Real-world Elections Research Articles

Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries

The organization of US presidential elections makes them potentially vulnerable to the “voting paradoxes” identified by social choice theorists but rarely documented in real-world elections. Using polling data from the 2016 Republican presidential primaries we identify two possible cases: Early in the pre-primary (2015) a cyclical majority may have existed in Republican voters’ preferences between Bush, Cruz and Walker. Furthermore, later polling data (January-March 2016) suggests that while Trump (who achieved less than 50% of the total Republican primary vote) was the Plurality Winner, he could have been beaten in pairwise contests by at least one other candidate and may have been the Condorcet Loser. The cases confirm the empirical relevance of the theoretical voting paradoxes and the importance of voting procedures.

It’s My Party and I’ll Vote How I Want to: Experimental Evidence of Directional Voting in Two-Candidate Elections

The competing theories of proximity and directional voting have long been used to model voting behavior. Empirically evaluating these theories, however, requires knowledge of voters’ utilities, which are inherently unobserved. Empiricists have generally dealt with this by using self-reports of utility. Yet, self-reports are likely biased, leaving experimental predictions at odds with real-world election outcomes. We improve upon this method by constructing a discrete choice model which is able to measure the likelihood of any one voter exhibiting proximity voting behavior as opposed to directional voting behavior, without needing to know voters’ utilities. We subsequently conduct a voting experiment with over 1,800 participants to estimate the parameters of the model. Our results suggest that, among voters whose expected behavior differs across the two theories, there is an approximately even split between voting behaviors, and the probability of exhibiting proximity voting behavior decreases by roughly 10 percentage points for each step away from the midpoint of a (−10 to +10) political spectrum. Our results are robust across two measures of preferences and four candidate pairings. The outcomes of our experiment are also consistent with the results of the 2012 Presidential Election, which took place the day after our experiment closed.

Computational aspects of strategic behaviour in elections with top-truncated ballots

Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past two decades. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that the voters or agents specify a complete preference ordering over the set of candidates. There are many multiagent systems applications, and even real-world elections, where this assumption is not warranted, and this in turn raises a series of questions on the impact of partial voting on the complexity of manipulative actions. In this paper, we focus on two of these questions. First, we address the question of how hard it is to manipulate elections when the agents specify only top-truncated ballots. Here, in particular, we look at the weighted manipulation problem—both constructive and destructive manipulation—when the voters are allowed to specify top-truncated ballots, and we provide general results for all scoring rules, for elimination versions of all scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems known as Copeland\(^{\alpha }\), and for the maximin protocol. The second question we address is the impact of top-truncated voting on the complexity of manipulative actions in electorates with structured preference profiles. In particular, we consider electorates that are single-peaked and we show how, for many voting protocols, allowing top-truncated voting reimposes the \(\mathcal {NP}\)-hardness shields that normally vanish in such electorates.

A testbed to enable comparisons between competing approaches for computational social choice

Within artificial intelligence, the field of computational social choice studies the application of AI techniques to the problem of group decision making, especially through systems where each agent submits a vote taking the form of a total ordering over the alternatives (a preference). Reaching a reasonable decision becomes more difficult when some agents are unwilling or unable to rank all the alternatives, and appropriate voting systems must be devised to handle the resulting incomplete preference information. In this paper, we present a detailed testbed which can be used to perform information analytics in this domain. We illustrate the testbed in action for the context of determining a winner or putting candidates into ranked order, using data from realworld elections, and demonstrate how to use the results of the testbed to produce effective comparisons between competing algorithms.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Peru

I combine a field experiment with a change in voting laws reducing the fine for abstention to assess the effects of monetary incentives to encourage voter participation. In a real world election, using experimental variation in the perceived reduction of the fine for abstention I estimate that receiving information about a reduction in the fine by 50 (75) percent causes a decrease in turnout of 2.6 (5.3) percentage points. These estimates imply a cost elasticity of voting of −0.22. The reduction in turnout is driven by voters who are in the center of the political spectrum, hold less political information and have lower subjective value of voting. The increase in abstention does not change aggregate preferences for specific policies. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire political information, is independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that the reduction in the fine reduces the incidence of vote buying and increases the price paid for a vote.

An Efficient E2E Verifiable E-voting System without Setup Assumptions

End-to-end (E2E) verifiability is critical if e-voting systems are to be adopted for use in real-world elections. A new E2E e-voting system doesn't require additional setup assumptions and uses conventional cryptographic building blocks.

The role of partisan cues in voter mobilization campaigns: Evidence from a randomized field experiment

The transmission of partisan appeals during election campaigns is widely believed to aid the formation of citizens' candidate preferences, or to serve as rallying cries, thereby increasing turnout. While laboratory and survey experiments show that partisan cues help citizens decide between candidates, and partisan elections see higher turnout than non-partisan elections, it is unclear if party labels and partisan rhetoric cause voters to turn out in higher numbers in real-world elections. We exploit a low-information election in the UK to randomly assign whether campaign phone messages include strong partisan cues or promote the same candidate without such cues. Whereas we find no significant difference in the overall effectiveness of messages with and without partisan cues at increasing turnout, the effectiveness of the former is moderated by party preference: Consistent with the use of acceptance-rejection heuristics, campaign calls with partisan cues are more likely to mobilize party supporters than rival partisans.

Neural predictors of evaluative attitudes toward celebrities

Our attitudes toward others influence a wide range of everyday behaviors and have been the most extensively studied concept in the history of social psychology. Yet they remain difficult to measure reliably and objectively, since both explicit and implicit measures are typically confounded by other psychological processes. We here address the feasibility of decoding incidental attitudes based on brain activations. Participants were presented with pictures of members of a Japanese idol group inside an functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner while performing an unrelated detection task, and subsequently (outside the scanner) performed an incentive-compatible choice task that revealed their attitude toward each celebrity. We used a real-world election scheme that exists for this idol group, which confirmed both strongly negative and strongly positive attitudes toward specific individuals. Whole-brain multivariate analyses (searchlight-based support vector regression) showed that activation patterns in the anterior striatum predicted each participant’s revealed attitudes (choice behavior) using leave-one-out (as well as 4-fold) cross-validation across participants. In contrast, attitude extremity (unsigned magnitude) could be decoded from a distinct region in the posterior striatum. The findings demonstrate dissociable striatal representations of valenced attitude and attitude extremity and constitute a first step toward an objective and process-pure neural measure of attitudes.

The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Voting for Women Candidates by Level and Type of Office

Previous research has documented that the public often views women candidates through the lens of gender stereotypes. However, as much of this work draws on experimental designs and hypothetical candidates, we have less information about whether and how voters employ stereotypes in the face of real candidates for office. This project examines one important aspect of the impact of stereotypes on the fate of actual women candidates: whether gender stereotypes have a different influence on elections for different levels and types of offices. Previous research suggests that voters are more likely to apply male stereotypes and evaluate candidates differently as the level of office increases and as we consider executive versus legislative office. The research reported here draws on new data that capture voter attitudes and behaviors in real-world elections to test a series of hypotheses related to when and how gender stereotypes affect candidates for the U.S. Congress and governorships. In general, we find little evidence to support claims that voters stereotype women candidates differently when they seek different kinds of offices.

Online and Social Media Data As an Imperfect Continuous Panel Survey.

There is a large body of research on utilizing online activity as a survey of political opinion to predict real world election outcomes. There is considerably less work, however, on using this data to understand topic-specific interest and opinion amongst the general population and specific demographic subgroups, as currently measured by relatively expensive surveys. Here we investigate this possibility by studying a full census of all Twitter activity during the 2012 election cycle along with the comprehensive search history of a large panel of Internet users during the same period, highlighting the challenges in interpreting online and social media activity as the results of a survey. As noted in existing work, the online population is a non-representative sample of the offline world (e.g., the U.S. voting population). We extend this work to show how demographic skew and user participation is non-stationary and difficult to predict over time. In addition, the nature of user contributions varies substantially around important events. Furthermore, we note subtle problems in mapping what people are sharing or consuming online to specific sentiment or opinion measures around a particular topic. We provide a framework, built around considering this data as an imperfect continuous panel survey, for addressing these issues so that meaningful insight about public interest and opinion can be reliably extracted from online and social media data.

Conventional Machine Learning for Social Choice

Deciding the outcome of an election when voters have provided only partial orderings over their preferences requires voting rules that accommodate missing data. While existing techniques, including considerable recent work, address missingness through circumvention, we propose the novel application of conventional machine learning techniques to predict the missing components of ballots via latent patterns in the information that voters are able to provide. We show that suitable predictive features can be extracted from the data, and demonstrate the high performance of our new framework on the ballots from many real world elections, including comparisons with existing techniques for voting with partial orderings. Our technique offers a new and interesting conceptualization of the problem, with stronger connections to machine learning than conventional social choice techniques.

A Simultaneous Analysis of Turnout and Voting Under Proportional Representation: Theory and Experiments

In a system of proportional representation, we study the interaction between a voter’s turnout decision and her party choice, and how these relate to party polarization. Quantal response equilibria predict such interaction effects. In particular they predict (i) a Polarization Effect: reduced strategic party choice when voting is voluntary makes voters more likely to vote for extreme parties (conditional on voting at all); (ii) an Extremist Effect: voters supporting extreme parties are most likely to vote; (iii) a Turnout Effect: party polarization increases voter turnout. We provide data from a laboratory experiment that support these theoretical predictions. In addition, we provide supporting empirical evidence from real world elections. Hence, the interaction between turnout and strategic voting that has been neglected in most of the previous literature is shown to be important.

Please Don’t Vote for Me: Strategic Voting in a Natural Experiment with Perverse Incentives

Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. Exploiting a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may gain seats by receiving fewer votes, this paper documents patterns of strategic voting in a large, real world election. During the 2005 elections to the Bundestag, the sudden death of a right-wing candidate necessitated a by-election in one electoral district. Knowing the results in all other districts and aware of the paradoxical incentives in place, a substantial fraction of the electorate reacted tactically and either voted for a party other than their most preferred one, or abstained. As a result, the Christian Democratic Union won an additional mandate, extending its narrow lead over the Social Democrats.

Probabilistic voting equilibria under nonlinear candidate payoffs

The ‘mean voter theorem’ implies that candidates should choose identical policy positions in a two-candidate race if voting is probabilistic. This result is in fact an artifact of the assumption that the candidates maximize expected vote share or probability of win, which is not true for many real-world elections. In this paper I analyze a probabilistic voting model in which the candidates have preferences other than the maximization of the expected number of votes or the probability of win maximization. I derive the comparative statics for two voters and one-dimensional policy space. Each voter cares about both the policy platform and the identity of the candidate. It is shown that an increase in the value of exactly one vote causes each candidate to choose a position closer to that of its partisan voter. Numeric computation of equilibria show that these results can be generalized to three or more voters. The results imply that the nonlinearity and non-symmetry of payoffs can affect the policy positions of the candidates.

Where are the hard manipulation problems

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate the result by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational complexity. In particular, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We consider two settings which represent the two types of complexity results that have been identified in this area: manipulation with unweighted votes by a single agent, and manipulation with weighted votes by a coalition of agents. In the first case, we consider Single Transferable Voting (STV), and in the second case, we consider veto voting. STV is one of the few voting rules used in practice where it is NP-hard to compute how a single agent can manipulate the result when votes are unweighted. It also appears one of the harder voting rules to manipulate since it involves multiple rounds. On the other hand, veto voting is one of the simplest representatives of voting rules where it is NP-hard to compute how a coalition of weighted agents can manipulate the result. In our experiments, we sample a number of distributions of votes including uniform, correlated and real world elections. In many of the elections in our experiments, it was easy to compute how to manipulate the result or to prove that manipulation was impossible. Even when we were able to identify a situation in which manipulation was hard to compute (e.g. when votes are highly correlated and the election is hung), we found that the computational difficulty of computing manipulations was somewhat precarious (e.g. with such hung elections, even a single uncorrelated voter was enough to make manipulation easy to compute).

Altruism and Turnout

Scholars have recently reworked the traditional calculus of voting model by adding a term for benefits to others. Although the probability that a single vote affects the outcome of an election is quite small, the number of people who enjoy the benefit when the preferred alternative wins is large. As a result, people who care about benefits to others and who think one of the alternatives makes others better off are more likely to vote. I test the altruism theory of voting in the laboratory by using allocations in a dictator game to reveal the degree to which each subject is concerned about the well-being of others. The main findings suggest that variation in concern for the well-being of others in conjunction with strength of party identification is a significant factor in individual turnout decisions in real world elections. Partisan altruists are much more likely to vote than their nonpartisan or egoist peers.

Taking New World Notes: An embedded journalist's rough guide to reporting from inside the Internet's next evolution

In 2005, persistent online worlds — sometimes saddled with the unwieldy acronym MMORPGs, for “massively multiplayer online role playing games,” or somewhat less clumsily, MMOs — made the leap from niche entertainment to global mainstream medium. On a popularity metric, Worlds of Warcraft became the first game to surpass a million U.S. subscribers, while gaining a global audience over 4.5 million and counting (with a third of that from mainland China.) On an innovation scale, Second Life suggested the potential for MMOs to also be a development platform for commercial, educational, and research projects. As broadband and high end PCs saturate the international market, it’s time to consider MMOs as the likeliest candidate for the Internet’s next generation, supplanting the two dimensional, semi–interactive portal of the Web for an immersive, three–dimensional, fully interactive Metaverse of data. But a new medium requires new guidelines for understanding it, and it is here that many questions loom. What happens as users continue to employ MMOs for purposes beyond gaming or light socializing, when they become the first true meeting space for the world, where cultural, commercial, and political intercourse is conducted in real time in an immersive setting that feels real, even hyperreal? When they have a direct, measurable impact on real world news? And who will do the reporting to understand this profound shift? Unlike the Web revolution of the ’90s, documenting the emergence of online worlds is something that will be conducted from the inside, immersed within the media itself. Some tentative guidelines are therefore proposed, a new kind of journalistic ethics for a world where reality and identity are mutable and anonymity is both hazard and godsend. Based on nearly three years as Second Life’s official embedded journalist, the author suggests several principles, with the object to preserve a separation between real life identity and virtual being, while sustaining the fantastic, otherworldly nature of online worlds. Paradoxically, it’s argued, maintaining the illusion increases the value of online worlds as a journalistic tool, enabling a direct, intimate form of communication with diverse people throughout the world. At the same time, it enables us to see these worlds as model and microcosm for the socioeconomic realm of the world at large. In either case, these worlds can help us understand the conflicts and values of our own material world — and for good and ill, begin to shape them. To emphasize how crucial the need to understand this next dramatic shift for the Internet, the author offers five likely futures in which online worlds directly impact national and international politics and the global economy — a time when MMOs help decide the outcomes of real–world elections and influence long–established jurisprudence, while authoritarian government attempt to repress them, and they become the next theater for terrorist and counterterrorist infiltration.

Candidate ability and platform choice

Contrary to the median voter theorem, candidates in real-world elections do not always adopt moderate platforms. Using a modified Hotelling model, we show that low-ability candidates may attempt to differentiate themselves from higher-ability competitors by choosing less moderate platforms.

Collective preferences in presidential elections

Although the literature on cyclical majorities is extensive, there is a paucity of empirical examinations of real world elections with mass electorates. This brief article attempts such an analysis. Using CPS data, I address the issue of intransitivities in social preferences for candidates in US presidential elections from 1972 to 1984. It is argued that (a) there were clear Condorcet winners in each of the four elections in question, and (b) that in each case collective preferences were ideologically constrained.

The Structure of Voter Preferences

Economic models of voting typically assume the transitivity of individual-level preferences. Other conditions, such as single-peakedness or dichotomization, are also sometimes postulated. Despite the ubiquity of these assumptions, there is a paucity of empirical tests using real-world elections with mass electorates. Using CPS data, I address these issues in the context of U.S. presidential elections from 1972 to 1984. It is maintained that (a) the traditional assumption of transitivity is empirically plausible, even with a large number of alternatives, and while preferences are (b) predominantly not dichotomous, they do (c) tend to be single-peaked along a traditional ideological dimension.