ABSTRACT The Greek Civil War (1946–49) witnessed the introduction of the institution of the political commissar in the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE). The new reality of US intervention forced the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) to seek and establish total political control of its troops in order to transform its guerrilla force into a regular revolutionary army. The KKE understood that such a transition would benefit the DSE, its training procedures and its military capabilities, and would limit desertion by producing conscious and willing fighters. They hoped that the deployment of political commissars within the army’s ranks would allow this. Simultaneously, the KKE and the DSE set about importing Soviet war experience and war culture into Greece in order to achieve the intended politicization, militarization and centralization of the army. They undertook a huge translation and publication project that allowed them to circulate Greek translations of Soviet war literature among their troops. The goal was to galvanize and train them, as the Soviets had with their own troops during the Second World War, emphasizing the decisive role of the human factor in the revolutionary struggle. War novels were used as educational material for both DSE political commissars and fighters, and their simple and relatable plots made them accessible to the men and women of the DSE, facilitating the transfer of a communist class consciousness, culture and sense of comradeship, as well as an anti-reactionary and anti-fascist culture of war. Many DSE commissars and fighters viewed the novels’ fictional and non-fictional heroes as examples to follow.

ABSTRACT The political commissars active in the armed forces of the twentieth century’s socialist states emerged during the Russian Revolution and civil war and spread throughout the world with the growth of the communist movement. Depending on the country and time period, the functions and institutional power of commissars ranged from that of a parallel hierarchy of officers with operational powers, to an integrated part of the officer corps specializing in matters regarding personnel management and education. The commissars’ subsequent development into an essential part of military organization resulted in a distinct system of civil-military relations that differed significantly from that of non-socialist contemporary states. This article provides a condensed overview of commissar-led political instruction as a transnational phenomenon during the first half of the twentieth century. It begins with a brief conceptual discussion of the problem of civil–military relations in the Marxist theory of the state held by the Bolshevik Party. It goes on to argue that the commissar system was an institutional innovation intended to provide a politically acceptable solution to this problem within the context of the Russian Civil War. The article then traces the export of the commissar system through the Communist International, discussing the development of analogous positions among the anti-fascist armed forces of Republican Spain and the Balkan resistance movements. It argues that the commissar form was sufficiently flexible to accommodate a variety of civil–military dynamics reflecting the concrete conditions of each conflict.

ABSTRACT This paper aims to be the first research that approaches the role played by political commissars in the Republican and anti-Francoist guerrillas that acted in Spain between 1936 and 1952. The question of the involvement of political commissars in the Spanish Civil War has remained on the margins of historiography, and the actions of these men in the framework of the armed resistance are even more unknown. For this reason, this article will try to show who these men were and what role they played in the different armed groups.

The article examines the issue of the management system of the first Soviet pedagogical institutions of higher education in the 1920s - institutes of public education. On the basis of normative documents that established the management system of each higher education institution, the scope of duties of the rector, political commissar, activities of institute and faculty councils, commissions, general meetings, etc. were revealed.

Perspective of V.I. Lenin about political commissars, political instructors and one-chief regime in the Red Army

The article highlights the main stages of professional, labor and political activity of the sixth People's Commissar of Education of Soviet Ukraine F.A. Redko in the 1920–1930's. Purpose of the article. Involve and analyze unknown sources, identify differences in the figure of F. Redko among the six People's Commissars of Education of the interwar period, considering that four of them were party functionaries, and the last two came from educational institutions. The research methodology consists of general scientific methods (structural and functional, analysis and synthesis), scientific- historical (comparative, historical biography). Events and phenomena are considered from the standpoint of historicism, objectivity. The statistical methods are partially used. Scientific novelty. For the first time, thereare used the unknown archive documents, which are related to the early stage of F. Redko biography, his social origin, and also pedagogical activities before appointment to the post of People’s Commissar of Education. Conclusion. It is indicated that F. Redko's political characterization was impeccable: no participation in anti-Soviet movements and parties. Peasant by social origin. In the 1920's he promoted the ideas of Bolshevism in educational and cultural institutions, and had a higher pedagogical education. He belonged to the new sovietparty nomenclature in the Ukrainian SSR, and the old one was repressed. The director of the Kyiv school became the People's Commissar of Education. The phenomenon of the nomenclature assignment during the years of great terror. His candidacy was elected and «approved» by a completely renewed squad of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP(B)U, that is, the young generation of Ukrainian Soviet figures. They did not criticize the general line of the party, did not belong to the opposition, did not support Stalin's opponents, and fully agreed with his domestic and foreign policies. Educator F. Redko served as political commissar of the Soviet education system in the second half of the 1920's.His social background and maximum adherence to ideological principles saved him from repression. People's Commissar for Education F. Redko was engaged in reforming of higher and secondary school in Ukraine, the Sovietization of the new system in the western regions connected to the Ukrainian SSR. The position of People's Commissar of Education was political, so his activities took place in the coordinate system of Bolshevik ideology. He was its propagandist and a conscious supporter.

The concept of war is inextricably linked to violence, and military action almost always resounds with the emotion and language of rage. Since the War on Terror began in September 2001, post-9/11 expressions of terror and rage have influenced academics to evaluate rage and its meanings (Gildersleeve and Gehrmann). Of course, it has directly influenced the lives of those affected by global conflicts in war-torn regions of the Middle East and North Africa. The populace there has reacted violently to military invasions with a deep sense of rage, while in the affluent West, rage has also infiltrated everyday life through clothes, haircuts, and popular culture as military chic became ‘all the rage’ (Rall 177). Likewise, post-9/11 popular films directly tap into rage and violence to explain (or justify?) conflict and war. The film version of the life of United States Iraq veteran Chris Kyle in American Sniper (2014) reveals fascinating depictions of rage through the perspective of a highly trained shooter who waits patiently above the battlefield, watching for hours before taking human life with a carefully planned long-distance shot. The significance of the complexities of rage as presented in this film are discussed later. Foundations of Rage: Colonial Legacy, Arab Spring, and ISISThe War on Terror may have purportedly began with the rage of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda missions and the responding rage of George Bush’s America determined to seek vengeance for 9/11, but the rage simmering in the Middle East has deeper origins. This includes: the rejection of the Shah of Iran's secular dictatorship in 1979, the ongoing trauma of an Arab Palestinian state that was promised in 1947, and the blighted hopes of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab nationalism that offered so much in the 1950s but failed to deliver. But these events should not be considered in isolation from events of the whole 20th century, in particular the betrayal of Arab nationalism by the Allied forces, especially Britain and France after the First World War. The history of injustice that Robert Fisk has chronicled in a monumental volume reveals the complexity and nuances of an East-West conflict that continued to fracture the Middle East. In a Hollywood-based film such as American Sniper it is easy to depict the region from a Western perspective without considering the cycle of injustice and oppression that gave birth to the rage that eventually lashed out at the West. Rage can also be rage against war, or rage about the mistreatment of war victims. The large-scale protests against the war before the 2003 Iraq invasion have faded into apparent nothingness, despite nearly two decades of war. Protest rage appears to have been replaced by outrage on behalf of the victims of war; the refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and those displaced by the ever- spreading conflict that received a new impetus in 2011 with the Arab Spring democracy movements. One spark point for rage ignited when Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi embarked on his act of self-immolation in protest against harassment by public officials. This moment escalated into a kaleidoscope of collective rage as regimes were challenged from Syria to Libya, but met with a tragic aftermath. Sadly, democratic governments did not emerge, but turned into regimes of extremist violence exemplified in the mediaeval misogynistic horror now known as ISIS, or IS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Hassan). This horror intensified as millions of civilised Syrians and Iraqis sought to flee their homelands. The result was the movement of peoples, which included manipulation by ruthless people smugglers and detention by governments determined to secure borders — even even as this eroded decades of consensus on the rights of refugees. One central image, that of three-year-old Aylan Kurdi’s corpse washed up on a beach (Smith) should invoke open rage. Here, the incongruity was that a one-time Turkish party beach for affluent 18 to 35-year-olds from Western Europe would signify the death place of a Syrian refugee child, now displaced by war. The historical significance of East/West conflicts in the Middle East, recent events post- Arab Spring, the resulting refugee crisis in the region, and global anti-war protests should be foremost when examining Clint Eastwood's film about an American military sniper in Iraq.Hot Rage and Cold Rage Recent mass shootings in the United States have delineated factions within the power of rage: it seems to blow either hot or cold. US Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hasan was initially calm when he embarked on a public expression of rage, wounding 30 people and murdering 13 others in a mass shooting event in 2009 (MacAskill). Was this to be categorised as the rage of a nihilist, an Islamist - or as just another American mass shooting like events in Orlando or Sandy Hook? The war journalist and film maker Sebastian Junger authored a study on belonging, where he linked mass shootings (or rampage killings) to social stress and disunity, as a “tendency rising steadily in the US since the 1980s” (115-116). In contrast, the actions of a calm and isolated shooter on a rooftop can be justified as acceptable behaviour if this occurs during war. Now in the case of Chris Kyle, he normalised his tale of calm killing, as an example identified by action “built on a radically asymmetric violence” (Pomarede 53).Enemy at the Gates The point is that sniper killings can be presented in film as morally good. For example, the 2001 film Enemy at the Gates portrays a duel of two snipers in Stalingrad, Russia. This is a fictionalised contest of a fictionalised event, because there was only tangential evidence that Russian sniper hero Vasily Zaytsev actually engaged in a three-day sniper duel with his German enemy during the Second World War. Enemy at the Gates presents the sniper as an acceptable figure in mass popular culture (or even a hero?), which provides the justification for American Sniper. However, in this instance, viewers could recognise a clear struggle between good and evil.Politically, Enemy at the Gates, whether viewed from a conservative or a progressive perspective, presents a struggle between a soldier of the allies (the Soviet Union) and the forces of Nazism, undeniably the most evil variant of fascism. We can interpret this as a defence of the communist heartland, or the defence of a Russian motherland, or the halting of Nazi aggression at its furthest expansion point. Whichever way it is viewed, the Russian sniper is a good man, and although in the movie’s plot the actor Ralph Fiennes as political commissar injects a dimension of manipulation and Stalinist authoritarian control, this does not detract from the idea of the hero defeating evil with single aimed shots. There is rage, but it is overshadowed by the moral ‘good.’American Sniper The true story of Chris Kyle is quite simple. A young man grows up in Texas with ‘traditional’ American values, tries sport and University, tries ranch life, and joins the US Navy Special Forces. He becomes a SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) team member, and is trained as a specialist sniper. Kyle excels as a sniper in Iraq, where he self-identifies as America's most successful sniper. He kills a lot of enemies in Iraq, experiences multiple deployments followed by the associated trauma of reintegration to family life and redeployment, suffers from PTSD, returns to civilian life in America and is himself shot dead by a distressed veteran, in an ironic act of rage. Admired by many, the veracity of Kyle’s story is challenged by others, a point I will return to. As noted above, Kyle kills a lot of people, many of whom are often unaware of his existence. In his book On Killing, Lieutenant-Colonel David Grossman notes this a factor that actually causes the military to have a “degree of revulsion towards snipers” (109), which is perhaps why the movie version of Kyle’s life promotes a rehabilitation of the military in its “unambiguous advocacy of the humility, dedication, mastery, and altruism of the sniper” as hero (Beck 218). Most enlisted soldiers never actually kill their enemies, but Kyle kills well over 100 while on duty.The 2012 book memoir of United States Navy sniper Chris Kyle at war in Iraq became a national cultural artefact. The film followed in 2014, allowing the public dramatisation of this to offer a more palatable form for a wider audience. It is noted that military culture at the national level is malleable and nebulous (Black 42), and these constructs are reflected in the different variants of American Sniper. These cultural products are absorbed differently when consumed by the culture that has produced them (the military), as compared to the way that they are consumed by the general public, and the book American Sniper reflects this. Depending upon readers’ perspectives, it is a book of raw honesty or nationalistic jingoism, or perhaps both. The ordinary soldier’s point of view is reiterated and directed towards a specifically American audience. Despite controversy and criticism the book was immensely successful, with weeks on the New York Times bestseller list. While it naturally appealed to many in its primary American audience, from an Australian perspective, the jingoism of this book jars. In fact, it really jars a lot, to the point of being quite challenging to read. That Australian readers would have difficulty with this text is probably appropriate, because after all, the book was not created for Australians but for Americans.On the other hand, Americans have produced balanced accounts of the soldier experience in Iraq. A very different exemplar is Garry Trudeau’s Doonesbury blog that became the book The Sandbox (2007). Here American men and women soldiers wrote their own very revealing stories about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in autobiographical accounts that ranged from nuanced explanations of the empathy for t

Este trabajo presenta y analiza la primera crónica periodístico-literaria escrita y publicada por Miguel Hernández: “Defensa de Madrid. Madrid y las ciudades de Retaguardia” durante la Guerra Civil española (1936-1939), quien inicia con ella una serie de crónicas bélicas que establece un género particular de periodismo: la crónica literaria -poético-política-. Miguel Hernández publica en diferentes periódicos del frente como cronista, con su nombre propio y con seudónimo, desempeñando también tareas de director y comisario político. Temáticamente, esta primera crónica muestra su compromiso, su deseo e incluso su estrategia para poder proteger a la capital de España. Metodológicamente, se aborda desde el giro lingüístico en Ciencias Sociales que permite explicar algunas de las peculiaridades del estilo personal del cronista Miguel Hernández. Todo ello pone de manifiesto que el llamado Nuevo Periodismo (narrativo y literario) que florece en la década de los 70, hoy así acuñado, ya había sido practicado profusa y eficientemente por Miguel Hernández 40 años antes. Por ello, Miguel Hernández merece ser no sólo incorporado al colectivo de los grandes periodistas-cronistas junto con otros ya rescatados hasta el momento. Su estilo y calidad literaria le sitúan por tanto en una posición destacada y pionero del género actualmente conocido como Nuevo Periodismo, que es, además, políticamente comprometido.

Preface 1. Silk Road City in the Land of Mountain and Desert 2. Kashgar and the Chinese Republic 1911-1949 3. Kashgar and the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic 1933-4 4. The view from Chinibagh 1: Britain's Consulate-General in Kashgar and Xinjiang under Governor Jin Shuren 5. The view from Chinibagh 2: The Consulate-General and the 1933-4 Revolt in Southern Xinjiang 6. Communist Activists in the Kashgar Region during the 1930s and 1940s 7. Border Security and the Battle against the British and Smugglers: Hu Dong in Tashkurgan 8. Tax and Currency Reform in Kashgar 9. Education and Running a County: Li Yunyang in Kashgar and Maralbashi (Bachu) 10. Educating Girls and Working with Women: Wu Naijun in Kashgar and Maralbashi 11. Kashgar Newspaperman: Wang Mo and Xinjiang Daily 12. Honest and Public-Spirited Official: Xu Liang 13. Political Commissar on the Frontier: Zhou Chunlin 14. Abudukerimhan Mehsum 15. Entry of the PLA into Kashgar and the 'Peaceful Liberation' of Xinjiang 16. Liberating Khotan: Bai Chushi in Southern Xinjiang 17. Colonising Kashgar in the Name of the People

This article analyses the function of political commissars in the Republican Popular Army during the Spanish Civil War of 1936–9. It evaluates the commissariat’s role in fostering soldiers’ political engagement with the war, as well as the challenges maintaining morale and discipline in a revolutionary army. It also examines the complex relationship between commissars and Republican soldiers, and considers political divisions within the commissariat, particularly the rise and domination of delegates affiliated to the Communist Party of Spain. The article argues that commissars were a central component of the Republic’s relatively successful, and heavily improvised, politicized wartime mobilization in the face of considerable challenges.

Abstract The archive has been one of the most popular topics in the humanities of the past few decades. The archive as such has not only influenced historical, art historical, cultural anthropologi...

Reviewed by: The Third Reich at War Peter Mansoor The Third Reich at War, by Richard J. Evans. New York: Penguin Press, 2009. 926 pp. $40.00. The Third Reich at War is the final segment in Richard Evan's excellent three-volume history of Nazi Germany. The author, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge University, combines narrative history with first-person accounts to provide a holistic description of what life was like under Nazi rule. The Third Reich at War is not a comprehensive history of World War II in Europe. Rather, Evans focuses on key turning points: the conquest of Poland, the fall of France, and the Battle of Britain in the first year of conflict; the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad on the Eastern Front; and the strategic bombing of German cities. He provides a more complete treatment of the mass murder along racial and ideological lines of millions of Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, homosexuals, mentally and physically handicapped, and others deemed unfit to live in the new order of the Third Reich. Extensively researched from published German and English primary and secondary sources and exceptionally well written, The Third Reich at War is an excellent account of the Third Reich during its final years that belongs on the bookshelves of all serious students of World War II. Evans provides just enough narrative of military operations to keep the reader engaged as to the broad sweep of events. He is at his best when describing the impact of occupation on the peoples and areas conquered by the Wehrmacht. In Poland in the last quarter of 1939, for instance, we learn that the Germans murdered 65,000 Poles and Jews, a down payment on the genocide to come. Poland was a model for what would happen in the East in Hitler's new order—its population enslaved, its territory either annexed or stripped of usable resources, and those deemed racially unfit summarily shot or hanged. By 1943 the Germans had ethnically cleansed millions of Poles and others to make room for German settlers, had suppressed local culture and learning, and had Germanicized the language in preparation for the area's eventual incorporation into the greater Reich. [End Page 187] The Nazi order made a sham of the rule of law in Europe. Heralded as a functional, disciplined, efficient governing system, Hitler's Germany was instead riven with criminality and corruption. In every society touched by Nazi tyranny, years of antisemitic and racial propaganda encouraged German soldiers to treat the local Jewish and Slavic populations with contempt and brutality. Nazi policy mandated the concentration of Jews into ghettoes in Poland, where hundreds of thousands died due to disease and starvation even before the final solution sent the remainder to death camps. Hitler's ideology drove his actions, to include the planning for the most important campaign of the war—Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. The German people needed lebensraum—living space—and the German economy needed the resources of Eastern Europe. The Red Army, in Hitler's view leaderless since the purges of the 1930s (as proven by its disastrous performance in the Russo-Finish War in 1939-1940) and composed of subhuman Slavic soldiers, would quickly fold. Since the conquest would take no more than a single campaign season, the prospect of a two-front war did not factor into German strategic thinking. The vaunted German General Staff posed no objections. The treatment meted out to the Poles was now replicated on a much larger scale in the Soviet Union. German troops summarily shot political commissars (a loosely defined term), starved prisoners, and subjected Jews to a massive genocidal campaign instigated by SS Einsatzgruppen and aided and abetted by the regular army. Given Nazi ideology and propaganda, it was a small step from the mass killings of Jews in the East to a more organized system of mass murder in killing centers in Poland. Although Hitler never signed a written order mandating the extermination of the Jews, his oral pronouncements were clear enough and provided all the guidance his subordinates needed to initiate the Holocaust. As the war dragged on, Hitler's mismanagement of...

Introduction 1. Social Trends in China: Implications for the People's Liberation Army, Tony Saich 2. The Impact of Social Changes on the PLA: A Chinese Military Perspective, Xiaobing Li 3. The New Military Elite: Generational Profile and Contradictory Trends, Cheng Li 4. The Fourth-Generation Leaders and the New Military Elite, Yu Bin 5. The PLA and the Provinces: Military District and Local Issues, Zhiyue Bo 6. The Political Implications of PLA Professionalism, Lyman Miller 7. Unravelling the Myths about Political Commissars, You Ji 8. Searching for a Twenty-First Century Officer Corps, Thomas J. Bickford 9. Educating the Officer Corps: The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Its Interactions with Civilian Academic Institutions, Kristen Gunness 10. China's Defense Budget: Is There Impending Friction Between Defense and Civilian Needs? Joseph Fewsmith 11. The PLA in the New Economy: Plus Ca Change, Plus Ca Meme Chose, James Mulvenon 12. Conscription: From the Masses, Sijin Cheng 13. Demobilization and Resettlement: The Challenge of Downsizing the People's Liberation Army, Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise 14. People's War in the Twenty-First Century: The Militia and the Reserves, Dennis J. Blasko.

Reviewed by: Hitlers Heerführer. Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42 Klaus Schmider Hitlers Heerführer. Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42. By Johannes Hürter. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006. ISBN 3-486-57982-7. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 719. €=49,80. For the last twenty years or so, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have endeavoured to come to grips with the issue of the Wehrmacht's complicity in Hitler's war of annihilation against the U.S.S.R. To what extent can the German armed forces in general and the Ostheer in particular be said to have been bystanders, more or less willing accomplices or even key players in the policies which resulted in the death of millions of Soviet civilians and POWs? The views put forward on the issue range from those willing to at least occasionally give the accused the benefit of the doubt (Jürgen Förster, Christian Hartmann, Klaus Jochen Arnold) to those fervently convinced of German guilt (Christian Streit, Omer Bartov, Christian Gerlach). In view of the ink already spilt on the subject (Hürter's bibliography takes up twenty-six pages of very fine print) and the apparent impossibility of reconciling some of the opposing views, the challenge of bringing a genuinely fresh perspective to the debate would seem to be daunting to say the least. Johannes Hürter has managed to do so by adressing the issue of personal responsibility. Rather than cast damnation on "the Wehrmacht" as a collective entity, he puts those individuals in the dock without whose acquiesence not one political commissar or Jewish civilian could have been shot in 1941: the twenty-five generals who during the first twelve months of the war in the East held command of an army, army group, or both. Even though arguably the victorious allies had already attempted to do something similar in 1948 in the twelfth Nürnberg trial, Hürter is able to do so from a much broader documentary base (including many private papers) and [End Page 562] makes a point of incorporating the formative experience each of these officers had gone through, first in the Kaiser's and then the Weimar Republic's army (pp. 21– 122). He follows suit by looking at each individual's reaction—insofar as there is a record of it—to the marriage of convenience between Hitler and the old elites (pp. 123–201). At this point, the chronological structure of the book changes over to a thematic one: while this presupposes a certain foreknowledge of the Russian campaign, it has the major advantage of giving the remainder of the book a very user-friendly setup. After a chapter dealing with the preparations for war and the issuing of the orders which flew in the face of international law (pp. 203–65), the author devotes considerable space to the operational problems involved in actually waging the campaign (pp. 266–358), followed by the Ostheer's treatment of enemy combatants (pp. 359–441) and civilians (pp. 442–508). The final chapter is devoted to examining the role played by his protagonists in the first months of the Holocaust on Soviet soil (pp. 509–99). Apart from the breathtaking thoroughness of Hürter's research, this reviewer was struck by two features which set his work apart from that of most of his predecessors. Firstly, he has a serious grounding in military history and as such, is able to put many of the actions of his "defendants" in a historical context (the small chapter on the daily workings of an Armeeoberkommando is an excellent example of this). Just as importantly, he has by and large managed to withstand the overpowering urge which so many of his predecessors (German ones in particular) have been unable to resist: to relentlessly castigate those responsible for so much human suffering if not in person, then at least in print. As a result, the overall picture which Hürter paints of the actions of this small elite group, while still mostly black, has shades of grey in it and is all the more credible for...

We have known Trevor West since before he was Trevor West, and that's not yesterday.Our first encounter would have been over fifty years ago, when we both presented for the Entrance Scholarship Examination for Trinity College.And he knew all about us: the Midleton Mafia and Bennet's Brewery Boys [17] had us sussed.But they didn't know about The Plough: "Twixt finger and thumb, the squat pen sits: I'll dig with it."Seamus Heaney [10] knew all about The Ploughit got him a Nobel Prize.And dig with it we did -all through the physics paper -while the young Tim Starr sat and chewed the end of his pencil (they were very poor in Midleton in those days).This must have disconcerted him, because shortly afterwards Tim Starr changed his name to Trevor West.Then of course he rallied himself, soon scaling the heights of college society.By the time we came out the other end of Trinity College he had appointed himself our political commissar, vigilant lest we should reveal to the waiting Brits the depths of our collective ignorance of matters Tripos Three.He fumbled the ball a little on his first outing when he had to be brought back to the Smythies seminar with a proper proof of Lemma 5 [11]:Hans Freudenthal single handedly kept West and ourself away from partially ordered vector spaces for nearly twenty years.But then

Introduction 1. The Chinese Army in Domestic Politics: Factors and Phases 2. China's Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua 3. Deferring to National Interest: Arms Control and Civil-Military Relations in China 4. Civil-Military Dynamics in Chinese Defense Industry and Arms Policy: An Approaching Tipping Point 5. Sorting Out the Myths about Political Commissars, You Ji 6. Servant of Two Masters: the PLA, the People, and the Party, Dennis J. Blasko 7. Company Province: Civil-Military Relations in Xinjiang, Yitzhak Shichor 8. China's Expenditure for Militia and People's Armed Police 9. The PLA and its Changing Economic Roles: Implications for Civil-Military Relations 10. Dual-Use Technologies, Civil-military Integration, and China's Defense Industry.

Popular justice and policing from bush war to democracy: Uganda 1981–2004

At the beginning of its democratization process, Bulgaria inherited armed forces that had been shaped to serve the Soviet Union’s military doctrine. There was no doubt that, among all the Warsaw Pact members, Bulgaria was the most loyal and reliable. In September 1945, in a matter of days, the Bulgarian armed forces transferred their allegiance from the still too young Tsar (and from being an ally of Nazi Germany) to a new world power—Stalin’s Russia. The same troops that, until a few days before, were fighting Yugoslav partisans under Tito and their Greek counterparts now had to cooperate with them. This generally confusing situation, where enemies suddenly became allies and now had to cooperate on the front line, caused many problems and internal confusion, as could be expected. However, it was the beginning of a thorough purge within the military. Regular troops were joined by units of the Bulgarian partisans, and each unit, from the platoon level and up, received (as was the case in the Red Army) a deputy commander for political affairs—or a political commissar—with wide-ranging orders to control the commander. Under this political pressure and the tension of battle, troops were shaped to become the new armed forces of Communist Bulgaria. Until 1947–48, practically all military positions were filled with people loyal to the Communist regime—Soviet-trained officers of Bulgarian background, or guerilla cadres, who were rapidly retrained in Soviet military academies. Only a few old-timers were relieved of their command functions and reassigned to the military schools and academies. Even those captains who had helped the Communists to seize power, and were elevated to the rank of general, were expelled from active duty. Many officers, even those from the last classes to graduate from the military schools, were sentenced and, if they succeeded in evading capital punishment or death in the labor camps, served long prison terms and were denied the possibility of continuing their profession. Moreover, the purges reached even the glorified guerilla commanders—such as Generals Slavcho Trunski, Dencho Znepolski, and many others—on such grounds as pro-Yugoslav sympathies, or affiliation to resistance groups that were considered to be not quite submissive enough to the Moscow-based Communist leadership. When in 1954 a relatively obscure local activist, Todor Zhivkov, came to power on a wave of anti-Stalinist enthusiasm, and especially after he established his position between 1956–62, his guerilla unit, Chavdar, became the main reservoir for cadres for

I deeply appreciate this honor. I am particularly honored that it comes from hands of Senator Moynihan who, more than any other individual, represents ideal of scholar in public life, more concerned with what is objectively t r u e than what is expedient or subjectively reassuring. The Almanac of American Politics, 1996, has justly called him the nation's best thinker among politicians since Lincoln and its best politician among thinkers since Jefferson. The Almanac goes on to say that Moynihan is the kind of philosopher-politician who Founding Fathers hoped would people Senate. Though American universities have emerged in past century in ways that have expanded our intellectual horizons, increasingly university's underlying responsibility to truth has been violated by those controlling academic power structure. Rather than speaking truth to power, they have spoken power to truth. They have done this by denying possibility of objective truth, by forbidding consideration of certain subjects, by refusing to acknowledge error in past judgments, and by shamelessly separating behavior from rhetoric. James Coleman, first recipient of Hook Award, in 1990, noted that greatest enemies of academic freedom in university are norms that exist about what kinds of questions may be raised in research. 1 Those norms, he said, were more often than not established by self-suppression, for fear that research might lead to results that would elicit disapproval by those colleagues we see regularly. ~ Coleman was nearly expelled from American Sociological Association for violating those norms. To Fang Li-Zhi, second Hook Award recipient, norms established by political commissars were greater enemies of academic freedom than norms of timorous faculties. Fang insisted that free research is one of effective ways to break down ideological barriers erected by totalitarians. s Fang risked more than disapproval of his colleagues. Like other Chinese--Harry Wu, for example-he risked his life pursuing freedom of inquiry. How much more are we in West, with our tradition of scientific inquiry and religious tolerance, obligated to raise academic questions whether or not they are embarrassing or politically incorrect? As C. Vann Woodward, third Hook Award recipient, put it, the university is a place where unthinkable can be thought, unment ionable can be discussed, and unchallengeable can be challenged. 4 At least it should be such a place.

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 641 Martin V. Melosi Dr. Melosi is professor of history and director of the Institute for Public History at the University of Houston. He is completing a book entitled The Sanitary City: Technology, Environment, and Urban Growth in America From Colonial Times to 1995. Stalinism, and Soviet Rail Transport, 1928-1941. By E. A. Rees. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Pp. xiv+307; illustrations, notes, appendixes, bibliography, index. $65.00. The opening ofarchives in the former Soviet Union has permitted far more comprehensive analysis of the social, political, and eco­ nomic forces that shaped that nation. Taking advantage of this op­ portunity, E. A. Rees gives us in this monograph a political history of Soviet railroads during the first thirteen years of Stalin’s rule. When Stalin took power in 1928, he forced the nation into breakneck industrialization. Economic ministries such as the Peo­ ple’s Commissariat ofWays of Communication (i.e., transport) were crucial to the effort. The Soviet Union stretched across eight time zones. The distance between natural resources and industry could be bridged only by railroad. As Rees points out, it was no simple matter to rebuild and modernize Soviet rail. Transport officials de­ bated how to divide resources among the tasks of building new su­ pertrunk lines and rebuilding old rail. They protested the regime’s insistence that they find reserves of capital and labor in annual ap­ propriations. They lamented each annual plan that set higher nu­ merical targets for wagons loaded, tons carried per kilometer, speed of transport, and so on, all ofwhich were forced on them by political commissars and seemed inevitably to lead to short-term declines in performance. When the People’s Commissariat for Heavy Industry, which was responsible for producing new wagons and rail, failed to meet its targets, the transport ministry often paid the price. The Communist Party berated its leadership. In fact, each new target produced disappointment, increased pres­ sures from above, and led to more disappointment. The frequency of accidents skyrocketed; worker safety was discounted; and targets were readjusted downward. Repression followed failure. A special railway procuracy and “comradely courts” viewed this failure as criminal activity, breach of discipline, or “wrecking,” and imposed purges, prison, even execution as punishment. Another source of tension at the transport ministry—and in rap­ idly modernizing Soviet society generally—was class-based, in this case between specialists and communists. Many of the first persons put on show trial in the Soviet Union for economic crimes against the regime were engineers connected with the railroad. Still, in 1933 the transport ministry forged contacts with the Academy ofSciences 642 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE to secure the input of technical experts. The Academy’s transport commission studied axles, couplings, and other weak links in rail transport, and recommended changes in manufacture to fight this source of accidents. Yet even these scientific studies were subjected to the criticism that their authors were “limiters,” that is, individuals who created mere scientific obstacles to the superhuman targets which the party had set. Superhuman “Stakhanovites,” workers who set new production norms, were expected to show the “wreckers” the right way to work. Unfortunately, Soviet Rail Transport lacks a comparative perspec­ tive that would enable the reader to understand how technical and political debates over the chosen path of railway development re­ flected peculiarly Stalinist influences rather than issues faced by eco­ nomic planners and railway specialists elsewhere. What can railroads tell us about Soviet technological style? The Soviet economic and technical debates that Rees recounts remain hidden in long lists of names, appointments and reappointments, figures on tonnage and wagons, and bureaucratic reorganizations. Passive voice abounds. Decisions were made; tonnage increased; construction was acceler­ ated. There is little flesh and blood to this story. It may be that Rees allowed the rich Russian archival sources to speak for him. But the result is that his chapters lack analytical verve. Subheadings interrupt constantly. Chapter 3, for example, which covers the period 1932-33, has eight main headings and fifteen sub­ headings in twenty-five pages. Perhaps these problems derive from Rees’s attempt to weave a history around an evaluation of...