Transport Of Radioactive Materials Research Articles

A Consideration for the System for Transport of Radioactive Material

A Consideration for the System for Transport of Radioactive Material

European technical guide on package design safety reports for transport packages containing radioactive material

For each design of a package for the transport of radioactive material, it is necessary to demonstrate compliance with national and international transport regulations as applicable. It is recommended to combine all information necessary to demonstrate compliance in a package design safety report. The European Technical Guide is intended to assist in the preparation of such a package design safety report for use in all European countries. The development of this guide has been initiated and supported by the European Commission (EC) to improve harmonisation in this field in Europe. Starting from 2005, a draft of the guide has been produced with inputs from Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, UK, the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) and AREVA. This paper describes the scope, structure and contents of the draft of the Technical Guide. The guide is based on the IAEA TS-R-1 Regulations which are generally consistent with the regulations for the road, rail, sea, inland waterways and air modes of transport, namely, ADR, RID, IMDG code, ADN and ICAO respectively, which have to be applied in European countries. The guide is applicable to all types of packages. It proposes a structure and a minimum contents for the safety report to assist the applicant in the case of a package design subject to competent authority approval, and to assist the package designer in the case of a package not requiring competent authority approval in demonstrating compliance with the provisions of TS-R-1 applicable to the respective package type. The guide also includes a matrix of paragraph numbers of IAEA TS-R-1 and modal regulations applicable to each package type to support demonstration of compliance with all regulatory requirements that have to be addressed for each package type. Further guidance for the scope of the contents of a package design safety report specifically related to each package type is given in annexes to the guide. It is intended in the further development of the guide to provide the results to IAEA to support worldwide harmonisation in this matter.

Assessing response of Type B packages to maritime accident environments

Abstract The transport of radioactive material, and especially spent fuel, high level waste and plutonium, by sea is a source of concern for many coastal states. For states that are not nuclear states this transport is seen as a risk without benefit. For this reason it is incumbent on the nuclear states that engage in this transport to ensure and assure that it is carried out in the safest possible manner. Safe transport is ensured by packaging the radioactive material within robust containers designed to the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safe transport is assured through public communication efforts, IAEA meetings, and the performance of technical studies. One large international technical study was performed under the auspices of an IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) and was documented in IAEA-TECDOC-1231. One part of the IAEA CRP involved the assessment of the structural and thermal accident conditions that a spent fuel package could experience during sea transport...

Recent assessments in USA of spent fuel packages exposed to severe thermal environments different from regulatory standards

AbstractThe regulatory driven design of radioactive material transportation packages leads package vendors to perform analyses that demonstrate the ability of packages to meet the regulatory requirements. For risk assessment and communication, the analysis of package response to thermal environments that are more severe than those described in the regulations is required. In general, experimental and analytical assessments of casks exposed to thermal insults other than the regulatory environment are performed in the USA by the Department of Energy national laboratories. This paper provides a brief summary of some recent thermal analyses of spent fuel transportation packages exposed to thermal environments different from regulatory standards. The analyses were performed by Sandia National Laboratories under several different projects for multiple customers. These analyses examined the response of spent fuel packages exposed to severe thermal environments different from the regulatory hypothetical accident ...

The role of spectroscopy versus detection for border security

Countries around the world are deploying radiation portal monitor systems to interdict the illicit shipment of radioactive material crossing international borders. Because of their high efficiency for gamma-ray detection, most deployed systems are based on plastic scintillators and are non-spectroscopic in capability. Spectroscopic portal monitor systems are undergoing engineering development for near term deployment. The ability to identify the detected radionuclides may allow improved operational handling of radiation alarms, particularly those from the normal commerce of naturally occurring radioactive material. The goal for improved systems is to increase the sensitivity to threats while reducing the operational impact of nuisance alarms.

FORMULATION ON THE EMPIRICAL EQUATION OF THE CASK IMPACT FORCES BY DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS

Radioactive material is used in the various fields. The numbers of transport for radioactive material have been gradually increased in both domestic and international regions. The safety of the cask should be secured to safely transport of radioactive material. The Korean atomic law and the IAEA safety standards prescribe regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material. The cask for spent fuel is comprised of the body and the impact limiter. In this study, the empirical equation of the cask impact force was proposed based on the dimensional analysis. Using this empirical equation the characteristics of the impact limiter were analyzed. The results are also validated by comparing with the previous results of the impact area method and the finite element analysis. The present method can be used to predict the impact force of the cask.

Applying RFID technology in nuclear materials management

The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) of US Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM), Office of Safety Management and Operations (EM-60), has developed a radio frequency identification (RFID) system for the management of nuclear materials. Argonne National Laboratory, a PCP supporting laboratory, and Savi Technology, a Lockheed Martin Company, are collaborating in the development of the RFID system, a process that involves hardware modification (form factor, seal sensor and batteries), software development and irradiation experiments. Savannah River National Laboratory and Argonne will soon field test the active RFID system on Model 9975 drums, which are used for storage and transportation of fissile and radioactive materials. Potential benefits of the RFID system are enhanced safety and security, reduced need for manned surveillance, real time access of status and history data, and overall cost effectiveness.

Communicating nuclear transportation

"Communicating nuclear transportation." Packaging, Transport, Storage & Security of Radioactive Material, 19(1), pp. 1–2

Evaluating Type B package responses to impacts onto different targets

AbstractThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials require a 9 m free drop onto an unyielding target to demonstrate the robustness of the package design to accident loads. This drop results in an impact velocity of 13˙3 m s–1 (30 mph), which is considerably lower than typical transport speeds for both truck and rail. This leads to the concern that the regulatory impact is not sufficiently severe to assure protection of the public and environment. Sandia National Laboratories and others have conducted both experimental and analytical research in the attempt to demonstrate the severity of the 9 m impact onto an unyielding target by comparing this impact with higher velocity impacts onto other types of targets. Targets investigated have included soil, concrete roadways, concrete runways, bridge columns, sand, water and other transportation vehicles. Impact velocities have ranged up to 110 m s–1 (246 mph). Two important conclusions can be drawn fr...

Recent assessments in USA of Type B packages to impacts beyond regulatory package test standards

The regulatory driven design of radioactive material transportation packages leads packaging vendors to perform analyses that demonstrate the package's ability to meet the regulatory requirements. However, for risk assessment and communication, the response of packages to impacts that are more severe than the regulatory impact is required. Traditionally, in the USA, the task of performing assessments of package response to impacts more severe than the regulatory ones has been performed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories. These assessments have been both experimental and analytical. This paper provides a brief history of extraregulatory package impacts and then focuses on recent analyses performed by Sandia National Laboratories for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the US DOE. The analyses have been primarily in support of two large studies: 'Re-examination of spent fuel shipment risk estimates' and 'Package performance study'. The first of these examined the response of four generic spent fuel casks to impacts onto rigid targets at speeds up to 53˙6 m s–1 (120 mph). The second examined the response of two certified spent fuel cask designs to impacts up to 33˙5 m s–1 (75 mph). Analyses have been performed for closure end impacts, closure end CG over corner impacts and side-on impacts. The analyses and testing of packages to beyond regulatory impact standards have shown that the packages have a considerable margin of safety against release of radioactive material. This fact reinforces the adequacy of the packaging requirements of the US NRC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the methods currently used to certify that spent fuel casks meet these requirements.

Scale model impact limiter in type assessment of radioactive material transport packages

AbstractIn Germany, the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) is the competent authority for the mechanical and thermal design safety assessment of transport packages for radioactive material according to IAEA regulations. The combination of experimental and numerical safety proof forms the basis for a state of the art evaluation concept. Reduced scale models are often used in experimental investigation for design assessment of transport packages corresponding to IAEA regulations. This approach is limited by the fact that a reduced scale model cask can show different behaviours from a full scale cask. The paper focuses on the peculiarities of wood filled impact limiter of reduced scale models. General comments on drop testing with reduced scale models are given, and the relevant paragraphs of the IAEA regulations and Advisory Material are analysed. Possible factors likely to influence the energy absorbing capacity of wood filled impact limiting devices are identified on the basis of s...

Emerging issues in radioactive material transport

Nuclear power currently generates ∼16% of the world's electricity and is set to play an increasingly significant role in meeting the world's growing need for sustainable, clean and affordable electricity. As the industry expands, so too will the demand for fuel cycle services which inevitably places new and greater demands on transport. The demand for other radioactive materials, for example, cobalt 60 sources used for a range of important medical, humanitarian and industrial applications, is also likely to increase. These gamma sources are manufactured in very few countries and both sea and air transport is therefore vital to distribute them to users worldwide. A reliable transport infrastructure is essential to support all these industries and the challenge will be to ensure that this can be maintained safely and securely in a changing world where security and other concerns have increased. The sources of nuclear fuel cycle services often are remote from the demand centres. An essential question for nuclear power generation in the future surely must be: even if availability of fuel can be assured, how can transport to support such a programme be assured? At the front end of the fuel cycle, could existing commercial liner services be relied upon, particularly in an environment where there already are increasing delays and denials of shipments? Indeed, is it possible to assure availability of transport in a commercial environment? More problematic still, where will the capacity to transport spent fuel, reprocessed fuel and residues in greater volumes and across expanded routes come from? More transport to areas potentially lacking in infrastructure, service providers and experience raises a variety of issues including compliance with regulation, harmonised standards, security and training. The US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Strategic Plan says much about a government–industry partnership to build a nuclear fuel recycling centre and a prototype advanced recycling reactor. Is a similar partnership between government and industry conceivable for the transport of the assured supply? Transport of radioactive materials cannot be taken for granted: it faces a variety of challenges, and there are a number of emerging issues in the wider nuclear industry that have important implications for transport.

Feedback from IAEA TranSAS appraisal mission in France

In 2002, France requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to organise a mission to assess its organisation for the control of transport of radioactive materials and its implementation of international regulations. The Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) mission was conducted in 2004 by a team composed of thirteen independent experts. The scope of the appraisal was broad and covered all aspects of the implementation of regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials. The main conclusion is that the implementation of the Transport Regulations is performed in accordance with IAEA requirements. Nevertheless, this mission issued three recommendations and sixteen suggestions. It led France to strengthen its control of non-competent authority approved. Moreover, the findings include twelve good practices that can serve as a model for other competent authorities, in particular in the area of maritime transport. The present paper presents the French Nuclear Safety Authority's feedback from this mission, in order to reach a high safety level in the field of transports.

PATRAM Awards – A history, and Awards for PATRAM 2007

The following summarises the history of awards that have been presented during the international symposia on Packaging and Transport of Radioactive Materials (PATRAM), documents the awards presented during PATRAM 2007 which was convened in Miami, Florida, USA, during October 2007 (including pictures of recipients), and summarises previous awards given.

Conference Summary: PATRAM 2007, Miami, Florida, October 2007

(2007). Conference Summary: PATRAM 2007, Miami, Florida, October 2007. Packaging, Transport, Storage & Security of Radioactive Material: Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 181-188.

Radiochemical Analysis in Fuel Integrity Evaluation

The main function of radiochemical surveillance in a nuclear power plant is to monitor the transport of radioactive materials in and out of various systems, including the fuel integrity evaluation and the control of radioactive material release to the environment. Radiochemical analyses of iodine activities in the reactor coolant to assess fuel integrity during normal operation and to characterize the nature of fuel failure are demonstrated. Assessment of fission products released by the so-called recoil process is emphasized in the study. Measurements of 91Sr and 92Sr in reactor water are recommended as the recoil indicators and to determine the fuel particle contamination on fuel surfaces. In an operating BWR/6 with a recoil level at ~1.2 × 1013 fission/s operated at ~2980 MW(thermal), ~30 g of fuel particle contamination was estimated.

Testing of radioactive materials packages – an industrial view

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, TS-R-1, set the standards for the packages used in the transport of radioactive materials under both normal and accident conditions. The underlying philosophy is that safety is vested principally in the proper use of correctly designed and fabricated packages.There is a large body of evidence which demonstrates that the current IAEA tests for high duty Type B packages are severe tests which cover all the impact, fire and submergence accident situations in transport which can be realistically envisaged. This conclusion is also supported by over 50 years of safe and efficient operating experience. Packages designed for the transportation of radioactive materials in the past have also been subjected to a variety of tests which are different from those specified in the IAEA transport regulations. These tests have often taken the form of spectacular demonstrations such as high speed road or rail crashes, large drops greater than the regulatory requirement, for example from a helicopter, high temperature long duration fires and also explosions. However, such tests or tests more severe than the current IAEA tests could not be justified on quantitative cost/benefit safety grounds and would present an unnecessary economic burden on the radioactive material transport industry. Such tests should not be required as part of the regulatory process. It is vital that public/political confidence in the current regulatory regime should not be undermined. We must continue our efforts to reassure the public that radioactive material transport is a necessary, safe and secure operation. We must dispel exaggerated claims and irrational fears. Wider public dissemination of the relevance of the current IAEA regulations in ensuring safety under severe accident conditions and the results of other tests and public demonstrations to simulate real accidents could both be beneficial in this regard.

Helicopter drop testing of Type B packages in UK

AbstractTesting was carried out in UK in 1986 to demonstrate the ability of two type B packages designed to pass the 9 m drop test criteria in the IAEA SS6 1985 transport regulations, to provide a high degree of containment even under an extended drop test as might result from a package being released from an aircraft in a mid air incident at high altitude. The tests showed that the contents would be completely contained within the containment vessel of the package. The present paper is presented to document these tests, on packages used for the transport of radioactive materials, which have not been reported elsewhere. These data serve as a useful addition to the literature of extra regulatory testing that has been carried out on an international basis.

Investigation of Criticality Effects of Deuterium and Beryllium in Package Containing Fissile Material

The maximum mass of deuterium and beryllium in fissile exempted packages is strictly limited under subparagraph 672(a) of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-R-1).1) This is because the restriction of fissile material mass in the subparagraph is based upon the assumption of hydrogenous moderation and reflection and that deuterium and beryllium are potentially more effective than hydrogen in terms of criticality. However, the basis of the deuterium and beryllium limits in the subparagraph is not clear and it may be inappropriate to impose a limit on their mass alone. In order to evaluate the reactivity effects of deuterium and beryllium in hydrogenous moderation and reflection, a series of calculations is performed using simple models with various parameters. The parameters include fissile nuclides, fissile concentrations, and concentrations of deuterium or beryllium in the moderator or the reflector. According to the calculation results, the concentrations of deuterium or beryllium as well their mass in the moderator or the reflector should be considered when establishing criticality based limits. This shows that, when beryllium or deuterium are present in very low concentrations within a package containing fissile material, the total mass of each may not be the only relevant factor to consider in terms of criticality.

Obligation of the Carrier to Transport Radioactive Medicines by Air

It is indisputable that civil aviation has proved to be the most effective medium of relief to suffering humanity. From the Asian tsunami of 2004 to Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, both of which left many dead and stranded, cataclysmic events needing assistance to people in distress have been coped with effectively by aid provided through carriage by air of essential items. It follows, therefore, that there should be no distinction in the role of civil aviation in this regard between times of collective distress and exigencies of individual distress of patients whose lives depend on the expedited transport of medicines. At a meeting held in May 2006 at the IAEA Headquarters on the subject of denial of shipments of radioactive material, ICAO advised that air carriers could only be persuaded to carry radioactive cargo, and cannot be forced to do so. At the same meeting, IFALPA observed that there has been an increase in recent years of the number of denials of shipments of radioactive materials by airlines, airports, pilots and States and that such denials are capable of posing problems for hospitals, patients and suppliers of radioactive pharmaceuticals. This article examines the attendant obligation at law of a carrier not to refuse the carriage of radioactive cargo to be used for medical purposes.