Punishment Institutions Research Articles

“ChatGPT seems too good to be true”: College students’ use and perceptions of generative AI

This study investigates how U.S. college students (N = 1001) perceive and use ChatGPT, exploring its relationship with societal structures and student characteristics. Regression results show that gender, age, major, institution type, and institutional policy significantly influenced ChatGPT use for general, writing, and programming tasks. Students in their 30s–40s were more likely to use ChatGPT frequently than younger students. Non-native English speakers were more likely than native speakers to use ChatGPT frequently for writing, suggesting its potential as a support tool for language learners. Institutional policies allowing ChatGPT use predicted higher use of ChatGPT. Thematic analysis and natural language processing of open-ended responses revealed varied attitudes towards ChatGPT, with some fearing institutional punishment for using ChatGPT and others confident in their appropriate use of ChatGPT. Computer science majors expressed concerns about job displacement due to the advent of generative AI. Higher-income students generally viewed ChatGPT more positively than their lower-income counterparts. Our research underscores how technology can both empower and marginalize within educational settings; we advocate for equitable integration of AI in academic environments for diverse students.

Abuse of power: An experimental investigation of the effects of power and transparency on centralized punishment

Punishment institutions are a major guarantor of prosocial behavior. At the same time, their asymmetrical power structure may lead to antisocial behavior itself. We investigate power abuse, understood as the use of power for personal gain, of a single punisher in a public-goods game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. Using a laboratory experiment we find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency.

The newly graduated nurse as a second victim

Objective To describe the prevalence of newly graduated nurses as second victims of adverse events and to know the conditions of support received in health institutions. Methods Cross-sectional, descriptive, quantitative study. The population consisted of newly graduated nurses who agreed to answer the online questionnaire with questions related to being hired at the institution, involvement in adverse events and management of the second victim condition. Contacted was by email, intermediated by the Regional Nursing Council of São Paulo. Descriptive data analysis and the test of equality of proportions were performed. Results The final sample consisted of 138 nurses, 54.3% were unaware of the term ‘second victim’, 44.9% were unaware of the existence of institutional protocols for emotional support to professionals and 26.8% were involved in adverse events. Of these, 94.6% presented emotional distress, frustration, guilt, sadness, stress, inability, embarrassment and insecurity to perform their duties at work as an outcome of the event; 59.5% received some type of support and 21.6% received institutional punishment. Conclusion The prevalence of newly graduated nurses involved in adverse events was 26.8%, and among those who experienced this incident, the majority presented negative feelings and insecurity in performing their work as an outcome. After the event, most of the time, the support received came from work colleagues and significant others. Regarding institutional support, the need for programs for emotional support is also highlighted, so that these professionals can overcome when finding themselves in the place of the second victim.

Examining the Black Gender Gap in Educational Attainment: The Role of Exclusionary School Discipline & Criminal Justice Contact

Abstract Black men and women have different levels of average educational attainment, yet few studies have focused on explaining how and why these patterns develop. One explanation may be inequality in experiences with institutional punishment through exclusionary school discipline and criminal justice exposure. Drawing on intersectional frameworks and theories of social control, I examine the long-term association between punishment and the Black gender gap using data from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort (NLSY-C). Decomposition analyses reveal that about one third of the gender gap can be explained by gender differences in experiences with institutional punishments, net of differences in observed behaviors. These measures are predictive at key educational transition points, including finishing high school and earning a 4-year college degree. Though Black boys and girls have similar family backgrounds and grow up in similar neighborhoods, results suggest that Black girls have a persistent advantage in educational attainment due in part to their lower levels of exposure to exclusionary school discipline and the criminal justice system. In addition, I find that gender differences in early achievement, early externalizing behavioral problems, school experiences, and substance use in adolescence and early adulthood are associated with gender differences in educational attainment. Taken together, these results illustrate the importance of punishment disparities in understanding disparate educational outcomes over the life course of Black men and women.

О ПРАКТИЧЕСКИХ ПУТЯХ ПРЕОДОЛЕНИЯ МОРАЛЬНОЙ АНОМИИ В СОВРЕМЕННЫХ КИТАЙСКИХ ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯХ

The pursuit of personal gain in the name of the public good is a typical characteristic feature of the moral anomie of public organizations (NGOs) in China. The root cause lies in the insufficient development of the culture of public welfare, weak self-restraint of public organizations and weak government supervision. The moral management of public organizations in modern China should not only emphasize the recognition of the value of members of public organizations for the purposes of public welfare of public organizations, improve the provision of an ethical system for public organizations and increase the cultivation of individual morality of members of public organizations, but also it is necessary to strengthen systemic punishments and rewards for the socially charitable behavior of social organizations and use rigidity settlement systems, deterrence and direction of social and charitable behavior of social organizations. Speaking in a substantive way, it is necessary to foster a culture of public welfare in public organizations and promote leadership orientation to the values of public welfare, combining institutional punishments and incentives to promote the management of the behavior of public organizations in the field of public welfare, strengthen government supervision and promote the management of the anomie of public welfare of public organizations, thereby contributing to the general promotion of overcoming the anomie in the field of public welfare of public organizations, as well as general advancement in other directions.

Social preferences in the public goods game-An Agent-Based simulation with EconSim.

Using a reinforcement-learning algorithm, we model an agent-based simulation of a public goods game with endogenous punishment institutions. We propose an outcome-based model of social preferences that determines the agent's utility, contribution, and voting behavior during the learning procedure. Comparing our simulation to experimental evidence, we find that the model can replicate human behavior and we can explain the underlying motives of this behavior. We argue that our approach can be generalized to more complex simulations of human behavior.

Research on the Existing Problems and Countermeasures of "Student Disciplinary Punishment Regulations" in Colleges and Universities

Colleges and universities have the right of independent management according to law. In the aspect of student management, formulate "Disciplinary Punishment Regulations for students", according to which students are rewarded and punished. However, the legal rights and interests of some college students have been infringed due to various problems in the formulation basis, the content of regulations and their implementation which are contrary to the constitution and laws. The fundamental reason is that the concept of education is not correct, the legal system of higher education is not perfect, and the judicial review is absent. In particular, the law based on which colleges and universities formulate the "Regulations on the Punishment of students' discipline Violations" does not clearly define the scope of the affairs of the punishment of students' power, which leads to the confusion of the decentralization of power in the student affairs office of colleges and universities. In this regard, the article puts forward the principle of legal reservation, from the absolute legal reservation, relative legal reservation and no legal reservation to clarify the scope of college students' management power of three aspects, supplemented by judicial review limited involvement, adhere to due process, improve the student punishment institutions, improve the supervision system, and construct a scientific "student punishment regulations for disciplinary violations". The article puts forward the opinion on how to protect the legitimate rights and interests of college students with the right to education as the core and has profound enlightenment.

Zoombombing: causes and preventions

This paper aims to share the Zoombombing: a new phenomenon that emerged during COVID-19, its causes, and measures to prevent Zoombombing. Finally, it provides recommendations to prevent such incidents. Zoom emerged as the most popular alternative teaching tool during COVID-19. However, even though Zoom has utilized state-of-the-art encryption methods, it has underestimated privacy expectations among its exponentially growing customer base. Zoom has many options settings for users to customize and secure their videoconferencing platform to minimize Zoombombing. However, some users overlook these security features, which leaves them vulnerable to offensive material displayed by attackers in a virtual classroom setting. Furthermore, most Zoombombings were made by insiders who had legitimate access to Zoom meetings, particularly students in high school and college classes. To reduce Zoombombing, teachers can enable settings, such as waiting room, restricting access to screen-share, and physical reporting. Moreover, severe institutional punishment for the attackers and their insider supporters can discourage such activities.

A pathway towards the development and evolution of consumer behavior: Policy directions for sustainable development and improvement of nutrition.

The virtuality, concealment, uncertainty and complexity of online trading make the online food trading market have security risks, while the lack of information, information asymmetry and imperfect market system make the "lemon problem" in the market increasingly obvious. In order to clearly understand and manage the "lemon problem" in the online food trading market, we built an evolutionary game model involving the seller, buyers and online food trading platform, deeply analyzed the formation process of the "lemon problem" in the online food trading market, and revealed the influencing factors and effects of each subject's strategy choice from the perspectives of subsidy, punishment, cost, and benefit. Findings of this study reveal that: (1) In the online food trading market, the strategy of the seller, buyer and platform will be stable in six situations, and the "lemon problem" will emerge with the development and evolution of the online food trading market. (2) The strategy of each subject in the online food trading market will be affected by variables like cost difference between positive performance and negative performance of the seller, punishment from the buyer with positive participation to the seller with negative performance, subsidy from the platform with positive regulation to the seller with positive performance, etc., and different factors have different influence directions and degrees on the subject strategy. (3) In the online food trading market, cost, punishment, subsidy and benefit have different effects on the subject's strategy. Among them, cost and cost difference have the most significant impact on the subject's strategy, followed by punishment and benefit difference, and subsidy and additional benefit have less impact on the subject's strategy. Based on our study findings, it is proposed that by constructing a complete and standardized system of online food trading market from the aspects of examination and verification institution, reward and punishment institution, and supervision institution, it will be able to provide reference for managing the "lemon problem" in the online food trading market, promoting the sustainable development of the market, and ensuring the safety of online food.

Limited punishment pool may promote cooperation in the public goods game

Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still a challenge. In practice, there exists numerous examples indicating that punishment is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. However, the executors of the punishment institution are costly and limited in reality. To reveal potential explanations here we introduce the limited punishment pool into the public goods game. It means that when the punishment pool is occupied by the pure punishers, who just contribute to the punishment pool but not to the common pool in the public goods game, the extra individuals who want to participate in punishing but miss out will passively withdraw and become exiters. The game model is verified by empirical analysis. Results demonstrate that the existence of punishment group can effectively weaken the defectors in the population. By reasonably adjusting the capacity of the punishment pool, the cooperators can prevail in the population. Surprisingly, there will be a special strategy fixation, that is, the fixation of the punishment group. Moreover, the existence of a certain limit of punishment pool capacity will promote the cooperative behavior and accelerate the disappearance of defectors.

Religious Basic Idea In Forming Non-Penal Policy To Countermeasures Supporter Anarchism

AbstractThe background of this research is to analyze and formulate an ideal non-penal policy to countermeasures supporter anarchism based on religious values as contained in Pancasila. This is because the problem of supporter anarchism is no longer only solved through institutional punishment but must look for other “punishment” alternatives or “causative treatment” that are more internal in nature so that supporter anarchism can restore themselves and provide support to their football club properly. Especially if the main problem of supporter anarchism is caused by a misperception of understanding the implementation of fair play football, making them unfair and uncivilized supporters. Formulating a non-penal policy can be done as an answer to the weaknesses of the criminal justice system to countermeasures supporter anarchism. The policy will be carried out based on the religious ideas contained in Pancasila which reflects the identity and character of the Indonesian nation. This goal will be achieved by using normative research based on literature and legislation review with an emphasis on secondary data processing. Based on the research, it can be concluded that there are four basic religious ideas that can be used as a basis for countermeasures supporter anarchism, namely the domestication function as a tool to limit, the personalization function as a tool to make good and caring individuals, the compensation function as a tool to limit social conflict, and the function of innovation as a tool creative function to help resolve problems or conflicts. Keywords: Religious Idea; Non-Penal Policy; Supporter Anarchism.

Some Philosophical and Legal Problems of Qualification of Crimes Against Political Rights in Modern Legal States

This article is devoted to the study of problems of the qualification of crimes against the realization of political rights. Based on a comparative analysis, approaches to the concept of “crimes” within the Criminal Codes of the Republic of Armenia, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Artsakh are presented. The ancient foundations of the problems of proportionality of sentencing are considered, on the basis of which the similarities of the institutional punishment of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh were studied. Based on a comparative analysis of the post-election situations in the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh, it turned out that even with the similarity and uniformity of the legislative settlement of problems related to the non-obstructive exercise of political rights, the results in Armenia and Artsakh are different. The presented article notes that crimes related to political rights, first of all, are levelled against the strengthening and development of democratic values and principles, and based on this and on the basis of a multi-faceted analysis of the nature of the problems of resolving issues related to the implementation of political rights, appropriate methodological and legislative proposals are made.

Shadow of conflict: How past conflict influences group cooperation and the use of punishment

Intergroup conflict profoundly affects the welfare of groups and can deteriorate intergroup relations long after the conflict is over. Here, we experimentally investigate how the experience of an intergroup conflict influences the ability of groups to establish cooperation after conflict. We induced conflict by using a repeated attacker-defender game in which groups of four are divided into two ‘attackers’ that can invest resources to take away resources from the other two participants in the role of ‘defenders.’ After the conflict, groups engaged in a repeated public goods game with peer-punishment, in which group members could invest resources to benefit the group and punish other group members for their decisions. Previous conflict did not significantly reduce group cooperation compared to a control treatment in which groups did not experience the intergroup conflict. However, when having experienced an intergroup conflict, individuals punished free-riding during the repeated public goods game less harshly and did not react to punishment by previous attackers, ultimately reducing group welfare. This result reveals an important boundary condition for peer punishment institutions. Peer punishment is less able to efficiently promote cooperation amid a ‘shadow of conflict.’ In a third treatment, we tested whether such ‘maladaptive’ punishment patterns induced by previous conflict can be mitigated by hiding the group members’ conflict roles during the subsequent public goods provision game. We find more cooperation when individuals could not identify each other as (previous) attackers and defenders and maladaptive punishment patterns disappeared. Results suggest that intergroup conflict undermines past perpetrators’ legitimacy to enforce cooperation norms. More generally, results reveal that past conflict can reduce the effectiveness of institutions for managing the commons.

Punishment institutions selected and sustained through voting and learning

Punishment institutions selected and sustained through voting and learning

Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation

The view that altruistic punishment plays an important role in supporting public cooperation among human beings and other species has been widely accepted by the public. However, the positive role of altruistic punishment in enhancing cooperation will be undermined if corruption is considered. Recently, behavioral experiments have confirmed this finding and further investigated the effects of the leader’s punitive power and the economic potential. Nevertheless, there are relatively few studies focusing on how these factors affect the evolution of cooperation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we combine institutional punishment public goods games with bribery games to investigate the effects of the above factors on the evolution of cooperation. Theoretical and numerical results reveal that the existence of corruption will reduce the level of cooperation when cooperators are more inclined to provide bribes. In addition, we demonstrate that stronger leader and richer economic potential are both important to enhance cooperation. In particular, when defectors are more inclined to provide bribes, stronger leaders can sustain the contributions of public goods from cooperators if the economic potential is weak.

Inter-brain synchronization is weakened by the introduction of external punishment.

Punishment is a popular institution to enforce social norms in human society. However, how the punishment institution impacts the inter-brain neural signatures of two-person social interactions is still an open question. By performing electroencephalography recording of brain activity in two interacting parties as they simultaneously played both the revised repeated ultimatum game (rrUG) and the revised repeated dictator game (rrDG), this study focused on exploring how the introduction of external punishment influences inter-brain synchronization between the two parties. The data showed a significant negative effect of external punishment on inter-brain synchronization, with greater inter-brain synchronization observed in the rrDG than in the rrUG. We proposed a possible mechanism underlying this result. In the rrDG, the similar moral motivation of both proposers and responders results in inter-brain synchronization between them. However, in the rrUG, the introduction of external punishment crowds out the intrinsic moral motivation of the proposers, thereby undermining the inter-brain synchronization. Moreover, we found a significant positive correlation between the rejection rate from responders for disadvantageous inequal offer and inter-brain synchronization in the rrDG. These findings contribute to understanding the negative effect of punishment institution and shed light on the inter-brain mechanism underlying social interaction.

The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is particularly large when members know about the composition of their group. The experimental results confirm these hypotheses. However, the information about the composition of the group turns out to be even more important than we expected. It helps cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it helps members to recognize the need for punishment early on and not to follow an uncooperative path that produces a persistently competitive attitude. These findings highlight the role of group composition and information for institution formation.

Trust and punishment

This paper explores the impact of institutions on the evolution of preferences (culture) and on economic outcomes. Punishment institutions determine the capacity and the individual cost of punishing opportunistic behavior, while preferences are endogenous and can be influenced by a cultural transmission process that is conditioned by the existing punishment institutions. We investigate the interaction and evolution between the preferences for reciprocity or rewarding of the allocator and the preferences to punish hostile behaviour by the investor in a trust game with a costly punishment phase. Our main result provides a rationale for the existence of a strong positive relationship between the quality of society's punishment institutions and the levels of trust achieved. Trust only flourishes in the shadow of efficient sanctioning institutions. The driving force behind this result is that strong institutions are necessary to make the socialization of children towards punishment preferences worthwhile. However, there is no relationship between the level of trust and the distribution of social preferences. Even when there is a high proportion of punishers in the population, a high level of trust will not be obtained if there is not a well-functioning punishment institution.

Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation

Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability.

Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game

The role of incentive institutions on promoting cooperation in public goods game (PGG) has attracted much attention. Theoretical studies based on Nash equilibrium analysis predict that the punishment effect is often stronger than the reward effect. Although this result is confirmed by empirical studies, subjects do not always play these rational strategies. Recent experiments indicate that most subjects in PGGs are conditional cooperators who tend to contribute the group average. In this paper, we consider PGGs with three types of subjects, namely, cooperators, defectors, and conditional cooperators. Evolutionary game method is applied to investigate how conditional cooperators affect the effectiveness of different types of incentives. Overall, having conditional cooperators cannot lead to a higher contribution level in the standard PGG or the PGG with institutional rewards. However, they can enhance the effectiveness of institutional punishment, where a high contribution level can be maintained even for small punishments. As a consequence, in PGGs with conditional cooperators, punishment always leads to a higher contribution rate than do rewards. Numerical analysis indicates that this result is robust to errors in decision making.