Recent Cognitive Science Research Articles

Rethinking intelligent behaviour through the lens of accurate prediction: Adaptive control in uncertain environments

While recent cognitive science research shows a renewed interest in understanding intelligence, there is still little consensus on what constitutes intelligent behaviour and how it should be assessed. Here we propose a refined approach to biological intelligence as accurate prediction, according to which intelligent behaviour should be understood as adaptive control driven by the minimisation of uncertainty in dynamic environments with limited information. Central to this view is the concept of accuracy, which we argue is key to determining the success of predictions. We identify tensions in applying this framework to contemporary artificial systems such as large-language models, which, despite their impressive capacities for abstract prediction, show deficits in terms of context-sensitive knowledge transfer.

The body says it all: Non-verbal indicators of choice awareness

Abstract Recent cognitive science research suggests that occasional “blindness” to choice manipulations indicates a lack of awareness in choice making. This claim is based on participants’ tendency not to detect choice manipulations and the similarity between their justifications for choices they made and those they were tricked into believing they made. Using a cognitive-semiotic framework, we argue that such conclusions underestimate the embodied, intersubjective nature of human meaning-making. We support this by investigating choice awareness beyond language to include non-verbal behavior. Forty-one participants were asked to choose from pairs of photographs of human faces the one they found most attractive and then to justify their choices, without knowing that for some of the trials they were asked to justify a choice that they had not made. Verbal responses were categorized as (i) non-manipulated, (ii) detected manipulated, and (iii) undetected manipulated trials. Bodily expressions, assessed using five different Categories of Bodily Expression (CBE): Adaptors, Torso, Head, Face and Hand expressions, revealed differences in: (a) duration, (b) rates of occurrence and (c) variety of the CBEs across trials. Thus, even when manipulations were not verbally detected, participants took longer to assess choices, showed increased bodily expressions, and engaged more body parts in undetected manipulations compared to non-manipulated choice trials. This suggests a degree of awareness to the choice manipulation, even if pre-reflective, manifested in participants’ bodily expressions.

Remaking Critical Theory: A Creative Humanities Process and Intervention

Popular conceptions of creativity advance a neoliberal world view that reduces creativity to spontaneous ideation or so-called “right-brain thinking.” Such formulations, now commonly upheld in popular and educational discourse, blinker the essential role of criticality and sensitivity to socio-cultural context in the creative process. To challenge the neoliberalization of creativity, we designed the Remaking Critical Theory (RCT) process, which synthesizes recent cognitive science and creative humanities research to reconstitute creativity as criticality and vice versa – what we label critical creativity. The process reframes humanistic interpretation as a critical-creative activity and adapts methods from art, design, and innovation management to facilitate the production of humanities insights. Drawing upon dual-process models of creative cognition, we theorize how the RCT process activates the right type of thinking at the right time in the creative process. We also evidence efficacy by delineating and reflecting upon a pilot application at Sheridan College, which culminated in the student researchers making critical theory zines. More than simply reaffirming the value of critical theory in neoliberal societies, we delineate a radically new approach to humanities research and pedagogy.

Comparing Moralities in the Abrahamic and Indic Religions Using Cognitive Science: Kindness, Peace, and Love versus Justice, Violence, and Hate

Recent cognitive science research indicates that humans possess numerous biologically rooted religious and moral intuitions. The present article draws on this research to compare forms of religious morality in the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) and the Indic traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism). Special attention is given to moral teachings on kindness, peace, and love, as well as related teachings on justice, violence, and hate. The article considers how moral intuitions shape Abrahamic/Indic moral teachings, which, in turn, impact: (1) Abrahamic/Indic doctrines concerning politics, law, and war; (2) Abrahamic/Indic doctrines concerning individual ethics, and moral behavior proper to monastics and laypersons; and (3) Abrahamic/Indic doctrines concerning theological matters, such as the nature of the universe, souls, and deities.

Character: Three Inquiries in Literary Studies

Character: Three Inquiries in Literary Studies

Why kinship is progeneratively constrained: Extending anthropology

The conceptualisation of kinship and its study remain contested within anthropology. This paper draws on recent cognitive science, developmental cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of science to offer a novel argument for a view of kinship as progeneratively or reproductively constrained. I shall argue that kinship involves a form of extended cognition that incorporates progenerative facts, going on to show how the resulting articulation of kinship’s progenerative nature can be readily expressed by an influential conception of kinds, the homeostatic property cluster view. Identifying the distinctive role that our extended cognitive access to progenerative facts plays in kinship delivers an integrative, progenerativist view that avoids standard performativist criticisms of progenerativism as being ethnocentric, epistemically naïve, and reductive.

Static-Dynamic Hybridity in Dynamical Models of Cognition

Abstract Dynamical models of cognition have played a central role in recent cognitive science. In this paper, we consider a common strategy by which dynamical models describe their target systems neither as purely static nor as purely dynamic, but rather using a hybrid approach. This hybridity reveals how dynamical models involve representational choices that are important for understanding the relationship between dynamical and non-dynamical representations of a system.

Analogy-Detail Networks for Object Recognition.

The human visual system can recognize object categories accurately and efficiently and is robust to complex textures and noises. To mimic the analogy-detail dual-pathway human visual cognitive mechanism revealed in recent cognitive science studies, in this article, we propose a novel convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture named analogy-detail networks (ADNets) for accurate object recognition. ADNets disentangle the visual information and process them separately using two pathways: the analogy pathway extracts coarse and global features representing the gist (i.e., shape and topology) of the object, while the detail pathway extracts fine and local features representing the details (i.e., texture and edges) for determining object categories. We modularize the architecture and encapsulate the two pathways into the analogy-detail block as the CNN building block to construct ADNets. For implementation, we propose a general principle that transmutes typical CNN structures into the ADNet architecture and applies the transmutation on representative baseline CNNs. Extensive experiments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, street view house numbers, and ImageNet data sets demonstrate that ADNets significantly reduce the test error rates of the baseline CNNs by up to 5.76% and outperform other state-of-the-art architectures. Comprehensive analysis and visualizations further demonstrate that ADNets are interpretable and have a better shape-texture tradeoff for recognizing the objects with complex textures.

How and Why We Should Argue with Angry Uncle: A Defense of Fact Dumping and Consistency Checking

ABSTRACT How should we talk to Angry Uncle, or attempt to persuade any very ignorant audience? This paper discusses several strategies, including fact dumping, consistency checking, pandering, and just being friendly. It defends the continued value of fact dumping and consistency checking despite skeptical doubts rooted in recent cognitive science literature about their strategic efficacy. Pandering and friendliness often fail to confront our audience with epistemic resistance and so face serious limitations as means of responding to ignorance. Any reasonable view of how to talk to Angry Uncles must also consider how to meet relevant moral standards, such as showing respect for ourselves, our audience, and important social causes. Without some fact dumping and consistency checking, pandering and friendliness often fail to meet these standards. All in all, the various modes work best together, and it would be a mistake to conclude from unfavorable cognitive science research that we should avoid fact dumping and consistency checking in Angry Uncle exchanges.

Tormented by sinful thoughts in seventeenth-century England

ABSTRACT In seventeenth-century England, many religiously devout people believed they had an obligation to immediately stifle any sinful thought that entered their minds. As some prominent clerics during the time period recognised, however, the effort to subdue unwelcome thoughts often can increase the thoughts. Indeed, recent cognitive science research bears out the counterintuitive phenomenon that trying to suppress an undesired thought can boomerang. With this in mind, just how effective was the endeavour in seventeenth-century England to purify thoughts? The paper argues that it was frequently counterproductive. The paper also explores a disagreement among mental health professionals, historians, and literary scholars regarding how to interpret the numerous seventeenth-century English autobiographical descriptions of tormenting, uncontrollable sinful thoughts. For instance, were the ungovernable blasphemous thoughts that Pilgrim's Progress author John Bunyan (1628-1688) recounted experiencing the product of a bodily illness equivalent to obsessive-compulsive disorder? The question presents methodological challenges.

Disseminated Computation, Cognitive Domestication of New Ignorant Substrates, and Overcomputationalization

Eco-cognitive computationalism considers computation in the context of following some of the main tenets advanced by the recent cognitive science views on embodied, situated and distributed cognition. It is in the framework of this eco-cognitive perspective that we can usefully analyze the recent attention in computer science devoted to the importance of the simplification of cognitive and motor tasks caused in organic entities by the morphological features: ignorant bodies can be domesticated to become useful “mimetic bodies”, that is to be able to render an intertwined computation simpler, resorting to that “simplexity” of animal embodied cognition, which represents one of the main qualities of organic agents. Through eco-cognitive computationalism we can clearly acknowledge that the concept of computation changes, depending on historical and contextual causes and we can build an epistemological view that illustrates the “emergence” of new kinds of computations, such as the one regarding morphological computation. This new perspective shows how the computational domestication of ignorant entities can originate new unconventional cognitive embodiments. I also introduce the concept of overcomputationalism, showing that my proposed framework helps us see the related concepts of pancognitivism, paniformationalism and pancomputationalism in a more naturalized and prudent perspective, avoiding the excess of old-fashioned ontological or metaphysical overstatements.

Imaginative Constraints and Generative Models

ABSTRACT How can imagination generate knowledge when its contents are voluntarily determined? Several philosophers have recently answered this question by pointing to the constraints that underpin imagination when it plays knowledge-generating roles. Nevertheless, little has been said about the nature of these constraints. In this paper, I argue that the constraints that underpin sensory imagination come from the structure of causal probabilistic generative models, a construct that has been highly influential in recent cognitive science and machine learning. I highlight several attractions of this account, and I favourably contrast it with Peter Langland-Hassan’s account of sensory imagination in terms of the forward models exploited in sensorimotor control.

On the Politics of Perception in Moving Image Technology

If Walter Benjamin’s interpretation of modernity was, as some argue, centered on shock, then cognition, especially cognition mediated by the mass art technologies of photography and cinema, is always a political matter. This paper assesses the politics of media technology in Benjamin’s famous ‘Mechanical Reproducibility’ essay in light of recent American cognitivist philosophy and the competing phenomenological cognitive science of embodied cognition. I would like to argue that recent cognitive science confirms certain relationships central to Benjamin’s insights concerning the political nature of the moving image and, further, that such cognitive science reveals significant shortcomings in cognitivist philosophy’s approach to the phenomena. As a result, Benjamin’s analysis remains useful for clarifying the politics of perception today and recent cognitive science ought to take notice of the political nature of such mediation.

Computational domestication of ignorant entities

Eco-cognitive computationalism considers computation in context, following some of the main tenets advanced by the recent cognitive science views on embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. It is in the framework of this eco-cognitive perspective that we can usefully analyze the recent attention in computer science devoted to the importance of the simplification of cognitive and motor tasks caused in organic entities by the morphological features: ignorant bodies can be domesticated to become useful “mimetic bodies”, that is able to render an intertwined computation simpler, resorting to that “simplexity” of animal embodied cognition, which represents one of the main quality of organic agents. Through eco-cognitive computationalism we can clearly acknowledge that the concept of computation changes, depending on historical and contextual causes, and we can build an epistemological view that illustrates the “emergence” of new kinds of computations, such as the one regarding morphological computation. This new perspective shows how the computational domestication of ignorant entities can originate new unconventional cognitive embodiments. In the last part of the article I will introduce the concept of overcomputationalism, showing that my proposed framework helps us see the related concepts of pancognitivism, paniformationalism, and pancomputationalism in a more naturalized and prudent perspective, avoiding the excess of old-fashioned ontological or metaphysical overstatements.

The Spatial Thinking Workbook: A Research-Validated Spatial Skills Curriculum for Geology Majors

ABSTRACT Spatial visualization is an essential prerequisite for understanding geological features at all scales, such as the atomic structures of minerals, the geometry of a complex fault system, or the architecture of sedimentary deposits. Undergraduate geoscience majors bring a range of spatial skill levels to upper-level courses. Fortunately, spatial thinking improves with practice, and students benefit from intentional training. Several promising teaching strategies have emerged from recent cognitive science research into spatial thinking: gesturing, predictive sketching, and comparison, including analogy and alignment. Geoscience educators have traditionally incorporated many of these tools in their teaching, though not always consciously, intentionally, and in the most effective ways. Our research team, composed of geoscientists and cognitive psychologists, has collaborated to develop curricular materials for mineralogy, structural geology, and sedimentology and stratigraphy courses that incorporate these strategies intentionally and purposefully, supporting student understanding of the spatially challenging concepts and skills in these courses. Collectively, these two dozen learning activities comprise the Spatial Thinking Workbook (http://serc.carleton.edu/spatialworkbook/index.html). Pre- to posttest gains on a suite of assessment instruments, as well as embedded assessments, show that these curricular materials boost students' spatial thinking skills and strengthen their ability to solve geological problems with a spatial component.

Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars

Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing advances a theory of neural function with the resources to put an ecumenical end to the “representation wars” of recent cognitive science. In this paper I defend and develop this suggestion. First, I broaden the representation wars to include three foundational challenges to representational cognitive science. Second, I articulate three features of predictive processing’s account of internal representation that distinguish it from more orthodox representationalist frameworks. Specifically, I argue that it posits a resemblance-based representational architecture with organism-relative contents that functions in the service of pragmatic success, not veridical representation. Finally, I argue that internal representation so understood is either impervious to the three anti-representationalist challenges I outline or can actively embrace them.

Reasoning under Scarcity

ABSTRACTPractical deliberation consists in thinking about what to do. Such deliberation is deemed rational when it conforms to certain normative requirements. What is often ignored is the role that an agent's context can play in so-called ‘failures’ of rationality. In this paper, I use recent cognitive science research investigating the effects of resource-scarcity on decision-making and cognitive function to argue that context plays an important role in determining which norms should structure an agent's deliberation. This evidence undermines the view that the norms of ‘ideal’ rationality are necessary and universal requirements on deliberation. They are a solution to the problems faced by cognitively limited agents in a context of moderate scarcity. In a context of severe scarcity, the problems faced by cognitively limited agents are different and require deliberation structured by different norms. Agents reason rationally when they use the norms best suited to their context and cognitive capacities.

An organizing model for recent cognitive science work on the self.

An organizing model for recent cognitive science work on the self.

Choreographic Arrhythmias

Aberrations in the constancy and duration of movement challenge the determination of bodies and things within and beyond dance. In fact, 19th-century anthropological studies on animism and recent cognitive science experiments on timescale bias demonstrate that the agency of erratic motion is difficult to apprehend. From irregular and unexpected movements in dance to the variable tempos of cell motility, this paper considers how arrhythmic choreography recalibrates the agency of matter, objects, bodies and environments.

The Multidimensional Spectrum of Imagination: Images, Dreams, Hallucinations, and Active, Imaginative Perception

A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre) he draws an excessively sharp, qualitative distinction between imagination and perception, and because of his flawed, empirically ungrounded conception of hallucination. His arguments in defense of these views are rebutted in detail, and the traditional, passive, Cartesian view of visual perception, upon which several of them implicitly rely, is criticized in the light of findings from recent cognitive science and neuroscience. It is also argued that the apparent intuitiveness of the passive view of visual perception is a result of mere historical contingency. An understanding of perception (informed by modern visual science) as an inherently active process enables us to unify our accounts of perception, mental imagery, dreaming, hallucination, creativity, and other aspects of imagination within a single coherent theoretical framework.