Plausible Claims Research Articles

Perfecting justice and legitimacy?

ABSTRACT This paper examines two aspects of the views developed in Tahzib’s excellent book A Perfectionist Theory of Justice. First, I consider the implications of including the principle of perfection within the theory of justice, and in particular what this means for the legitimacy of non-perfectionist states. Second, I argue that spiritual excellence has a plausible claim to be included in Tahzib’s conception of flourishing, and identify some problems this raises for his account.

Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites

ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that our perceptual experiences have composites-presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness.

Safety and Pluralism in Mathematics

AbstractA belief one has is safe if either (i) it could not easily be false or (ii) in any nearby world in which it is false, it is not formed using the method one uses to form one’s actual belief. It seems our mathematical beliefs are safe if mathematical pluralism is true: if, loosely put, almost any consistent mathematical theory is true. It seems, after all, that in any nearby world where one’s mathematical beliefs differ from one’s actual beliefs, one would believe some other true, consistent theory. Focusing on Justin Clarke-Doane’s recent discussion, I argue the thesis that mathematical beliefs are safe given pluralism faces some obstacles. I argue (i) is true of mathematical belief given pluralism only if we deny plausible claims about the interpretation of non-pluralists who many of us could easily be. Unless strong metasemantic theses are true, it is plausible many of us could easily deny or refuse to believe a consistent and true mathematical theory we actually believe. Since philosophical arguments and controversies permeate the methodology of foundational mathematics, I argue we cannot confidently distinguish the methods we use in mathematics between worlds, thus raising doubts about (ii).

A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness

Abstract In this paper, I argue that no theory of consciousness can simultaneously respect four initially plausible metaphysical claims—namely ‘first-person realism’, ‘non-solipsism’, ‘non-fragmentation’, and ‘one world’—but that any three of the four claims are mutually consistent. So, theories of consciousness face a ‘quadrilemma’. Since it will be hard to achieve a consensus on which of the four claims to retain and which to give up, we arrive at a landscape of competing theories, all of which have pros and cons. I will briefly indicate which kinds of theories correspond to the four horns of the quadrilemma.

Meta‐regresses and the limits of persuasive argumentation

AbstractThis paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation.

The epistemic challenge to longtermism

Longtermists claim that what we ought to do is mainly determined by how our actions might affect the very long-run future. A natural objection to longtermism is that these effects may be nearly impossible to predict—perhaps so close to impossible that, despite the astronomical importance of the far future, the expected value of our present actions is mainly determined by near-term considerations. This paper aims to precisify and evaluate one version of this epistemic objection to longtermism. To that end, I develop two simple models for comparing ‘longtermist’ and ‘neartermist’ interventions, incorporating the idea that it is harder to make a predictable difference to the further future. These models yield mixed conclusions: if we simply aim to maximize expected value, and don’t mind premising our choices on minuscule probabilities of astronomical payoffs, the case for longtermism looks robust. But on some prima facie plausible empirical worldviews, the expectational superiority of longtermist interventions depends heavily on these ‘Pascalian’ probabilities. So the case for longtermism may depend either on plausible but non-obvious empirical claims or on a tolerance for Pascalian fanaticism.

The two ‘strongest pillars of the empiricist wing’: the Vienna Circle, German academia and emigration in the light of correspondence between Philipp Frank and Richard von Mises (1916–1939)

ABSTRACT This paper is divided into a surveying and argumentative part and a slightly longer documentary part, which is meant to verify or at least make more plausible claims made in the first part. The first part deals in broad outline with the relationship of Frank and von Mises to the Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism on the one hand and to the physicists and mathematicians in the German-speaking world on the other. The varying special positions, partly the non-conformity of the two Austrian scientists are emphasized, in particular, their adherence to Ernst Mach’s epistemology and their shared interest in probability theory and applied mathematics. The impact of emigration and the after-effects in the U.S. are discussed. This leads to new insights into the fine structure of the Vienna Circle and the latter’s relationship to German academia within ‘Weimar Culture’. P. Forman’s interpretation (1971) of von Mises’ position is critically discussed. The second, documentary part, uses recently discovered correspondence between Frank and von Mises, and, to a lesser extent, von Mises’ personal diary. It aims at further substantiating some of the introductory theses and will at the same time provide material for a thorough biographical appreciation of the two scholars and friends.

Trust’s Meno problem: Can the doxastic view account for the value of trust?

ABSTRACT The doxastic view (DV) of trust maintains that trust essentially involves belief. In a recent paper, Arnon Keren (2020) gestures toward a new objection to the view, labeled Trust’s Meno Problem (TMP), which calls into question the DV’s ability to explain the widely held intuition that trust has distinct and indispensable value. As of yet, there has been no attempt to take up TMP on behalf of DV. This paper aims to fill precisely this lacuna. I do so in three main stages. In §1 I contextualize and elucidate the problem, to which Keren gestures but does not address in detail. In §2 I disambiguate multiple possible interpretations of TMP, seeking to identify the most philosophically challenging. Finally, in §3, I argue that DV can solve even this interpretation. In order to do so, I make use ofthe highly plausible claim we find in the work of Katherine Hawley (2012, 2019): that trust pays a compliment to the trustee. The payoffs of exploring the doxastic view in the context of Trust’s Meno Problem are twofold: we better understand the nature of the problem itself, and we see that the doxastic view can give a satisfying answer.

Domination, social norms, and the idea of an emancipatory interest

Domination, social norms, and the idea of an emancipatory interest

Cultural Capital: Reflections from a Latin Americanist

<i>Cultural Capital</i>: Reflections from a Latin Americanist

The Governing Conception of Laws

In her paper, “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws,” Helen Beebee argues that it is not a conceptual truth that laws of nature govern, and thus that one need not insist on a metaphysical account of laws that makes sense of their governing role. I agree with the first point but not the second. Although it is not a conceptual truth, the fact that laws govern follows straightforwardly from an important (though under-appreciated) principle of scientific theory choice combined with a highly plausible claim about the connection between scientific theory choice and theory choice in metaphysics. I present and defend this argument and then show how the resulting understanding of governance gives rise to an especially strong version of recent explanatory circularity arguments against Humeanism about laws of nature. Finally, I present three options for a further understanding of the governance relation that are compatible with my argument.

Decolonising the Conrad Canon. By Alice M. Kelly. Conrad’s Decentered Fiction. By Johan Adam Warodell

Alice M. Kelly begins her monograph, Decolonising the Conrad Canon, with the bold and plausible claim that there can be no ‘decolonial Conrad’ (p. 1) – no possible way of redeeming the author from the charges of anti-black racism levelled against Heart of Darkness (1899) by Chinua Achebe in 1977. Yet there was a colonized Conrad, born in exile in Ukraine in 1857 after his father had been caught scheming to free a Russian-controlled Poland from its cruel invaders, who had closed the universities, frozen the constitution, suspended parliament, and stonewalled all pleas for social reform. Conrad’s first memory, according to his friend Ford Madox Ford, was of a prison yard in May in falling snow, where Russian warders on horseback fed their captives red herring and refused them water. He was four years old. At five, living in exile with parents whom the Russians had lacked sufficient evidence to execute, he penned his first-known written words, in Polish, to his grandmother, thanking her for feeding his father bread in his cell. Conrad’s critics have historically made much of the folly of his father’s nationalistic hopes, in a bid to distance the author from all suspicion of revolutionary fire, yet in light of contemporary Ukrainian invincibility against Russian troops and indeed of the entire discourse of postcolonial criticism, it is hard to begrudge Apollo Konrad his right to rage.

Fetal reduction, moral permissibility and the all or nothing problem

There is an ongoing debate about whether multifetal pregnancy reduction from twins to singletons (2-to-1 MFPR) is morally permissible. By applying the all or nothing problem to the cases of...

Contesting legitimacy in global environmental governance - An exploration of transboundary climate risk management in the Brazilian-German coffee supply-chain

Stronger interconnections between people, ecosystems and economies in a globalized world are changing the scope and nature of global environmental governance. One area where this is becoming increasingly evident is climate change, where there is a growing recognition that climate risks can be transboundary in nature, crossing international borders as people, goods, and capital do. This suggests that a multiplicity of actors – state and non-state – have plausible claims to be engaged in or responsible for the governance of transboundary climate risks. However, it is presently unclear on what premises a global governance institution to do so might be constructed and the roles various actors may play therein. This absence of established roles and norms creates a space for political contestation with legitimacy at its center. In this paper, we unpack the contested nature of legitimacy by examining the governance of TCRs in agricultural supply-chains. Empirically, we analyze 41 semi-structured interviews across the Brazilian-German coffee supply-chain in an effort to characterize the primary modes of governance available to manage TCRs and their perceived institutional sources of legitimacy. We identify five distinct governance pathways, each underpinned by a distinct operationalization of legitimacy. These governance pathways are not necessarily mutually exclusive; it is plausible for several to co-exist, though the relative balance between their importance in a given context may vary widely. We argue that these five pathways and the role of legitimacy in navigating their differences are transferrable to other challenges in global environmental governance. Further, we argue that legitimacy is best understood as an object of political contestation, wherein actors deploy various sources of legitimacy differently in an effort to legitimize their preferred approach to TCR management, delegitimize others, and advance their own vision of appropriate global environmental governance.

The Deontic Primacy of Actions?

Why ought we to perform the actions that we ought to perform? We can categorize the various answers to this question depending on whether they hold that the oughts governing actions are explained by the oughts governing non-actions. In this essay, I show how a handful of plausible claims from normative ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action entail the conclusion that what an agent ought to do is explained by the attitudes she ought to have.

Certainty and Assertion

It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty.

Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle

AbstractI develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that $ \phi $ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that $ \phi $, but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’

The Challenge of Nietzsche: How to Approach His Thought

The Challenge of Nietzsche: How to Approach His Thought

Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?

ABSTRACT The eighteenth century debate between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists has seen a striking renaissance in the past decades, not least because of research into the nature of moral judgement conducted by empirical scientists such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. A claim that is often made in the current discussion is that the evidence made available by such empirical investigations refutes rationalist conceptions of moral judgement and vindicates the views of Hume or other moral sentimentalists. For example, Jesse Prinz and Hanno Sauer have recently argued that the available data demonstrates that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgement and that the best or the only way to make sense of these findings is to conclude that moral judgements are constituted by emotions. The aim of this paper is to thoroughly examine this argument and the underlying empirical evidence and to show that there is currently no compelling evidence for the truth of either the necessity or the sufficiency thesis and that, even if both theses were true, they would fail to provide a sound basis for a plausible sentimentalist constitution claim.

Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox

According to axiological retributivism, people can deserve what is bad for them and an outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby have intrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal with comparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents. Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels a well-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiological retributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if a deserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither better nor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a set of very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing the paradox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, though perhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.