ABSTRACT Genocide scholarship overwhelmingly identifies states as the primary perpetrators of genocidal violence. While non-state armed groups, particularly pro-government militias, have been implicated in genocide, rebel-perpetrated wartime genocidal violence remains exceedingly rare. This paper argues that state-centric explanations of genocide can be exported to explain these edge cases. I argue that four high-threshold conditions must align for rebels to commit wartime genocidal violence: (1) effective territorial control, (2) the dispensability of civilian support, (3) a rigid and exclusionary ideological program, and (4) perceptions of threat, typically constitutive rather than military, where the target group is framed as incompatible with the nascent political order. These conditions provide rebel groups with both the strategic capacity and ideological justification for genocide. To illustrate this framework, the paper examines ISIS’ genocide against the Yazidis as a case study. ISIS’ state-like governance structures through consolidating territorial control, sectarian ideological rigidity, and strategic logic in targeting the Yazidis for extermination demonstrate how rebels can engage in genocidal violence as part of their state-building and order-making processes. This analysis contributes to understandings of genocide by highlighting that, under specific conditions, rebels can behave like states in their use of systematic mass violence.

ABSTRACT Violent non-state actors (VNSAs) aligned with state interests have become prominent yet conceptually fragmented actors within contemporary security dynamics. Despite their growing importance in conflicts worldwide, scholarly and policy literature lack a coherent typology that systematically distinguishes among diverse forms of state-aligned VNSAs. This article addresses this gap by developing a new typology based on an inductive analysis of 100 empirically documented cases active between 2015 and 2025 across multiple world regions. Drawing on seven analytical dimensions including: origin, organisational structure, degree of state control, funding, functional role, motivation, and legal status, seven ideal types are identified: paramilitary units, pro-government militias, loosely state-sponsored VNSAs, auxiliary forces, state-backed self-defence groups, proxy forces, and quasi-state military companies. The typology clarifies conceptual ambiguities by integrating structural and functional variation and provides a valuable tool for comparative analysis, policy formulation, and normative assessment of state-aligned violence.

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.

Although the existing literature on Pro-Government Militias (PGMs) is rife with studies on various aspects of government-militia relations, not much is known about specific approaches that governments employ to ensure loyalty of their semi-formal proxies. Lessons from recent civil war in Sudan and other cases of PGMs turning their arms against their former patrons further enhance the importance of understanding which mechanisms (if any) incumbents deploy to prevent militias from “going rogue.” In this study, we examine three mechanisms employed by governments to guarantee loyalty of their militia allies. We emphasize the importance of personal, sectarian and other ideological fractionalization within rebel groups; deployment of extreme violence by PGMs against co-ethnic civilians; and formation of rival militias as the most effective PGM loyalty assurance tools available to the incumbents. We test these theoretical assumptions on the case study of the Second Chechen War to elucidate how each of these mechanisms was implemented in practice during the decades-long counterinsurgency campaign waged by Moscow.

ABSTRACT Post-civil conflict demobilisation research usually focuses on rebel disarmament and overlooks the non-state militias that helped incumbent regimes retain power. Despite being allied to the government, pro-government militias can pose a long-term threat to the state if not eliminated or integrated. We argue that post-war militia management politics are driven by structural factors and elite concerns for regime survival. Quantitative analyses show that post-war pro-government militias survive longer in autocracies compared to when democratic regimes have defeated a rebellion. The findings paint a more complete picture of armed group demobilisation and have implications for post-war repression, democratisation and conflict recurrence.

ABSTRACT The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan in 2021 has led to calls for a review of counterinsurgency strategy. One aspect of COIN strategy in Afghanistan was the use of militias in the anti-insurgent campaign the Taliban. As well as their use in Afghanistan, states have successfully countered insurgent violence through the deployment of, or cooperating with, pro-government militias elsewhere. Indeed, between 1981 and 2014, more than 504 militias were active across the world, 1 1 Sabine Carey, et al., ‘The Life, Death and Diversity of Pro-Government Militias: The Fully Revised Pro-Government Militias Database Version 2.0’, Research and Politics 9/1 (2022). of which many were identified as anti-insurgent non-state forces in counter-rebel campaigns. Taking Colombia and Philippines as two contemporary cases, this paper will explore the limited contributions of anti-insurgent militias (such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia and the Manila Crusaders for Peace and Democracy) in counterinsurgency campaigns. The paper will seek to identify the reasons why these armed groups produce contributions in countering armed rebels. These case studies are diverse and both have faced highly adaptable and unique rebel campaigns. Both highlight how the use of militias as counterinsurgency mechanisms can yield positive results. Using evidence from both case studies (government reports, primary archives etc.), I provide evidence of how militias can produce valuable results for a government’s anti-insurgent campaign.

Abstract Does the military strength of rebel movements affect conflict-related sexual violence by pro-government militias (PGMs)? Existing studies on PGMs show the significant role that PGMs can have in shaping conflict dynamics and outcomes. What remains understudied is how the variation in power capabilities between conflict actors and the sources of support for PGMs influences civilian victimization by militia groups. We argue that strong rebels tip the balance of power against the state, making the state more susceptible to authorizing or allowing sexual violence by PGMs. In addition, the level of autonomy of PGMs from the government is likely to influence their sexual violence, conditional on rebel strength. When rebels are militarily strong, states are likely to order or tolerate sexual violence by PGMs that they train and/or provide resources to, thereby resulting in sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs. Examining all civil conflicts from 1989 to 2009 and using newly collected data on state-dependence of PGMs, our empirical findings provide evidence that PGMs are associated with higher levels of conflict-related sexual violence when the government faces strong rebels. Results also show that the likelihood of sexual violence by state-dependent PGMs increases when rebels exhibit strong military capabilities.

ABSTRACT The disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) poses an intractable and thorny political-security dilemma. Besides prevailing uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of the adopted DDR measures, their ramifications on the interconnected framework of transitional justice (TJ) introduce yet another layer of complexity. Based on a literature review and a limited number of expert interviews, this paper explores what DDR initiatives are in place for PMF members, and what challenges they present for transitional justice in Iraq’s post-IS landscape, to reflect on the often overlooked tensions between DDR and TJ. Such tensions are especially intricate in Iraq, as the PMF are pro-government militias (PGMs), who are themselves key actors in Iraq’s post-conflict governance and have a de facto role in formulating and implementing TJ initiatives on the ground. The paper demonstrates that the limited Iraqi DDR initiatives in place have a negative impact on TJ initiatives aimed at accountability, reparations, and reconciliation. This leads us to critically reflect on the viability of any conventional DDR programme for PGMs like the PMF.

This article analyzes the recent trends of pro-government militias in Africa. A total of sixty-eight active pro-government militias were identified in the examined period, 2003-2023. Inductive content analysis was then carried out to categorize these militias and determine the most common type of militia, the most frequent targets of their attacks, their average length of existence, and how they cease to exist. Based on this research, the most common type of pro-government militias in Africa is the emergency militia, which arises primarily for political-power reasons. The article also endeavors to uncover whether these militias also attack state targets and if they pose a threat to their supporters.

Abstract: Conflicts in Africa have brought the fragmentation of the monopoly of violence to the fore. In conflicts such as those that occurred in Sudan and Sierra Leone, militias play a significant role in the state’s strategy against the rebels. In the literature on civil wars, little attention is paid to groups fighting alongside the state and their effects on conflict outcomes. While all militias share the ability to use organized violence, some of them can also be a source of security for local communities. However, the relationship between states and pro-government militias can affect the stability of the state. This study focuses on militia groups acting alongside the state and examines the extent to which the dynamics of collaboration between the states and militias affect state fragmentation.

How is service history associated with returning veterans' attitudes about democracy? Existing research predicts pro-government militia veterans have less support for democracy because of political efficacy gained from service and divergent policy preferences from the general population. We test that theory in Ukraine through surveys of both returning veterans and the general population between 2019 and 2022. Our findings differ from predictions. Veterans who joined the armed forces as volunteers were more supportive of democracy as an institution than ordinary Ukrainians. At the same time, Army volunteers, as well as veterans who were drafted into the armed forces and veterans who were rejected from the armed forces and joined pro-government militias were more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. In-depth interviews reveal both those rejected from the armed forces and army conscripts opposed democracy because they felt rampant draft evasion made civilians unqualified to make political decisions.

ABSTRACT Iraq’s 2017 victory over the Islamic State (IS) ushered in a period of political gridlock and electoral violence. Rather than demilitarising to compete in elections, pro-government militias retained their weapons while simultaneously providing public goods and services. Iraq’s experience presents a challenge to existing theories of civil war transitions, which suggest that wartime coalitions either fragment or demilitarise as peacetime approaches. Iraq’s stalled transition presents a third possible outcome—a stalled transition—which emerges from constraints confronting pro-government coalitions. Iraq’s ecosystem of ‘militia-party hybrids’ resembles Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where armed groups enter peacetime politics without fully demilitarising.

Abstract Ethnic defection has been identified as a potential game changer in conflicts. However, the factors that enable this process require further study. One factor that has been often overlooked is that of social identity and, more particularly, identity leadership. Ethnic defection is a social as much as it is a political process. Incumbents who can utilize this element may be more successful in encouraging a continuous and more persistent process of ethnic defection. A particularly useful tool for counterinsurgency (COIN) leaders to function as identity leaders is that of militias. Traditionally perceived in the literature as ad hoc outcomes of defection, this article demonstrates how militia recruitment can serve as a platform for recruiters to serve as identity leaders and create among recruits a distinct sense of identity that further distances them from other group members and strengthens their group identity. Success in enabling this group categorization could pave the way for more defectors to switch to the government side in a way less relevant than material incentives. The article illustrates this process by employing the case of Israel's recruitment of Shi‘a defectors into pro‐Israel militias in South Lebanon and the Security Belt during the 1980s and 1990s.

A growing line of research examines causes and consequences of militant group competition. However, empirical work on these topics has limitations. Most quantitative research uses relatively rough proxies for competition, such as counts of groups in a country. Other work uses dichotomous indicators, ignoring the intensity or degree of rivalries. Additionally, many studies examine either terrorist organizations or rebel groups, overlooking cross-type rivalry (e.g., terrorist vs. rebel). We address these issues by introducing time-varying dyadic rivalry data on hundreds of groups – rebels, terrorists, and pro-government militias – in Africa and Asia, 1990-2015. Rivalry levels include denouncements, threats, and violence. After presenting the data, we test the “outbidding” hypothesis: the notion that inter-organizational competition leads to more terrorism. This argument has found support in qualitative analyses, but quantitative tests using rivalry proxies show mixed results. Using our data we find support for the hypothesis. We conclude with research questions that could be addressed with the data.

Abstract Despite the benefits of rebel governance such as increased legitimacy and resource extraction, providing governance is also costly for rebel groups, as it entails constant investment of time and money as well as the need to protect their properties and territories. Rebels, therefore, weigh the costs of providing governance against the benefits in their decision to provide governance. In this paper, we explore the impact of pro-government militias (PGMs) on the cost-benefit analysis of rebel governance. We argue that governance becomes a suboptimal strategy for rebel groups in the presence of semi-official PGMs but not informal PGMs. This is because semi-official PGMs’ relationship with the government makes them more formally accountable to the government, which effectively bolsters the counterinsurgency capabilities of the state (and thereby weakens rebels) through providing credible and timely intelligence and undermining civilians support for the rebels, and even allowing rebel defection. We test our argument using data on rebel governance and PGMs and indeed find that semi-official—but not informal—PGMs decrease the likelihood of rebel governance.

Militias are violent actors, shown to be self-serving, and to consistently act as spoilers of peace. So far, research has focused on their use of instrumental violence to directly undermine peace talks. Yet, militias have alternative, more indirect ways to act as spoilers of peace. As such, we seek to explore whether militias spoil peace by preventing nonviolent resistance (NVR) events, which have previously been associated with an increased likelihood of peace deals. Specifically, we argue that pro-government militias (PGMs) deter and prevent NVR events with the threat of violence when governments offer concessions to rebel groups in efforts to maintain a profitable status quo. We extend previous panel data sources covering the African continent in the time period 1997-2014 to show evidence of these relationships. This paper contributes to research showing the negative effects of PGMs and offers policy implications for civil society in conflict zones and peace prospects.

Sudan has never experienced peace since it attained its independence from Britain in 1956. Most of the causes of the conflicts in Sudan are related to political domination, economic deprivation, and Islamization. The regime of former President Omar al Bashir since it took power from 1989-2019, it adopted a counter-insurgency strategy of using militias in the peripheral areas to confront alongside its army on the rebellious activities. The review literature on pro-government militias in the context of the unstable Sudan provides debates pertains violent atrocities committed by militias against innocent civilians in the name of counterinsurgency. The 2003 crisis in Darfur region clearly outlines the state strategy of employing the Janjaweed militia who later metamorphosed into Rapid Support Force, a paramilitary group who committed genocide and crime against humanity in the name of fighting the two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The RSF has grown a powerful paramilitary force that are now battling the State Army for the takeover of the government militarily. The militia group which was once built up by the state now turning a real danger to the transitional democracy. This paper argues that the RSF are the direct beneficiary of the state and are closely linked to its structures, its people, its wealth, and foreign partners. This paper draws a conclusion that amicable solution ought to be sought for the benefit of the marginalized peripheral areas of Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile or Sudan with this unstoppable conflict risks to fragment into different autonomous states.

How can we describe and categorize government relationships with pro-government militias (PGMs)? Most research tends to focus on government sponsorship of PGMs. This entails a cooperative relationship and government delegation to PGMs. Yet most government-PGM relations are nuanced, complex, and are often fraught with uncertainty and even conflict and hostility. In this article we discuss the conceptualization of PGMs vis-à-vis a government or state, we then discuss the complexities of government-PGM relations, and then develop a spectrum framework to categorize these relationships. We classify government-PGM relations based on their alignment of interests/objectives, the degree to which a government has control over a PGM and their balance of power, and the extent to which a government provides material support to a PGM. We introduce five categories – government control, delegation, cooperation, acquiescence, and conflict. This spectrum framework aids in a better understanding of the nuances in government-PGM relationships, includes under-explored aspects of their possible relations, such as competition/conflict, and how these relations change over time.

Why do some countries harbor pro-government militias (PGMs), while others do not? We assert that the deployment of PGMs depends on topographic, social, and political structures within which governments and rebels operate. Drawing on the concept of opportunity structures, we postulate that structural conditions within which governments are embedded in constitute a contributing factor to the existence and multiplicity of PGMs. Data from the Pro-Government Militia Dataset along with a two-stage hurdle model reveal that personalist regime type and civil wars increase the likelihood of PGM emergence. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization, onshore oil fields, drug production, number of rebel groups, and military prowess influence the number of PGMs.

It is typically argued that civil war acutely inhibits inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the evidence is inconsistent and does not support the assumed negative relationship between civil war and FDI. Some studies suggest that FDI enters countries with internal armed conflicts unabated; others show that civil war economies exhibit strong increases in FDI during conflict. Underpinned by a liberal interpretation of war, this scholarship finds these trends to be surprising, counter-intuitive and curious, arguing that FDI enters conflict zones in spite of violence. In contrast, critical perspectives can provide insights by acknowledging that violence can facilitate economic processes such as FDI, creating a particular form of security and stability that can be conducive to FDI inflows. This article examines the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), a country which exhibited strong increases in FDI during phases of the conflict. It is argued that particular types of violence perpetrated by the government’s armed forces and pro-government militias – groups which were sympathetic to the interests of key investors in the oil industry – facilitated FDI in Sudan’s oil sector during the 2000s to the detriment of large sections of the civilian population affected by the violence.