A new attack on the quantum key distribution is proposed involving joint collective unambiguous measurements of reflected probe states from an intensity modulator and photon number splitting (PNS) measurements, i.e., nondestructive measurements of the number of information photons in the quantum communication channel. This attack does not change the relative statistics of photocounts of states with different numbers of photons, does not lead to errors on the receiver side, and, thereby, is not detected by any of known methods, including the modified decoy state method. The attack results only in additional losses in the communication channel, which are not “controlled” by the decoy state method. The dependence of introduced losses on the intensity of reflected probe states is estimated. The critical level of losses depends on a particular physical implementation of the quantum cryptography system, which determines the upper bound of the intensity of reflected probe states. The knowledge of this bound is fundamentally necessary to ensure the security of keys. The fact that the attack does not lead to errors on the receiver side and does not change the relative statistics of photocounts but only results in additional losses, which depend on the intensity according to the distinguishability of reflected probe states, does not mean that this attack transforms quantum cryptography systems from the type of cryptographic systems where the security of keys is guaranteed by fundamental quantum mechanical laws to the type of systems where this security is guaranteed by technical restrictions. Even in the presence of side channels of information leakage, the security of keys is still guaranteed by fundamental quantum mechanical restrictions on the distinguishability of states. A low level of distinguishability (“intensity”) of quantum states in side channels is naturally reached by technical tools.