ABSTRACT The core claim of constitutivist ethics is that moral principles are necessarily present within the concept of what it means to be an agent. Though recent publications have attempted to apply this claim to issues of contemporary legal theory, there has been no comprehensive attempt to develop an account of legal status grounded in the constitutivist position. The purpose of this article is to fill that gap, with emphasis on the role of the legislator. The argument will proceed in three parts, the first of which will demonstrate the need for such an account. It will be suggested that existing approaches see recognition of legal personality as a social fact separable from moral considerations, and thus assume a legal positivist understanding of legal validity. Part two will then use Gewirthian theory to demonstrate why such an approach is unacceptable to the constitutivist, before offering an alternative built around the maxim that agency is a sufficient, though not necessary condition for the ascription of legal personality in any legal system where this status is an instrumentally necessary pre-requisite for legal rights-bearing. From this position, legislators faced with the task of ascribing legal personality must work within the following two-tiered approach: (1) Core legal persons: beings/entities considered moral patients by the constitutivist, whose legal personality legislators have a positive obligation to recognise; and (2) Penumbral legal persons: beings/entities not considered moral patients by the constitutivist, and the recognition of whose legal personality remains at the discretion of legal officials. The final part of this chapter will introduce case studies to explore the practical workability of the mind-independent aspect of legal personality that this account requires us to accept.

This article examines the necessity of enshrining the right to a healthy environment in the second chapter of the Constitution in light of international and European legal developments. It traces the emergence and gradual consolidation of this right from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration to the 2022 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. Particular attention is given to the role of the Aarhus Convention in shaping procedural guarantees and to the case‑law of the European Court of Human Rights, through which environmental protection has been linked to the rights to life, private life, and property, thereby affirming States’ positive obligations. Through a comparative legal analysis, the article presents constitutional solutions adopted in several European countries and explores the specific features of their judicial application. It argues that incorporating the right to a healthy environment into the second chapter of the Constitution would render the State’s environmental obligations directly applicable, broaden the toolkit of constitutional review, and provide an interpretative framework for the systematic development of national environmental legislation. The purpose of the study is to assess the necessity of constitutionally entrenching the right to a healthy environment in the second chapter of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, devoted to fundamental rights and freedoms.

The article presents a constitutional‑law understanding of human trafficking, examining it as a systemic violation of human dignity and fundamental rights and, simultaneously, as a threat directed against the value foundations of the constitutional order. Trafficking is analysed not exclusively through criminal‑law categories but within the logic of constitutional protection of human rights, emphasizing that exploitation undermines legal subjectivity by transforming a person into an object of control and ownership. The article advances the thesis that, at the constitutional level, the anti‑trafficking framework is grounded in the inviolability of human dignity, the rule of law, and the interconnection of a number of absolute or reinforced guarantees (personal liberty, prohibition of torture and forced labour, non‑discrimination, and the right to effective judicial protection). The study develops the constitutional dimension of the State’s tripartite structure of positive obligations — to guarantee, to ensure, and to protect — demonstrating that prevention of trafficking, early identification, protection and rehabilitation of victims, as well as effective investigation and inevitability of accountability constitute a unified system of continuous obligations. The article further highlights the interaction between international and constitutional law, particularly the influence of the case‑law of the European Court of Human Rights and the standards established by the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings on national legal interpretation. It ultimately proposes an approach according to which the fight against trafficking functions as a benchmark of constitutional governance, reflecting the State’s practical capacity to recognise and manage exploitation risks, reduce vulnerabilities, and secure real and effective protection.

Who do we believe deserves rights, and when do we feel personally obligated to protect them? Expanding the moral circle has been seen as a hallmark of moral progress, yet existing research has rarely examined how different kinds of moral judgements, recognizing rights versus endorsing obligations, shape this process. The present research disentangles these judgements across human and non-human entities to better understand how they predict prosocial decision-making. Across three studies (N = 1256), we consistently found that people were more willing to grant moral rights than to endorse moral obligations, particularly for human targets. Yet only obligations emerged as a reliable predictor of prosocial intentions across both high- and low-cost behaviours. Study 3 extended these findings by distinguishing between positive and negative forms of moral judgement, showing that while negative rights and obligations were attributed more broadly, positive obligations most strongly motivated helping, especially towards non-human entities. Together, these findings demonstrate that rights may expand the moral circle symbolically, but obligations, particularly positive obligations, supply the motivational force that is most closely tied to prosociality. This distinction offers new theoretical insight into moral cognition and highlights practical avenues for fostering prosocial engagement in a time of expanding but often inconsistent moral concern.

The phenomenon of wrongful conviction in contemporary legal systems underscores the effectiveness of mechanisms for restoring violated human rights and the responsibility of the state for judicial errors. In the context of increasing attention to fair trial standards, the institution of rehabilitation of wrongfully convicted persons acquires particular significance not only as a procedural legal means of overturning unjust judgments, but also as a complex legal and criminological instrument aimed at safeguarding human dignity and restoring social justice. The subject of the research is the institution of rehabilitation of wrongfully convicted persons within the human rights paradigm, with an emphasis on its criminological nature, functional purpose, and role in the system of guarantees for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The purpose of the study is to develop a criminological concept of rehabilitation based on an analysis of its genesis, normative content, and doctrinal approaches, taking into account international human rights standards. The methodological framework of the research is based on general scientific and special legal methods of cognition, including analysis and synthesis, the systemic-structural method, the formal legal method, the comparative legal method, and the criminological method, which ensure a comprehensive understanding of rehabilitation as a multidimensional legal phenomenon. The relevance of the study is determined by the persistence of structural risks of wrongful conviction even in states with well-developed legal institutions, as well as by the insufficient conceptualization of rehabilitation within the criminological dimension. The scientific novelty of the research lies in substantiating rehabilitation as an independent criminological category that integrates restorative, compensatory, and preventive functions. The results of the study demonstrate that wrongful convictions have a complex criminological nature and are caused by a combination of procedural violations, institutional dysfunctions, and evidentiary deficiencies. The expediency of distinguishing between a narrow (procedural) and a broad (socio-legal) interpretation of rehabilitation is substantiated. An original conceptual approach to the grounds for rehabilitation is proposed, defining them as a set of legally significant and socially conditioned circumstances, the establishment of which confirms the unlawfulness or groundlessness of criminal prosecution and gives rise to a positive obligation of the state to ensure the full restoration of the legal and social status of the individual. The practical significance of the findings lies in their potential application to improving criminal procedural legislation, law enforcement practice, and the formation of criminological policy in the field of preventing judicial errors and protecting human rights. It is concluded that the effective functioning of the institution of rehabilitation serves as a criterion of the democratic maturity of a rule-of-law state and as a necessary condition for the humanization of criminal justice.

After two years of the Chamber judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR delivered its final judgment of Semenya v. Switzerland (App no. 10934/21) on 10 July 2025. The Chamber judgment found violations of procedural aspects of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, as well as Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In contrast to the Chamber judgment, the Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR due to the lack of a fair hearing caused by the limited scope of judicial review exercised by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) under Article 190(2)(e) of the Swiss Private International Law Act (Swiss PILA). Furthermore, it declared the applicant’s claims under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, as well as Article 13 ECHR, inadmissible. This landmark decision is expected to significantly impact the Swiss legal system, as it places a positive obligation on Switzerland to adopt a broader interpretation of Article 190(2)(e) Swiss PILA in order to ensure the protection of substantive human rights within the framework of sports arbitration and the Swiss legal system.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the realization of the right to a safe environment for life and health as a common interest of the international community and a universal obligation of States. It examines the evolution of international environmental law to the status of erga omnes norms, which apply to all States irrespective of specific treaties, with reference to key decisions of the International Court of Justice, in particular the Barcelona Traction case (1970) and the precedent-setting recognition in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025 of the erga omnes character of obligations to protect the climate system from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (the obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm under customary international law).Separate attention is given to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in cases involving environmental and climate threats, viewed through the lens of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (positive obligations of the State to protect life and private/family life from industrial pollution, noise, climate change, etc.). The article highlights the tension between national sovereignty and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as well as the limitations of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction (absence of a direct right to a clean environment, requirement to exhaust domestic remedies).The authors emphasize that effective protection of the right to a safe environment is impossible without international cooperation, as environmental threats are transboundary in nature, and the further development of the erga omnes concept and accountability mechanisms will strengthen guarantees of every individual’s right to a clean and safe environment.

On 9 April 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered three highly anticipated decisions in climate‑related cases: Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, Carême v. France and Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 states. The Court declared the latter two applications inadmissible but examined the merits in KlimaSeniorinnen. Unlike earlier environmental cases before the ECtHR, these complaints did not concern discrete sources of pollution; they challenged inadequate state responses to the systemic threat of anthropogenic climate change. In KlimaSeniorinnen the Court relied on its ‘living instrument’ doctrine to interpret the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in light of contemporary challenges. It found that Switzerland’s failure to adopt and implement effective climate‑mitigation and adaptation measures breached its positive obligations under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life). The judgment clarified the scope of substantive obligations, a demanding test for victim status, and a novel approach to causation and burden of proof. It also distinguished between a reduced margin of appreciation for setting climate goals and a broader margin for choosing means, and emphasised procedural safeguards and democratic participation. This article examines the facts, reasoning and broader implications of KlimaSeniorinnen, critiques aspects of the Court’s approach to victim status and judicial activism, and assesses what the decision means for future strategic climate litigation.

This paper examines the positive obligations of States Parties to the European Social Charter (ESC) to secure migrant workers’ collective bargaining rights and analyses their interaction with European Union (EU) law. It sets out the Charter framework, notably Article 5 on the right to organise and Article 6 on collective bargaining, read together with Article 19§4(b) on equal treatment in trade union membership and in the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining, and analyses its interpretation in the supervisory practice of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR). The paper addresses both formal legal conformity and effective implementation in practice, with particular attention to discriminatory effects and structural impediments that may undermine the practical and effective exercise of these rights. It then examines the interaction between ESC obligations and EU internal market freedoms, as illustrated by the Viking and Laval judgments, and considers whether subsequent EU instruments, including Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages, reinforce collective bargaining as a policy objective. It concludes that, notwithstanding areas of convergence, ESC standards retain autonomous normative force and require practical and effective protection of migrant workers’ collective bargaining rights.

In Bradshaw and Others v United Kingdom , the European Court of Human Rights recognised, for the first time, that disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference engage the right to free elections under Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1‐3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It further held that states may have a positive obligation to take measures to protect the integrity of electoral processes against such threats where there is a real risk that the ‘very essence’ of the P1‐3 right will be curtailed and deprived of its effectiveness. While Bradshaw is an important milestone in the emerging jurisprudence on disinformation and foreign interference, it is susceptible to critique along four lines: (i) it reveals a disconnect between the theory and practice of Convention rights; (ii) it leaves significant uncertainty across the Council of Europe about the existence, extent and fulfilment of states’ obligations to protect electoral integrity against such threats; (iii) the evidentiary threshold set by the Court poses a potentially insurmountable hurdle for future claimants, while the threshold for state compliance is comparatively low; and (iv) the Court missed the opportunity to elucidate the ‘public’ aspect of P1‐3 for citizens and states alike.

This paper interrogates the systemic enforcement failures in monitoring migrant fishers by critically examining the legal responsibilities of labour-sending and flag states within the framework of international human rights law, the law of the sea, and transnational labour regulation. Labour-sending states, while normatively empowered to regulate recruitment and working conditions through extraterritorial measures, frequently fail to meet their due diligence obligations due to institutional fragmentation and remittance-driven policy choices. Flag states, though vested with exclusive jurisdiction under Article 92 of UNCLOS, exploit open registries and fragmented oversight to evade enforcement, resulting in a profound accountability vacuum. Anchored in the principles of effective control, positive obligations, and structural injustice, this study shows how jurisdictional fragmentation enables states and private actors to circumvent liability, leaving migrant fishers in a persistent legal lacuna. The paper calls for a reconfiguration of the monitoring paradigm, shifting from fragmented, territorially bound enforcement to a polycentric model grounded in transnational legal accountability and binding obligations. Without structural change, the prevailing regime not only fails to prevent harm but structurally enables a transnational economy of exploitation at sea.

The anti-discrimination policy as a vital component of international human rights standards within its conceptual dimension is explored in the article. It is determined that contemporary international human rights standards are formed not merely as a set of international legal norms enshrined in treaties and declarations, but as a complex of principles, approaches, and requirements arising from the interaction of treaty and customary international law, the practice of international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions, and doctrinal interpretations. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the principles of equality and non-discrimination perform a system-forming function within this framework, defining the limits of state discretion and the criteria for permissible interference in the of human rights implementation field. It is substantiated that anti-discrimination policy should be viewed not as a collection of isolated prohibitions or declarative provisions, but as a holistic conceptual construct that integrates normative, institutional, and procedural dimensions. It is demonstrated that the evolution of international standards indicates a transition from a formal and legal understanding of equality to a substantive one, oriented toward eliminating factual inequality, structural barriers, and the vulnerability of specific social groups. In this context, anti-discrimination policy emerges as a tool for implementing the positive obligations of the state, which go beyond the simple duty to refrain from discriminatory actions. The study reveals that the conceptual dimension of anti-discrimination policy is manifested in the dynamic determination of protected characteristics, the formation of effective mechanisms for preventing and eliminating both direct and indirect discrimination, and the creation of institutional guarantees for access to justice. Key words: anti-discrimination policy; discrimination; international law; non-discrimination; international standards; human rights; legal regulation; justice; principle of equality.

The subject of the study is the constitutional guarantees of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine viewed through an economic and legal lens, with a focus on how normative standards, institutions, procedures, and public finance jointly determine the real level of rights protection under ordinary conditions, martial law, and recovery. The paper examines why constitutional guarantees should be treated as an operating governance system that shapes predictability of state behaviour, integrity of regulatory decision-making, investment and labour incentives, and the sustainability of social protection, rather than as a declarative catalogue of rights. Special attention is paid to the role of constitutional review and judicial control in constraining administrative discretion, to due process as an economic safeguard against arbitrariness, and to budget and tax governance as a resource infrastructure enabling positive obligations. The paper also addresses the impact of European human-rights standards, including the Convention system and ECtHR case-law, on proportionality, non-discrimination, protection of property, and effective remedies, particularly in crisis regulation and in contexts where temporary measures tend to become permanent. Methodology. The research is based on a combination of formal-legal, systemic, comparative-legal, and institutional approaches. It integrates doctrinal analysis of constitutional provisions and related legislation with an examination of European standards (rule of law, proportionality, fair balance, and non-discrimination) and a review of judicial practice relevant to economic rights, property interference, and access to justice. Policy analysis is applied to clarify how constitutional requirements are translated into administrative procedures, regulatory instruments, and budget programs, and to identify interface risks that typically arise between constitutional standards and implementation capacity during resource scarcity and wartime governance. The aim of the work is to substantiate an analytically coherent model of constitutional guarantees for Ukraine that explains their economic significance, identifies vulnerabilities in the strategy–delivery chain of rights protection, and formulates practical proposals for strengthening controllability, transparency, and accountability of state interference while preserving the enforceability of social rights under fiscal constraints. The results of the study show that that the effectiveness of constitutional guarantees depends less on the density of constitutional declarations and more on the coherence of four interconnected layers: normative limits on interference, institutional checks (constitutional jurisdiction, ordinary courts, ombudsman and integrity bodies), procedural discipline (reasoned decisions, the right to be heard, access to information, and reviewability), and financial governance (budget transparency, prioritization rules, and enforceable compensation mechanisms). The paper demonstrates that due process reduces transaction costs and arbitrariness risks in economically significant decisions, while judicial control operationalizes proportionality and fair-balance tests in concrete disputes. For Ukraine, the critical governance risk is the normalization of emergency practices: under martial law, expanded regulatory tools and accelerated decision-making can weaken legal certainty unless supported by time-bounded measures, public criteria, periodic review, and effective remedies. The study proposes a strengthening roadmap centred on standardizing decision-making procedures for high-impact administrative acts, embedding proportionality and evidence standards in regulatory templates, reinforcing access to justice and enforcement capacity, institutionalizing budget openness for rights-related programs, and ensuring practicable compensation for unlawful interference and emergency-related property measures. Conclusion. Sustainable constitutional guarantees require shifting from formal recognition of rights toward a managed, auditable governance cycle in which legal standards, institutions, procedures, and public finance operate as a single system of constraints and remedies. For Ukraine, the most feasible path is not expanding declarations, but reproducing functional safeguards: predictable and reviewable procedures, integrity-by-design controls, stable proportionality tests in adjudication, and budget transparency that makes social rights administrable during war and recovery, thereby strengthening trust and reducing economic uncertainty associated with state intervention.

Aim: To investigate the negative and positive obligations of the state in ensuring the right of an individual to respect for human dignity in medical and legal relations, taking into account the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, and to reveal the protection of this right among drug addicts. Materials and Methods: The research methodology involves the analysis of national regulatory provisions, international treaties, legislative acts of Ukraine, and legal positions of the ECHR on the problems of implementing the right to respect for human dignity in medical and legal relations, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Data analysis was conducted using open sources, mainly for the period 2010-2025. The main search keywords were "ECHR", "protection of rights", "health care", "legal regulation", "the right of an individual to respect for human dignity". The search criteria focused on modern scientific approaches and practical experience in ensuring the right of individuals to respect for human dignity in medical and legal relations. Sources that do not focus on medical-legal relations, that do not take into account the current practice of the ECHR, that do not comply with international human rights standards, legal acts or regulatory documents that contradict the practice of the ECHR were excluded from consideration. Conclusions: The study highlights cases of failure to fulfill negative obligations of a material nature of the studied right of individuals, among which the following are identified: improper performance by officials of their duties due to inaction (failure to provide medical services, which led to serious consequences); improper performance of official duties by officials of state bodies, as well as unlawful actions of law enforcement agencies of a deliberate nature (physical and psychological violence against persons in custody). An approach is proposed in which adherence to the principle of the supremacy of the law under study, taking into account the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, is the basis for respecting human rights and freedoms.

Abstract This article examines the methodology employed by the Czech Constitutional Court in adjudicating social rights, with particular focus on the so-called rationality test. While the Court’s approach aims to balance judicial restraint with the constitutional protection of social rights, its implementation raises important theoretical and practical concerns. The article relies both on holistic analysis of the case-law from which general remarks in relation to social rights in the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and methodological approach of the Court are derived, and the detailed case study of three pilot judgments, namely: judgments on Compulsory Vaccination ( Pl. ÚS 16/14); Smoking Ban in Restaurants ( Pl. ÚS 7/17) , and Health Insurance of Migrants ( Pl. ÚS 2/15). By these means, the article explores how the Court has developed and applied its distinctive four-step rationality test that combines the protection of the core of the right with reasonableness and proportionality. The approach of the Czech Constitutional Court represents a global anomaly, as no comparable model has yet been described in the comparative constitutional law literature. This article addresses three core pitfalls of the Court’s approach to judging social rights: 1) Although the rationality test seems to accommodate deferential variation on proportionality, in practice the test often collapses into a mere assessment of the suitability of the contested measure, without proper consideration of the normative content of the right at issue or the harm caused to individual rights-holders. 2) In many cases, the Constitutional Court is reluctant to interpret the core of rights and/or their normative content in general. 3) The study also demonstrates that the Constitutional Court still has not found a clear and sound attitude towards positive obligations. In its concluding section, the article offers a normative proposal for reform of the Court’s methodology.

This comment examines the landmark European Court of Human Rights case of FM and Others v Russia (2024), which assessed the relationship between Articles 4 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of human trafficking and related forms of exploitation. The case involved five Central Asian women subjected to severe labour exploitation in Russia, where authorities repeatedly failed to investigate their claims or offer protection. The court found that Russia violated its positive obligations by condoning trafficking and labour exploitation. While welcoming this watershed ruling, the comment expresses some disappointment at the court’s incomplete engagement with intersectional discrimination, arguing that the judgment focuses primarily on gender and migrant status while neglecting other factors like ethnicity and social position. It also highlights the court’s missed opportunity to fully articulate the role of human dignity in anti-trafficking adjudication, despite acknowledging its importance in passing.

This article provides a comprehensive constitutional law analysis of the nature of the right to a favorable environment and the mechanisms for its protection. This right is examined as a systemic precondition for the realization of the rights to life, health, and dignified existence. Through comparative analysis, the article presents anthropocentric constitutional models (France, Germany, Portugal, South Africa, India), where the environment is viewed as a condition for the realization of human rights, and ecocentric models (Ecuador, Bolivia, New Zealand), which recognize the subjective rights of nature. It is noted that while the Republic of Armenia’s constitutional law model corresponds to the anthropocentric approach, it does not include direct constitutional guarantees for intergenerational justice, climate protection, or rights of nature. The article analyzes the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (López Ostra v. Spain, Taşkín v. Turkey, Hamer v. Belgium, Tătar v. Romania, Di Sarno v. Italy), which confirms the state’s positive obligations to prevent environmental threats and ensure a proportionate balance between economic interests and the protection of human rights. Particular emphasis is placed on the Court’s position in Taşkín, according to which economic expediency cannot justify the exploitation of natural resources that creates a real threat to human health and life. The judicial practice of the Republic of Armenia is presented, particularly the 2011 decision of the Court of Cassation (VD/3275/05/09), which restricted the ability of civil society organizations to bring environmental cases to court by requiring the contestation of direct individual rights. It is noted that the 2010 Constitutional Court decision (SDO-906) also received ambiguous interpretation in law enforcement practice, which demonstrates the need to develop the actio popularis institute to ensure judicial protection of environmental rights in the public interest. A preventive constitutional law approach is substantiated, according to which the state’s positive obligations should be directed not only at compensating damage, but primarily at the early prevention of environmental risks. In this context, mandatory integration of impact assessment tools is proposed: Health Impact Assessment (HIA), Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). As a scientific contribution, an expanded model of the objective and subjective nature of the right to a favorable environment is proposed, emphasizing the potential of subjective rights in protecting collective and public interests. It is argued that this right should be viewed not as a secondary social right, but as a systemic precondition for constitutional order and the effective realization of fundamental human rights. The article proposes the development of the actio popularis institute, improvement of administrative proceedings, and strengthening of preventive mechanisms of state control to ensure effective protection of the public interest in environmental protection.

The subject. The article considers a constitutional-legal dispute on posthumous reproduction, which became the subject of consideration in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 2024. On February 11, 2025, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation issued a decision recognizing that norms of the legislation on social security are violated the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This decision gives rise to a number of new legal problems in the field of constitutional, civil, inheritance, medical law and social security law. At present, there is no legislative regulation of posthumous reproduction in the Russian Federation.The purpose of the article:– to establish the presence or absence of positive obligations of the state in relation to the somatic right to reproductive choice;– to determine the presumption of consent or disagreement to posthumous reproduction;– to propose possible measures to prevent constitutional conflicts related to posthumous reproduction.The methodology of the study includes general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, description) and legal methods, method of constitutional conflict diagnosis. In addition to this, historical method was also applicable. The article also uses a comparative legal method to analyze the legislation and practice of foreign countries such as the USA, France and Japan.Main results. The author proposes to eliminate the legislative gap by establishing at the statutory level a presumption of consent or disagreement in accordance with the following legislative formulas:– presumption of consent: posthumous reproduction using the sex cells (or embryos created with their help) of a deceased person is not permitted if the medical organization was informed at the time of using the relevant assisted reproductive technologies that the person, during his or her lifetime, declared his or her disagreement with the use of his or her sex cells (or embryos created with their help) for the purpose of procreation after death;– presumption of disagreement: posthumous reproduction using the sex cells (or embryos created with their help) of a deceased person is permitted only if the medical organization has, at the time of using the relevant assisted reproductive technologies, a written expression of the person's will, given during his or her lifetime, of consent to the use of his or her sex cells (or embryos created with their help) after death for the purpose of procreation.

Is it ethically permissible to allow untrained practitioners to perform IONM? An African perspective

The issue of child neglect by parents with mental disorders raises complex legal and social challenges, as both the child and the mentally ill parent are vulnerable groups requiring legal protection and State responsibility to ensure their rights. Mental illness often impairs parental capacity to provide adequate care, placing the child in a highly vulnerable and precarious situation. From a criminal law perspective, such mental conditions may serve as a ground for excuse under the Indonesian Penal Code, potentially eliminating criminal responsibility. This raises the question of who is accountable for ensuring the child's protection. This normative legal research aims to analyze the available forms of legal protection for children in such circumstances under Indonesian law, particularly Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection as amended by Law No. 35 of 2014, and to examine State responsibility through the lens of Child Rights Theory and the Best Interests of the Child principle. The study finds that while Indonesia's legal framework is relatively comprehensive, highlighted by Government Regulation No. 44 of 2017 on the Implementation of Child Care and Government Regulation No. 78 of 2021 on Special Protection for Children, implementation remains hindered by significant challenges, including weak institutional coordination, limited resources, and an insufficiently child-centered approach. The State thus has a positive obligation to take concrete preventive and curative measures to ensure children's rights protection, including providing appropriate alternative care and access to psychosocial recovery services.