ABSTRACT Alliances between centre-right and radical right parties in Western Europe have elicited varied responses and strategic adaptations depending on the national context. In this respect, Italy presents a particularly distinctive case. Since the mid-1990s, a coalition between these parties has remained a stable feature of the Italian party system, winning the popular vote in five elections and forming a government on four occasions. Over time, the internal balance of power within the alliance has shifted significantly, with radical right parties now occupying a dominant position. This article examines the factors influencing electoral support for – and within – this coalition since 2001, with a specific focus on the role of anti-immigration attitudes and right-wing self-identification. Our findings reveal a growing explanatory power of anti-immigration sentiment in predicting support for the coalition. Unexpectedly, this trend first emerged in the mid-2000s and intensified markedly in 2022, when immigration-related concerns became a central driver of voting behaviour. Importantly, centre-right voters have not exhibited a corresponding rise in anti-immigration attitudes over time, suggesting that no ideological contagion from radical right parties has occurred within this segment. Instead, our results indicate that Italian populist right-wing voters have undergone a process of radicalisation, building upon a pre-existing reservoir of anti-immigration sentiment.

The background of this research stems from the tension that arises between the formal legitimacy of the presidential threshold and its impact on substantive representation of the people. This research examines the presidential threshold in Indonesia's 2024 simultaneous general elections with the main objectives: (a) to analyse its constitutional basis explicitly and (b) to evaluate its impact on political representation and democratic inclusiveness. The method employed is a normative juridical approach, which involves analysing primary legal materials, including the 1945 Constitution, particularly Article 6A, Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, and related decisions of the Constitutional Court. The research findings reveal a crucial dilemma: first, although the threshold has a legitimate legal basis and is a valid legislative policy, its legitimacy is formalistic in nature. Second, its implementation substantially reduces political representation; the 2019 Election data show that parties representing 34.2% of the popular vote cannot participate in the presidential contest, resulting in forced joining coalitions that are often at odds with the aspirations of their constituents. This situation erodes popular sovereignty and contradicts the Pancasila value of social justice, exposing a fundamental tension between the legal form and substance of democracy. The originality of this research lies in its systematic presentation of this representation gap and its normative contribution, proposing a new threshold model of 10–15% to balance political stability with democratic inclusiveness. The implications are practical for policymakers and the General Elections Commission (KPU), as well as theoretical for the global discourse on electoral system design in developing democracies. A limitation of this research is its normative nature, necessitating further empirical studies on voter behaviour and the impact of digital campaigns.

Support for referendums has often been investigated in new and established democracies. However, we know very little about what drives support for referendums in transition countries. This article addresses that gap and aims to identify the determinants of support for referendums in the Republic of Moldova. The analysis uses individual-level data from a survey in November 2024 based on a nationally representative sample in the aftermath of a divisive popular vote on EU accession. The results indicate that support is rooted both in long-term attitudes, such as democratic satisfaction, democratic values, and high interest in politics, as well as in more immediate situational and strategic considerations. Compared to earlier evidence from democracies, people in Moldova attach more hope to referendums as a way to improve democracy and disconnect them from critiques against politicians.

Abstract This study explores whether ideological polarization increases political engagement and trust, both of which are central elements of civic culture. Polarization can clarify political positions and thereby simplify the formation of opinions, increase the stakes of elections, and offer more options to citizens. To estimate the impact of polarization from a causal perspective, we exploit variation within individuals over time using individual-level data from the Swiss Household Panel spanning from 1999 – 2023, amounting to 178,251 observations from 28,187 persons. Ideological polarization at the individual level is measured by a process of increasing extremity of the self-position on the left-right scale. In addition, we test how polarization of cohabiting household members has spillover effects on political engagement and trust. For political engagement, we adopt a comprehensive approach, focusing on interest in politics, participation in popular votes, party identification, and frequency of political discussions as dependent variables. Political trust is measured as confidence in the federal council. To analyze the data, we primarily use fixed effects models, complemented by a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, and cross-lagged models to address reverse causality. Results show that ideological polarization does promote engagement but has a weak negative impact on political trust. This effect remains significant when controlling for affective polarization. Additionally, there is an overall increase in political engagement and a decrease in political trust if partners living in the same household become more extreme in their ideological preferences.

Abstract Richard Nixon won a narrow popular and electoral vote victory in 1968. This article investigates whether newspaper endorsements, which heavily favored Nixon, were pivotal in his victory. Utilizing the shift in endorsements between 1964 and 1968, we find a sizable endorsement effect. This estimated effect was large enough to be pivotal: eliminating Nixon’s endorsement advantage would have deprived him of an Electoral College victory, resulting in a contingent election. Alternatively, if newspapers had endorsed his opponent, Hubert Humphrey, at the same rates they endorsed Johnson in 1964, Humphrey would have won the Electoral College.

Abstract The 2024 general election underscored how significantly the British political party system is changing. It produced the most fragmented party system in the history of British democracy, with thirteen political parties sending at least one MP to Westminster and a record number of independent MPs. The huge disparity between Reform UK's 14 per cent share of the popular vote and its five MPs has been ammunition for protests around the minimal rights given to them in the Commons, particularly their lack of any places on select committees. It has cast a stronger spotlight on the lack of rights given to smaller parliamentary groups and independents, something that the new Modernisation Committee has committed to examining further. This article highlights the opacity of small‐party rights and how they are often based on informal negotiation with key parliamentary players rather than on the Standing Orders. Moreover, it demonstrates how the reluctance to integrate smaller parties fully into parliamentary procedures reinforces a democratic and representational deficit and suggests three ways in which this could be remedied.

ABSTRACTWhat does it mean to be an effective citizen in a democracy? Answering this question requires unpacking “democracy” and an analysis of institutions that systematically disempower and alienate citizens. This paper briefly examines the contributions of psychoanalysis to understanding democracy and authoritarianism. It scrutinizes U.S. governance institutions and points to democratic deficits and backsliding present even before Trump 1.0 and 2.0. These range from the Electoral College, the Senate, and the Supreme Court to the Federal Communications Commission. All contributed to institutionalizing minority rule and elite capture. Governance institutions failed to deliver what the American people tell opinion pollsters they want, including affordable health care, a higher minimum wage, regulation of industry and finance, reduced educational, medical and housing debt, a serious climate change policy, an economy that provides meaningful work, abolition of the Electoral College, the popular vote for president, and labor, reproductive and consumer rights. Elite capture limits effective citizenship in multiple ways. Social exclusion involves the systemic, structural exclusion of people from institutions to which they are supposed to have access and from rights to which they are entitled. Elite capture and social exclusion have very real material effects on the population. They also deeply structure subjectivity and fuel beliefs in conspiracy theories and authoritarian demagogues. A full discussion of Trump 1.0 and 2.0 is beyond the scope of this paper. The rise of a deeply authoritarian and reactionary movement and administration, however, cannot be separated from earlier processes of systemic exclusion and disinformation that left significant portions of the electorate feeling enraged and abandoned.

New technologies and today's society are inseparable, the latter increasingly needing the former, but the evolution of the Internet and Social Networks is not accompanied by legislation, and perhaps it would be a danger if it were, but the Law as a whole cannot evade these recent changes. This scenario of evolution has brought some problematic issues, such as the 2016 elections in the United States and the 5 Star Movement in Italy, which demonstrated the power that algorithms and AI's of Big Tech Companies have in the decisions of political leaders. The parastatal activity of these companies or mobilizations will be analyzed as the General Objective, while the Specific Objective will observe the Legitimacy of the Popular Vote of those who were guided to a certain political vision through the algorithms of Social Networks. The central problem to be faced can be summarized in the following question: Is the vote of the voter manipulated by the Internet and social networks valid? As an initial hypothesis, it is assumed that it is. The methodology used was bibliographic, using studies on algorithms, AI, the Internet, Social Networks, neuroscience and Digital Law. The result of the research is that the private sector is acquiring excessive power and generating control over the masses in an almost imperceptible way. However, as a reference, Brazilian law states that the private sector can do anything that does not contravene the Law. From a legalistic point of view, it is a vote like any other: Legitimate, but we must have other questions ahead, such as whether we are better off with the Internet and Social Networks as they are today.

Is voting behaviour in referendums impacted by having similar proposals on the same topic? Drawing on the literature on the compromise effect, I argue that support for a proposal is higher if it is presented alongside a more extreme version. Empirically, I apply this argument to the substantive topic of electoral rights for immigrants—a contemporary frontier of democratisation. First, I test the argument with an original survey experiment fielded in the United States. Second, I delve into the practical relevance of the topic by focusing on Swiss immigrant enfranchisement referendums. Two case studies complement a subsequent analysis of voting data. The results of the experiment and the observational analysis both support the idea that the compromise effect shapes voting behaviour in simultaneous referendums. These findings call on scholars to consider the compromise effect in the study of popular votes and political decision-making more generally.

The Constant Two Plan: Reforming the Electoral College to Account for the National Popular Vote

Human society is coordinated by mechanisms that control how prices are agreed, taxes are set, and electoral votes are tallied. The design of robust and effective mechanisms for human benefit is a core problem in the social, economic, and political sciences. Here, we discuss the recent application of modern tools from AI research, including deep neural networks trained with reinforcement learning (RL), to create more desirable mechanisms for people. We review the application of machine learning to design effective auctions, learn optimal tax policies, and discover redistribution policies that win the popular vote among human users. We discuss the challenge of accurately modeling human preferences and the problem of aligning a mechanism to the wishes of a potentially diverse group. We highlight the importance of ensuring that research into “deep mechanism design” is conducted safely and ethically.

Abstract The debate on voting age 16 is intensifying all over Europe, raising important empirical questions about the political maturity of underage citizens. Building on a survey of 4,000 young citizens aged 16 to 25 years, we shed light on the Swiss context. We find that Swiss citizens aged 16 and 17 are as politically mature as young adults aged 18 to 25. Regarding political dispositions, we find that citizens aged 16 and 17 are as politically interested as citizens aged 18 to 25 and that they display comparable levels of political efficacy and comparable attitudes towards voting as a civic duty. In addition, citizens aged 16 and 17 show stronger intentions to participate in elections and comparable intentions to participate in popular votes. Regarding political behavior, we find that citizens aged 16 and 17 consume more political information than citizens aged 18 to 25 and are exposed to political discussions with similar frequency. We conclude that citizens aged 16 and 17 are ready to vote.

Abstract Even though the Parti Conservateur du Québec (PCQ) did not manage to elect any members to the Assemblée nationale in Quebec's 2022 general election, this political party nonetheless received nearly 13 per cent of the popular vote. The party mainly campaigned on issues related to the economic right, but also discontent with the Legault government's COVID-19 health measures. We assess the extent to which these different drivers of support explain vote choice in favour of the PCQ using individual-level survey data from the 2022 Quebec Election Study. We find that the PCQ did succeed in gathering support on the basis of these issues, but that it was also able to attract voters with a lesser appetite for climate change mitigation as well as a populist and cynical outlook on politics. The party also appears to be especially popular among younger, male and less educated voters living outside the Greater Montreal region.

To ensure that both large and small states had equal representation among states with different populations, the Electoral College was created to contribute meaningfully to U.S. presidential elections. Yet, in practice, the system has led to significant disparities in electoral influence, with larger states often holding disproportionate power. This paper investigates the extent to which the Electoral College upholds or undermines its original purpose of equitable representation. Through an analysis of the system’s structural biases, including the focus on swing states and the winner- takes-all method, the article reveals how these elements can diminish the voices of smaller states and concentrate power in a few populous regions. It also examines how this unequal distribution of influence risks fostering conditions that could lead to one-party dominance, particularly if certain large states consistently support a single party. The study concludes by examining the implications of these dynamics for American democracy and considers possible recommendations that might restore a balanced and representative electoral process. The study found out that the Electoral College fails to provide equitable representation, risks becoming a tool for one-party dominance and deviates from its federalist roots, effectively functioning as a flawed proxy for a popular vote system dominated by populous states. It’s on this note the study, recommended that Electoral Vote Caps should be introduced for Highly Populated States: Capping the number of electoral votes that any single state can hold would reduce the excessive influence that large states like California and Texas currently have.

Corruption, as one of the most persistent social pathologies, has accompanied humanity since the emergence of the first civilizations. It arose alongside the development of social hierarchies, administrative governance, and resource distribution, becoming an integral part of the relationship between authority and society. In ancient states, corrupt practices were so prevalent that many scholars consider them a systemic factor influencing the evolution of political and legal institutions. In the antiquity era, corruption posed a significant threat to the stability of societies and the efficiency of state governance. States such as Athens, Sparta, and Rome faced a wide range of corrupt practices, including bribery, abuse of power, and embezzlement of public resources. In response, ancient societies began implementing anti-corruption mechanisms based on both legal and moral-ethical principles. Corruption, as a social phenomenon, has accompanied state formations since ancient times, and the civilizations of Ancient Greece and Rome developed various mechanisms to curb it. In Ancient Athens, this issue was seen as a threat to democracy, which led to the introduction of ostracism—-a mechanism of popular voting that allowed for the expulsion of politicians suspected of abusing power or accumulating excessive influence. If a person received more than 6,000 votes on pottery shards (ostraka), they were forced to leave the polis for ten years, serving as a preventive measure against the concentration of power in one person’s hands. Additionally, there was dokimasia, a pre-appointment screening of candidates for public office, which assessed not only their financial standing but also their moral character. After completing their term, officials underwent euthyna, a process of public accountability in which they had to report to the assembly, and if abuses were found, they faced punishments ranging from fines to the death penalty. During the Peloponnesian War, anti-corruption efforts intensified, as state resources were critical for military operations, and any embezzlement was equated with treason. Nevertheless, despite these mechanisms, history records numerous instances of Athenian officials evading responsibility by manipulating the assembly or resorting to bribery. In Ancient Rome, corruption became particularly acute during the late Republic when governing provinces became a means of personal enrichment for officials. The first attempt to address this issue was the Law on Bribery (Lex Calpurnia, 149 BCE), which provided for the prosecution of officials who abused their positions, with penalties including property confiscation and exile. However, this law proved insufficient, leading to the enactment of Lex Julia de repetundis in 59 BCE, which introduced stricter sanctions, requiring guilty officials to return illicitly acquired funds and property, and even face permanent exile. A significant role in combating corruption was played by censors, special officials responsible for overseeing the moral conduct of magistrates and senators, who had the authority to remove corrupt individuals from office. However, during the decline of the Republic and the transition to an imperial system, corruption became even more rampant, and emperors often used bribery as a tool of governance. Some authoritarian rulers took particularly harsh measures against corruption, such as Nero, who ordered the execution of bribery offenders without trial, or Diocletian, who implemented strict control over state financial flows. Similar methods were used in other ancient civilizations; for example, in Babylon, under the Code of Hammurabi, corrupt officials could be sentenced to death, highlighting how seriously this crime was regarded in society. Thus, even in the ancient world, corruption was seen not only as an ethical issue but also as a threat to the state system, necessitating strict legal and administrative measures. These mechanisms included laws regulating the activities of officials, financial reporting obligations for public servants, and institutions of public oversight. For instance, in the Roman Republic, special tribunals were established to handle cases of bribery, while in Athens, citizens participated in judicial processes through a lottery system. However, despite the progressive nature of some approaches, their effectiveness was often limited by inequalities in civil rights, insufficient institutional maturity, and the influence of private interests on state affairs. The study of historical forms of anti-corruption efforts not only provides insights into their impact on the stability of ancient societies but also offers valuable lessons for contemporary governance systems. This article examines the key anti-corruption mechanisms of antiquity, their impact on the political and social structures of those societies, and their relevance in the modern context. The ancient experience of combating corruption serves as a reminder that, even in the most developed societies, eradicating corruption is a complex yet essential task. Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption mechanisms, ancient world, antiquity, Greece, Rome, Athens, Sparta, bribery, abuse of power, effectiveness, legal norms, moral and ethical principles, social hierarchy, public administration, financial control, public oversight, legislation, social stability, political institutions, judicial system.

Abstract Several legislative changes following popular votes have transformed the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex, and queer (i.e., LGBTIQ+) people. We suggest these decisions to change laws serve as strong signals of public support (i.e., shifting the perceived societal norms), which may not only impact the well‐being of individuals directly targeted by these votes (LGBTIQ+ people) but also members of advantaged groups (cis‐heterosexual people) supporting or opposing such changes. Drawing on three preregistered analyses of longitudinal studies following votes in Switzerland (Study 1, 419 LGBTIQ+ people; Study 3, 619 LGBTIQ+ people and 247 cis‐heterosexual supporters) and Australia (Study 2, 189 cis‐heterosexual supporters and 195 cis‐heterosexual opponents), we find that legal changes extending LGBTIQ+ rights led to a positive shift in perceived norms. This positive shift also led to a change in the well‐being of LGBTIQ+ people in Study 1 but not in Study 3, suggesting that substantial variation in how people initially perceive the norm may be necessary for such changes to affect well‐being. No association was found between perceived norms and well‐being among cis‐heterosexual people in Studies 2 and 3. Together, these findings suggest that it is critical to focus on the socio‐psychological impacts of legal changes on people.

Abstract The academic literature is rife with analyses of the US Electoral College’s flaws, but proposals to improve the system often rely upon old ideas. For example, the idea of replacing the Electoral College with a nationwide vote originated in 1816, and the derivative concept underlying the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact dates to 1976. Similarly, numerous methods for retaining the College but modifying the manner in which individual states select electors were proposed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the only one that gained significant traction – the congressional-district system currently used by Maine and Nebraska – was initially described in the 1950s by Senator Karl Mundt and Representative Frederick Coudert. This article describes the County-Elector Plan, a new approach that maintains the Electoral College but allocates a state’s electoral votes to each county’s plurality winner, in an amount proportional to the county’s voter turnout. A candidate’s statewide electoral vote total is then the rounded sum of the electoral votes the candidate receives in each county. The County-Elector Plan would seismically transform presidential elections by shifting an election’s focus from a handful of battleground states to hundreds of battleground counties spread across both current battleground and spectator states. Retrospective application of the plan to the 2016 Trump-Clinton contest shows that each candidate would have received electoral votes from 41 states, and that Clinton would have won the election by 26 electoral votes. The County-Elector Plan could be implemented on a state-by-state basis, without requiring a constitutional amendment. The plan is gerrymandering-resistant and provides all voters in a state with equal voting power.

Abstract The study examines the potential role of ChatGPT as a tool for popular voting. It assesses ChatGPT's positions on four voting objects (three initiatives and one referendum) by simulating various Swiss voter profiles (neutral, centrist, left, right, progressist, and conservative) and comparing these to its default stance. Additionally, ChatGPT's responses to arguments for and against each object were analyzed for consistency with its voting patterns. The study compared ChatGPT's decisions to real voting outcomes, fixing the temperature and collecting 100 answers per question to ensure reliability. Results showed that voting decisions varied by model version (GPT‐3.5 or GPT‐4) and language (French or German), indicating cultural and model iteration influences. ChatGPT's decisions did not consistently align with a left‐progressist stance, highlighting the impact of language, model versions, and contextual factors on political interpretations.

Abstract Wolf reintroduction and management is a highly conflictual topic in both the United States and Europe, enflaming rural–urban tensions and pitting agriculture interests against environmentalists. This study examines the case of gray wolf reintroduction in Colorado. The reintroduction decision was decided by state popular vote on a citizen‐introduced ballot initiative, Proposition 114, in 2020. While a majority of Coloradans voted in favor of reintroduction, this vote was almost exclusively divided along rural–urban geographic lines. To analyze these cleavages and the conflict therein, this study examines the changing coalitional discourse surrounding wolf reintroduction policy in Colorado. This study captures changes in the policy conflict from the beginning of 2020 when the ballot initiative to reintroduce gray wolves was first proposed, to the passage of that initiative on the November 2020 ballot, through the related legislative bills proposed in the spring of 2021 in an effort to maintain rural representation in the reintroduction process. This case utilizes the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and emotion belief analysis (EBA) to analyze news media and legislative testimony.

Direct democratic institutions are often introduced by popular vote, but there is little research on what motivates voters to support these new instruments. Using a unique dataset on the ideological positions of voters and members of parliament, this article examines support for the introduction of the initiative right in a popular vote. We find that voters support the initiative right when they are inadequately represented in parliament. Moreover, the analysis shows that the voting behavior is consistent with voters understanding the strategic implications of adopting the popular initiative. We demonstrate that voters support its adoption if they are ideologically more proximate to the median voter than they are to the median legislator. Finally, the article shows that ideological distance matters for voters of the ruling party as well, which helps explain why a majority of voters support a political institution that limits the ruling party’s room for maneuver.