TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 641 Martin V. Melosi Dr. Melosi is professor of history and director of the Institute for Public History at the University of Houston. He is completing a book entitled The Sanitary City: Technology, Environment, and Urban Growth in America From Colonial Times to 1995. Stalinism, and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-1941. By E. A. Rees. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Pp. xiv+307; illustrations, notes, appendixes, bibliography, index. $65.00. The opening ofarchives in the former Soviet Union has permitted far more comprehensive analysis of the social, political, and eco nomic forces that shaped that nation. Taking advantage of this op portunity, E. A. Rees gives us in this monograph a political history of Soviet railroads during the first thirteen years of Stalin’s rule. When Stalin took power in 1928, he forced the nation into breakneck industrialization. Economic ministries such as the Peo ple’s Commissariat ofWays of Communication (i.e., transport) were crucial to the effort. The Soviet Union stretched across eight time zones. The distance between natural resources and industry could be bridged only by railroad. As Rees points out, it was no simple matter to rebuild and modernize Soviet rail. Transport officials de bated how to divide resources among the tasks of building new su pertrunk lines and rebuilding old rail. They protested the regime’s insistence that they find reserves of capital and labor in annual ap propriations. They lamented each annual plan that set higher nu merical targets for wagons loaded, tons carried per kilometer, speed of transport, and so on, all ofwhich were forced on them by political commissars and seemed inevitably to lead to short-term declines in performance. When the People’s Commissariat for Heavy Industry, which was responsible for producing new wagons and rail, failed to meet its targets, the transport ministry often paid the price. The Communist Party berated its leadership. In fact, each new target produced disappointment, increased pres sures from above, and led to more disappointment. The frequency of accidents skyrocketed; worker safety was discounted; and targets were readjusted downward. Repression followed failure. A special railway procuracy and “comradely courts” viewed this failure as criminal activity, breach of discipline, or “wrecking,” and imposed purges, prison, even execution as punishment. Another source of tension at the transport ministry—and in rap idly modernizing Soviet society generally—was class-based, in this case between specialists and communists. Many of the first persons put on show trial in the Soviet Union for economic crimes against the regime were engineers connected with the railroad. Still, in 1933 the transport ministry forged contacts with the Academy ofSciences 642 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE to secure the input of technical experts. The Academy’s transport commission studied axles, couplings, and other weak links in rail transport, and recommended changes in manufacture to fight this source of accidents. Yet even these scientific studies were subjected to the criticism that their authors were “limiters,” that is, individuals who created mere scientific obstacles to the superhuman targets which the party had set. Superhuman “Stakhanovites,” workers who set new production norms, were expected to show the “wreckers” the right way to work. Unfortunately, Soviet Rail Transport lacks a comparative perspec tive that would enable the reader to understand how technical and political debates over the chosen path of railway development re flected peculiarly Stalinist influences rather than issues faced by eco nomic planners and railway specialists elsewhere. What can railroads tell us about Soviet technological style? The Soviet economic and technical debates that Rees recounts remain hidden in long lists of names, appointments and reappointments, figures on tonnage and wagons, and bureaucratic reorganizations. Passive voice abounds. Decisions were made; tonnage increased; construction was acceler ated. There is little flesh and blood to this story. It may be that Rees allowed the rich Russian archival sources to speak for him. But the result is that his chapters lack analytical verve. Subheadings interrupt constantly. Chapter 3, for example, which covers the period 1932-33, has eight main headings and fifteen sub headings in twenty-five pages. Perhaps these problems derive from Rees’s attempt to weave a history around an evaluation of...
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