and, further, that Ernie meets plausible compatibilist conditions for acting freely. Let us say, for example, that one adopts the theory according to which the freedom-relevant condition on moral responsibility is that the agent exhibits ‘guidance control’ of his action (Fischer 1994) and (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). On this approach, one acts freely (and thus meets the freedomrelevant condition for moral responsibility) in so far as one acts from one’s own, suitably reasons-responsive mechanism. We can then simply stipulate that, in the relevant context, Ernie acts from his own, suitably reasonsresponsive mechanism (in performing A and thereby bringing about E). If one prefers a different set of compatiblist-friendly conditions for acting freely, one can simply stipulate that Ernie meets them; indeed, the plausible compatibilist-friendly conditions seem to be compatible with each other, and thus Ernie could presumably meet all of them in the relevant context. In such a case, and given that the epistemic condition on acting freely and moral responsibility is met, I am inclined to say that Ernie acts freely in performing A and is morally responsible for performing A (and bringing about E). Of course, this is simply my inclination; I recognize that my view about such a case is contentious. Obviously, one would need an argument for the compatibility of causal determinism and acting freely (and moral responsibility), in order to defend the view to which I am inclined here. But it does seem very clear to me that the precise circumstances of Ernie’s conception some 30 years earlier have nothing to do with whether he acts freely and is morally responsible in the context in question (30 years later). More specifically, it certainly is irrelevant to Ernie’s moral responsibility that John and Mary did not intend to have a baby and that they used contraception in an effort to prevent a pregnancy! And surely it would not change things at all, with respect to Ernie’s moral responsibility, if we modified the
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