85 Smith concedes that, as an institution, the court ‘‘might continue to suffer an irreversable [sic] political decline,’’ but maintains that, because of the way the Georgian court operated ‘‘as a venue,’’ the situation is ‘‘significantly more complicated than that.’’ I find her use of Habermas ’s concept of the bourgeois public sphere unconvincing, and in conclusion Ms. Smith accepts that: ‘‘Much remains to be further explored.’’ What Georgian Monarchy succeeds in doing, however, is to turn the spotlight back on the early Georgian court, and to question the assumptions about the unpopularity of the first two Georges derived in part from the writings of Swift, Pope, and Gay. J. A. Downie Goldsmiths College, University of London ANDREW C. THOMPSON, Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688– 1756. Studies in Early Modern Cultural, Political and Social History. Rochester, New York: Boydell, 2006. Pp. xxv ⫹ 267. $95. Most of Hanover’s foreign policy files were destroyed by bombs in 1943 and a flood in 1946, but Mr. Thompson makes use of a trove remaining at Regensburg and Vienna to show the complex interactions of Hanover, Britain, and the Holy Roman Empire for half of the eighteenth century. Through the ‘‘personal union,’’ George I and II wielded the military and financial resources of Britain in continental engagements till the 1750s, when Britain’s foreign policy became global. What the diplomatic correspondence reveals is a pervasive use of the language of the ‘‘protestant interest’’ [the author always uses a small ‘‘p’’ for protestant], which seems to contradict the prevailing view that Hanoverian foreign policy was secularized . Mr. Thompson thinks militant Protestantism did not simply vanish after 1648, but morphed into the ‘‘protestant interest.’’ Sermons, official propaganda , newspapers, and diplomatic correspondence are replete with references to this ‘‘interest’’ as linked to maintaining the ‘‘balance of power’’ and opposing ‘‘universal monarchs, real or imagined .’’ The author’s contention is that the Whigs—the only party governing Britain after 1714—remained ‘‘protestant ’’ until 1750, though he concedes that the grandees controlling the government were ‘‘largely free-thinking British whig nobles.’’ While the language of the ‘‘protestant interest’’ has previously been dismissed as a ‘‘cloak,’’ Mr. Thompson insists it is ‘‘more than mere rhetoric.’’ Yet when he asks why George I and II, neither of whom had a ‘‘deep personal religious conviction,’’ used this language, he replies that it was important for the elector of Hanover ‘‘to be seen’’ as defending the ‘‘protestant interest in the Empire,’’ and even more ‘‘vital’’ for the Hanoverian British king ‘‘to be seen’’ doing it because his claim to the throne was based on religion. This sounds like posturing . In fact, the Hanoverian kings and ministers talked much, but did little on behalf of European Protestants. One source of grievance was the fourth article of the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), which allowed the churches Louis XIV had given to Catholics during his occupation of the Palatinate to remain in their hands. German Protestants kept pressing for repeal of the clause whenever a treaty was afoot, offering in exchange their support of the Emperor. The Hanoverians claimed repeal of the clause was ‘‘high on the list of priori- 86 ties,’’ yet during peace negotiations in 1736, they refused to press for repeal ‘‘because of its potential for causing a further rupture with Austria’’ and prevented a deputation from the Reichstag ’s Corpus Evangelicorum from demanding it. There was another Protestant grievance regarding the Palatinate: in 1719 the Elector, a convert to Catholicism, banned the use of the Heidelberg catechism because his coat of arms was used without permission and he thought the 80th question ‘‘deeply offensive’’ for calling the Mass a ‘‘cursed Idolatry’’ derived from ‘‘the Devil.’’ Till then the main church in Heidelberg had been divided between Protestants and Catholics , but now Catholics took possession. In Britain the event was seen as ‘‘a Europe-wide attack on protestants.’’ George I declared ‘‘he would not flinch from taking firm action, if forced, to defend legitimate protestant rights,’’ but then he went on helping Austria gain control of Sicily, and when Prussia’s Frederick William proposed a confessional alliance, he opposed it for fear Catholics would do likewise. Meanwhile , in an echo of...
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Mar 22, 2013
Qiana Johnson 
Open Access
