Preferences Of Member States Research Articles

EVALUATING THE AGENCY OF UNITED NATIONS FORUM ON FORESTS IN HALTING DEFORESTATION

The recent decrease in deforestation suggests a success in global effort of halting it, yet the question on in the agency of United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) remains. Do these changes occur due to UNFF’s facilitation? To examine this, this paper utilizes Principal-Agent theory proposed by Hawkins et al., (2006) to explore UNFF’s autonomy and discretion and its role in halting deforestation. It will first analyse the historical and relational foundation of UNFF as an international organization (IOs) and then define the meaning of ‘problem-solved’ in terms of forest issue. It will then evaluate policy instruments and powers that UNFF holds using Martha & Finnemore’s argument on the power of IOs. This paper argues that UNFF is serving as a forum for global forestry governance. It faces challenges due to differing national interests, limited discretion and significant role of NGOs in influencing discussions and advocating for sustainable forest management. Tensions persists between developed and developing nations in forestry issue, thus UNFF plays the role of collaboration and coordinating agents through Collaborative Partnership on Forest (CPF). It possesses limited role as arbitrating and enforcing agent due to Non-Legally Binding Instruments (NLBI) preferences of member states. However, UNFF possesses the power in terms of diffusing norms accepted by members, that halting deforestation is non-negotiable.

Pre-emptive depoliticisation: the European Commission and the EU foreign investment screening regulation

ABSTRACT In March 2019 the European Union adopted the first pan-European investment screening framework, thus joining the bandwagon of growing investment screening mechanisms around the world. This article explores why the European screening framework was adopted swiftly and with no politicisation, even as the negotiations unfolded against the background of heightened politicisation of trade and investment policy. The paper develops three expectations: (1) converging member state preferences; (2) securitisation of investment policy; and (3) Commission entrepreneurship. It then explores them empirically through process-tracing, drawing on extensive interviews with the actors involved. We argue that the European Commission played a pivotal role. To avoid falling into another strand of politicisation and to defuse political mines, the Commission engaged in a ‘pre-emptive depoliticization’ strategy that shortened the policy process, limited the number of actors involved, and justified the policy options in a legalistic framing.

The Neglected Integration Crisis: France, Germany and Lacking European Co‐operation During the 1973/1974 Oil Shock

AbstractWhen does European co‐operation and (further) integration not happen in the face of a major integration crisis? When do France and Germany not emerge as regional stabilizers, forging and uploading bilateral compromises to the European level? By developing a combined theoretical framework based on liberal intergovernmentalism and leadership approaches, this article analyses the European Economic Community's (EEC) reaction to the 1973/1974 oil crisis. Despite some favourable conditions, differences in domestic energy markets and relations with Arab oil‐producing countries complicated member state co‐operation. In turn, divergent economic philosophies and foreign policy priorities prevented France and Germany from filling the European leadership vacuum. As a consequence, the EEC did not find a unified stance on the Arab oil embargo, subordinated itself to US‐American dominance and undermined its common market via export restrictions for oil. The findings suggest that without minimum convergent member state preferences or compensating regional leadership, European integration and today's European Union risk stalling or even disintegrating.

In every crisis an opportunity? European Union integration in defence and the War on Ukraine

ABSTRACT Russia’s war on Ukraine has upended the European security order. Ukraine has requested EU membership, unprecedented sanctions have been imposed on Russia, European countries have shipped weapons and munitions to Ukraine and NATO has shored up its military presence. Despite such action, is it possible to speak of a transformative moment or ‘Zeitenwende’ for EU security and defence? This article analyses the state of EU integration in defence since the war on Ukraine. Drawing on hypotheses developed under ‘new intergovernmentalism’, this article analyses how EU Member State preferences in defence and intergovernmental-supranational dynamics are being shaped by the war. In particular, the article probes how supranational and intergovernmental institutions have reacted to the war and how domestic preferences have fed into recent EU defence efforts. In doing so, the article provides a preliminary assessment of the state of EU integration in defence since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

How does delegation structure shape agent discretion in EU foreign policy? Evidence from the Normandy Format and the Contact Group on Libya

ABSTRACT Informal groupings have proliferated in EU foreign policy over the past decade, despite the enhanced role of the High Representative tasked with ensuring the coherence of this policy domain under the Lisbon Treaty. This article analyzes how the decision of select EU member states to act on certain policy issues through informal groupings, bypassing the EU framework, affects the High Representative’s room for maneuver. Drawing on the principal-agent model, the emergence of informal groupings is conceptualized as a manifestation of pathological delegation, which undermines High Representative’s role. The findings reveal two factors that may nevertheless increase the agent’s discretion in cases of delegation anomalies: the low heterogeneity of member state preferences toward the informal grouping and the interaction between agents in the same domain, facilitating agent’s performance. By examining agent's discretion when delegation anomalies arise, the article may be useful for scholars investigating delegation and agency in international organizations.

A Friend like Me: The Effect of International Organization Membership on State Preferences

Do international organizations (IOs) have an independent effect on state preferences? Despite the importance of this question in the international relations literature, isolating the causal effect of IO membership has proved difficult because of endogeneity concerns. This article offers a novel empirical approach to identifying the causal effect of shared membership in IOs on member state preferences. We exploit the fact that states joining the European Union obtain automatic membership in several other IOs through the European Union’s membership in these organizations. We then use a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate the effect of automatic membership in IOs on preference similarity with other members versus preference similarity with nonmembers. We demonstrate that shared IO membership leads to an increase in preference similarity. This approach offers a useful way to disentangle the effect of IO membership from selection effects that lead states to join IOs.

Completing Banking Union? The Role of National Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Shifting Member States' Preferences on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme

AbstractThe gridlock on the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), the missing pillar of the banking union, is most commonly attributed to moral hazard concerns on the side of Germany. However, Member State preferences on EDIS cannot be understood solely based on concerns over pre‐emptive risk reduction. Instead, banking sector interests connected to the institutional setup and legal status of national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) have also informed these preferences. This article examines the development of preference formation on EDIS for the cases of Germany, Italy and France after the initial 2015 proposal failed. National preferences on the institutional setup of EDIS have become more aligned with a reinsurance system that maintains existing DGS. Hence, current trajectories point to a discussion over how national DGSs are to be linked in a reinsurance system, instead of a discussion about whether it should be abandoned or not.

Do Intergovernmental Organizations Have a Socialization Effect on Member State Preferences? Evidence from the UN General Debate

AbstractThe question of whether intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have a socialization effect on member state preferences is central to international relations. However, empirical studies have struggled to separate the socializing effects of IGOs on preferences from the coercion and incentives associated with IGOs that may lead to foreign policy alignment without altering preferences. This article addresses this issue. We adopt a novel approach to measuring state preferences by applying text analytic methods to country statements in the annual United Nations General Debate (UNGD). The absence of interstate coordination with UNGD statements makes them particularly well suited for testing socialization effects on state preferences. We focus on the European Union (EU), enabling us to incorporate the pre-accession period—when states have the strongest incentives for foreign policy alignment—into our analysis. The results of our analysis show that EU membership has a socialization effect that produces preference convergence, controlling for coercion and incentive effects.

Behind the screen: Understanding national support for a foreign investment screening mechanism in the European Union

What determines national preferences for institutionalizing foreign direct investment (FDI) screening? Over the past decade, advanced economies worldwide have tightened their national investment screening mechanisms (ISMs). In March 2019, the European Union (EU) adopted its first common FDI screening framework. This article explores variations in Member State preferences for the creation and nature of a pan-European screening framework. Based on extensive interviews with high-level EU and country officials involved in the negotiation process, and using a unique measure of national support for the EU-wide ISM created through the first-ever elite survey on this subject matter, we find that countries with higher technological levels were more supportive of FDI screening due to concerns over unreciprocated technological transfer. We also show the effects of Chinese FDI on country-level support for FDI screening sector-dependent. We found no evidence that total Chinese FDI predicts preferences for ISM. Instead, countries with high levels of Chinese FDI in strategic sectors are more likely to support the ISM, while those with high levels of Chinese investment in low-tech sectors tend to oppose screening. Our overall findings suggest that EU investment screening, and national-level screening in general, might become more restrictive in the future, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.Supplementary informationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-021-09436-y.

A matter of preference: Taking sides on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project

ABSTRACT Over the past few years, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has been one of the most divisive issues in EU politics, with some member states opposing the project, others supporting it, and a third group adopting a neutral stance. Which conditions explain these varying national positions? Our study offers the first systematic attempt to examine preference formation with regard to Nord Stream 2 across the entire EU membership. Drawing on elite surveys, we compile an original dataset to position EU member states in the Nord Stream 2 debate. We then perform a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to uncover the determinants of the differing positions taken by member states. The Nord Stream 2 controversy is employed as a testing ground for new intergovernmentalist theory, which argues that preference formation is not just shaped by material and (geo)political conditions, but also by the preferences of other member states. Our study finds that material benefits and the role of Russia are relevant conditions for position formation on Nord Stream 2. However, in this case, we did not find evidence for the importance of other member states’ preferences.

The EU’s ‘strategic partnership’ with China in a post-Brexit world: Recalibrating internal dynamics and facing up to external challenges

The UK has played a critical role in shaping EU–China relations. Policymakers need to carefully consider the extent to which Brexit will weaken the EU’s collective power – shifting the balance in China’s favour – and impact prospects for increasing EU involvement in East Asia. Brexit arrives at a moment when negotiations for an ambitious bilateral investment agreement continue – with an eye on an eventual free trade agreement – while EU policymakers increasingly perceive challenges arising from the expansion of China’s global presence, exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative, the creation of alternative international institutions, and its behaviour in the South China Sea disputes. As both the EU and China emerge as global powers, the significance of their relationship’s trajectory extends beyond bilateral confines. I analyse how the relationship’s contemporary dynamics are playing out and likely to evolve. Assessing the impact of Brexit on the relative power balance, specifically the EU27’s collective economic, military and political power, sets the scene for mapping out the ‘state of play’ in four crucial issue areas, highlighting the UK’s preferences and input. This leads to consideration of how the loss of resources and shifting constellation of preferences among the EU27 could affect the attainment of strategic objectives. I argue that while Brexit does not fundamentally disrupt the EU–China relationship, it will weaken the EU’s capacity to respond to China’s rise and necessitates a recalibration to the new constellation of Member State preferences and reduced resources.

Brexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearing

The decision by the United Kingdom (UK) to withdraw from the European Union (EU) has reignited tensions around the clearing of euro-denominated derivatives. Yet, the EU has resisted concerted pressure from several member states and the European Central Bank (ECB) to force the relocation of euro clearing away from London. Instead, it has opted to strengthen the supervision of EU and non-EU Central Counterparties (CCPs), leaving the derecognition of third-country CCPs as a last resort. How do we explain this? This article adopts a synthesis approach, combining theories with distinct domains of application to provide a more comprehensive explanation. We argue that a state-centric perspective helps us to understand the preferences of key member states, but it cannot fully explain the EU’s position because it ignores the critical role of supranational institutions. In addition, a transnational approach has limited explanatory power because the most concerted opposition came from a small number of dealer banks, not a wide coalition of financial interests. To address these gaps, we argue that incorporating a bureaucratic politics perspective can add significant analytical leverage. This reveals that the EU’s resistance to a location policy reflected the need to reconcile the competing bureaucratic interests of different supranational institutions.

Causal mechanisms in civil war mediation: Evidence from Syria

Studies of conflict management by international organizations have demonstrated correlations between institutional characteristics and outcomes, but questions remain as to whether these correlations have causal properties. To examine how institutional characteristics condition the nature of international organization interventions, I examine mediation and ceasefire monitoring by the Arab League and the United Nations during the first phase of the Syrian civil war (2011–2012). Using micro-evidence sourced from unique interview material, day-to-day fatality statistics, and international organization documentation, I detail causal pathways from organizational characteristics, via intervention strategies, to intervention outcomes. I find that both international organizations relied on comparable intervention strategies. While mediating, they counseled on the costs of conflict, provided coordination points, and managed the bargaining context so as to sideline spoilers and generate leverage. While monitoring, they verified violent events, engaged in reassurance patrols, and brokered local truces. The execution of these strategies was conditioned on organizational capabilities and member state preferences in ways that help explain both variation in short-term conflict abatement and the long-term failure of both international organizations. In contrast to the Arab League, the United Nations intervention, supported by more expansive resources and expertise, temporarily shifted conflict parties away from a violent equilibrium. Both organizations ultimately failed as disunity among international organization member state principals cut interventions short and reduced the credibility of international organization mediators.

The European Commission’s Shifting Climate Leadership

The European Commission has played a crucial role in promoting ambitious EU climate targets and policies that boost the credibility of EU leadership-by-example efforts internationally. The approach has gradually shifted from leadership toward more strategic behavior that reflects the preferences of the member states. Reduced uncertainty concerning member-state preferences and solutions accounts for much of the change in leadership. Uncertainty has decreased as climate policies have become more mature and member states have gained experience from implementing them. Asymmetries in member-state preferences, decision-making procedures, and impatience caused by the international context are all important conditions for the European Commission’s leadership. These observations lend support to apparently contradictory theories that have seen EU climate policy as propelled either by autonomous supranational institutions or by increasingly ambitious member states.

The Conundrum of Solving ‘Too Big to Fail’ in the European Union: Supranationalization at Different Speeds

AbstractIn the aftermath of the international financial crisis, the European Union (EU) adopted a series of regulatory reforms concerning capital adequacy, bank structures and resolution in order to tackle the risks created by financial institutions that were ‘too big to fail’. This article demonstrates different degrees of progress towards a supranational framework in two important areas of reform: Limited harmonization of the rules on bank structures, but robust progress toward the supranationalization of bank resolution, where the euro area dimension is also considered. What accounts for this variation? We draw on a synthesis of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the diverging outcomes. We explain the low supranationalization in bank structural reforms with the absence of strong spillovers and availability of domestic options to unilaterally contain financial instability. In bank resolution, we examine the causal mechanisms through which significant spillovers modified the government preferences of key Member States.

Financing the United Nations: Explaining variation in how donors provide funding to the UN

When donors contemplate providing financial support to United Nations institutions they encounter a menu of funding options. Some UN institutions require mandatory dues, but most rely substantially on voluntary contributions, which donors can choose to earmark for specific purposes. How donors provide resources has widespread effects on the authority of UN governing bodies, donor control over UN programs, and the efficiency of UN operations. What explains how donors choose to fund UN programs and agencies? We advance a theory that emphasizes member state preferences over the affordability and policy substance of IO activity. Using data from two novel experiments and a case study of U.S. funding practices toward the United Nations (1945–1980s), we provide mixed-method evidence showing that a state is more likely to provide voluntary contributions when its preferences over the affordability and policy of IO activity differ from those of the governing coalition and more likely to provide mandatory contributions when its preferences are consistent with those of the governing coalition. Further, we demonstrate that preferences over policy substance are particularly important in explaining recent trends in donor earmarking.

Holding the door half (?) open: the EU and Turkey 10 years on

A decade of accession negotiations with the EU has not brought Turkey significantly closer to EU membership. In part, the reasons lie with Turkey. This article, however, explores the position of the EU and the ‘supply-side’ of enlargement. It reflects on developments in how the EU has engaged with Turkey on the question of membership, situating Turkey’s candidacy and the EU’s position within the broader comparative context of how the process and politics of EU enlargement have evolved over the last 10 years. It focuses on a set of supply-side variables that are key to determine the progress that applicants can make towards membership: member state preferences, the activism of supranational institutional actors, the EU’s integration capacity, public opinion in the EU towards enlargement and the narratives deployed in justification of enlargement. The article also considers the state of Turkey’s accession negotiations and how they have been and potentially will be affected, assuming they are meaningfully revived, by the evolving nature and substance of EU accession negotiations more generally and EU’s approach to conditionality.

Consensus Decisions and Similarity Measures in International Organizations

ABSTRACTVoting behavior in international organizations, most notably in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), is often used to infer the similarity of foreign policy preferences of member states. Most of these measures ignore, however, that particular covoting patterns may appear simply by chance (Häge 2011) and that these patterns of agreement (or the absence thereof) are only observable if decisions are reached through roll-call votes. As the relative frequency of roll-call votes changes considerably over time in most international organizations, currently used similarity and affinity measures offer a misleading picture. Based on a complete data set of UNGA resolution decisions, we demonstrate how taking different forms of chance agreement and the relative prevalence of consensus decisions into account affects conclusions about the effect of the similarity of member states’ foreign policy positions on foreign aid allocation.

TOWARDS STRONGER NORMATIVE POWER: THE NATURE OF SHIFT IN EU FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

The crisis in Ukraine of 2014 produced considerable change in the EU international environment, which not only tested its capabilities to react very quickly and adequately but also actually destroyed previous subtle balance of its Member States in relations with Russia. The EU Member States were not able to continue to maintain in these relations the disunity pattern, which was successfully described in the European Council on Foreign study A Power Audit of EU – Russia Relations already in 2007. New turbulence pushed EU member states closer together, re-introduced old geopolitical constraints and concerns about national and international security and limited the room for diplomatic maneuver and finally produce new unity pattern. However nature of that new pattern remains not yet fully investigated from academic point of view. The aim of the article is to present results of analysis of this shift in foreign policy preferences of the EU and its Member States. The research is targeted to identify the nature of this change, which happened through process of adjustment to new reality, in the hierarchy of foreign policy preferences of Member States and finally of the European Union in general. The aim of the paper will be achieved by implementation of analysis of collected empirical data on foreign policy preferences of the EU Member States. The analysis will be based on typical methods of foreign policy analysis. Those include analysis of legal acts, statements of politicians, analytical literature and interviews with experts from the EU Member States. The conclusion of the article is supposed to answer to the main research question and to explain nature of new choices in the EU Members States foreign policies and its effect to the EU foreign policy towards Russia in general. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.eis.0.9.12792

Between Law and Political Truth? Member State Preferences, EU Free Movement Rules and National Immigration Law

AbstractThis article explores how Member States respond to the challenge of complying with EU law obligations, whilst remaining alert to the demands of domestic politics in the context of contentious areas of EU competence. It is argued that in the case of free movement we can see the United Kingdom drawing upon three overlapping strategies in order to tread the fine line ‘between law and political truth’: it exploits as much as possible any uncertainties within free movement law; it draws upon the proximate field of domestic immigration law in order to reinterpret free movement law; and it argues for new resources to be brought into the field of free movement, in particular resources which restrict the freedoms of Member States. A discursive frame of migration governance provides the analytical construction within which the argument is located. The article is therefore a contribution to debates about (legal) Europeanisation and compliance, as well as the more specific challenges facing the UK in the latter half of the 2010s, namely a renegotiation of and referendum on EU membership.