Philosophy Of Science Research Articles (Page 1)

Abstract This paper examines the paradoxical decline in engagement with philosophy of science among engineers precisely when machine learning (ML) systems are increasingly performing complex epistemological functions in engineering practice. We identify how philosophical naivety , characterized by the uncritical adoption of reductive frameworks regarding consciousness, intelligence, and ethics, creates tangible organizational and technical liabilities. We then demonstrate how conceptual limitations in engineers’ philosophical foundations lead to three primary flaws: 1) ontological misclassification of system capabilities, 2) ethical blind spots in ML system design and application, and 3) inadequate epistemological approaches and hidden philosophical commitments for interpreting model outputs. Thus, we argue that renewed engagement with the philosophy of science is not merely academic but necessary for engineers to maintain epistemic authority and responsibility in an era where engineering judgment is increasingly delegated to or mediated by ML systems. In response, we propose a technical-philosophical framework integrating perspectives from philosophy of mind, ethics, epistemology, and engineering to address these shortcomings systematically.

Abstract Human attention has become a touchstone of widespread concern across the humanities, sciences, and broader culture in much of the world. The emergence of a new, heavily capitalized, and technologically sophisticated industry “commodifying” human attention (what has been called “human fracking”) has given rise to a transdisciplinary conversation about attentional problems. Philosophical analyses of attention take on special importance in the context of these new developments. Drawing on historical epistemology and the critical perspective of the history and philosophy of science, this paper examines the major positions in contemporary philosophy that have staked accounts of human attention. Ultimately, this metaphilosophical analysis juxtaposes analytic and Continental approaches, and contends that much current philosophical work on human attention fails to take adequate account of the sublated genealogy of instrumentalizing/cybernetic scientific practices that have constituted attention as an object of inquiry across the twentieth century. The implications for forward‐looking investigations are considered.

This study will examine the determinants of income among individuals with disabilities (CP) in India, as well as the implications for income tax. People with disabilities may have limitations in their economic and social opportunities, which can be impacted by factors such as age, gender, type of cerebral palsy, education level, social status, and family wealth. The researcher suggests that the current income tax system is reducing the earnings of persons with disabilities and proposes changes to the income tax system in the postmodern period. In essence, persons with CP experience limited income sources, and the increased income tax rate is worsening many problems. Hence, it is crucial to enact enhancements in the current income tax structure. The study will employ case studies of persons with cerebral palsy to advocate for tax rate modifications in the postmodern period. The study employs postmodernism and the philosophy of science as the theoretical frameworks for the investigation. The aforementioned frameworks will be utilized to examine and dismantle the notions of socioeconomic class.

Community-based adaptation (CBA) has become a credible remedy to climate change adaptation, emphasizing local participation and community-defined priorities. However, its transformative potential remains limited when structural root causes of vulnerability are insufficiently addressed. This article argues—via the methodology of problematization—that aligning CBA with the broader agenda of social-ecological transformation requires a stronger philosophical foundation. We propose critical realism as a suitable philosophy of science to translate CBA’s emancipatory ambitions into a robust analytical and methodological practice. Critical realism is a practically oriented philosophy facilitating causal analyses coherent with its realist ontology and relativistic epistemology. It illuminates the interplay between agency and structure, enhancing CBA to confront power imbalances and systemic injustices while supporting local agency. By conjoining insights from political ecology and political economy, we show how critical realism offers analytical coherence, methodological robustness, and normative orientation for transformative adaptation practice. We delineate nine key synergies between critical realism and CBA that together provide the conceptual scaffolding for a politically powerful, reflexive, and justice-oriented adaptation science. In doing so, the paper contributes to rethinking CBA as not merely a localized coping mechanism but as part of a structural response to the social-ecological crisis.

The development of digital technology and the Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed the paradigm of urban development towards the concept of a smart city based on data and connectivity. This study analyzes the nature of smart cities through three dimensions of the philosophy of science: ontology, epistemology, and axiology. From an ontological perspective, a smart city is understood as a complex entity consisting of physical, digital, social, and ecological systems that interact with each other to create efficient and adaptive urban governance. Epistemologically, knowledge in a smart city is obtained through the process of collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various IoT devices, sensors, and citizen participation, thereby producing new insights that support evidence-based decision-making (data-driven governance). From an axiological perspective, a smart city has ethical values and goals to improve the quality of life of its citizens, strengthen government transparency, maintain environmental sustainability, and promote inclusive social participation. Thus, this study asserts that the development of a smart city is not only technological but also has a philosophical foundation oriented towards a balance between efficiency, humanity, and sustainability.

Abstract An aspect of the Indigenous struggle against colonial oppression is the struggle for the inclusion of their knowledge in policymaking. Perceived as epistemically inferior to science, Indigenous knowledge and subsequently interests are systematically excluded in science-based policy. This article advances an anti-colonial political philosophy of science. As Indigenous knowledge feeds into the necessary political value judgments in policy-relevant science, Indigenous knowledge inclusion, I contend, should be treated as a political, not solely epistemic, matter. I further argue that Indigenous peoples, not just scientists, should have the power to make such political value judgments given the politics of representation under coloniality.

Responsible policymaking often relies on esoteric scientific knowledge. Yet, in a democracy, policymaking also requires support from laypeople who lack this knowledge. Is it permissible for experts to communicate falsehoods about esoteric matters to bolster this public support? The standard answer is “no.” A near-consensus view, in democratic theory and philosophy of science, holds that experts should be honest. The present article challenges this position by defending a particular category of falsehoods: educational falsehoods. My argument proceeds in two parts. The first contends that, in non-ideal circumstances, communicating falsehoods can play an indispensable epistemic function, by educating the public about urgent scientific matters. The second part addresses a pressing objection: namely, that educational falsehoods are deceptive, which in turn makes them inimical to autonomy, public trust, and democratic accountability. Although this objection proves unsuccessful, I argue that it helps clarify the conditions under which deploying educational falsehoods is permissible.

Purpose This conceptual paper aims to inspire further advancement of the visual turn in tourism, hospitality and leisure studies. It offers an updated overview of the implications of different philosophical positions for visual data and provides insights into both big and small data studies. Future research possibilities within the visual turn in these fields of studies are also discussed. Design/methodology/approach Given the conceptual nature of this paper, the lines of arguments are largely informed by existing literature in both the wider social sciences and humanities as well as the multidisciplinary fields of tourism, hospitality and leisure studies. While not attempting to provide a systematic review, this paper critically discusses both the wide variety of visual data types used in tourism, hospitality and leisure research, as well as the relevant, philosophy of science informed, theoretical framing of visual research. Findings This paper offers insights into possible futures for the visual turn in tourism, hospitality and leisure, while being neither prescriptive nor favouring a particular philosophical position or methodology. Some of the key directions for the future of the visual turn in fact, are expected to be influenced by the very diversity of approaches. Namely, both big and small data studies are expected to play a significant role in visual tourism, hospitality and leisure studies in the future, in much the same way the studies underpinned by the broad umbrellas of paradigms belonging to a variety of different paradigms will. Originality/value The originality of this paper lies in its offering of an updated meaningful synthesis of relevant literature which spans across disciplines and fields of studies to offer both an overview of the current state of the visual turn in tourism, hospitality and leisure studies and visions for its future. This is supported through an updated table outlining the key paradigms and their implications for visual data, and an emphasis of the important roles both big and small data studies play in knowledge production in these fields of studies.

This paper examines the philosophy of mathematical language, exploring how mathematics functions as both a formal symbolic system and a natural language for describing abstract structures. We investigate the nature of mathematical meaning, the relationship between mathematical symbols and their referents, the role of natural language in mathematical practice, and contemporary debates about mathematical realism, platonism, and formalism. Through an interdisciplinary approach drawing from philosophy of mathematics, linguistics, cognitive science, and mathematical practice, this research illuminates how mathematical language shapes our understanding of mathematical truth, proof, and knowledge.

Abstract The principle of charity (PC) is widely discussed in the philosophy of language and argumentation theory. Typically, in these disciplines, it is considered justified for prudential and epistemic reasons. However, the limitation of such arguments lies in their dependence on the goals of the individual interpreter and the usefulness of PC to facilitate them. Ethical reasons based on broadly accepted principles of fairness and rights offer more universal justifications. Stevens (Charity for moral reasons?–a defense of the principle of charity in argumentation. Argumentation and Advocacy 57:67–84, 2021), divides those into the deontological, which refer to respect for dignity, and the consequential, which rely upon the duty to avoid harm. The goal of this paper is to provide a systematic conceptual framework, rooted in the Socratic conception of justice, which strengthens and elaborates these ethical reasons for PC. On a psychological view of harm, the consequential argument seems to suggest an obligation to interpret even the most extreme and harmful claims charitably. To avoid this problematic outcome, we propose an approach to harm as unjust damage, originating with Socrates and refined by Feinberg (The moral limits of the criminal law, vol 1. Oxford University Press, New York, NY; Oxford, UK, 1984). We also apply the distinction between compensatory justice and the principle of equal measure that Ajdukiewicz (On justice. Philosophy of Science 30(1):119–130, 2022) draws from Aristotle (Nicomachean ethics. Oxford University Press, London, UK,1966) to show that the charitable interpretation of arguments is the just desert of a dignified human being, due to their status as a rational subject. In this way, the deontological and consequential arguments put forward by Stevens are united into one ethical support for PC and the potential paradox of charity raised by Lewiński (The paradox of charity. Informal Logic 32(4):403–439, 2012) is dissolved.

In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has been actively integrated into everyday human life. Its popularity continues to grow steadily, and companies increasingly employ AI to optimize and accelerate workflows. Ordinary users leverage large language models (LLMs) and multimodal AI systems to perform a wide range of tasks, including generating texts, images, and videos; planning their daily schedules; and searching for information, among others. The rapid integration of AI into diverse spheres of human activity gives rise to a number of fundamental challenges such as the simulation of meaning, the substitution of human will, and other issues that threaten personal identity and autonomy. An increasing number of cognitive and creative functions – such as text generation, decision-making, and reflection – are being delegated by humans to AI systems. Consequently, it becomes critically important to explicitly identify and articulate the problems emerging from human–AI interaction and to develop ethically and cognitively sound frameworks for such interaction. This article examines current trends and key challenges associated with the integration of AI into everyday life. It introduces the concept of “meaning simulation” – a phenomenon whereby AI models function as simulacra of meaning, creating an illusion of understanding, thought, and meaning. The paper proposes a conceptual framework for productive human–AI collaboration and outlines a positive scenario for its implementation. This article will be of interest to researchers and professionals working in artificial intelligence, philosophy of science and technology, cognitive science, as well as to anyone concerned with contemporary technological trends and their social, ethical, and existential implications.

Abstract Scientists and philosophers of science often draw methodological lessons from successful theories to justify methods of theory construction and to guide research programs.This paper proposes an epistemic framework for this practice, articulated in terms of the notion of meta-induction. By analogy to Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’, it introduces the concept of projectability of meta-inductive arguments, and demonstrates its significance in any account of meta-inductive reasoning. Likewise to scientific induction, meta-induction is shown to be constrained by naturalist epistemology in determining which classifications of theoretical methods are ‘projectable’. Projectability judgments in meta-inductive arguments help ensure that when taking lessons from past theorizing (either as a part of scientific discussions or in a philosophical reflections about science), they would be based on the way evidence was exploited in theory construction or on theoretically plausible hypothesis about the natural world, rather than on human-made concepts. This framework emphasizes the primacy of empirically guided patterns of conjecture over purely formal considerations, enabling epistemic evaluation of research projects, even when theorizing is primarily grounded on abstract theoretical methods and at stages when direct evidence is unavailable. The paper discusses possible implications on philosophical debates concerning theory assessment in fundamental physics, particularly regarding meta-empirical justification, as well as discussions on model transfer in the special sciences.

The history of the Department of Philosophy of Natural Sciences of the Institute of Philosophy dates back to the creation of the Institute of Scientific Philo­sophy by G.G. Shpet, in which one of the sections was the “Section of Methodo­logy of Science”. S.L. Frank worked exactly in it. Subsequently, the Department went through a difficult path, the milestones of which coincide with the difficult history of Russian philosophy. In 1937, during the reorganization of the structure of the Institute of Philosophy, the Department ceased to exist. During the War, the changed atmosphere in the country also affected the work of the Academy of Sciences. At the end of 1942 the Department of the history of religions and atheism is being abolished, and the Department of the history of science is taking its place. It was headed by Professor A.A. Maksimov. Later, at the very end of 1944, the subject of this department was transferred to the newly created Insti­tute of the History of Science by the Academy of Sciences, and the Department of Philosophy of Natural Sciences was created at the Institute of Philosophy, which was headed by Academician S.I. Vavilov on February 1, 1945. It was he who defined the new department’s priorities and organized communication with leading scientific institutions. In its new form, the sector has attracted a large number of prominent natural scientists, including academians A.I. Oparin, A.E. Fersman, V.G. Fesenkov and V.A. Obruchev. At various times, such fa­mous people as M.A. Markov, D.I. Blokhintsev, Ya.P. Terletsky, A.L. Zelmanov, S.A. Yanovskaya, and Yu.A. Zhdanov worked in the Department.

This study aims to analyze the transformation of axiological values within the context of digital technology development that increasingly shapes the orientation of science, education, and public policy. Using a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) approach, this research synthesizes national and international academic literature to identify patterns of value shifts, ethical challenges, and the reconstruction of axiology in the digital era. Findings reveal that technological progress promotes efficiency and access to knowledge but simultaneously raises issues of algorithmic bias, knowledge commercialization, and dehumanization The study emphasizes the need to renew the axiological paradigm so that technological advancement aligns with moral, humanistic, and social justice values. Integrating philosophy of science, digital ethics, and humanism forms a foundation for constructing a more applicable axiological framework. Thus, the success of science and technology should be assessed not merely by technical achievements but by their contribution to human dignity and social sustainability.

This research, entitled Essence of Religion in Islam. Many people often connote science with Western. However, if tracked historically, Islam have enormous contribution in developing of science. Therefore, this study aimed to compare the scientific character of the West and Islam, analyzing the development of science in Islamic and discover the nature of science in Islam. This is a library research using hermeneutic method with method elements are description, verstehen and interpretation. The material object is Islamic thought while the formal object is the philosophy of science. The results of this research indicate that there is a distinctive characteristic between Western science and Islam from the aspect of ontology, epistemology, and a/iology. The most striking difference is the recognition of the e/istence of God. In its development, Islamic science actually stems from the Prophet Muhammad's own then forwarded the new companions subsequent Islamic thinkers. The nature of science in Islam includes facility, processes and objectives. Epistemologically, it means that Is- lam accepts ratio and sense as well as revelation and intuition, while the pur- pose of science is to reveal the truth in pursuit of Ultimate Truth

The purpose of this article is to find an alternative direction in qualitative research based on the scientific philosophy of critical realism for the purpose of overcoming the current dilemma which qualitative educational research should deal with. Some postmodern qualitative research trend is obsessed with dichotomous criticism of the modernity, in which epistemology replaces ontology and 'text' replaces 'reality'. The common foundation for communication and rational judgment between studies for 'better understanding' or 'better explanation' may be lost. In this awareness this study attempted to define the context of the times in which educational research is now placed as 'post-postmodern', introduce critical realism as the philosophical basis for qualitative research, and suggest the direction of qualitative research based on the ontology. In particular, it attempted to build an ontology based on the overall understanding of the development from basic critical realism to dialectical critical realism and the philosophy of metaReality. By specifying what practical implications the result of this study have for qualitative education research, I tried to suggest the direction of future education qualitative research.

Abstract Phenomenon‐based classification (PBC) systems are gaining renewed interest for their potential to facilitate interdisciplinary research. This paper acknowledges the practical advantages highlighted by proponents but critically examines the underlying philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of “phenomena.” Drawing on insights from the philosophy of science, semiotics of information, and domain analysis, this paper argues that PBC is caught in a foundational paradox: its ambition to classify phenomena irrespective of context is implicitly essentialist, while its method for defining those phenomena is necessarily constructivist, relying on social consensus. This unexamined tension between its goals and its practice is a significant theoretical weakness. Understanding this philosophical conflict is crucial for developing more epistemologically robust and truly interoperable knowledge organization systems.

Research on algorithms has drastically increased in recent years. Various sub-disciplines of computer science investigate algorithms according to different objectives and standards. This plurality of the field has led to various methodological advances that have not yet been transferred to neighboring sub-disciplines. The central roadblock for a better knowledge exchange is the lack of a common methodological framework integrating the perspectives of these sub-disciplines. It is the objective of this article to develop such a research framework for algorithm engineering. Our framework builds on three areas discussed in the philosophy of science: ontology, epistemology and methodology. The framework helps us to identify and discuss various validity concerns relevant for any contribution on algorithms in various areas of computer science.

Popper’s philosophy of science and economic imperialism are “correctly” formulated. Popper’s philosophy contrasts with the author’s interpretation. The reliance on situational analysis is dubious; one needs to break with it. Three tasks are bringing Popper’s theory in conformity with scientific research and practices of social scientists and explaining how Popper could have endorsed a theory of how institutions function. The description of problems Popper’s view raises is too narrow, as is situational analysis. Merten had sympathy for Popper’s philosophy. Popper’s theory is incorrectly described, due to the absence of philosophical considerations.

Professional philosophy is an important part of training and practice for trainee and qualified sport and exercise psychology practitioners (SEPPs) alike. Despite this, there remains limited literature addressing the philosophical premises relevant to the field, and how to navigate them. In this paper, the authors provide an account of how to approach professional philosophy, derived from both their experience teaching philosophy of practice to neophyte SEPPs and their experiences as practitioners. This account is the culmination of a reevaluation of the existing literature in conjunction with the recent changes in the applied field of sport and exercise psychology, and an examination of both the philosophical inheritance of sport and exercise psychology and the broader philosophical literature (e.g., philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, axiology). Given that SEPPs typically receive little, if any, professional philosophical guidance, this paper unpacks and aims to make accessible the components of a professional philosophy, and guides practitioners in interrogating and establishing their professional philosophy using the Philosophy Onion.