Previous articleNext article No AccessMonitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent ModelNirvikar SinghNirvikar Singh Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 93, Number 3Jun., 1985 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261318 Views: 20Total views on this site Citations: 33Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1985 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:PIERRE CHAIGNEAUAND, NICOLAS SAHUGUET The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring, Journal of Accounting Research (Aug 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12459Olga Fullana, Alba M. 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