Fertility Postponement Research Articles

Is Lowest‐Low Fertility in Europe Explained by the Postponement of Childbearing?

In 2001, more than half of Europe's population lived in countries with a total fertility rate (TFR) at or below 1.3. Use of the adjusted TFR proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney, which takes into account the effects of the ongoing fertility postponement, changes the European fertility map considerably. All 27 countries analyzed had adjusted TFRs in 1995–2000 above 1.4. Thus, the “lowest‐low” fertility in Europe may be interpreted as a temporary consequence of the increasing age at motherhood. However, substantial regional differences in fertility level across Europe persist even when the differential pace of fertility postponement is taken into account. The estimated adjusted TFRs in Europe (1.63) and in the 25‐member European Union (1.71) contrast with the TFR levels of 1.40 and 1.46, respectively. These seemingly small differences have vastly different implications in terms of the potential long‐term pace of population decline.

Fertility, Timing of Births and Socio-economic Status in France and Britain: Social Policies and Occupational Polarization

Comparison of family growth and the timing of births in France and Britain calls for consideration of the role of family policy and women’s economic conditions in determining their demographic behaviour. The study relies on data from the Longitudinal Study of England and Wales and the Permanent Demographic Sample in France, that link birth registrations to 1971-1991 and 1968-1990 census data, respectively. Over the period studied, the 1970s through the 1990s, in Britain state intervention has been minimal, while France practised a generous family policy. In parallel, social polarization in fertility behaviour was larger in Britain, and differences in fertility between those women who leave the labour force and those who do not were larger still. In France, differences by socio-occupational group are observed only at third births, although by the second birth there is already an association between parity progression and having left the labour force as of the census observation. In France, almost all married women in managerial occupations become mothers, while in Britain one quarter of such women do not. Fertility in Britain is higher at all birth orders among those not in the labour force and in less-skilled occupations, while in France family policy tends to increase third births in those categories too.Comparing women born in the 1950s to those born in the 1960s reveals that the postponement of marriage and fertility, appreciable in both countries, is more marked in France. Among married women, however, changes in fertility have been negligible. All other things being equal, the differences in fertility by socio-occupational group decrease in France, but not in Britain.

Tempo-Adjusted Period Parity Progression Measures, Fertility Postponement and Completed Cohort Fertility

In this paper we introduce a new set of tempo-adjusted period parity progression measures in order to account for two distinct implications caused by delays in childbearing: tempo distortions imply an underestimation of the quantum of fertility in observed period data, and the fertility aging effect reduces higher parity births because the respective exposure is shifted to older ages when the probability of having another child is quite low. Our measures remove the former distortion and provide means to assess the latter aging effect. The measures therefore provide a unified toolkit of fertility indices that (a) facilitate the description and analysis of past period fertility trends in terms of synthetic cohort measures, and (b) allow the projection of the timing, level and distribution of cohort fertility conditional on a specific postponement scenario. Due to their explicit relation to cohort behavior, these measures extend and improve the existing adjustment of the total fertility rate. We apply these methods to Sweden from 1970 to 1999.

Fertility, Timing of Births and Socio-economic Status in France and Britain

Comparison of family growth and the timing of births in France and Britain calls for consideration of the role of family policy and women’s economic conditions in determining their demographic behaviour. The study relies on data from the Longitudinal Study of England and Wales and the Permanent Demographic Sample in France, that link birth registrations to 1971-1991 and 1968-1990 census data, respectively. Over the period studied, the 1970s through the 1990s, in Britain state intervention has been minimal, while France practised a generous family policy. In parallel, social polarization in fertility behaviour was larger in Britain, and differences in fertility between those women who leave the labour force and those who do not were larger still. In France, differences by socio-occupational group are observed only at third births, although by the second birth there is already an association between parity progression and having left the labour force as of the census observation. In France, almost all married women in managerial occupations become mothers, while in Britain one quarter of such women do not. Fertility in Britain is higher at all birth orders among those not in the labour force and in less-skilled occupations, while in France family policy tends to increase third births in those categories too.Comparing women born in the 1950s to those born in the 1960s reveals that the postponement of marriage and fertility, appreciable in both countries, is more marked in France. Among married women, however, changes in fertility have been negligible. All other things being equal, the differences in fertility by socio-occupational group decrease in France, but not in Britain.

Is Low Fertility a Temporary Phenomenon in the European Union?

This article addresses two questions: (i) will the mere end of further postponement of fertility in the EU‐countries lead to an appreciable rise in European fertility and bring total fertility rates closer to replacement level, as witnessed in the United States? and (ii) what are the chances that such a stop to postponement is imminent? The answer to the first question is positive, but only if there is enough recuperation of fertility at older ages. Translated in the Bongaarts–Feeney framework, this condition means that the birth‐order‐specific TFRs would indeed remain constant. In the absence of full recuperation at older ages, the induced rise in the national TFRs would be trivial and by no means restore period and cohort TFRs to replacement levels. Hence, caution is needed when using the Bongaarts–Feeney adjusted TFRs for pro‐jective purposes. With respect to the second question, female education and employment trends in tandem with ideational and family disruption data are used to speculate about the prospects for such an end to further fertility postponement and for fertility increases at older ages. Strikingly, EU‐countries that have the greatest potential for still later fertility are also the ones with very low TFRs (below 1.5) at present. The overall conclusion is that low to very low fertility in the EU is unlikely to be a temporary phenomenon

American Fertility Patterns: A Comparison of White and Nonwhite Cohorts Born 1903-56

In the United States, nonwhite women have long had higher fertility than white women (Farley, 1966, 1970, 1972; Ryder and Westoff, 1971; Westoff and Ryder, 1977), although in recent years nonwhite fertility has been converging toward the lower level characteristic of whites (Rindfuss and Sweet, 1977; Cutright and Shorter, 1979). Further, the pace of fertility tends to be faster for nonwhite women than for whites (Farley, 1970; Presser, 1971; St. John, 1982). Yet, the strong decline in the level of nonwhite fertility has occurred despite very high adolescent fertility (Cherlin, 1981; Kitagawa, 1981; O'Connell and Moore, 1980). This last trend is particularly intriguing because it differs sharply from the strong association between fertility postponement and fertility reduction that has characterized most European societies. This paper sets out to refocus attention on the general pattern of racial differences in cohort fertility and to provide data that will facilitate future systematic hypothesis-testing. Following Ryder (1969), I will examine the mean of the distribution of fertility by age (hereafter called the mean age at fertility), the standard deviation of this distribution, the total fertility rate, the proportion ever having a child, and mean completed parity of mothers. These data can be used to conduct future research into the effects of socioeconomic change and of patterns of marriage and formation of sexual unions on fertility. In addition, current fertility patterns are viewed in historical perspective using exactly comparable data over time. Examining fertility patterns by race has several compelling advantages. First, nonwhites and whites have typically had different fertility patterns, but have shared some intertemporal changes: the baby boom and subsequent bust occur in both groups at about the same time. Examining the two groups enables one to see variety within a common phenomenon, and may provide insight