How can we maintain the reality and significance of human moral concerns in a universe that science has seemingly revealed to be utterly indifferent to us? This paper follows William James' struggle to answer this question, from his early embrace of his father's religious monism, through a period of atheistic scientism, to his mature position advocating for belief in a finite God. While James is often read as defending religious faith on pragmatic grounds, I argue instead that his belief can only be understood as part of his lifelong project to recognize evil's reality and significance.

Leibniz’s position on God is close to pantheism, because the best of all possible worlds is an asymptotic perfection with that of God, and because God creates out of moral necessity. On the other hand, Catholics may think that, by faith, they attain a superior knowledge of God. But Thomism defends that the existence of God is only known after a laborious knowledge of the world; moreover, the essence of God is always mysterious. These differences may help explain Leibniz’s flawed conception of creation and the existence of evil in the world.

Eleonore Stump, The Image of God: The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Mourning

The Problem of Evil in Early Nishitani Keiji : On the Re-appropriation of “Life”

The problem of evil and the problem of consciousness occupy central positions in the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind, respectively. On the face of it, these problems seem to be fundamentally distinct. The problem of evil is concerned with whether the existence of evil in the world undermines belief in the existence of God while the problem of consciousness concerns the nature of consciousness and how it can arise from physical processes in the brain. In this paper, however, I defend the following novel thesis: the problem of evil and the problem of consciousness are versions of the same problem, which I term the “problem of ontological expectation mismatch.” I argue that, by recognizing that they stem from the same root, we can gain a fresh perspective for evaluating existing approaches to both problems in a systematic manner. I conclude my discussion by utilizing this thesis to critically examine panpsychism, a response to the problem of consciousness that has recently gained significant popularity.

In this paper, we analyze Kant?s late essay ?On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy? and compare it with his Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, which represent an important expression of the transitional phase between his pre-critical and critical thinking. Special attention will also be given to Leibniz?s theodicy, considering its influence on Kant?s reflections regarding the relationship between God and the existence of evil. After the introductory considerations, we will examine in detail the nine doctrinal theodicies that Kant explicitly rejects before turning to his notion of an ?authentic? theodicy. We will argue that Kant does not attempt to solve the problem of evil within the bounds of speculative reason but instead adopts a position of agnosticism grounded in moral sincerity and in faith rooted in the postulates of practical reason.

This text presents an overview of how the academic field of theories of religion and philosophy of religion is taught at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University “Ss. Cyril and Methodius”, focusing on the didactic aims and learning outcomes of the courses across the BA, MA, and PhD levels. This overview provides a brief account of curricular design in an area that examines the sacred, the divine, the ineffable, and the metaphysical dimensions of religious life, thus contributing to the metaphysical core of the degree in philosophy, and to the pluriperspective nature of the interdisciplinary profiles. At the BA level, Theories of religion introduces students to major theories on the origin and nature of religion, covering concepts such as the sacred, myth, ritual, magic, and the formation of homo religiosus. It emphasizes interdisciplinary approaches by introducing anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies. Philosophy of religion builds on this foundation by addressing central metaphysical questions concerning the existence and nature of God, the limits of religious language (the field of negative theology), and the problem of evil in religion, while fostering analytical, comparative, and interpretive skills. It is also shown how an adapted elective version accommodates students from non-philosophical disciplines (archeology, art history etc.). At the MA level, Theories of the nature of religion deepens students’ analytical-synthetical and her­meneutical abilities, enabling them to critically engage with paradigms and methodological assumptions. History of the notion of God offers a genealogical study of the concept of divinity, training students to analyse and synthesize complex metaphysical ideas. Courses offered within interdisciplinary programs (Interreligious studies, Religiousstudies) provide foundational competencies for students without extensive philosophical background. The PhD courses, Philosophy and religion and Religion and morality, expand the study of metaphys­ics, methodology, and value systems. They cultivate pluriperspective analysis, conceptual reflexivity, and autonomous research skills, addressing topics such as theories of divinity, theodicy, moral heteronomy and autonomy, and the evolution of ethical and symbolic systems. Together, these courses articulate the central role of philosophy of religion within philosophical ed­ucation, highlight its interdisciplinary relevance, and demonstrate its importance for understanding human search for meaning across cultural, symbolic, and metaphysical domains.

Udayana, a prominent 10th-century Indian philosopher, belonged to the īśvara-vāda tradition, a theistic school of Indian thought centered on Īśvara , a personal Divine Absolute. This paper examines the significance of Udayana’s discourse on theodicy, particularly in light of contemporary debates, such as J. Sterba’s critique of theistic responses to the problem of evil: How can the existence of God be reconciled with the existence of evil? Udayana, in line with other Indian (and ancient) philosophers, posits that Īśvara coexists with primordial and eternal matter - atoms - whose combinations constitute the cycle of karma-samsāra , the realm where evil originates. While this cosmological compatibility of God with the source of evil might appear to render Indian theism more vulnerable to criticism than monotheism, Udayana argues that the all-powerful and all-perfect Īśvara constructs the world solely out of benevolence and is not responsible for evil, which stems from human karmic actions. According to Udayana, God is ontologically and morally irreconcilable with evil. Although Īśvara does not create primordial matter, He controls and directs all karmic processes ( adṛṣṭa - the unseen force of karma) with their inherent good and bad deeds, ultimately alleviating human suffering from evil at the end of each cosmic cycle. As a keen medieval polemicist, Udayana demonstrates a remarkable capacity to address contemporary challenges to theism.

In this essay I argue that there are necessarily true synthetic a priori moral propositions whose truth does not depend on the existence of God. To make my case, I appeal to an analogy with arithmetic truths such as 2 + 2 = 4 whose truth does not depend on the existence of God. I criticize views like Peter Railton’s that hold that moral truths are like truths about natural kinds such as water and heat, and non-cognitivists who hold that there are no robust moral truths. The point of my criticisms is to answer challenges to my view that there are necessarily true synthetic a priori moral propositions and, in the case of Railton, to block an argument by Robert Adams for a Divine Command Theory of ethics. Second, I argue by example that there can be conflicts between what is best for me and those for whom I care and what is morally required that cannot be reconciled by a theistic ethics. It can be rational to violate moral requirements that have the same contents as the commands of a loving God even if there would be most reason to adhere to those requirements IF God exists, just as it can be rational to leave your umbrella at home even if there would be most reason to take it IF it rained. This will be true regardless of whether the reason to adhere to God’s commands, IF God exists, is because our greatest good is the love of God (and that requires adhering to his commands) or because God will punish you if you do not and reward you if you do. The problem of evil is the primary reason to believe that God does not exist, and so to believe that there are no divine commands that there would be most reason to follow if God did exist.

In this article, I offer a friendly engagement with Amir Saemi’s recent publication, Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond: A New Problem of Evil. In this book, Saemi introduces what he terms the “Problem of Divinely Prescribed Evil,” which arises from the apparent conflict between the divinity of Scripture, the existence of seemingly prescribed immoral actions, and the reliability of human moral judgment. To resolve this conflict, Saemi proposes and defends what he calls the “Legal Interpretation” solution, which reframes morally problematic scriptural injunctions as historically contingent legal measures intended to resolve the social challenges of a nonideal community. In what follows, I argue that this solution is vulnerable to two significant objections. First, it risks being appropriated by traditionalist or fundamentalist perspectives that resist claims of moral progress (the “Absāl’s Island” objection). Second, it fails to resolve the underlying moral tension, merely relocating the problem without dissolving it (the “Illusory Solution” objection). I conclude my discussion by noting that my criticisms should be viewed as constructive and part of a larger, ongoing conversation about Saemi’s important work.

This paper is a critical study of Amir Saemi’s Morality and Religion in Islamic Moral Thought and Beyond: A New Problem of Evil. This book identifies and enhances resources available to conscientious Muslims for resolving normative conflicts. Saemi focuses particularly on tensions between, on the one hand, Scriptural commands and permissions and, on the other, deliverances of moral reflection. This paper first notes some representative ideas Saemi brings out from among the many classic Islamic philosophers and theologians he explicates. It then indicates the apparently central elements in his own resolution of some major conflicts faced by conscientious Muslims. These conflicts center on the issues of how to interpret theologically authoritative testimony; how, in doing so, to weight the reliability of competent human reflection; and how to balance the requirements of piety with the constraints of conscientious believers. The paper concludes with a proposal that respects the piety Saemi hopes to accommodate and the sound moral standards of conduct that, despite their tension with commands and permissions widely considered theologically binding, he argues are reasonable for conscientious Muslims.

This paper deals with the philosopher Franjo Šanc’s reflections on the problem of evil in the world. After some introductory remarks, the second chapter briefly presents the life and main works of Franjo Šanc. The third chapter, which is also the central chapter of the article, is structured around five themes. The first theme is the basic assumption from which Šanc starts, and that is: there is a personal God, and he is the Christian God, the creator and ruler of the world. The second theme is Augustine's concept of evil as absentia or privatio boni, the framework within which Šanc reflects on evil in the world. The third theme is Šanc’s central idea that in both physical and moral evil, God has a good purpose in mind, which does not always have to apply only to the individual, but can also apply to the whole world, and that evil does not necessarily exist. The fourth theme is Šanc’s argument that the existence of evil is proof of the existence of God, and not the reverse, as many authors claim and advocate. The fifth theme is Šanc’s answer to the question of the origin of evil. He says that evil exists for the greater glory of God. The conclusion of the paper briefly recapitulates Šanc’s philosophical thought and presents the author’s conclusion that his philosophical position is acceptable to Christians, but not to those who are not familiar with Christianity.

For decades, the debate over the problem of evil in analytic philosophy has focused on the existence of evil mainly considering God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. But this is neglecting other attributes of God, like justice, mercy, and patience. And this omission of these attributes in the debate is striking because it is not clear how the existence of evil is logically incompatible with a more complete list of God’s attributes. So, this article considers a fuller understanding of God’s attributes to show that the problem of evil is more of a rhetorical than a merely logical problem. After showing that the problem of evil is more of a rhetorical problem, this article emphasizes rhetorical stases that provide a framework for the explanatory and rhetorical power of various theodicies and defenses. Also, this article discusses how including Biblical stories can supplement theodicy by providing emotionally stirring examples of how and why God allows evil. Overall, it will be recommended that Christian philosophers and theologians should be mindful of the rhetorical nature of the problem of evil and of rhetorical strategies that can help with this issue.

Abstract Much of the contemporary discussion over the problem of evil is undermined by a violation of a basic conceptual truth: no rational agent would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. The argument of this paper contends that several prominent versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil are undercut as these arguments imply an incentive structure that would generate perverse outcomes. Put another way, these arguments imply that an omniscient agent would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. Interestingly, however, it is not just arguments from evil which run afoul of the principle that no rational being would knowingly engage in self-sabotage. As several prominent theodicies suffer from the flaw of incentivizing perverse outcomes as well.

Abstract The problem of evil is one of the greatest obstacles to belief in God. However, Brian Davies and other classical theists have argued that the problem of evil, as it is discussed in contemporary philosophy of religion, is based on the false assumption that God is a moral agent. If we understood that God, as the Creator of the universe, cannot be subject to moral evaluation, evil would no longer pose a problem for theism. In this paper, I draw on research from cognitive science of religion to show that representing God as a moral agent is cognitively natural for us. I then argue that this gives rise to a significant challenge for classical theists who accept the Christian teaching that God created us so that we may freely enter into communion with Him through belief in Him. These classical theists must explain why God created us with a cognitive tendency to misrepresent Him as a moral agent, thus causing us to struggle to reconcile belief in Him with the reality of evil in our world.

This study explores representations of human suffering in Kopano Matlwa’s Period Pain, echoing the enduring theological question “Where is God when it hurts?” I examine how the novel interrogates the presence of the divine amid adversity, positioning Period Pain as a cultural text that offers a theodical perspective—a literary engagement with the problem of evil. I conclude that Matlwa’s work functions as a form of biblical exegesis, interweaving South Africa’s social, political, and economic realities with spiritual lessons in hope and resilience.

Abstract According to Yujin Nagasawa (2018, 2024), theists are better equipped than atheists to address the problem of evil arising from natural selection because their ontology is wider and subsumes the ontology of atheists. We see the world as fundamentally and overall not bad, yet the existence of evil creates a mismatch between this expectation and the reality of the world, a mismatch that, Nagasawa argues, theists can address more effectively than atheists. However, I contend that this conclusion is false. I argue that a wider ontology does not always provide better explanations than a narrower one, even when the latter is subsumed by the former; on the contrary, a narrower ontology could provide better answers. I argue that since the theistic ontology is larger than the atheistic one, it comes with a large explanatory burden, which makes the theistic ontology more demanded to provide an answer than the atheistic one. And contrary to Nagasawa’s claim, I argue that the ontology of atheists is not entirely subsumed by that of theists, which provides atheists with a potential response that theists cannot borrow.

At present, an intensive search is underway for a synthesis that satisfactorily explains the existence of evil and suffering against the background of the evolution of living beings and essential attributes of the Christian God. The methodological approach of this paper was to combine fundamental statements of the Christian faith, results of research in modern theological and philosophical publications, and findings of the natural sciences. The first attempt explains suffering and evil in the world in terms of evolution and human free will. The second attempt also takes into account the Angelic Fall and the Adamic Fall. The third attempt adds the following working hypothesis: God the Father is timeless. In contrast, God the Son, as part of his kenosis, subjected himself to time not only during his life as a human being on Earth, but also before and after. Various consequences of this working hypothesis were considered. The contribution of this working hypothesis is that it resolves the conflict between the free will of creatures and the omniscience of God and explains some other theological questions: The incarnation of Jesus Christ as a response to the Fall, the intra-Trinitarian dialogue and the significance of God the Father for creation.

Abstract: As followers of Wang Yangming, the Taizhou school places significant emphasis on the body , which has led to challenges concerning the potential dissipation of natural desires. Critics argue that Taizhou philosophy, while acknowledging human's natural state, fails to adequately address the existence of evil and tends to overlook the role of deliberate moral practice by idealizing the natural as morally perfect. This article employs the framework of embodied cognition to present a novel interpretation of Taizhou moral philosophy and to address critiques regarding its views on evil and moral practice. It explores Taizhou's holistic approach, integrating mind and body, self and others, to offer fresh insights into the balance between deliberation and spontaneity in moral practice. As a comparative and interdisciplinary endeavor, this article bridges Eastern and Western philosophies, connecting moral philosophy with empirical science. It aims to deepen understanding of Taizhou philosophy while highlighting its broader relevance for ethical behavior and moral reasoning in a global context.

The Carolingian reading of 2 Thess 2:3-12, particularly by Rabanus Maurus and Haimo of Auxerre, discloses its anthropological dimension. By portraying Antichrist as the embodiment of evil in its diverse manifestations, these authors provide some insights into the contemporary comprehension of evil from the Catholic perspective. The human being, conceived as a bipartite reality encompassing both the mystery of lawlessness and the mystery of providence, possesses the capacity to confront and overcome its dualistic condition through the responsible use of freedom. The existence of evil appears to facilitate the conscious maturation of the body of Christ inside believers, fostering operational attitudes necessary for the destruction of the body of Antichrist.