PurposeThis paper seeks to investigate how the Government and people of Jamaica responded to the onslaught of Hurricane Ivan in September 2004, against the background of the established institutional response framework, including the Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act (1993) and Disaster Prevention and Emergency Management Plan of 1983 and established norms of practice.Design/methodology/approachQualitative methods for primary research were adopted in the study including élite interviews, attendance at press briefings, and reviews of policy documents and media reports. It also adopted a critical application of policy outcomes frameworks in a bid to interpret and evaluate the policy interventions during the event of Ivan.FindingsThe research revealed the following: that established configurations of working relations were upset by the establishment of an ad hoc reconstruction agency called Office of National Reconstruction (ONR); that the decentralised institutional level of response, the Parish Disaster Committees, were expected to possess the relevant capacity for assessment and response, even though these committees had not been capacitated to make an appropriate response; that by placing the ONR outside the legally established response agency, the government had weakened the prospects for institutional learning and preservation of institutional memory, as well as generated undue conflict which impinged on coordination, at a time when unity of purpose was most required.Originality/valuePosits that, if there was a real and continuous need for an ONR, then its location would be better within the Office of Disaster Planning and Emergency Management. It also suggests that the Parish Disaster Committees are critical to disaster prevention and management as they are located at the interface between government and community, and should be appropriately empowered to play their role.