Recent Fertility Decline Research Articles

Shigemi KONO and Minoru OKADA (eds.), Trends, Determinants and Implications of Recent Fertility Decline

Shigemi KONO and Minoru OKADA (eds.), Trends, Determinants and Implications of Recent Fertility Decline

A decomposition analysis of recent fertility decline in Fiji

Over the period 1966-86, both the Fijian and Indian populations of Fiji demonstrated declines in fertility. Differentials in the decline were, however, noted with the total fertility rate (TFR) of the Fijian population declining by 26% over the period compared to a 50% decline in the Indian TFR. Moreover, rate declines were not smooth and consistent over the period. Faster fertility decline was experienced in the 1st decade for both groups, slowing in the 2nd decade for Indian women, and stabilizing among the Fijians. This paper decomposes these differential changes in fertility rate into marital structure and marital fertility. The study was conducted using data from the censuses of 1966, 1976, and 1986. For the period 1966-76, declines in marital fertility contributed most to overall TFR decline for both ethnic groups. Marital structure had a reducing effect upon TFR among Indian women in the 1st decaed, but not during the 2nd. Fijian women experienced an overall negative impact from marital structure. Contraception plays an important role in limiting fertility in these 2 populations. Accordingly, differentials in acceptance were noticed, the family planning acceptance rate for Indians being almost twice that of Fijians; 35.6% and 18.7%, respectively in 1986. Compared to Indian women, Fijian women were more literate, more economically active, had higher life expectancies, and experience lower infant mortality rates. Nonetheless, they are not motivated to use family planning. Motivational, cultural, religious, and behavioral factors are suggested as causal factors determining acceptance and use of modern contraceptive methods.

Recent trends in fertility and family formation.

"Australia's fertility has declined significantly since the 1950s, and has remained below the long-term replacement level since 1976. The current trend appears to be towards a further decline. This paper describes the patterns of the fertility decline in terms of age and parity of the mother, and the effect on recent fertility decline of the postponement of marriage and family formation. The implications of the continued decline in fertility on completed family size are studied by reference to fertility patterns of marriage cohorts."

The Proximate Determinants of Low Fertility in Brazil

According to data from the 1986 Brazil Demographic and Health Survey the nations total fertility rate has fallen to 3.3 lifetime births per woman. While total fertility is fairly uniform throughout southern Brazil (from 2.4 to 2.6 births per woman) the rate is substantially higher in the northeast (5.1). A comparison with national census data indicates that Brazil has experienced a dramatic fertility decline since 1970 in every region of the country. Contraceptive prevalence in 1986 stood at 66% among married women 15-44 years of age with rates highest among women in their early 30s. Female sterilization and the pill accounted for more than 3/4 of all contraceptive use with female sterilization the leading method in almost every region. A comparison of contraceptive prevalence in 4 regions with rates from earlier state surveys shows that contraceptive use has climbed in each region over the last decade. Indices of contraception for earlier years and for 1986 suggest that in the past 4-8 years a rise in the use of the more effective methods accounted for most or all of Brazils recent fertility decline. Changes in the proportions of women married or in the ages at which they begin childbearing made no important contribution to the decline; neither did the duration of breastfeeding or of postpartum abstinence. Ideal family size has diminished in Brazil in recent years. The DHS data indicate that Brazilian womens average ideal family size is 2.8 children; younger women say their mean ideal is 2.6 whereas older women report an average of 3.5. More than 60% of married women reported either that they wanted no more children or that they had already been sterilized for contraceptive reasons. Despite high levels of contraceptive prevalence however the shift to a preference for smaller families has left 8% of married women with an unmet need for contraception. (authors) (summaries in SPA FRE ENG)

Fertility Trends and Determinants in Jordan

In Jordan levels of fertility at least equal those of most other Arab countries. A 1983 survey shows that women whose chilbearing is complete have about 8 children on average and that by 30 years of age women have already had 5 children. Current levels of fertility are lower than those observed 15 years age however: At all ages women have fewer children than their counterparts of a decade ago. The total fertility rate fell from about 8 births per woman in the early 1970s to about 7 in the early 1980s. Jordanian women appear to marry later than they did 10 years ago. In 1976 the singulate mean age at marriage was about 22 whereas in 1983 it was nearly 24. There has however been very little increase in levels of contraceptive use only about 1/4 of married Jordanian women use some birth control method. However almost 2/3 of those who do use a method rely on the pill or the IUD. Analysis of the proximate determinants of fertility reveals that Jordans recent fertility decline is due mainly to later marriage not to increased contraceptive use. In addition the mean duration between births is about 2 years a pattern of close spacing that may have a serious health impact on women and their babies. (authors modified)

Reviews: Population Change and Social Planning: Social and Economic Implications of the Recent Decline in Fertility in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, Energy Decision Making: The Interaction of Law and Policy, Oxford Studies in Transport. Subsidised Public Transport and the Demand for Travel: The South Yorkshire Example, beyond the Urban Fringe: Land Use Issues of Nonmetropolitan

Reviews: Population Change and Social Planning: Social and Economic Implications of the Recent Decline in Fertility in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, Energy Decision Making: The Interaction of Law and Policy, Oxford Studies in Transport. Subsidised Public Transport and the Demand for Travel: The South Yorkshire Example, beyond the Urban Fringe: Land Use Issues of Nonmetropolitan

10. Background of Recent Fertility Decline in Japan(General Session,The 1982 Meeting of the Population Association of Japan,Meeting Reports)

10. Background of Recent Fertility Decline in Japan(General Session,The 1982 Meeting of the Population Association of Japan,Meeting Reports)

Fertility and Family Planning in Brazil

Fertility and Family Planning in Brazil

Work and Family in Industrializing America

« Work » and « family » : two major components of the human experience which have received concentrated attention. Labor historians, for example, have explored the changing modes of production, the evolving organization of work, and its effects on society. Historical demographers have focused on such family-related issues as the causes of recent fertility decline, the rise of the modem nuclear family, and the revolution in mores. The ways in which the world of the family and the world of work have evolved together, however, have not been as well studied as each separate topic. What is known of the relationship between work and family is that it is complex. In our introductory essay to this seminar. T. Caplow and I stressed the novelty — and impermanence — of the post World War II one wage-earner family. We also pointed to the changing role of women, and compared their role in today's labor force to that of the secondary wage-earners of the nineteenth century, the children

The Ingredients of Recent Fertility Decline in Developing Countries

The hypothesis that certain demographic social and economic development factors independent of family planning program efforts can influence fertility decline was examined using survey data from 83 less developed countries. Independent variables included economic development (GNP per capita and energy consumption per capita) social development (adult literacy and life expectancy) urbanization and family planning program effort. The crude birthrate (CBR) was used to measure fertility. The 1970 level of social and economic development was correlated with change in fertility between 1960 and 1980. The 1974 measure of national family planning programs was also used in the analysis. A much stronger relationship was found between the CBR and social development and family planning effort than was found for economic development. The association of urbanization with fertility was stronger than that for economic development but weaker than the social or family planning program development indicators. Identical mean CBRs were found in the Asian (34.2) and Latin American (34.3) countries in the study. However in Asia family planning effort was higher and in Latin America levels of social and economic development were higher. Literacy and especially life expectancy showed consistently stronger zero-order correlations with family planning effort than either of the economic development indicators or urbanization. Family planning effort and literacy were always significant predictors of the 1960-80 change in CBR. These results suggest that policies to reduce fertility should concentrate simultaneously on increasing literacy improving health conditions and strengthening family planning program efforts. Moreover the finding that fertility is sensitive to certain measures of development and not to others indicates that separate measures of social and economic development can be isolated.

Eversley, David and Wolfgang Kollman, "Population Change and Social and Economic Implications of the Recent Decline in Fertility in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany" (Book Review)

Eversley, David and Wolfgang Kollman, "Population Change and Social and Economic Implications of the Recent Decline in Fertility in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany" (Book Review)

Population Change and Social Planning: Social and Economic Implications of the Recent Decline in Fertility in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The primary objective of the investigations described in this volume was the analysis of the fertility decline in the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) mainly since 1964 as an aid to the identification of policies which might be required to deal with problems arising from a changing population structure. The research was undertaken by 2 teams 1 working in the UK the other in the Federal Republic of Germany. No agreement could be reached as to whether the decline in the total number of births and age specific fertility since 1964 marks the beginning of a movement different in kind rather than in degree from the longterm decline observed for over 100 years. There is also no agreement as to whether the analysis of past events enables reliable projections for the future. According to the explanation adopted either a continuation of low longterm fertility (as measured by the completed family size of women now entering reproduction age) can be foreseen or even further decline; or again a continuation of the slight upward trend observed in the UK since 1977-78 and in the Federal Republic since late in 1979 can be assumed. These uncertainties do not prevent examination in some detail of various areas of social and economic policy. If the view that there have been marked changes in population structure since 1965 which require a policy oriented analysis is taken as a starting point then no claim is made that this is the only change which should be taken into account. The primary reason for examining the problems in 2 different countries is to highlight the importance of examining population changes in the context of a number of related variables. It does not make sense to look at demographic variables except in relation to the size and distribution of national and personal incomes to technological changes to the availability and price of raw materials and energy and such quasi political factors as prevailing views on the proper role of the state in the fields of housing health education and social welfare. The prospects for young entrants to the labor force in the 1980s are quite different in the UK and the FRG regardless of which demographic growth alternative is adopted and regardless of future rates of investment in productive capacity because the 2 economies already differ so much in structure that it would take an unprecedented decline in the German growth rate combined with an equally unprecendented rise in that of the UK to alter the balance of prospects in any fundamental way. The research shows that to a large extent changes in the volume and sector allocation of public resources devoted to the principle areas of public policy have not in the past depended to any large extent on changes in population structure.

La notion de cycle en démographie. La fécondité post-transitionnelle est-elle cyclique ?

Résumé Chesnais Jean-Claude. — The Notion of Periodicity in Demography. Is Post- transitional Fertility Cyclical ? Following a brief presentation of the notion of periodicity in population growth, the work dealing with cyclical movements in fertility undertaken by Easterlin along the lines suggested by Kuznets in the USA is described. The author suggests that after the end of the transition, fertility will fluctuate cyclically, depending on the relative economic status of young adults. The theoretical relevance of the model, and the validity of the demographic and econometric tests to which it has been submitted are discussed with particular reference to the downswing of the cycle. It shows that Butz and Ward's alternative model in which demand for rather than supply of labour plays the determining role (the rise in women's wages being regarded as particularly important in explaining the recent decline in fertility) cannot account for the recent recovery in birth rates. A study of a long series of net reproduction ratios (1930-1980) in 18 industrialized countries suggests five different types of development of post-transitional fertility. Only two of these could correspond to the beginning of long cycles. The assumption that relative economic status plays a determining part turns out to be debatable and not to be generally true. Finally, a return to a more general explanation, rooted in a consideration of profound historical movements, is suggested.

Has fecundability been declining in recent years in developed countries? A comment.

2 objections may be lodged against James (1981) who offers evidence that Western fecundability has been declining. His argument, together with the author's previous comment, engenders concern about the effect of technological change on reproductive ability. The recent fertility decline was, with minor exceptions, characterized by an increasing concentration of childbearing in the younger age groups. The age shift continues that observed in essentially every Western fertility decline thus far, and it is regarded as proof of increasing family limitation. Secondly, changes in reproductive potential cannot greatly affect reproduction unless the affected population is reproducing near that potential. A fecundity decline could not then effect the recent decline in fertility unless Western fecundity in 1960 had already been unexpectedly low. James offered his effect as only a partial explanation of that fertility decline. Before accepting such a concession, it is necessary to question whether the explanations and procedures of demography give reason to reject a biosocial explanation of the overall Western fertility decline, particularly one based on an increasing prevalence of degenerative diseases. Several objections to such a "demographic degeneration" theory are impugned by ambiguities in the usual demographic definitions of fecundity and birth control. The Davis-Blake framework for fertility analysis and the many surveys based on it fail to consider reasonable distinctions between the social and biological motives for birth control and between voluntary family limitation and behavioral disorders affecting fertility. As yet, the predicted sociopsychological determinants of fertility have not been found. Many demographers now concede the inadequacy of the desired family size model of childbearing. Couples reproductively compensate for child deaths at barely 1/4 of the rate it predicts. Social demographers have overlooked data providing 2 independent corroborations of a degeneration theory: the increase in chronic diseases affecting Western populations has been characterized by the same shift in age patterns as the Western fertility decline--both most affect the oldest ages; and the fertility declines experienced by animals subjected to several continuous stresses are accompanied by that same shift in the age pattern. These considerations suggest that James' effect may be a major component of an explanation based on increasing chronic disease, subfecundity, health motivated family limitation, and behavioral disorders affecting fertility.

On The Recent Fertility Decline in Japan

On The Recent Fertility Decline in Japan

On the Recent Fertility Decline in Japan

In the recent issue of this Journal, Mr.Yoshiki Kikuchi wrote about the rapid fertility decline since 1973 in Japan. He implied in it that the recent low fertility in Japan, measured by total fertility rates, reflected the decrease in birth intention of the average married couple toward less than two children. Based on the assumption that fertility behavior of Japanese women changed fundamentally in 1970's, he attempted population projections in which he assumed women would have only 1. 5 children on average in the future Japan.In my judgement, such argument is totally unwarranted. There has been no significant change in the legal status and the extent of actual prevalence of birth control measures in around early 1970's. In this respect Japanese situation is completely different from the Western countries where the diffusion of modern contraceptive methods and the liberalization of induced abortion presumably contributed to the recent fertility decline there.No evidence has shown that Japanese married couples have changed their fertility dramatically toward less than two children. Mean number of children ever born for 1955-1965 marriage cohorts were almost invariably about 2.2 and the total intended number of children was also 2.2 on average for more recent marriage cohorts.Although such social and economic changes as industrialization, urbanization, the rising aspirations for living, and the rise of educational level, may have been conducive to the long-run low fertility in Japan, they cannot explain the recent abrupt decline in period fertility rates. Also, there has been no significant change in married women's status either within or out of home.The major reason for the recent decline in period fertility rates is the simultaneous rise in the mean age at marriage for both sexes since 1973, which is, in turn, not only due to the abrupt shrinkage of the size of younger age cohorts in the marriage market after the “baby boom” cohort, but also due to the recent rise in the proportion of women entering colleges. Fragmentary data seem to indicate that marital fertility itself has declined recently, but this should be interpreted not as the decline in completed fertility but as the temporal decline due to the spacing of childbearing.

On the New Context of Marriage in Western Europe

The recent decline in fertility in western Europe has been accompanied by a decline in the number of marriages an increase in the number of divorces and changes in the fertility of unwed mothers. This has followed a period during which marriage was nearly universal and age at marriage had declined precipitously. In the last 10 years or so marriage rates have fallen off and divorce rates soared and an increase in cohabitation without official marriage has been noted along with a concomitant increase in numbers of children born out of wedlock. Marriage has become an increasingly personal affair based on mutual feelings -- a point attested to by both the rise in divorce rates (when these bonds break down) and the current questioning of formal marriage. Increased professional activity of women outside the home also points in this direction. However this does not imply that cohabitation will become the norm -- at least in those countries where social institutions continue to encourage marriage as the necessary framework for child rearing.

On the End of the Population Explosion: A Rejoinder

Focus is on the substantive issues raised in the Reply to this authors criticism of the propositions expounded by Bogue and Tsu on world fertility trends their causes and policy implications and the prospects for zero population growth. The discussion is organized around 4 main topics -- world population in the year 2000 estimates of recent fertility decline explaining fertility decline and the case for family planning programs. The 5.88 billion world population figure projected by Bogue and Tsui for the year 2000 is within the domain of the plausible; criticism was directed not at their numerical figures but at their interpretation of those figures as representing a world demographic outlook markedly changed for the better. Bogue and Tsuis defense of their estimates of recent fertility decline underscores the tenuousness of the numerical estimates that they have presented for that decline and the validity of the objections raised. Whatever the actual influence of family planning programs on fertility decline bickering about percentages attributable to this or that factor is warranted only if the underlying model construction that produced the results initially could be adequately defended. The analytical difficulty Bogue and Tsui encounter but are unwilling to admit is illustrated. There are obvious and strong arguments pointing to the potentially high cost-effectiveness of family planning programs but on the basis of the record of such programs to date it is clear that in many present-day developing countries the programs potential scope for affecting fertility levels is very limited.

The Recent Fertility Decline in the Chiang Mai Area of Thailand

An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for the seventh Summer Seminar, East-West Population Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1976. For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/

The Recent Fertility Decline in the Chiang Mai Area of Thailand.

An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for the seventh Summer Seminar, East-West Population Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1976. For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/