Populist Leaders Research Articles

Economic Policies of Populist Leaders. A Central and Eastern European Perspective

Economic Policies of Populist Leaders. A Central and Eastern European Perspective

"Mechanisms of democratic erosion: Analysing populist rhetoric across international contexts"

This paper explores how populist rhetoric contributes to the erosion of democratic trust by analyzing the emotional and polarizing strategies employed by populist leaders in various international contexts. It aims to reveal the mechanisms through which such rhetoric undermines core democratic values and institutions. The research adopts a qualitative content analysis of political speeches delivered by prominent populist leaders from Hungary, the USA, India, Turkey, and France. Using NVivo software, thematic patterns were extracted and coded to identify rhetorical strategies. Supplementary computational analysis was conducted through Doc2Vec modeling to detect semantic patterns and quantify linguistic commonalities. The study finds that populist rhetoric consistently frames political discourse as a binary struggle between “the people” and “the elite,” reinforced through emotional appeals, simplification of complex issues, and narratives of victimhood. These rhetorical tools foster public skepticism, weaken trust in democratic institutions such as the judiciary and media, and exacerbate social polarization. Populist rhetoric poses a significant challenge to democratic stability. By delegitimizing institutional authority and amplifying antagonistic narratives, populist leaders undermine the very foundations of democratic governance. The findings highlight the need for strengthening institutional transparency, civic education, and media literacy as tools to resist populist manipulation. Policymakers and democratic stakeholders must proactively counteract these narratives to protect democratic norms and foster social cohesion.

How democratic backsliding and populism affect trust in democratic institutions

ABSTRACT In recent decades, there is a widespread perception that we are witnessing a period of confluent crises that are putting world democracies under strain. On the one hand, there is an apparent wave of democratic backsliding at the global level, characterized by gradual loss of democratic quality, weakening checks on executive power, and rising pernicious polarization, among others. On the other hand, populist leaders with illiberal leanings are grabbing power in both democratic and non-democratic regimes. Besides this, citizens seem to be more willing to tolerate undemocratic behaviours, which has been seen as a clear symptom of a crisis of democratic confidence. By combining a global dataset on individuals' democratic attitudes and vote choice with macro-level data on populist/non-populist incumbents and democratic backsliding, this article investigates voters' reactions to backsliding in contexts where incumbents are reasonably expected to commit backsliding (i.e. populist-led regimes) and contexts where backsliding is unlikely to unfold - but it (sometimes) occurs (i.e. non-populist-led regimes). Its main findings indicate that non-populist supporters in backsliding scenarios led by populist incumbents may shape as a resilient force to protect pluralistic democratic institutions, as they reinforce their confidence in both parliaments and political parties as backsliding becomes persistent.

Popcorn politics: Entertainment appraisals predict support for populist leaders.

Populism refers to a political style that describes society as a struggle between corrupt elites versus noble people and occurs across the political spectrum. What explains the appeal of populist leaders? In the present contribution, we tested the hypothesis that entertainment appraisals predict support more strongly for populist than non-populist leaders. Four preregistered studies conducted among US participants supported this hypothesis, comparing appraisals of existing politicians between parties (Trump vs. Biden; Study 1) and within parties (Trump vs. Romney, Study 2a; Sanders vs. Biden, Study 2b). Furthermore, we experimentally exposed participants to a populist versus non-populist speech of an unknown politician in a fictitious society (Study 3). Of importance, all studies also showed that the link between general populist attitudes and support was mediated by entertainment appraisals, but only for the relatively populist politicians. We conclude that to some extent, populism is a form of 'popcorn politics': Support for populist leaders depends on how entertaining people find them, more so than support for non-populist leaders.

Evolving populist rhetoric: how public approval shapes its employment

ABSTRACT Do radical right-wing populist incumbents strategically adjust their rhetoric in response to declining public support during non-electoral periods? While existing literature has studied populist rhetoric during electoral campaigns, less attention has been paid to how incumbent right-wing populist leaders adapt their communication strategies between elections. This paper examines this question through an analysis of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s official speeches from 2014 to 2020. Using Structural Topic Modeling (STM), the analysis reveals that Orbán strategically increases his use of specific populist rhetoric – particularly people-centric messages and anti-immigration or nativist rhetoric – when faced with lower approval ratings, even during non-electoral periods. However, contrary to existing theories suggesting populist rhetoric peaks during campaigns, the study finds no significant difference in Orbán’s use of right-wing populist rhetoric between electoral and non-electoral periods. These findings suggest that right-wing populist incumbents remain reliant on populist rhetoric throughout their tenure, likely due to voters’ expectations of rhetorical consistency and the adaptability of right-wing populist rhetoric. This study contributes to our understanding of how right-wing populist leaders strategically deploy rhetoric to maintain public support while in power.

The Strategic Exploitation of Conspiracy Theories by Populist Leaders

Populist leaders have strategically exploited conspiracy theories as powerful political tools to shape national identities, delegitimise opponents, and consolidate their authority. This paper examines the historical genealogy of conspiratorial populism, tracing its evolution across distinct political and economic crises from the 1970s to the present. Using a threefold analytical framework—(1) constructing external threats, (2) demonising domestic elites, and (3) positioning populists as the defenders of the “pure people”—the study demonstrates how conspiracy theories have been central to the rise and endurance of nativist populism. By analysing key historical waves—ranging from the economic turmoil of the 1970s, the collapse of communism, the post-9/11 security environment, the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2015 refugee crisis, to the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing geopolitical conflicts—this paper highlights how conspiratorial narratives have been repeatedly adapted to shifting socio-political contexts.

Kimonos, Ponchos and Blue Jeans: The Politics of Clothing in Alberto Fujimori’s Performative Populism

This article explores the role of clothing in populism through an analysis of Alberto Fujimori, Peru’s one-time autocrat (1990–2000). Drawing on the discursive-performative approach to populism and novel primary sources, this article makes the process-traced argument fashion may be essential to the performance of populism since, from the perspective of populist leaders, clothing is capable of overcoming some limitations of discourse. Despite several rhetorical shortcomings, clothing allowed Fujimori to perform ‘the popular’. Through kimonos, Fujimori differentiated himself from Peru’s White elite, through ponchos he built identification with indigenous Peruvians and through blue jeans he embodied a hands-on governing style. Clothing allowed Fujimori to build charismatic authority without rhetorical skill, transmitted nuanced messages alongside discourse and convinced many Peruvians of the authenticity of his populist project. This analysis of Fujimori highlights the oft-neglected importance of clothing in politics while providing a methodological blueprint for scholars interested in addressing this important gap.

Are populist leaders playing the public? Examining the effect of populism on common and luxury good imports

ABSTRACT Populist movements have grown significantly around the world in recent years. Populist ideologies typically view social and political elites as the enemy of the people; however, populist leaders are themselves part of the elite class, and are politically and financially dependent on other elites to some degree. We use principal-agent theory to examine whether populist leaders act as constrained agents by faithfully representing the people’s interests, or whether they actually pursue elite interests. We use panel data on more than 170 countries from 1993 to 2019 to look at total imports and imports of luxury goods under populist regimes to examine whether populist leaders try to carve out exceptions for elite interests. We find that both total imports and imports of luxury goods decline under populist regimes, and further decline over time. This suggests that populists act more as constrained agents to the people.

Restoring Ingroup Status and Glory: Essentialism as Ingroup Preservation When Collective Victimhood Narratives Are Endorsed

This study examines whether a specific type of leader rhetoric, collective victimhood rhetoric, shapes social identity and group normative structure as ultra-distinctive and immutable. Following measures of outgroup (Muslim) vitality and ingroup existential identity-uncertainty, Indian Hindu participants ( N = 149) were randomly assigned to read either a leader narrative of ingroup collective victimhood or a pro-diversity narrative. Participants completed measures of leader endorsement and ingroup essentialism of status. Results indicated that support for collective victimhood rhetoric was related to heightened essentialism of ingroup status as naturally endowed. This effect was accentuated under high identity-uncertainty about the ingroup's future. Findings also replicated results from previous research. Identity-uncertainty about the ingroup's (Hindu) religious future mediated the relationship between outgroup (Muslim) vitality and leader support. Support for leader victimhood rhetoric was heightened when identity-uncertainty was high. Implications for populist leader support are discussed, as victimhood rhetoric is central to populist mobilization of followers.

From Populist Politician to Sober Statesman

Abstract The surge of far-right populist leaders around the world has raised the question of whether they can be moderated through their participation in government—a matter of scholarly contention. This article examines the political arc of Naftali Bennett, a populist-nationalist politician who served as Israel's prime minister from June 2021 to June 2022. Until his unexpected ascension to the top political post, Bennett regularly employed populist Us vs. Them rhetoric while backing populist measures as a government minister that often put him at odds with the security establishment. Upon assuming the premiership, however, Bennett, following an instrumental logic, abandoned his polarizing rhetoric and embraced, instead, a statesmanlike approach to governing. The case of Bennett illustrates partial moderation undergone by a populist-nationalist politician's rise to power.

Authoritarian economic soft power: the case of Russian and Chinese investments in Central Europe

ABSTRACT The paper deals with the economic soft power strategies of authoritarian countries in the Visegrad region: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Based on the material of authoritarian countries, state-owned enterprises and investments, economic soft power is necessary for the investment to be accepted and not perceived as a security issue. Based on empirical material, it concludes that even if the countries’ overall soft power ranking is low, they can overcome such an obstacle through cooperation with populist leaders. Even scaling down their presence for economic and non-economic reasons, Russia and China still leave the room for a return open, as the investment relies on a populist type of ruler, not a specific politician. It uses two case studies, one for Sputnik V as the economic soft power creation strategy and the case of CITIC departure for the scaling down presence strategy.

The Philippines’ distinct path under Duterte: Closer ties with China

President Duterte's administration is showing a different approach to Philippine economic and political policies which previously leaned more towards the West, through concept formation Dutertismo And Dutertenomics. Dutertismo refers to Duterte's authoritarian, populist leadership style and focus on solving domestic issues such as drugs and terrorism, often with an approach that is at odds with the human rights values upheld by the United States. Meanwhile, Dutertenomics is a massive infrastructure development policy designed to increase the Philippines' economic competitiveness, with a focus on projects that support the Philippines' integration in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The research method used is an explanatory approach with the aim of explaining the cause-and-effect relationship between Duterte's policies and the shift in Philippine alliances, as well as their impact on the country's economic policy and foreign relations. The research results show that the mismatch between the human rights values upheld by the United States and Duterte's policies encourages the Philippines to seek a solution by strengthening relations with China, which is considered more pragmatic in supporting Duterte's agenda. Dutertenomics designed as a response to China's BRI, with a focus on infrastructure development as a way to improve connectivity and boost the Philippines' economic growth. This research also notes challenges in implementing this policy, such as dependence on foreign loans and domestic political uncertainty, which may affect the sustainability of this agenda.

Media Capture, Survival of the Corruptest and Journalistic Agency: The Case of Bulgaria

Democratic backsliding has been on the rise globally, including in the established and transitional democracies of the Global North, with populist leaders adopting similar practices of undermining the epistemology of journalism or attempting to capture news media outright. A representative survey with 391 Bulgarian journalists conducted as part of the Worlds of Journalism Study in 2021–2024 shows that corruption through the misuse of European and national funds has become one of the main survival mechanisms for their news outlets. This is complemented on a personal level with the finding that nearly two in five journalists have been forced to hold a second job, which has often led to conflict-of-interest issues. The Bulgarian case study is an excellent illustration of the consequences of a 13-year-long rule by populist leader Boyko Borisov and concurrent practices of Berlusconization and media capture in this Eastern European country, which for over a decade (2011–2022) had the lowest press freedom ranking among all European Union member states. The study shows an increased recognition among journalists of the power of journalistic agency, that is, their own role in the media capture process. The link between journalistic agency and media capture is of essential importance but has not been studied sufficiently.

Nothing but a piano-key: populism as a consequence of relational pathology

The paper examines populism as a symptom of a dysfunctional relationship between the few (elites) and the many (the masses) in liberal democracies. We take as the core broken promise of contemporary liberal democracies the failure to deliver the assurance of there being a meaningful relationship between the citizens' self and the increasingly complex, difficult-to-understand world. Employing Frank's theory of credible commitment, we propose that populism's success lies in its ability to signal commitment through seemingly irrational actions, a strategy which creates trustworthiness on the part of populist leaders but exacerbates generalized distrust in the institutional system. Moreover, the non-populist forms of trust-building find it difficult to compete with such an emotionally loaded appeal. In the latter parts of the paper, we discuss the detrimental effects of the populist way of creating trust on democracy's self-correcting capacities, contending that it engenders its own relational pathologies and ultimately undermines the very system it seeks to correct. Finally, we address populism's disruptive impact on public justification of collectively binding norms and shared institutions. By highlighting the relational dimension of populism, the paper urges a nuanced understanding of populism's appeal as a reaction to, and simultaneously an amplifier of, the pathologies of liberal democracies.

Populism in international relations: champion diplomacy

This article examines how populism reconfigures diplomacy. We contend that populist leaders practice a new form of diplomacy, i.e., champion diplomacy, which poses significant problems for negotiating and implementing international agreements. Portraying themselves as championing the causes of the people in its supposed struggle against the elites, champion diplomats sideline career diplomats, use simple and often coarse language, and prefer direct public diplomatic encounters, often on social media, over more traditional diplomatic channels. This complicates getting to the negotiation table, makes it more difficult to come up with meaningful agreements, and causes problems for implementing them. Our empirical research of two cases, US nuclear diplomacy towards North Korea and the Abraham Accords between Israel as well as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, Morocco and Sudan provides strong evidence for our claims. Our findings have important implications for diplomacy and international order more generally. With populist practices increasingly diffusing in diplomatic conduct, even beyond non-populist leaders, concluding workable agreements among states becomes more and more difficult.

Holding back the damage: strong political institutions and the effect of populism on business investment

Abstract Populism is a political phenomenon that attempts to harness existing institutions for populist ends, often leading to negative consequences for businesses. However, can national institutions resist this pressure and mitigate the damage to firms? This paper investigates how populist electoral success influences corporate investment, unraveling the intricate connection between a country’s political institutions and the investment behavior of companies. Through the lens of political uncertainty and transaction cost economics, we theorize that countries with fortified checks and balances—facilitated by electoral systems (situated at the entrance to power), judicial independence (supervising the exercise of power), and government accountability (serving as ex-post checks)—effectively mitigate populist impulses. However, these checks and balances are also often targeted by populist leaders, as they prevent full implementation of a populist agenda. Analyzing a dataset spanning over 36,000 firms across 42 countries from 1995 to 2021, we find that existing checks and balances shield firms from populist excesses. In line with our theory, the longer a ruler is in power, the weaker these checks and balances remain. Our study highlights populism’s harm to business and the role of robust political institutions as mitigating factors.

Injustices and Insecurities: Victimhood in Rodrigo Duterte's Populist Script of Philippine Foreign Policy

Abstract Philippine foreign policy under Rodrigo Duterte is notorious for its abrupt pivot to China and the unraveling of the country's longstanding alliance with the United States. His pronouncements have vividly reflected these to rationalize significant foreign policy recalibrations. It is from this understanding that this article seeks to explore the specific discourses that he has promoted in relation to China and the United States in pursuit of a coherent foreign policy logic for his administration. This article introduces victimhood as a framework to analyze Duterte's salient policy discourses and explores how these discourses influenced his administration's foreign policy behavior and informed his unique populist leadership. By invoking a discourse of suffering from past and present injustices, along with perceived insecurities arising from shifting power dynamics between the two major powers, Duterte constructed and internalized a victim identity for the Philippines, which has profoundly influenced the country's external relations during his tenure.

Populists and diplomats: Negotiated agency of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs

ABSTRACT The two-decade-long Turkish experience shows that the populism-diplomacy relationship, contrary to the common wisdom, does not have to be hostile. The existing literature characterize often this relationship as adversarial, emphasizing the repressive measures used by populists to weaken diplomatic institutions and disrupt foreign policy continuity. This perspective suggests that populist leaders undermine diplomatic services to pursue their unorthodox agendas. However, this study challenges this binary view, arguing that the interaction between populists and diplomats is more complex and multifaceted. By combining insights from populism literature with diplomacy studies, this study demonstrates how diplomats navigate and adapt to populist rule. Using Turkey as a case study, this article shows how diplomats implement, shape, and, on rare occasions, resist populist policies. Consequently, diplomats under populist regimes can reassure international partners, support populist policies as confirmatory agents, and engage in damage control.

Populism and regional cooperation: how did Pink Tide governments promote a new regional (or global?) order through populism?

For most political science scholars, populism is conceived as a domestic phenomenon. For decades, populism has been considered either as a democratic deviation that threatens the rule of law or as a legitimate discourse that encourages participation. Beyond this ongoing debate, it is necessary to consider whether populism has had effects on regional integration or cooperation. Such is the case with Latin American Pink Tide governments, most of which were populists. Those regimes were different from the most well-known Latin American populist leaders, such as Juan Domingo Perón, Getúlio Vargas, or Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, as new leftist governments promoted a regional cooperation framework. In 2004, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) was founded; two years later, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was created; and in 2008, this was the case for the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Unlike traditional populists, who focused their interests on domestic politics, this new radical populism has had a regional scope. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to explore how populism has been reshaping regional cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last 20 years. The research is divided into three parts. First, we explore the causes of the reemergence of populism in Latin America from the 2000s. Second, we analyze how Pink Tide populisms proposed and institutionalized a regional integration and cooperation framework on three fronts: ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC. Finally, we discuss the current relevance of populism to regional integration dynamics, two decades after the Pink Tide populist governments’ appearance.

Guardians of integration? The Constitutional Court of Colombia and regionalism in the age of populism

This article examines how the Constitutional Court of Colombia (CCC) balances its role as guardian of the Colombian constitutional order while engaging in regional integration processes across Latin America. Through an analysis of constitutional theory, institutional development and the Colombian political context since 1991, the study explores how the Court interprets constitutional integration clauses while navigating increasing populist pressures. Moving beyond reductionist views of populism as mere demagoguery, the article analyses case studies of two contrasting populist leaders: conservative authoritarian Álvaro Uribe (2002–10) and progressive reformist Gustavo Petro (2022–26). By examining the theoretical foundations of constitutional guardianship and the institutional framework within which the Court operates, this analysis highlights the complex relationship between constitutional courts, regional integration and populist challenges in Latin America. The findings demonstrate how the CCC has developed judicial approaches that, while focused on domestic constitutional matters, contribute to broader regional judicial discourse. This theoretical exploration underscores how constitutional courts can shape regional integration processes while safeguarding their domestic institutional legitimacy. The Colombian experience offers valuable insights into the evolving role of constitutional courts in balancing national sovereignty with regional legal developments in an era of rising populism.