Prosperity Party Research Articles

A Critical Review of Medemer from Ideological Perspectives

Medemer, both as a book and as an idea, is trapped between two extremes: admiration and rejection. Writers from both ends offer their thoughts, criticisms, and reviews of Medemer. The aim of this article is to analyze Medemer from an ideological perspective. Raising some political and policy questions about Medemer’s application is also the aim of this article. This article used a qualitative research approach and comparative and critical research methods. Secondary sources of data were used to compare Medemer with various political ideologies. Ideologically, Medemer meets the three criteria (critics of the present order, vision of the future society, and theory of change). Medemer is a “blended ideology” that combines concepts, principles, and ideas from liberalism, socialism, conservatism, and fascism. Furthermore, Medemer ideology attempted to combine concepts from opposing political ideologies and proposed it as a solution to Ethiopia’s complex sociopolitical and economic problems. Despite the government’s claim that Medemer is Ethiopia’s redeemer, several political questions remain unanswered given the country’s current situation. Therefore, the country’s complicated sociopolitical and economic problems under the regime of the Prosperity Party challenged the applicability of Medemer. Is Medemer thus the sole (or perhaps the only) instrument, policy framework, ideology, and mechanism for resolving Ethiopia’s multiple, dynamic, and complex socio-political problems? These remain a point of contention among academics and politicians.

The Party System in Ethiopia

Abstract Political parties and their internal working policy and pattern of interactions have a profound impact on the operation of federations and the character of intergovernmental relations (IGR). By using the Ethiopian party system as a case study, this article aims to explore the impacts of party ideology, structure and style of functioning on the overall operation of a federation and the (de)institutionalisation of intergovernmental relations. It shows that the party structure, internal practices and ideological conviction of two parties—the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Prosperity Party (PP)—have shaped and reshaped the functioning of the Ethiopian federation and the dynamics of vertical and horizontal relations. At the same time, constitutional and IGR principles have been sidelined. There is a need to entrench stable and formal IGR frameworks for negotiation, the exchange of information and co-operation between federal and sub-state institutions. Reducing excessive reliance on the party line is essential to optimise the regularity, continuity and effectiveness of the interactions.

Ideology, grand strategy and the rise and decline of Ethiopia's regional status

Abstract Ethiopia transformed from a state on the verge of collapse at the end of the Cold War into one of the world's fastest-developing economies and a regional power in the Horn of Africa in less than two decades. Since 2018 its economic, military and diplomatic status have, however, become significantly compromised yet again. What explains these significant fluctuations in regional power status? Drawing on policy documents and in-depth interviews with diplomatic, military and political officials from the Horn of Africa this article conducts a comparative analysis of the nature and variation of Ethiopia's regional power status under the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 2000–2018 and the Prosperity Party (PP) in 2018–2022. The findings illustrate that the fluctuations in regional power were primarily caused by different grand strategies, which in turn reflected the priorities of the EPRDF's developmental state and the PP's restorative nationalist ideologies. These grand strategic concepts shaped Ethiopian government policies on key issues like defence doctrine, status-seeking, economic development, and rivalry and alliance management. These policies had a direct and significant impact on Ethiopia's state capacity, its ability to project military power and its diplomatic influence.

PRU-15: TIADANYA PARTI POLITIK YANG MENANG MAJORITI MUDAH 112 KERUSI PARLIMEN UNTUK MEMBENTUK KERAJAAN PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA

The year 2022 is an important year for democratic politics in Malaysia. This is because a General Election (GE) was held to elect representatives to form a stronger and more stable government after the country experienced political turmoil with the appointment of three Prime Ministers to the extent that foreign investors were confused by Malaysia's political position. After the GE was held, Malaysian politics was still at a standstill because no single political party coalition won the GE with a simple majority of 112 parliamentary seats, therefore, the purpose of writing this article is to analyze the results, which is the first time in Malaysian political history that there is no political party won the GE just like the previous 14 GEs. Based on data analysis of the 2022 GE results, observations in the field and analysis of secondary sources such as journal articles and conference papers, the findings show that Pakatan Harapan (PH) won 82 seats, Perikatan Nasional (PN) won 74 seats, Barisan Nasional (BN) 30 seats , Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) 23 seats, Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) 6 seats, Parti Warisan Sabah (WARISAN) 3 seats, Parti Bangsa Malaysia (PBM) 1 seat, Social Democratic Prosperity Party (KDM) 1 seat and Independent 2 seats. The results of this general election show that no single party managed to get a simple majority of 112 seats to dominate Parliament and the Federal Government. This result is due to BN's failure to win a simple majority due to the large shift of Malay votes to PN. This large shift in votes is a factor in the awareness of Malay voters to choose clean political parties and leaders who can be expected to fight for the rights of Malays and Muslims. As a result of the wisdom of His Majesty the Yang Dipertuan Agong's orders and advice, a Unity Government was formed from 148 members of Parliament which is a 2/3 majority of the 222 members of the Malaysian Parliament consisting of PH, BN, GPS, GRS, WARISAN, KDM, PBM and 2 Independent Members of Parliament. PN (74 members of Parliament) did not join the Unity Government and acted as the opposition. With that as well, Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim from PH has been appointed as the 10th Prime Minister. Therefore, political parties in this country do not have the best option as long as they need Malay-Muslim votes to control as many Parliament seats as possible and be able to form a strong and stable Government.

ETHIOPIA: FEDERALISM, PARTY MERGER AND CONFLICTS

This article has a twin mission: examining the impact of party merger on the federal arrangement and its association with the current conflicts in Ethiopia. The 1995 federal constitution of Ethiopia devolves powers to regional states. Since then, each regional state was fused with its distinct ruling party that created a coalition at the federal level. This state-party fused federal arrangement faced serious challenges with the rise of intra coalition disagreements since 2016 following the protest movements in the country, which further plunged Ethiopia into a devastating civil war since November 2020. This article asks what caused the conflicts. While recognizing the multidimensional roots of the conflicts, this article uses a political party-driven theory of federalism in order to identify the political processes that led to the conflicts. It argues that in a multiethnic federation such as Ethiopia where there is state-party fusion, a ruling party’s metamorphosis from a coalition to a union may not only centralize power but could also result in both de facto merger of that fragile federation and conflicts. Delinking the state from the party through inclusive national negotiations and democratic elections within a federal arrangement might help transition Ethiopia to a stable country. Keywords: Civil war, conflicts, political parties, Ethiopian federalism, Prosperity Party, power centralization, Abiy Ahmed.

Prescribing Constitutional Interpretation for Postponing the 2020 National Election: The covid-19 Complicatedness in Federalist Ethiopia

Abstract The covid-19 pandemic has become a global health, economic, social and political problem since January 2020. Like other countries, Ethiopia has been seriously threatened by the effects of the pandemic. Among the impacts, the Ethiopian government was forced to declare a state of emergency and thereby postpone the 2020 national election. The ruling party (the Prosperity Party) came up with four options for postponing the election, namely: dissolving the parliament, a constitutional amendment, a declaration of state of emergency and constitutional interpretation. The parliament eventually approved the fourth option, constitutional interpretation. Consequently, the objective of this article is to assess the constitutionality of the four mechanisms considered by the ruling government to postpone the national election, putting emphasis on constitutional interpretation. The article hence evaluates the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the action taken by the Ethiopian government in postponing the 2020 election by assessing all of the alternatives, with a particular emphasis on the constitutional interpretation option which the government eventually pursued.

Public Administration Developments in Ethiopia Under Three Different Regimes

The paper summarises and analyses the development of the public administration system in Ethiopia under three different regimes. The research mainly follows the traditional legal and administrative history approach methodology, focusing on the most significant historical, political, and legislative events (e.g. adoptions of constitutions) of the given eras, drawing attention to the main problems and reviewing them critically. Under Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974), Ethiopia was a centralised unitary state in the form of a feudal authoritarian monarchy. During the Derg regime (1974–1991), it remained a centralised unitary state, but with the concept of socialism, the military junta concentrated the power in their hands. The different government and administrative systems are characterized by weak and strong political, economic, and social achievements. Among these is a lack of good governance, human rights violations, weak institutional capacities, low citizen participation, and an (in)appropriate public administration system. These brought the nationality question to the forefront. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF, 1991–2019) established a decentralised federation, whereby parliamentary democracy guarantees a separation of powers with checks and balances and acknowledges the rights and self-determination of different ethnicities. In 2019 the EPRDF was dissolved and transformed into the Prosperity Party (PP). The reform forced the resignation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the ruling party in the Tigray Region, and as a result, the EPRDF split into PP and TPLF. Meanwhile, public administration transformed from a monarchial administrative system into a weak public administration with poorly functioning state agencies; finally, the present system works under western influences. To mitigate these problems, institutional reforms, effective and efficient use of modern technologies, and inter-institutional cooperation play essential roles in improving the public administration system.

The Continuing Quest for Inclusive Democratic Governance in Ethiopia

As early as the 18th Century, James Bruce, a European Traveller, observed that bad government was the most important source of the problems that plagued the Ethiopian society. Centuries on, political and ethnic mistrust and polarization, insecurity, human rights abuses and armed conflict characterize the Ethiopian body politic. The rule of law and democracy are far from taking roots. This article ­­–pointing out the most outstanding governance deficits of the Emperor Haile Selassie, Derg and EPRDF-cum-PP’s (Prosperity Party) governments– argues that the lack of inclusive democratic governance remains at the core of Ethiopia’s socio-political crises. It will offer suggestions on democratic governance options that, if adopted, can help deal with Ethiopia’s long-time political ills.

Ethiopia: Prosperity Party Congress

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 59, Issue 3 p. 23517C-23517C Internal Developments Ethiopia: Prosperity Party Congress First published: 18 April 2022 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2022.10447.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume59, Issue3April 2022Pages 23517C-23517C RelatedInformation

Transformation of the Ethiopian Political Elite and the Armed Conflict in Tigray: from Driving Predecessors out to De-Escalation?

In the article the authors consider elite dimension of the conflict in Tigray. Conducting the analysis of intra-elite processes allows both to find out the roots and to estimate the consequences of the most fast-moving conflict in the Horn of Africa. The research consists of five conceptual parts, which are preluded by a short description of the run of events. In the first part the conflict potential which takes its roots in 1994-2018 is explained. It starts with the basic notion that ethnic lines predetermine formation of elites in Ethiopia. Then the study shows that one of the main causes for the dispute which has severely divided political elites was the hegemony of the TPLF in government institutions. The second part refers to the transit of power. Here the point under consideration is redistribution of resources and particular strategies adopted by polarized elites. The analysis demonstrates that Abiy Ahmed and his allies did their best to deprive the TPLF leaders of power and economic resources. The TPLF resorted to ethnic mobilization while their rivals tried to break the unity of Tigrayans through stressing the existence of a class conflict. The third and the fourth chapters focus on the investigation of federal elites’ and «tigrayan clan’s» current positions respectively. In conclusion, the authors structure their findings and estimate the perspectives of inter-elites consensus. The research provides three important conclusions. Firstly, the roots of the conflict led to the formation of «action-response» cycles which was the basis for a rapid development and escalation. Secondly, the ongoing war even consolidates ruling elites in their fear of the TPLF. Finally, de-escalation and negotiations may become possible amid internal disputes in the Prosperity Party.

State-Building and Development in Ethiopia: From “Developmental State” to “Prosperity” Model

Abstract State-building and development are mutually reinforcing phenomena. The sustainability of development depends on the stability of state's political-structural foundation and the prospect of peace, which is influenced by the origin and evolution of the state. Every regime in Ethiopia has portrayed its advent as a new dawn for the country's development. In recent history, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced a “developmental state” model and registered notable economic growth on aggregate but failed on accounts of equitable distribution. The EPRDF regime used the “developmental state” model to enhance the centralization of state power and circumvent regional autonomy. In 2018, the Prosperity Party (PP) introduced a “prosperity” model. From the EPRDF to the PP, there are signals of a radical shift of approach in state-building and development. This article analyzes the premises and promises of the multinational federation and “developmental state” model under the EPRDF regime, and the unitarist orientation and “prosperity” paradigm under the PP. I argue that the radical shift of direction from the multinational federalism towards a unitary state is unrealistic and fundamentally shatters the prospect of development.

Crises and Crossroads in Ethiopia

Crises and Crossroads in Ethiopia

The Origins of the EPRDF and the Prospects for the Prosperity Party

This paper presents the historical development of the authoritarian Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) with particular attention to its origins in civil war and its use of multi-national federal structures to balance centralizing dynamics and demands for regional autonomy. It argues that the reform process launched by Prime Minister Abiy and the formation of the successor Prosperity Party failed to overcome the challenges and political logics that undermined the EPRDF. The article concludes by examining the prospects of the center to manage these contradictions and bind together the distinct and highly polarized regions and political interests.

Is Ethnonationalism Growing in Ethiopia and Will it Lead to the Dissolution of the Country? Evidence from the World Value Survey 2007–2020

In this paper, I examine whether ethnopolitical identities have grown in Ethiopia since the introduction of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reforms in 2018, using the most recent Ethiopian survey data from the World Values Survey (wave 5, from 2007 and wave 7, from 2020). I find that although there remains a general popular commitment to a national (Ethiopian) identity, among younger people (especially males) there is a growing sense of an “ethnic” identity and a growing intolerance of other ethnic groups. Further, I find that those who express ethnonational identities are significantly more likely to engage in protest and demonstrations. In conclusion, I suggest that this may not portend well for the future of Ethiopian unity. I also suggest that whether this happens also depends on the institutional transformation of the Prosperity Party (the successor the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)) and the level of external support the regime receives from its foreign benefactors.

Ethiopia: The Interplay Between Federalism and Dominant Party Rule and the Sidama’s Quest for Statehood

Abstract Political parties are particularly important for the operation of federal systems. The way parties are organised might reinforce or corrode the federal division of power. Ethiopian federalism is a case in point: although the Constitution gives wide rights of autonomy for regional states, centralised party rule has undermined the regional states’ ability to determine their own affairs. In this paper, the Sidama’s quest for regional statehood is discussed. This quest has been suppressed until recently, when a split in the ruling party led to political liberalisation and a new party leadership. The change made it possible for the Sidama to conduct a referendum for a separate regional state in 2019, resulting in a new Sidama state in 2020. A new national centre-oriented Prosperity Party may however lead to a recentralisation, showing how federal structures are vulnerable to changes in national political power.

Human Rights Crisis in Tigray Region of Ethiopia: The Extent of International Intervention and PM Abiy Ahmed’s Denial of Humanitarian Access into the Region.

The human rights crisis in the Tigray region of has grown out of a disagreement between central and regional governments. Even though the immediate causes were related to the discrepancy between Abiy Ahmed's push toward election postponement and new party aka Prosperity Party formation. The root causes go beyond that. The country has been in violent political chaos since it was formed as an imperial state. The ideological difference has got deep. The Abiy’s move toward unifying the country was not appreciated by many including Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). It is “the war of vision” between pan-Ethiopians and multi-nation structured as some say. When Abiy established the prosperity party, it seems he wants to bring the old as some call it glorious Ethiopia which is aimed at by unionists. The major ethnicities, their languages, cultures, identities, economic and political representations have not been reflected in such Ethiopia. Diverse ethnicities have been forcefully marginalized, subjugated, and assimilated to accept the system that does not represent them. The problem starts there. It led to non-ending violence's in the country. The current violence and human rights crisis in Tigray and across the country are partially grown out of such problems. This paper mainly focused on violence in the Tigray region, the root causes, Abiy Ahmed's political move that causes and turned into civil war, violence, death of thousands, massacres, mass rape, IDPs, refugee crisis, and human rights violation across the country. The discussion starts with a basic historical overview of empire formation, ethnic-based struggles, challenges to federalism, and the way forward. I have forwarded the recommendations that may be considered.

The Comparison of Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto Exposed on YouTube

This article reviews the exposure ratio of Jokowi and Prabowo in the YouTube channel. Joko Widodo’s alias, Jokowi, is the President of the Republic of Indonesia 2014-2019. He will re-join the 2019 presidential election, while Prabowo Subianto is a challenger who is supported by the Gerindra Party and the Prosperous Prosperity Party. The analytical method uses the semiotic concept of Strauss and John Fiske, who view the video as a sign system. The sign system is parsed through five political codes: lifestyle, transfer of power, existence, ideology and vision. This study finds that, in general, Jokowi's videos were more visited and preferred than Prabowo's videos, but Prabowo excelled in the transfer code of power, existence and ideology. In the video, Jokowi tends to impress himself as a person who has several characters. As the President of Indonesia, Jokowi displays a diligent character. As a political activist, Jokowi reinforces his ideology as a nationalist. As a citizen, Jokowi imitates the figure who adheres to the values of tradition As a man, Jokowi impressed himself as a humanist. Prabowo tends to feature a lavish lifestyle with equestrian sport with a historical background of the descendants of an economic Democrat Prof Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and associates himself like Soekarno. Prabowo tends to show his affiliation to the right Islamists. The contestation of the 2019 presidential election followed by Jokowi and Prabowo will show the battle of two different sources of legitimacy.

Nepal and Bhutan in 2013

The political stalemate prevailing in Nepal since the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly (CA) in 2012 ended with the second CA polls in November. Bhutan’s second parliamentary elections in July and the opposition People’s Democratic Party’s victory over the outgoing Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party) were signs of consolidation of Bhutan’s nascent democracy.

Getting culture: a new path for Indonesia’s Islamist Justice and Prosperity party?

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, The Justice and Prosperity Party) is the largest Islamist political party in Indonesia. It has roots in the religious and political and religious teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood and promotes what Oliver Roy calls "deculturized religion." The party can be understood as the political component of a larger social movement that seeks to transform Indonesian society and culture in ways that would establish Shari'ah as social, if not political, reality. It is also committed to the electoral process and to working inside the Indonesian political system in a more general sense. Until recently, the PKS has dismissed local modes of Muslim practice and much of Indonesian culture as "un-Islamic." The extent of the party's transformative agenda is unclear for three reasons: it shares the Muslim Brotherhood's gradualist approach, it is less than transparent about its goals, and it is divided into purist or "Justice" and pragmatic or "Prosperity" factions. The leadership of the Prosperity faction is currently ascendant and is attempting to reach beyond its Islamist base by sponsoring musical and dramatic performances it hopes will appeal to Muslims devoted to Javanese and other Indonesian cultural traditions. Ethnographic and web-based research indicate that these efforts are greeted with considerable suspicion.

No Turkish Delight: The Impasse of Islamic Party Politics in Indonesia

This article addresses the inability of Indonesia’s Islamic parties to launch a serious challenge for control over state power through insights obtained via comparisons with the Turkish case. By juxtaposing Indonesia’s PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperity Party) and Turkey’s AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), in particular, it offers a political economy-oriented understanding of the limited achievements of Islamic party politics in Indonesia. The analysis places Islamic party politics in Indonesia and Turkey in the context of social-structural changes associated with capitalist development. It argues that, unlike the AKP, the PKS remains predominantly identified with an urban middle-class constituency rather than a cross-class alliance waging struggles under the Islamic banner.