ABSTRACT Some concepts generate paradoxes by licensing inconsistent beliefs. We can try to revise some of those beliefs by doing some “conceptual engineering,” but this leads to a puzzle. However exactly the details of conceptual engineering get filled in, it seems that what happens is we revise our beliefs without gaining any evidence against our old views or in support of our new views. But epistemically rational belief change always requires new evidence—or so it seems. I respond to the puzzle by proposing a view of epistemic rationality on which we are required to hold a belief only if two conditions hold: Our evidence supports the belief, and our attention is directed at the evidence and the supported belief's content. Thus, we can rationally withdraw a belief by withdrawing our attention to its content, even without having any new evidence. Its ability to solve this puzzle for conceptual engineering, in addition to some other important puzzles that I briefly show it also solves, gives us a strong case for this proposed connection between rationality and attention.

Rational beliefs when the truth is not an option

In this article, the author describes the Cognitive Double, an original roleenactment technique that combines the procedure of cognitive restructuring (cognitive therapy) with the psychodramatic double. All group members need to be taught the principles of cognitive interventions in the beginning stages of the group. The director teaches the cognitive double to follow 6 prescribed steps: awareness, validation, identifying the irrational thoughts in context, confronting the automatic thoughts in action, articulating the erroneous belief (schema), and creating a new rational belief. The author also describes an auxiliary technique called the Automatic Thoughts Ticker.

The purpose of this article is to present medieval eating and drinking recommendations in the context of spiritual and physical human development. These recommendations were related to religion – one of the most important criteria for evaluating and valuing the world, and derived from the rational belief of people of the era that health should be taken care of and, if necessary, restored, and therefore from medical and, in a narrower sense, dietary reasons. In the Middle Ages, too, health was understood as physical, mental and social well-being. Both recommendations were timeless and geographically universal. Both proclaimed that moderation, which for Christian communities was primarily an important religious virtue, gave health to the body and peace to the soul.

ABSTRACT A central debate in conspiracy theory research concerns how to conceptualise conspiracy theories in a way that advances our understanding of the phenomena themselves as well as of those who believe in them. This debate remains unresolved, with researchers adopting widely different positions: while some argue for a purely descriptive understanding, others are strongly committed to the view that conspiracy theories are, or can be shown to be, inherently irrational. This paper reconstructs the controversy, arguing that it stems from two distinct scholarly motives: to attain objective knowledge of the phenomena in question versus to defend beliefs and norms that are part of the researcher’s own cultural context. By examining the epistemological and methodological challenges in this field, I highlight how competing frameworks—normative cultural biases versus objective scientific inquiry—shape our understanding of rational belief. When cultural biases influence research, they risk narrowing its scope and undermining the development of a comprehensive understanding of conspiracy theories. Ultimately, even proponents of normative cultural approaches can acknowledge that such perspectives fail to capture the full complexity and significance of these phenomena.

Dancing to the Wrong Tune: How Rational Myopia, Belief Heterogeneity, and Adjustment Costs Shape Financial Bubbles

The short story Sebuah Kisah di Candipuro by Budi Darma portrays the life of a rural community that remains bound to tradition and long-standing beliefs amid social change. This study aims to analyze the narrative structure and social reality in the short story using a structural approach and the sociology of literature. A qualitative descriptive method was employed by examining the intrinsic elements of the story and exploring the relationship between the text and the social conditions of the community depicted. The analysis shows that the short story features a forward-moving plot, characters with complex inner conflicts, and a social setting that highlights the tension between rationality and traditional beliefs. From a sociological perspective, the work presents a portrait of the Candipuro community, which continues to be influenced by belief systems, social inequality, and the search for the meaning of life. Thus, the short story reflects the social life of Indonesian society at a crossroads between traditional values and modernity, while simultaneously reaffirming the relevance of literature as a mirror of socio-cultural dynamics.

Abstract Freedom of thought is among the strongest human rights, yet it is largely devoid of practical legal application. This article operationalizes the right by distilling ten core aspects, mainly psychological capacities such as attention, meta-control over thought, and rational belief formation. It then examines how these aspects may be adversely affected by three digital technologies: neurotechnologies, virtual reality, and especially social media. The article addresses why the use of digital technologies might be a human rights issue at all and the doctrinal challenge associated with it. People use these technologies voluntarily, and detrimental effects tend to arise from a multitude of diffuse stimuli rather than from discrete identifiable interventions by a specific human -rights-bound actor. This complicates, and often renders impossible, findings of conventional interferences with rights. But this may not exhaust the remit of human rights. Another human rights-based perspective is proposed: Detrimental effects on thought might be conceptualized as risks arising from a digital environment, which may prompt States’ obligations to fulfil the enjoyment of the right by securing its factual–in this case, psychological–preconditions. A prime measure to meet this obligation is the regulation of technology through innovative models such as a freedom-of-thought impact assessment, or freedom-of-thought-sensitive technology design, for which the ten aspects provide a workable foundation.

This article proposes a philosophical approach to address the hermeneutical problem of the polysemy of the verb ‘to believe’ in the Gospel of John. After outlining the centrality of belief within the Johannine text, Chapter 2 of this Gospel is contextualised and examined, demonstrating its paradigmatic nature due to the occurrence of a threefold attestation of the verb ‘to believe’, each understood in distinctly different senses. Having analysed its problematic aspects, the article then proposes to investigate the issue using tools borrowed from analytic philosophy. To this end, it considers the work of Richard Swinburne, a prominent analytic philosopher of religion, and his contribution to the epistemic analysis of rational belief. Contribution: Subsequently, Swinburne’s scale of rational justification for belief is applied to the three episodes described in the chapter under examination, aiming to provide a coherent interpretation.

This study aims to determine the level of mental toughness and self-confidence in athletes among athletes of the Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) Bekasi City in preparation for the qualifying round of the West Java Provincial Sports Week (PORPROV XV) 2025. This study used a quantitative approach involving 140 athletes consisting of pre-teen, teen, and adult categories. Data were obtained through the Sport Mental Toughness Questionnaire (SMTQ) consisting of 14 valid items to measure mental toughness, and a self-confidence questionnaire consisting of 15 valid items. The results showed that in the self-confidence dimension of mental toughness, 140 athletes (100.00%) were classified as high, while 0 athletes (0.00%) were classified as low. In the control dimension, 109 athletes (77.86%) were classified as high, while 31 athletes (22.14%) were classified as low. In the consistency dimension, 131 athletes (93.57%) were classified as high, and 9 athletes (6.43%) were classified as low. Meanwhile, in terms of self-confidence, the indicators showed high categories for optimism (136 athletes, 97.14%), rationality (128 athletes, 91.43%), responsibility (120 athletes, 85.71%), belief in self-ability (104 athletes, 74.29%), and objectivity (80 athletes, 57.14%). As for the low category, the objectivity indicator recorded the highest number (60 athletes, 42.86%), followed by belief in self-ability (36 athletes, 25.17%), responsibility (20 athletes, 14.29%), rationality (12 athletes, 8.57%), and optimism (4 athletes, 2.86%). Overall, all dimensions of mental toughness and self-confidence of the athletes showed a high category, seen from the dominance of the high category in all dimensions measured. This finding indicates that the athletes have good psychological readiness in facing PORPROV XV 2025.

The selective revision of beliefs in light of new evidence has been considered one of the hallmarks of human-level rationality. However, tests of this ability in other species are lacking. We examined whether and how chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) update their initial belief about the location of a reward in response to conflicting evidence. Chimpanzees responded to counterevidence in ways predicted by a formal model of rational belief revision: They remained committed to their initial belief when the evidence supporting the alternative belief was weaker, but they revised their initial belief when the supporting evidence was stronger. Results suggest that this pattern of belief revision was guided by the explicit representation and weighing of evidence. Taken together, these findings indicate that chimpanzees metacognitively evaluate conflicting pieces of evidence within a reflective process.

Abstract This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s claim that epistēmē haplōs requires the knower to be ‘incapable of being persuaded otherwise’ (ametapeistos). The claim is interpreted as a requirement that a scientist with fully settled knowledge not undergo rational belief revision, itself a version of the Socratic idea that true knowledge is not subject to refutation or elenchos. Aristotle reduces this requirement to a pair of conditions regarding the knowledge and conviction (pistis) the scientist has in her principles. It is shown that these conditions serve to rule out precisely the types of refutation Aristotle takes to be incompatible with scientific knowledge.

Abstract Many widely discussed historical and contemporary views in epistemology rely on conditions requiring that evidence be causally related to the event that is the subject of belief. Such ‘causal conditions’ have also appeared both in normative debates about when belief is rational and in metaphysical debates about the relationship between belief and credence. Drawing on this literature, our paper formulates and then carefully scrutinises a range of plausible causal conditions on rational belief. A series of counterexamples leads us to rule out, in turn, distinct attempts to formulate such a condition. We then devise a condition that withstands our test cases. Ironically, though, this condition is ill-suited to play the roles for which causal conditions on rational belief have been theorised in the first place. Our result casts doubt on whether epistemologists should devote further attention to causal conditions, whether on rational belief or on other epistemic states.

Abstract It is both unavoidable and rational to form beliefs on the basis of testimony. But whose testimony should I trust? To whom would it be rational to outsource my beliefs? In this paper, I explore the role (if any) that intellectual virtues might play in rational belief formation on the basis of testimony. I begin by considering Linda Zagzebski’s proposed intellectual virtue of being able to recognize reliable authority. I argue that this quality, which is surely an excellence, is better categorized as a skill than a virtue. Then I explore whether other intellectual virtues contribute to assessing the reliability of a testifier. I consider two options: the role of virtues in (1) directly assessing a testifier and (2) indirectly assessing a testifier. With respect to (1), I follow Neil Levy and argue that such assessment requires like expertise to the testifier as opposed to intellectual virtue. With respect to (2), I argue that intellectual virtues are helpful in performing indirect assessment and they enable us to avoid social structures that undermine our ability to perform this assessment. Given that we all must form beliefs on the basis of testimony, this role for intellectual virtues is of great importance.

This study empirically analyzed the effect of self-leadership of real estate agents on customer orientation and established a hypothesis model to explain the relationship between these variables. The results of the study showed that constructive thinking strategy and natural reward strategy had statistically significant effects. However, action-oriented strategy did not show any effect on customer orientation. The self-leadership factors of real estate agents that affected customer orientation were confirmed to be natural reward strategy and constructive thinking strategy. Therefore, in order for real estate agents to improve customer orientation, they should develop leadership capabilities centered on constructive thinking strategies and natural reward strategies so that they can demonstrate self-leadership in accordance with the real estate brokerage field situation. To this end, first, in terms of constructive thinking strategies, real estate agents should make efforts to create or select work situations that they like and make efforts to feel psychological rewards or enjoyment from the work itself. In addition, when performing their work as a real estate agent, they should imagine themselves successfully performing their work, think that they can overcome difficulties when they face them during work, and think carefully about their beliefs and judgments when they experience difficult crises during work. Second, in terms of natural reward strategies, real estate agents should devise the method that they prefer the most in order to perform their work successfully, find factors and activities that give them enjoyment during work, and perform their work with positive and rational beliefs. In addition, they should feel joy and satisfaction when performing their work, and try to expand what they can do during work.

Abstract Can we rationally choose between philosophical hinge commitments if they resist argument and evidence? At first glance, such choices seem arbitrary. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) and Coliva and Doulas (2022) argue, however, that adopting a constitutivist account of hinges allows for rational choice through what Coliva terms ‘extended rationality’. They claim that accepting the hinge ‘there are physical objects’ is constitutive of epistemic rationality. This paper challenges that view, arguing that the idealist hinge is misrepresented in their work and that this particular hinge may not ground rational belief. The paper shows that constitutivism, though promising, faces a criterion problem in philosophical hinge disagreements. It concludes that while constitutivism and extended rationality can explain belief rationality, they must be supported by independent criteria for selecting between competing hinges.

This study examines the predictive roles of personality traits, rational/irrational beliefs, and self-efficacy in academic performance, while also investigating how these factors interact with gender, residence, and school type. Data were collected from 453 students at George Emil Palade University of Medicine, Pharmacy, Science, and Technology in Târgu Mureş using the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire (ZKPQ), the General Self-Efficacy Scale (SES), and the short-form Attitudes and Beliefs Scale (ABSs). Results revealed that institutional factors, particularly high school type, emerged as the strongest predictors of academic performance. Among the psychological traits, aggressiveness/hostility, impulsive sensation seeking, and rationality significantly predicted academic performance. Notably, impulsive sensation seeking was positively linked to higher performance in female but not male students, while aggressiveness/hostility predicted better performance only among students with high self-efficacy. These findings highlight the potential for tailored intervention programs that take into account gender and personality differences to improve academic outcomes.

A large part of how people learn about their shared world is via social information. However, in complex modern information ecosystems, it can be challenging to identify deception or filter out misinformation. This challenge is exacerbated by the existence of a dual-learning problem whereby: (1) people draw inferences about the world, given new social information; and simultaneously (2), they draw inferences about how credible various sources of information are, given social cues and previous knowledge. In this context, we investigate how social influence and individual cognitive processing interact to explain how one might lose the ability to reliably assess information. Crucially, we show how this happens even when individuals engage in rational belief updating and have access to objective cues of deception. Using an agent-based model, the Reputation Game Simulation, we show that mere misinformation is not the problem: The dual-learning problem can be solved successfully with limited Bayesian reasoning, even in the presence of deceit. However, when certain agents consistently engage in fully deceptive behavior, intentionally distorting information to serve nonepistemic goals, this can lead nearby agents to unlearn or discount objective cues of credibility. This is an emergent delusion-like state, wherein false beliefs resist correction by true incoming information. Further, we show how such delusion-like states can be rehabilitated when agents who had previously lost the ability to discern cues of credibility are put into new, healthy-though not necessarilyhonest-environments. Altogether, this suggests that correcting misinformation is not the optimal solution to epistemically toxic environments. Though difficult, socially induced cognitive biases can be repaired in healthy environments, ones where cues of credibility can be relearned in the absence of nonepistemic communicationmotives.

There has been an increasing interest in the study of concepts within the domain of ‘positive’ psychology within the psychological research in the recent couple of decades. In contrast to the traditional focus on negative emotions such as depression and anxiety, an increasing number of researchers are focusing on the experience of happiness and/or subjective well-being and life satisfaction. The aim of this study is to determine whether the subjective experience of life meaning, rational, and irrational beliefs can predict the level of life satisfaction. The research was conducted online in 2022 and involved 189 participants of both genders, ages 18 through 70, from the general population. The instruments used were the Meaning of Life Scale (MOLS) to examine the sense of life, the Irrational and Rational Beliefs Scale (IRBS-16) to examine rational and irrational beliefs, and the Temporal Satisfaction with Life Scale (TSWLS) to measure the level of life satisfaction. The results confirm that the level of life satisfaction can be predicted based on the subjective experience of life meaning (F=145.631, p<0.01), as well as that the subjective experience of life meaning has a positive effect on the level of life satisfaction (β= 0.662, p<0.01). Furthermore, a negative impact of irrational beliefs (β= -0.149, p<0.05) and a positive impact of rational beliefs (β= 0.252, p<0.01) on overall life satisfaction were confirmed. It has also been shown that the level of life satisfaction can be predicted based on irrational and rational beliefs (F=8.758, p<0.01).

When can you rationally resist misleading evidence? One influential answer appeals to the idea that knowledge can serve as a safeguarding instrument, which, if not allowing you to outright dismiss misleading evidence—as Kripke’s dogmatism paradox suggests—at least makes it more likely that your true beliefs rationally resist defeat (Williamson, 2000). I reject the idea, arguing that any such rational resistance is well accounted for by our beliefs, regardless of whether they amount to knowledge. By paying attention to how evidential strength influences the resilience of rational belief, I offer an evidential account of rational resistance. I use the account to evaluate Harman’s solution to Kripke’s dogmatism paradox, highlighting the limits of the knowledge-based approach.