Rational Requirements Research Articles

Rational requirements and ‘rational’ akrasia

Can akrasia be rational? Can it be rational to resist the motivational force of your own practical judgment? While I do not believe that akrasia can be rational, I think there is something revealingly right in recent arguments for the proposition. I aim to defend that insight in a way that does not entail that akrasia can be rational but more fundamentally addresses the normative structure of rational requirements. The fundamental issue lies in the relationship between two conceptions of rationality. Previous treatments of ‘rational’ akrasia have tended to regard rationality as a responsiveness to reasons. Previous treatments of rational requirements have tended to regard rationality as an attitudinal coherence. I’ll reformulate the question of rational akrasia within a framework that construes rationality as coherence. And I’ll reformulate the question of rational coherence to admit the possibility of reasoning as the apparently rational akratic does—from failure to follow through on a judgment to abandonment of that judgment. I’ll argue that rational requirements codify an agential coherence that you negotiate through a dynamic of self-trust and self-mistrust. It is not reasoning to abandon your judgment through forgetfulness, confusion or perverse self-rebellion. But it can be reasoning to abandon your judgment through reasonable self-mistrust. The difference lies in how self-mistrust can manifest a sensitivity to the norm of rational coherence that gives normative force to rational requirements. The core insight of those who defend the possibility of ‘rational’ akrasia lies in their emphasis on the rational force of self-mistrust.

Study on ductile crack initiation limit from notch root of pipeline girth welded joints with strength mismatch

This study investigated ductile crack initiation limit of pipeline girth welded joints with different strength mismatches. The ductile crack initiation limit for the girth welded joints was evaluated by conducting three-point bending fracture toughness tests and wide plate tensile tests with a surface notch. In addition, effect of heat input on the ductile crack initiation limit of weld metal (WM) was evaluated on the assumption that a welding condition would be varied in the field in the actual pipeline construction. As the results, the equivalent plastic strain at the notch tip for the ductile crack initiation of the three-point bending tests was consistent with those of the wide plate tests, and the heat input hardly affected the ductile crack initiation limit within the range of this study. This meant that the ductile crack initiation limit of the pipeline girth welded joints with strength mis-match was able to be estimated using the equivalent plastic strain obtained from the three-point bending tests. Based on these results, we proposed a procedure to determine the rational fracture toughness requirements which took into account the difference in the plastic constraint between standard fracture toughness test and pipeline girth welded joints. This procedure was also possible to determine the required strength matching level for a strain-based design for girth welded joint containing surface notch in the centre of the WM in terms of preventing the ductile crack initiation.

Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets

We analyze centralized housing markets under the existence of feasibility constraints on the number of agents and objects involved in the exchanges. We focus on an incomplete information setting where only the information about how each agent ranks her endowment is private. We show that under non-degenerate ex-ante probability distributions over preference profiles, no rule satisfies the joint requirements of individual rationality, (constrained) efficiency, and ordinally Bayesian incentive compatibility.

The database search problem: A question of rational decision making

This paper applies probability and decision theory in the graphical interface of an influence diagram to study the formal requirements of rationality which justify the individualization of a person found through a database search. The decision-theoretic part of the analysis studies the parameters that a rational decision maker would use to individualize the selected person. The modeling part (in the form of an influence diagram) clarifies the relationships between this decision and the ingredients that make up the database search problem, i.e., the results of the database search and the different pairs of propositions describing whether an individual is at the source of the crime stain. These analyses evaluate the desirability associated with the decision of ‘individualizing’ (and ‘not individualizing’). They point out that this decision is a function of (i) the probability that the individual in question is, in fact, at the source of the crime stain (i.e., the state of nature), and (ii) the decision maker's preferences among the possible consequences of the decision (i.e., the decision maker's loss function). We discuss the relevance and argumentative implications of these insights with respect to recent comments in specialized literature, which suggest points of view that are opposed to the results of our study.

On Rational Amoralists

An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more general requirements of rationality, but the violations of the moral requirements would be indicative of a rational failure. In this article I argue that ascription of irrationality to amoral individuals (e.g., psychopaths) is either empirically false, or else, conceptually problematic. An interpretation of irrationality in its instrumental sense fails to do justice to the results of the research concerning the intelligence of some amoralists, whereas the suggestion that the alleged cognitive deficiency lies at the level of final ends and ultimate values faces serious theoretical difficulties. All attempts to construe the notion of an external reason for action without reference to the agent's actual goals and values bespeak an objectivist's bias, rest on controversial assumptions, and tend to alienate the agent from the proposed set of reasons. The argument is partly based on the analysis of reasoning of Ted Bundy, a notorious serial murderer, who presents a rather sophisticated justification for his criminal behavior.

A Direct Method for Measuring Discounting and QALYs More Easily and Reliably

Time discounting and quality of life are two important factors in evaluations of medical interventions. The measurement of these two factors is complicated because they interact. Existing methods either simply assume one factor given, based on heuristic assumptions, or invoke complicating extraneous factors, such as risk, that generate extra biases. The authors introduce a method for measuring discounting (and then quality of life) that involves no extraneous factors and that avoids distorting interactions. Their method is considerably simpler and more realistic for subjects than existing methods. It is entirely choice based and thus can be founded on economic rationality requirements. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of this method and its advantages over classical methods.

Multi-attribute non-expected utility

In management applications of risk theory, planning and decision making are typically concerned with complex multi-dimensional attributes of risk and utility trade-offs between them. This paper presents a novel approach to multi-attribute non-expected utility which is especially designed to serve application and risk management purposes. It is based on a recently developed non-expected utility model that accommodates systematic violations of expected utility of various kinds observed in risky choice experiments. In the model, the possible outcomes of risky decisions are assumed to be multi-dimensional, that is, classified, measured, compared and assessed from different economic and non-economic perspectives simultaneously. Of the risk attributes to be jointly evaluated in a decision problem, each is supposed to be utility independent of the complementary set of all the other attributes also considered. Mutual utility independence and additive independence are particularly pronounced forms of utility independence. An order-preserving preference functional exists if the agent’s risk preferences satisfy familiar rationality requirements. The functional provides a consistently scaled, multi-linear representation in terms of single-attribute probability-dependent utility functions. Finally, the formalism is applied to explain observed trade-offs between monetary benefits obtained, and fatalities incurred, in the operation of large-scale industrial systems.

Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (Strategy-proof social choice on single-peaked domains: possibility, impossibility and the space between, 2002), Nehring (Oligarchies in judgment aggregation: a characterization, 2006), Dietrich and List (Soc Choice Welf 29(1):19–33, 2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (J Econ Theory 145(2):495–511, 2010a).

A User-Engineering Design Interaction Supporting Rational Product Cooperative Design

To input rational customer requirements into engineering design process more effectively and improve product design quality and market response efficiency, this paper focuses on the interaction between market analysis and engineering design decision for the modular product. While many researchers have successful evaluated and optimized the design schemes, few, if any, have provided a bridge the customer selection and firms product development decision. After a review of the literature we introduce the flow of user-engineering design interaction including both maximize the utility of customer and the profit of the firm. On the user and market analysis flow, customer requirements are defined according to the target market, then the customer selection possibility link to the product attributes by utility function. Accordingly, the alternatives are corresponding to the module different product, and then using decision support problem method to search the optimal design parameters. Two design domains can share the design information and realize the cooperative design process by computer computing platform.

Brief Note About the Dilemmas of Public Election

In this brief comment, the public choice theory aims to distinguish the dilemmas and conflicts in formal and empirical. The hypothesis argues that the reality more complex than the principles of choice of Pareto and Liberalism*. Both the ethics and politics are taking decisions that are not always in line with the requirements of rationality and complete information.

Wide and narrow scope

In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment, showing how this notion solves the symmetry problem as I’ve presented it. I also show that the concept of rational commitment is one we already appeal to in common sense discourse, and that it is necessary for vindicating comparative judgments of rationality.

Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity.

A Hobbesian derivation of the principle of universalization

In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant’s categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary to implement the derived principle. The analysis demonstrates the moral significance of the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the categorical imperative.

Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.

Self-Respect Regained

In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self-Respect’(sr). Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible normative principle.

Assessing the rationality of argumentation in media discourse and public opinion: An exploratory study of the conflict over a smoke-free law in Ticino

This article holds that ability to support one’s opinions with arguments, awareness of the arguments for other opinions, and insight into the superiority of some arguments are basic requirements for rational discourse. Based on a content analysis of Swiss Italian newspaper coverage of a controversy over a smoke-free law introduced and finally implemented in the canton of Ticino in 2007 and on a five-wave panel survey of public opinion on the issue, the article describes elements of the argumentative structure of news coverage of this issue and relates them to rationality requirements. It finds that the newspapers offered a wide variety of arguments to readers (articulation function) when political activity to introduce a ban intensified, and especially when arguments mattered as a referendum approached. Papers displayed a reasonable and differentiated picture of arguments, contributing to a unique pattern of weighting and evaluating them. Neither newspaper coverage nor public opinion showed much sign of change, which speaks against a reaction to superior arguments. Finally, the newspaper bias towards arguments for the ban and their inclination to publish objections to arguments against may have contributed to a widespread lack of awareness of arguments against the ban among people favouring it. Thus, evidence of the rationality of argumentative structures is mixed, and further enquiry into this subject is encouraged.

THE SMALL-IMPROVEMENT ARGUMENT RESCUED

Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the 'small-improvement argument', against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two ...

VIOLATING REQUIREMENTS, EXITING FROM REQUIREMENTS, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY

It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide‐scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow‐scopers’) that it violates narrow‐scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter‐example to narrow‐scope views. But a narrow‐scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow‐scope requirements when we do not comply with them. I show how Brunero's objection can be met by denying this claim, and I provide independent arguments in favour of denying it.

Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope

Instrumental rationality prohibits one from being in the following state: intending to pass a test, not intending to study, and believing one must intend to study if one is to pass. One could escape from this incoherent state in three ways: by intending to study, by not intending to pass, or by giving up one’s instrumental belief. However, not all of these ways of proceeding seem equally rational: giving up one’s instrumental belief seems less rational than giving up an end, which itself seems less rational than intending the means. I consider whether, as some philosophers allege, these “asymmetries” pose a problem for the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality. I argue that they do not. I also present an argument in favor of the wide-scope formulation. The arguments employed here in defense of the wide-scope formulation of instrumental rationality can also be employed in defense of the wide-scope formulations of other rational requirements.

Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: The case of imprecise Markov trees

We focus on credal nets, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian nets to imprecise probability. We replace the notion of strong independence commonly used in credal nets with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance, which is arguably more suited for a behavioural theory of probability. Focusing on directed trees, we show how to combine the given local uncertainty models in the nodes of the graph into a global model, and we use this to construct and justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a variable in the tree. The algorithm, which is linear in the number of nodes, is formulated entirely in terms of coherent lower previsions, and is shown to satisfy a number of rationality requirements. We supply examples of the algorithm’s operation, and report an application to on-line character recognition that illustrates the advantages of our approach for prediction. We comment on the perspectives, opened by the availability, for the first time, of a truly efficient algorithm based on epistemic irrelevance.