Negotiation Problem Research Articles

Bargaining framework for competitive green supply chains under governmental financial intervention

This work investigates the problem of negotiations between producers and reverse-logistics (RL) suppliers for cooperative agreements under government intervention. Utilizing the asymmetrical Nash bargaining game with uncertainties, this work seeks equilibrium negotiation solutions to player agendas. Analytical results indicate that financial intervention by a government generates a significant effect on the relative bargaining power of green supply chain members in negotiations. Over intervention by a government may result in adverse effects on chain members’ profits and social welfare. Furthermore, a bargaining framework underlying the duopoly–oligopoly context may contribute to a negotiation outcome most profitable for green supply chain members.

Common Testbed Generating Tool Based on XML for Multiple Interdependent Issues Negotiation Problems

Multiple interdependent issues negotiations have been widely studied since most real-world negotiation involves multiple interdependent issues. Our work focuses on negotiation with multiple interdependent issues in which agent utility functions are nonlinear. In the field of multiple issue negotiations, there are no established common testbeds for evaluating protocols. In this paper, we propose a common testbed creating tool based on XML that mainly covers the utility functions based on cube-constraints and cone-constraints. First, we propose a testbed generating tool that inputs configuration data and outputs XML formatted files that represent agent utility spaces. The current tool can produce four types of utility spaces: Random, A Single Hill, Two-Hills, and SeveralHills. These types are observed in real negotiation settings. Also we define the agent’s utility space information based on XML formats. By defining the testbed data as XMLs, users can easily read the files and change the data structure.

Searching for Pareto-Optimal Settlements in Negotiations

Decision-making analysts are generally familiar with the maximin and minimax criteria used in the selection of alternative courses of action when payoffs depend on different states of nature. This paper applies these criteria to the collaborative negotiation problem in which two parties negotiate the resolution of several issues each with defined payoffs, and where the alternative choices for each party are qualitative attributes or non-differentiable variables. The proposed method assumes that the negotiators do not know each other’s payoffs and are generally unwilling to disclose information about their preferences. The search procedure for Pareto-optimal settlements and the role of the mediator in assisting the parties to achieve an improved negotiated agreement are analyzed and illustrated through an example.

Representative based multi-round protocol based on revealed private information for multi-issue negotiations

Multi-issue negotiation protocols represent a promising field since most negotiation problems in the real world involve multiple issues. Our work focuses on negotiation with interdependent issues in which agent utility functions are nonlinear. Existi

Modeling agents based on aspiration adaptation theory

Creating agents that realistically simulate and interact with people is an important problem. In this paper we present strong empirical evidence that such agents should be based on bounded rationality, and specifically on key elements from Aspiration Adaptation Theory (AAT). First, we analyzed the strategies people described they would use to solve two relatively basic optimization problems involving one and two parameters. Second, we studied the agents a different group of people wrote to solve these same problems. We then studied two realistic negotiation problems involving five and six parameters. Again, first we studied the negotiation strategies people used when interacting with other people. Then we studied two state of the art automated negotiation agents and negotiation sessions between these agents and people. We found that in both the optimizing and negotiation problems the overwhelming majority of automated agents and people used key elements from AAT, even when optimal solutions, machine learning techniques for solving multiple parameters, or bounded techniques other than AAT could have been implemented. We discuss the implications of our findings including suggestions for designing more effective agents for game and simulation environments.

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.

Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to waterrelated issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising therules of the gamethat could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.

Applying hybrid case-based reasoning in agent-based negotiations for supply chain management

In recent years, enormous research effort has been spent on the development of multi-agent systems to automate buyer–seller negotiations in supply chain management (SCM) applications. In many of these agent-based negotiation systems, the negotiation process is restricted to the stage when agents interact to exchange bargaining offers; activities in the pre-bargaining and post-bargaining stages are ignored. With a more comprehensive perspective, the negotiation lifecycle comprises a number of phases including the pre- and post-bargaining phases, in addition to the phase when participants interact to bargain. In this paper, a hybrid case-based reasoning approach is applied in the pre- and post-negotiation phases to support adaptive negotiation strategy for buyer–seller negotiations in SCM applications. When a new negotiation problem arrives, a similar previous negotiation case is retrieved from the case database and its solutions are recommended for inferring the negotiation parameters. The recommended parameters have to be adjusted to suit the new negotiation problem. Subsequent to negotiation completion, negotiation parameters and the negotiation outcome are analyzed and evaluated. After the evaluation, the new negotiation case, including the problem descriptions and solutions, is retained in the case database for future applications.

The Art and Economics of International Negotiations

This paper offers a new theoretical model which combines game theory and cultural bargaining behavior. It is based on the framework of activity-based cultural types called linear-active (time-is-money approach), multi-active (negotiation-is-an-art approach) and reactive (building-up-trust approach) categories of culture. The complexities of international negotiations can be analyzed by using an activity-based approach with game theoretic bargaining models. In order to come up with useful results, the paper takes on the perspective of multi-active bargaining types as sellers and buyers which shows different outcomes, respectively. The article is structured into the literature review, the description of activity-based bargaining types, the game trees (time lines) and the models of uncertainty. In terms of solution concepts we are dealing with Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) and a new way of solving three-type problems. The results of the games show the equilibrium types and a possibility to circumvent problems in international business negotiations which are related to different time perceptions and strategic behavior in this respect. It is therefore important to anticipate the deadlocks, stalemates and even break-ups when bargaining with culturally programmed types. We are, now, able to show that international negotiations are prone to fail due to incompatibilities and lack of knowledge of different cultural bargaining strategies.

Wholesale power trading through concurrent multiple-issue negotiation

The electricity trade is expensive, and requires substantial expertise and efficient co-ordination methodologies. Several trading mechanisms including auctions have been adopted in the current energy market. To pursue success in this market, we present a protocol to support many-to-many bilateral multiple-issue negotiation in a competitive market where one or more self-interested electricity sellers can provide electricity to one or more buyers while buyers can choose the preferred sellers. Negotiation is a technique for reaching mutually beneficial agreement among autonomous entities. A concurrent negotiation problem occurs when one entity needs to negotiate simultaneously with several other entities to reach agreement. In the context of wholesale electricity trading, our described protocol enables both electricity buyers and sellers to manage several negotiation processes in parallel. This protocol allows the negotiating participants to make durable commitments to reduce the occurrence of the decommitment situation. Since coloured Petri nets are intuitive and can represent concurrency graphically, we use them to represent our negotiation protocol and facilitate our analysis of desirable properties.

Negotiation for Cooperation in Logistics Networks: An Experimental Study

This paper investigates the negotiation problem in a supply chain in which a supplier can realize cost savings if she reaches an agreement with a retailer to use the retailers accurate market data for production planning. We study the participants behavior in an asymmetric and a symmetric information scenario and model the experimental study as a reverse ultimatum game. The main finding is that the revelation of information in the game leads to higher payoffs for both parties and to a higher welfare.

Métodos de incrementos y concesiones equilibradas para el apoyo de negociaciones

We reconsIDer bargaining models developed to determine fair and reasonable solution outcomes for bargaining problems. Based on these models we develop novel negotiation support methods that will be able to produce on demand recommendations during a negotiation process. We first briefly discuss Raiffa's solution of balanced increments and, based on that IDea, propose another solution based on balanced concessions. The combined application of the bargaining process models associated with these solutions leads to a flexible negotiation support method. A risk sharing negotiation problem illustrates how to implement our negotiation support method in a negotiation case.

Balanced increment and concession methods for negotiation support

We reconsIDer bargaining models developed to determine fair and reasonable solution outcomes for bargaining problems. Based on these models we develop novel negotiation support methods that will be able to produce on demand recommendations during a negotiation process. We first briefly discuss Raiffa's solution of balanced increments and, based on that IDea, propose another solution based on balanced concessions. The combined application of the bargaining process models associated with these solutions leads to a flexible negotiation support method. A risk sharing negotiation problem illustrates how to implement our negotiation support method in a negotiation case.

Secure and Scalable Protocols for Multiple Issues Negotiations

Multi-issue negotiation protocols represent a promising field since most negotiation problems in the real world involve multiple issues. Our work focuses on negotiation with multiple interdependent issues in which agent utility functions are nonlinear. Existing works have not yet concerned with agents' private information that should be concealed from others in negotiations. In this paper, we propose Distributed Mediator Protocol and Take it or Leave it Protocol for negotiation that can reach agreements and completely conceal agents' private information. Moreover, we propose Hybrid Secure Protocol that combines Distributed Mediator Protocol with Take it or Leave it Protocol. The Hybrid Secure Protocol can also reach agreements while completely concealing agents' private information. Furthermore, the Hybrid Secure Protocol achieves high optimality and uses less communication cost. We demonstrate that Hybrid Secure Protocol can improve communication cost more than DMP with high optimality.

Взаимосвязь ядерного разоружения и нераспространения

The article is devoted to the problem of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons reduction negotiations. Evaluation is made, to what extent nuclear states have performed their obligations under the first part of the Art.VI, the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The author analyzes the influence of the Great Powers' policy aimed at nuclear arsenals curtailing and reduction of the nuclear weapons' role in national and international safety assurance, as well as at carrying of nuclear war concepts and plans far off stage in international military and political relations, at enhancement of the worldwide "taboo" against any use of nuclear weapons directly or as a threat, at lowering the popularity of nuclear weapons in inside politics of many countries.

Secure and efficient protocols for multiple interdependent issues negotiation

Multi-issue negotiation protocols represent a promising field sincemost negotiation problems in the real world involve multiple issues. Our work focuses on negotiation with multiple interdependent issues in which agent utility functions are nonlinear. Firstly, we define utility function based on cone-constraints which are nonlinear. The utility function based on cone-constraint is more realistic than existing utility models and configures the risk attitudes to the cone-constraint. However, if the utility function has cone-constraint features, the utility space becomes extremely nonlinear, making it very difficult to find the optimal agreement point. Existing works have not yet concerned with agents' private information that should be concealed from others in negotiations. In this paper, we propose Distributed Mediator Protocol and Take it or Leave it Protocol for negotiation that can reach agreements and completely conceal agents’ private information. Moreover, we propose Hybrid Secure Protocol that combines Distributed Mediator Protocol with Take it or Leave it Protocol. The Hybrid Secure Protocol can also reach agreements while completely concealing agents’ private information. Furthermore, the Hybrid Secure Protocol achieves high optimality and uses less communication cost. We demonstrate the performance of Hybrid Secure Protocol in cone-constraints and cube-constraints situations.

Characterizing Contract-Based Multiagent Resource Allocation in Networks

We consider a multiagent resource allocation problem where individual users intend to route traffic by requesting the help of entities across a network, and a cost is incurred at each network node that depends on the amount of traffic to be routed. We propose to study contract-based network resource allocation. In our model, users and nodes in the network make contracts before nodes route traffic for the users. The problem is an interesting self-interested negotiation problem because it requires the complete assembly of a set of distinct resources, and there are multiple combinations of distinct resources that could satisfy the goal of negotiation. First, we characterize the network allocation problem and show that finding optimal allocations is NP-complete and is inapproximable. We take both Nash equilibrium and pairwise Nash equilibrium as the solution concepts to characterize the equilibrium allocations. We find that, for any resource allocation game, Nash equilibrium and pairwise Nash equilibrium always exist. In addition, socially optimal allocations are always supported by Nash equilibrium and pairwise Nash equilibrium. We introduce best-response dynamics in which each agent takes a myopic best-response strategy and interacts with each other to dynamically form contracts. We analyze the convergence of the dynamics in some special cases. We also experimentally study the convergence rate of the dynamics and how efficient the evolved allocation is as compared with the optimal allocation in a variety of environments.

裁判員裁判評議における素朴交渉発生の可能性と問題点 : 模擬評議「及川事件」の発話交換に発現する裁判官と裁判員の枠組みのずれ(法と心理学会第8回大会シンポジウム, 心理学は裁判員裁判に何ができるか)

裁判員裁判評議における素朴交渉発生の可能性と問題点 : 模擬評議「及川事件」の発話交換に発現する裁判官と裁判員の枠組みのずれ(法と心理学会第8回大会シンポジウム, 心理学は裁判員裁判に何ができるか)

A Gender Analysis of Bank Loan Negotiations in Uganda

This paper highlights the differences between men and women in bank loan negotiations. It presents findings of an ex post facto design study that involved administering questionnaires to 289 respondents who had ever applied for a loan from a Ugandan commercial bank from 1999 through 2005. Results showed that male and female respondents differed in their negotiation behavior and outcomes. Female respondents scored higher than male respondents on self-enhancement and yielding. Male respondents scored higher than female respondents on inaction. Results further showed that female respondents receive lower payoff than male respondents from bank loan negotiations, and that both male and female respondents encounter problems in mixed gender negotiations.

Do countries free ride on MFN?

The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl–Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.