Sometimes, public policy outcomes disappoint when unintended consequences arise. In many such cases, the problems might be traced back to poor reasoning. For most of antiquity, logic was considered the core element for successful human endeavour. In this work, we argue that Aristotelian logic – specifically, the syllogism – remains highly relevant and could offer significant benefits for the development of sound public policy. To demonstrate the value of logic for contemporary public policymaking, we first provide an accessible explanation of the practical syllogism. Following this we set out our method for testing the value of syllogistic reasoning against an example of real-world public policymaking. Thereafter, we test both the validity and truth of the apparent syllogism. We conclude that the use of a practical syllogism would have prevented unintended harm from arising in the instance under consideration and also offer our thoughts around generalisability and future research directions.

Abstract This forum article contributes to the prospering debate in the circular economy (CE) community discussing whether—and to what extent—the CE is reconcilable with economic growth. Within this discourse about a functional CE, there exist two contesting perspectives. One argues in favor of pro‐growth circularity, the other in favor of post‐growth circularity. The aim of this article is to develop a line of argumentation that helps in reconciliating the two seemingly antagonistic perspectives. Toward that end, this article applies the method of “practical syllogism” that is well known in moral philosophy, since it can enlighten how normative and positive arguments can be structured to enable the formulation of well‐justified moral conclusions. With the help of this interdisciplinary impulse, the article aims at detecting logical errors in current reasoning and fostering discursive learning processes. The ensuing arguments provide vital implications on the macro level by highlighting four critical elements to facilitate a CE transition, namely an intensive growth trajectory, an internalization of negative externalities through creating (missing) markets, an institutional encouragement of spreading positive externalities, and a diffusion of rents from innovation to society by taking the profit motive into service for enabling sustainability goals. Complementarily, the article provides implications on the micro level by highlighting the necessity to develop supplementary management competencies, namely governance competence to realize argumentative clarification and governance competence to (re‐)configurate institutional structures. This article may serve as an incubator to ease new ways of thinking into academia and practice.

Aristotle says that conclusions of practical syllogisms are actions that occur εὐθύς, which is normally translated to indicate temporal immediacy. Both aspects of this—that the conclusions are actions, and that they occur immediately—seem wrong. Interpreting εὐθύς as atemporal, specifically as indicating that nothing more is needed to explain the action, makes better sense of practical syllogisms and solves the problems raised by calling their conclusions actions.

The article deals with the specifics of Elizabeth Anscombe’s approach to the history of philosophy. First, the author presents various approaches to the history of philosophy, and then gives a brief introduction of Anscombe as a philosopher and as a historian of philos­ophy. Her articles “Causality and Determinism” and “Practical Truth” are discussed as paradigmatic examples of Anscombe’s works on the history of philosophy. These exam­ples show that Anscombe’s appeal to the philosophy of the past, and especially to the legacy of Aristotle, was not episodic. The reason for her turning to the history of phi­losophy were always caused by theoretical difficulties in the contemporary philosophical context. For instance, the article “Causality and Determinism” appeals to a wide range of sources (Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Mill) in order to show the history of the forma­tion of the concept of causality as a necessary connection of events, but Anscombe looks for a solution to the problem in the works of her older contemporary B. Russell. Espe­cially often, Anscombe turns to Aristotle’s practical philosophy, with the help of which she attacks contemporary concepts. In particular, she criticizes the concept of “moral obligation”, points at an incorrect understanding of the “practical syllogism”, reveals the shortcomings of the Anglo-American concept of desire. In the end, the author of the article offers a brief retelling of the analysis of the Aristotelian concept of “practical truth”, which Anscombe proposes to understand as “the truth that one produces in acting according to choice and decision”. In proposing such an interpretation, Anscombe relies less on a philological or contextual analysis, but rather is guided by her own intuitions.

The paper starts from the observation that laws are full of conditional norms or obligations, the defeasible character of which prevents representing them by the material implication of classical logic. Material implication almost never adequately represents ordinary “if, then”; in particular, it can account neither for the legal syllogism nor for the practical syllogism ubiquitous in ordinary reasoning. In order to do better, the paper pursues a far-reaching analogy between beliefs (held by a person) and norms (held by an alleged authority). The analogy shows in doxastic and deontic logic. It extends to the Ramsey test, which is usually taken to be the basic explanation of conditionals, i.e., “if, then” sentences, to its treatment in the dynamic setting of belief revision theory and its normative counterpart, and thus to conditional logic and conditional deontic logic. A reflection of Chisholm’s paradox reveals a principled ambiguity in our normative talk; norms may be taken in a purely normative or in a fact-regarding way. In order to account for this ambiguity, the analogy must be further developed within so-called ranking theory which completes the dynamic perspective suggested by the Ramsey test and insufficiently explained in belief revision theory. Only in this account, fact-regarding norms can be explicated. In this way, finally, Chisholm’s paradox can be resolved, and the legal and the practical syllogism can be adequately represented. The paper attempts throughout to keep the connection to legal theorizing and argumentation.

Truth has always been a controversial subject in Aristotelian scholarship. In most cases, including some well-known passages in the Categories, De Interpretatione and Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the predicate ‘true’ for assertions, although exceptions are many and impossible to ignore. One of the most complicated cases is the concept of practical truth in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics: its entanglement with action and desire raises doubts about the possibility of its inclusion to the propositional model of truth. Nevertheless, in one of the most extensive studies on the subject, C. Olfert has tried to show that this is not only possible but also necessary. In this paper, we explain why trying to fit practical truth into the propositional model comes with insurmount­able problems. In order to overcome these problems, we focus on multiple aspects of practical syllogism and correlate them with Aristo­tle’s account of desire, happiness and the good. Identifying the role of such concepts in the specific steps of practical reasoning, we reach the conclusion that practical truth is best explained as the culmination of a well-executed practical syllogism taken as a whole, which ultimately explains why this type of syllogism demands a different approach and a different kind of truth than the theoretical one.

Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action (Wilson and Shpall , in: Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s (1963) challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to what she ought to do, but to what she actually does. That is, such explanations must be truth-apt, not mere rationalizations. My aim in this paper is to show how a non-causal account of action can provide explanations that are truth-apt and genuinely explanatory. To make this argument, I take as a given an account of the practical syllogism (the syllogistic form of practical reasoning) discussed by Michael Thompson (Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008) and Eric Wiland (Reasons, Continuum, New York, 2012), according to which the practical syllogism is truly practical rather than propositional in nature. Next, I present my primary positive thesis: reasons for actions have explanatory power in virtue of being parts of a structure—the practical syllogism—that contains the action being explained. I then argue that structural action explanations can meet Davidson’s challenge and that they genuinely explain actions. Finally, I conclude by addressing some objections to my argument.

The reasons for education reforms – as a particular form of social reforms – are either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. However, the reasons for the education reforms that are briefly discussed from the perspective of the philosophy of education in the present paper are above all consequentialist. These are the reasons for proposed education reforms in EU countries whose strategic aim is equated with the enhancement of two values: creativity and innovation. It is supposed that these education reforms will have good effects and not that they are good in and of themselves. Therefore, although creativity and innovation might be seen as having intrinsic value, they are – in these education reforms – treated predominantly as instrumental values. It seems that the introduction of such education reforms can be understood as a decision founded not on causal explanation, but rather on the basis of a special type of teleological explanation, which has the logical form of a “practical syllogism”. In this case, the occurrence of an action is explained in terms of the goals and purposes of the agent; it shows that the agent did what s/he did because s/he tried to achieve a certain goal and believed that certain means were necessary or sufficient for achieving this goal.

Confronted with the reality that our environment is (almost literally) dying, we must navigate feelings of grief and mourning. In this article, I set out to understand the emotion of climate grief, using the LBT model of emotions. I define climate grief as an emotion whose object is the loss of the local and global ecosystems as we rely on, value and relate to them. The rating of climate grief is strongly negative, such that we bleakly perceive our existence and our survival as an ecosystem. In addition, I explore how self-defeating practical syllogisms can transform the healthy emotional grieving process into a destructive process. In particular, I investigate the LBT fallacies of "awfulizing", "damnation" and "can'tstipation". Finally, I propose a set of "climate-friendly virtues" (courage, respect and self-control) and look at what all of us can do to mobilize our emotions of climate grief toward healthy, positive and sustainable action.

Abstract This article argues that Epictetus employs the terms orexis and hormê in the same manner as the older Stoics. It then shows, on the basis of this claim, that the older Stoics recognized a distinction between dispositional and occurrent forms of motivation. On this account of Stoic theory, intentional action is in each instance the product of two forms of cognition: a value ascription that attributes goodness or badness to some object, conceiving of its possession as beneficial or harmful to the agent, together with a situational judgment about appropriate action. The resulting interpretation suggests that the Stoic theory of motivation as a whole — and not merely the Stoic analysis of the pathê — has the basic shape of a practical syllogism, with more psychological depth than commentators have recognized.

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models – a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism – I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.

ABSTRACT Two moments in The Faerie Queene, the Redcrosse Knight's rescue from suicide in the cave of Despaire and Arthur's rapture at reading the truncated chronicle of the Britons, are strangely similar. In each case, the hermeneutic openness that seems to be developing is halted and closed in favor of a unified, simplified, syllogistic certitude. Though both Despaire's speeches and Briton Moniments are ripe for interrogation, Redcrosse is saved by the Practical Syllogism, and Arthur reacts with an outpouring of patriotic fervor. With some matters, proliferation of thought and feeling though ordinarily salutary must be suspended. Protestantism's simplifying strain did make an impression on Spenser. Returning to known truths of special and general providence is periodically necessary for maintaining an overall openness to ambiguity, intricacy, and dialogue. With a focus on these parallel episodes, this discussion both contributes to our understanding of The Faerie Queene's hermeneutic fluidity by looking closely at exceptions in it, and thereby proposes how a major current of Protestant thought inflects Spenserian poetics.

Abstract Prevailing interpretations of Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language outside the Organon hold that he offers a single, comprehensive theory of the practical syllogism spanning his ethical and biological works. These comprehensive theories of the practical syllogism are plausible neither philosophically nor as interpretations of Aristotle. I argue for a multivocal account of the practical syllogism that distinguishes (1) Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of animal motion in MA from (2) his use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of the distinctive practical cognition of the phronimos in EN. I offer a novel account of the role of syllogistic language in ethics, arguing that it elucidates a nuanced account of universals and particulars in ethics according to which acting virtuously requires an understanding of underlying universal values and a capacity to relate them to concrete, particular features of our circumstances.

A science museum exhibition about human health contains an exhibit that minimizes health impacts of air pollution. Relevant details, such as the full range of health risks; fossil fuel combustion; air quality statutes (and the local electrical utility's violations of these statues), are omitted, while end users of electricity are blamed. The exhibit accomplishes this, not through outright falsification, but through selected “alternative facts” that change the focus and imply misleading alternate explanations. Using two classical rhetorical concepts (the practical syllogism and the enthymeme) allows for the surfacing of missing evidence and unstated directives underlying multimodal rhetoric. By stating multimedia arguments syllogistically, a technique is proposed for revealing hidden political subtexts from beneath a putatively disinterested presentation of facts. The piece should be of interest to researchers, message designers, and policymakers interested in the rhetoric of science, ecology, health, and museums.

Abstract I present the text at Posterior Analytics (=APo) II.11, 94b8-26, offer a tentative translation, discuss the main construals offered in the literature, and argue for my own interpretation. Some of the general questions I discuss are the following: 1. What is the nature of the explanatory syllogisms offered as examples, especially in the case of the moving and the final cause? Are they scientific demonstrative explanations? In the case of the final cause, are they practical syllogisms? Are they productive? 2. Are we to read into such examples Aristotle’s requirements from APo I.4-6 that demonstrative premisses and conclusions are universal, per se, and necessary? If so, in what way? If such requirements do not apply here, what are the implications for question 1? 3. What, if any, is the advantage of one type of causal explanation over another (e.g., of final over efficient) in cases in which there is causal competition between complementary explanations? 4. What is the relation between the thesis of this chapter, especially the section dedicated to the final cause, and the argument of II.8-10? How is essence (the what-it-is) related to causes? How is explanation/demonstration-based definition related to causal explanation in terms of the four causes?

Abstract The article presents a proposal of explanation what practical rationality is, how it works and what are its criteria. In order to define practical rationality, the author starts from the general characteristics of reason, and then in the realm or reason activity distinguishes practical rationality from theoretical rationality. The necessary conditions of practical rationality are presented, as well as its standing between freedom and values. Next, the sources and nature of practical reasons are characterized, as well as their relation to values and desires. The problem of practical syllogism is briefly commented on. In the final part of the article the author proposes five criteria of practical rationality.

The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations (in analogy to intrinsic and extrinsic utilities). It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. Its central proposal will then be that the fact-regarding normative ranking function must be conceived as the sum of a purely normative ranking function and an epistemic ranking function (as suggested in qualitative decision theory). The distinctions defends this proposal with a comparative discussion of some critical examples and some other distinctions made in the literature. It gives a more rigorous justification of this proposal. Finally, it starts developing the logic of purely normative and of fact-regarding normative defeasible reasoning, points to the difficulties of completing the logic of the fact-regarding side, but reaches the initial aim of accounting for the defeasible nature of the practical syllogism.

規範事例型の実践的推論について アリストテレス『ニコマコス倫理学』の行為論

The author sets a goal to show the specificity of the formulation of universal prescriptive judgments about a virtuous act (moral norms) in the framework of Aristotelian ethical doctrine. To achieve this goal, Aristotle’s philosophy concept of practical wisdom (phronesis) is analyzed. It shows a necessity to distinguish the use of practical wisdom in a personal experience of the act and for forming the inter-subjective practical knowledge (episteme) about making of a virtuous act. The specificity of ethics as practical knowledge and its difference from individual moral experience are defined by means of the distinction of the use of practical wisdom. It also shows the limitations of practical syllogism as the main rational mechanism for the formation of inter-subjective practical knowledge. Additionally, the universal prescriptive judgments are divided into informative and functional: the former reveals the content of the action, the latter – its structure, that is, the former defines what a person must do, the latter defines what an action should be to comply with the right purpose, consequently, the right content. At the same time, the right content is recognized only in individual experience and can not be expressed universally, without losing its practical value. The author concludes that the formulation of informative universal prescriptive judgments is impossible within the framework of Aristotelian ethical doctrine. It is impeded by the unsolvable problem of the correlation between the general and the particular, the transition from descriptive judgments to prescriptive judgments. However, it is possible to formulate functional universal prescriptive judgments. They also constitute the methodological basis for criticism of the accepted in society moral norms, which are based on the past positive experience of actions.

Aristotle claims in the Metaphysics that in order to be resourceful in first philosophic inquiry it is useful to go through perplexity well. In this essay, the author argues that that perplexity plays a parallel role in Aristotle's account of practical, deliberative inquiry in the Nicomachean Ethics. He does so by offering an interpretation of the relation between Aristotle's account of akratic ignorance in Nicomachean Ethics 7 and his emphasis on the necessity of going through perplexity when inquiring into akrasia. Along the way, the author tries to shed some additional light on Aristotle's conception of endoxa, his account of the so-called practical syllogism, and the distinction between ethical virtue simply and "authoritative" virtue. But the intention throughout the essay is to examine the role that perplexity about the phenomena of ethical life plays in Aristotle's account of the kind of thoughtfulness required for excellence of character.