Professional Politicians Research Articles

The Local State and Local Economic Policy: Why the Fuss?

In the last decade, and especially since the accession of a radical right wing government to power in 1979, local government and the ‘local state’ has re-emerged as an important area of debate and public interest in Britain. This is not just a matter of academic journals, professional politicians and the inside pages of ‘serious newspapers'. Local government has become front page and even TV news material. Right-wing popular papers sell copy through sensationalist headlines about ‘Red Ken’ (the Greater London Council leader), the dangers of ‘municipal marxism’ and ‘socialism on the rates’. This is mirrored, and also exaggerated by the more earnest and less manipulative reports in the left wing press on local socialism, decentralisation, popular planning, and the scope for local economic regeneration. Even those shadowy local state institutions outside the orbit of officially public electoral policies, like police authorities, water boards and health authorities, now share some of this interest. Above all, there is a clear, continuing and at times rather dramatic crisis in relations between central and local government. Furthermore, this is a crisis which often cuts across party lines or becomes identified with internal party conflicts—localist v. centralist, left v. right, Thatcherite v. the wets, monetarist v. patrician.

Nepal in 1982: Panchayat Leadership in Crisis

THE MONARCHY IN NEPAL is widely regarded as an indispensable institution by the people, but, depending on their political affiliation and profession, they differ on the kind of political and economic powers the King should exercise. In foreign policy, because of Nepal's geographic location between the two Asian giants democratic India and Communist China the people of Nepal believe that the King should follow a nonaligned policy, thereby maintaining a political balance and possibly saving the sovereignty of the country. However, the King and responsible elected political leaders face important political and economic problems that can no longer be neglected or avoided. The reformed Panchayat political system was established as the people's political representational system by a narrow victory in the National Referendum on May 2, 1980, and in the General Election on May 8, 1981. The political features of the reformed Panchayat system include: election of a National Panchayat (assembly) through adult franchise; election of the Prime Minister by the National Panchayat; formation of a government responsible to the people; and affirmation that the nation's sovereignty is vested in the crown. But the reformed political system has not yet brought a significant change in the direction of political leadership on economic policies or foreign policy.

Eduardo Frei Montalva (1911–1982)

The unexpected death of former Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva in Santiago on 21 January 1982 had suddenly deprived his country and the international Christian Democratic movement of one of its firmest pillars – a force for justice, decency and order in Latin America and the world. At a time when the very profession of politics has fallen into a sort of fashionable disrepute throughout the democtatic world, and the notions of compromis, conciliation, and community seem less attraactive than ideological purification and a post-“political” order, men like Frei serve to remind us that there are alternatives, if we would but pursue them.

But How Many Candidates Should We Have in Donegal? Numbers of Nominees and Electoral Efficiency in Ireland

When the results of an analysis fly in the face both of generally accepted theory and the practice of professional politicians, it is usually a good idea to reconsider whether the point is really established. Such is the case with the small literature regarding the effects of nomination strategies on the outcomes of Dáil Éireann elections that has developed in these pages since the publication of an article by Cohan, McKinlay and Mughan (‘The Used Vote and Electoral Outcomes: The Irish General Election of 1973’, thisJournal, v (1975), 363–83). The original article made several valuable points, including a demonstration that patterns of transfer votes may be more important than the distribution of first preference votes in determining the result of elections under the single transferable vote (STV) system, and an extension of the wasted vote concept to STV, majority, and proportional elections. Unfortunately, the notes that have followed have all focused on the most questionable conclusion of the original article, that overnomination hurts a party's chances of electing the maximum possible number of deputies.

Recent Writing on the Mexican Economy

In a significant survey article published in the American Economic Review ten years ago, Leopoldo Solís could regret, not without justification, the lack of a serious tradition of empirical economics research in Mexico. There was no lack of well-trained and creative applied economists; but they were often engaged, then as now, in political action or public administration. Meanwhile, academic economists were engaged in the transmission of received theory (usually foreign) without reference to the realidad nacional or else in vague generalizations. However, the recent bibliographical survey by the Colegio de México, as well as the publications discussed in this review, indicate that the 1970s saw a flourishing of empirical and quantitative work among the two main groups identified by Solís: the neoclassical and monetarist economists on the one hand and the structuralists and radicals on the other. Moreover, there has emerged an increasing differentiation within these groups, spreading the scope of the debate outwards from the center, reflecting the polarization of political attitudes in Mexican society as a whole. Further, as the economists gained positions of power previously reserved for professional politicians, both structuralists such as Tello and neoclassicals such as Solís himself were in a position to translate at least some of their ideas into practice. However, although Solís had suggested that the intellectual advance would be made by economists of the neoclassical persuasion, in the event it was the monetarists and radical writers who appear to have been most fertile in the 1970s.

Attitude Stability among Italian Elites

How stable are elite survey responses over time? Scattered previous research casts doubt on the standard assumption that elite political attitudes are significantly more stable than mass attitudes. After a discussion of problems of interpreting and measuring attitude stability, this study presents evidence from a six-year panel survey of Italian regional political elites. The respondents are full-time, highly successful, professional politicians. Their ideological commitments, their orientations to social and political conflict, their attitudes toward democratic institutions, their political style, and some aspects of their attitudes toward Italian regionalism are shown to be remarkably stable over this period. Some methodological lessons for elite survey research are drawn from these analyses, including (most basically) the comforting conclusion that the fundamental beliefs of elites can be measured with a high degree of reliability.

Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy

F ROM the moment of Franco's death until the first general elections, on June 15, 1977, both professional politicians and large sections of the Spanish people focused their attention and hopes primarily on the transformation of the political system. After 40 years of authoritarian government, and more than a decade of substantial economic progress, Spaniards pinned their hopes on political liberalisation and showed surprising willingness to let social and economic changes wait until the political issues were settled. Some parallels might be drawn with Turkey, Brazil and Venezuela; but recent Spanish political experience is essentially unique in the annals of contemporary politics, and paradoxically demonstrates that ' Spain is different ' even when it is adapting itsel-f to the political pattern of the rest of Western Europe. It has found the path from authoritarian rule to a more liberal and democratic form of politics without experiencing defeat in war, foreign intervention or revolutionary upheaval. This process has been carried out from above, under the direction and control of the direct heirs of the Franco regime. Thus far political transformation has not been accompanied by major social or economic change. A new generation has displaced the old, but power is still largely in the hands of conservatives. The professional classes and the owners of the new industries, who are closely tied to their European counterparts, were becoming increasingly influential during the final decade of the Franco regime. Now they have won control over national political life. Although the left has shown considerable strength, a modernised right remains in power. The economic transformation of the 1960s contributed to the rise of the new holders of political power and helped create a large body of moderate opinion, favourable to liberalisation but wary of adventures. During the last decade of the Franco regime, Spaniards also gradually won greater freedom of expression, but scarcely any increase in participation. This created an inherently unstable situation. Either more participation or tighter controls on opinion were clearly necessary. Shortly after Franco's death in November 1975, King Juan Carlos chose to retain Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. The decision, made under heavy pressure from the right, was a grave disappointment

On Amateur and Professional Politicians

THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH NOTE iS to examine the delegates to the Democratic Mid-Term Conference from the amateur and professional perspectives.' In view of the many changes that have taken place in American political parties since the amateur and professional concepts were first distinguished, we want to know whether or not these two different political styles do indeed distinguish the delegates to the 1974 Conference.2 We will examine the demographic characteristics of the delegates, their records of party

Race, Class, and the New Ethnicity

Recent behavior of working-class Americans, sometimes called “new ethnics,”; has deeply shocked and bewildered many .acute commentators. The supposed return to militant self-identification has led one radical, Pete Hamill, to claim that “the working-class white man is actually in revolt against taxes, joyless work, the double standards and short memories of professional politicians, hypocrisy and what he considers the debasement of the American dream.”The same display of muscular working-class behavior has led Herbert Hill, an equally radical critic, to assert that “the hard-hat labor unionists, and they are by no means limited to the building trades, have joined with the military elite and their political spokesmen. This suggests the great danger of the rise of a proto-fascdst workers” movement in the United States.

From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Pattern of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines

In some areas of the Philippines, three important and interrelated changes in the traditional pattern of local leadership recruitment and faction organization had been taking place for several decades. Notables from old leading families were being replaced in positions of leadership by upwardly mobile “new men” from more humble backgrounds. Professional politicians were emerging in the local arena. Local factions were being transformed from traditional family-centered organizations into specialized machines. These changes were most likely to occur in areas of comparatively high social mobilization and low concentration of landownership. Changes are explained primarily by the impact of increasingly intense national political competition in rural communities and growing mass participation. These changes represent a decline in the autonomy of local elites, as they were accompanied by the latters' growing reliance on central resources to maintain their machines. These changes and the forces behind them are well illustrated by the pattern of political change in the town of Taal, Batangas during this century, which is reported in great detail.

Partisanship in the United States Senate: 1869-1901

Partisanship in United States Senate: I869-I9oi Increasingly, historians of all ideological persuasions speak of what Wiebe so aptly termed search for order which preoccupied Americans around turn of century.' Between I880 and I920, these historians argue, United States underwent an organizational revolution that transformed all elements of social order. Businessmen, workers, and farmers all saw that they must organize or perish.2 In Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901, Rothman presented a case study of impact of professionalization and bureaucratization on development of political institutions. For Rothman, dramatic changes taking place within larger society forced rationalization of political structures under leadership of professional politicians who recognized the value of united action and effective leadership. In general, he found that by end of century American institutions ... [had] proved equal to challenge. During years between 1869 and I9go party organization emerged to dominate business of Senate and impose unprecedented discipline on roll calls. 3 Rothman viewed partisanship as a product of party organization that emerged in response

From Vertical to Horizontal Inequality: The Case of the Soviet Union

Whatever superficial similarities there may be between the systems of inequality in Western and socialist societies, the causes of inequality are rooted in divergent social structures and are entirely distinct. The Soviet Union and some other socialist countries are characterized by the ascendance of professional politicians who attempt to transform the decision-making process into a public service, independent of class and other interests. A precondition for the survival of professionalized politics is the successful neutralization of the power of traditional classes and interest groups. Effective control of the competing sources of power is achieved by the systematic introduction of regulated inequality, transforming the society from a “class hierarchy” into a “ladder hierarchy.” A planned hierarchy, bureaucratically imposed on every community, group, and aggregate, facilitates control over the clients and transforms potential interest groups in Soviet society into horizontal structures. As a result, Soviet society cannot be said to stratify vertically in the way that “class hierarchies” do, but is more accurately described as stratifying horizontally.

The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-1896

What are the mainsprings of American politics? To historians of Charles A. Beard's generation differences in economic situation were the real stuff of politics, and the impact of major depressions can hardly be denied. A more recent generation has joined Lee Benson in pointing to the potent effects of pietistic sects versus the more liturgical churches. Both of these issue dimensions compete within an institutional framework itself subject to change, and buttressed by habitual party loyalty to the Republican and Democratic parties. The relative impact of economic and moral issues is most evident in those relatively few elections in which party lines are broken, and new loyalties emerge. Burnham seeks to examine such major changes from the days of Andrew Jackson to Richard Nixon, but with most emphasis on the realigning election of 1896. Richard Jensen presents a more detailed account of the changes culminating in the election of 1896 in the Midwest. Jensen covers much the same ground as Paul Kleppner's The Cross of Culture (1970), and with similar emphasis. Both Jensen and Kleppner see changes in the late nineteenth-century Midwest turning primarily on cultural or moral issues such as state enforcement of prohibition and state regulation of parochial schools. The GOP, reflecting its Know-Nothing and Abolitionist background, was the usual vehicle of the pietistic reformers. In the evenly balanced Midwest both parties sought to mobilize their voters by vast army-like campaigns, with professional politicians directing the use of patronage workers, funds, and floating voters. Jensen is at his best in recreating this lost world. Just how greatly the post-1896 political universe differs from others is a theme taken up by Burnham. Why the great change wrought by 1896 in the Midwest? Jensen's answer might be summarized as showing that reformist amateur leaders were catapulted into office by pietistic Republican voters in the late 188os. Once in office they imposed moralistic reforms-prohibition in Iowa, the Bennett Law requiring schools to use the English language in Wisconsin -that brought electoral disaster. German-Americans swung to the Democrats, who won smashing victories in 1890 and 1892. But the panic of 1893 was universally blamed on the Cleveland administration, and Bry-

Parliamentary Candidates and Party Professionalism in Western Germany

ism are interchangeable. A political career in the Federal Republic is virtually unthinkable except as it is structured by, and channeled through, one of the major party organizations. Indeed, Lewis Edinger argues that an extent unprecedented in German history, party leaders control the recruitment and performance of governmental elites. The contrast with American congressional candidates, one-third of whom typically do not hold any party office before going to Congress,2 is instructive: almost every nominee for the West German Bundestag enters the nominating process after holding a leadership position in one of the party organizations. Although the CDU and SPD actively seek candidates with distinguished private careers, they do so on the assumption that such men and women will also possess the requisite party experience. Professionalism and functional specialization are major features of German society, equally present in educational institutions, corporations, and public bureaucracies. Scholars since Max Weber have been critical of this tendency, particularly as it has reached deeply into the organization of political life.3 Suspended between a conception of parliament where notables, privately wealthy and socially distinguished, would at their leisure represent the interests of the German state, and the reality of a developing cadre of parliamentarians, large segments of the public still retain a basic hostility to the idea of professional politicians.4 Yet public opinion studies have demonstrated that

The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India

Research Article| May 01 1971 The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India Hugh Gray Hugh Gray Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1942) 11 (5): 463–474. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642982 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Hugh Gray; The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India. Far Eastern Survey 9 March 1942; 11 (5): 463–474. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2642982 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1971 Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

A Theory of Professionalization in Politics

Professionalization, in customary usage, refers to the assimilation of the standards and values prevalent in a given profession. Every profession, including politics, tends to have some set or sets of values that are widely held and which define what it means to be a “professional” within that field. These values are important because they affect the likelihood that the individual will achieve success in his profession. If the values are widely held, those that deviate from them are likely to be sanctioned by their colleagues, and people who fail to maintain the minimal standards of their profession are not likely to obtain professional advancement. Those who do behave according to the dominant values of their profession, however, are likely to be accorded the status of “professional” in the eyes of their colleagues, and that designation will contribute to the success of their careers.In the profession of politics, as in other professions, there is seldom one set of standards and values that prevails in all places at all times. These normative elements are likely to vary from political system to political system, to vary within a political system, and to vary within the profession of politics over time. In a highly centralized local political organization, for example, the achievement and maintenance of a position is likely to depend upon such values as deference and loyalty to the leaders of the political hierarchy.

Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: New York, 1815–1828

DURING the first thirty years of its existence the United States developed, quite unintentionally, a party system. Organized popular parties regularly contested for power; Federalists and Republicans fought passionately and acrimoniously in Congress and cabinet, in town squares and county courthouses throughout the nation. The evidences of party spirit alarmed many Americans, for the existence of parties and their constant contention violated powerful and ancient traditions of proper political behavior. According to canons inherited from British and colonial thought and practice, parties were evil: they were associations of factious men bent on self-aggrandizement. Political competition was evil: the ideal society was one where unity and consensus prevailed, where the national interest was peacefully determined by national leaders. Because partisan behavior violated normal ethical standards, many men, politicians among them, saw in the rise of parties a sign of moral decline. Not until a new generation of politicians emerged-men who had been raised in parties and had grown to maturity in a world that included party competition as a fixture of political life-were Americans able to re-evaluate the ancient traditions and establish new ones that justified their political activities. Much of this re-evaluation and development of new ideals took place in New York State in the I82o's.1 There a group of professional politicians, leaders of the Republican party known as the Albany Regency, developed the modern concept of a political party and declared party associations to be eminently desirable. They adhered to a set of values that insisted on preserving, not destroying, political parties. They denounced and derided the consensus ideal and praised permanent political competition as being beneficial to society.

COMMENT

Industrial experience is as important to politicians as to teachers in technical colleges; and increasingly important as the government is compelled to intervene in industrial matters, especially wage negotiations. One of Mr Wilson's many mistakes is to fail to recognize this. Twenty years on the parliamentary back‐benches is a poor training for the assumption of major administrative responsibilities and for making far‐reaching economic decisions. We are rightly proud in this country that there is little corruption and political patronage and that politics is therefore a poor man's game; but the price we pay for this is the innocence of many of our professional politicians when they are confronted by the harsh realities of the market place. This penalizes the Labour Party most of all. The Conservative Party has an amateur tradition and encourages its back‐bench MPs to continue to pursue their outside business and professional interests; this often prepares them reasonably well for ministerial responsibility. But the Labour Party has a professional tradition and has comparatively few business men. Its main strength in industrial experience is amongst its trade unionists and Mr Wilson has made notably less use of this than did Mr Attlee; his cabinet sorely lacks an Ernest Bevin.

Professional politicians and personality structures.

An abbreviated version of the Rockeach Dogmatism Scale was administered to a random sample of Italian parliamentarians and to a quota sample of Italian non-politicians. Findings substantiate the research hypotesis that professional politicians are characterized by personality structures which are more dogmatic than those of non-politicians, and suggest further that distinctions in terms of such personality structures can be made even more precisely on the basis of political ideology and political party affiliation. Significant relationships are found also between various degrees of religious practice and dogmatism. Variations are explained in terms of fundamental political ideology and methods of political recruitment. Theoretical significance for the functioning of political systems is discussed.

Horace Greeley and the Politicians: The Liberal Republican Convention in 1872

H iSTORIANS have long had a simple explanation for nomination of Horace Greeley at Liberal Republican convention in 1872. According to most historical accounts, certain professional politicians took control of convention from inexperienced reformers who had called it and who had intended to nominate Charles Francis Adams or Lyman Trumbull. The politicians settled upon Greeley as their candidate and nominated a simple maneuver. First, they made an alliance with one of contenders, B. Gratz Brown, who withdrew from contest after first ballot. Thereafter politicians deftly managed their well-disciplined minority and on sixth ballot stampeded convention to Greeley. In return, Greeley delegates helped nominate Brown for vice presidency. Thus high idealism of reform convention ended in a crass bargain manipulated politicians. This explanation emerged immediately after convention adjourned. Henry Demarest Lloyd, one of disappointed reform delegates at convention, attributed Greeley's nomination by a convention which I firmly believe to have been opposed to even while it nominated him to free traders' surrender of principle accepting a compromise-tariff plank. But of equal importance was the fact that Mr. Greeley was only candidate who had behind an efficient, skillful, well-trained, energetic working force.... Adams had majority, but Greeley minority had mastery of political machinery, which will overcome strongest undoubted majority.' Such views were restated innumerable times during weeks following Cincinnati convention.2