Abstract This essay has its point of departure in an observation: The monumental history of philosophy that Jürgen Habermas has published has as its guiding thread the relationship between religion and philosophy, faith and knowledge. It culminates in a presentation of the philosophy of Charles Peirce. But, oddly, it has nothing to say about Peirce’s own understanding of religion and the relationship between religion and philosophy. The essay briefly summarises the present state of knowledge on Peirce and religion and then confronts it not so much with debates in theology or philosophy of religion, as others have done in the last decades, but with the interdisciplinary empirical study of religion. This happens in five steps (situated creativity, formation of beliefs with existential relevance, sacredness, the God concept, the ideal of universalism), The essay concludes with a short reflection on how Habermas’s narrative would have had to change if the author had taken Peirce’s contribution as seriously as it deserves.

Introduction: The concept of individual divine providence has long been contested within philosophy of religion and theology, often regarded as conceptually implausible due to assumptions concerning cognitive limitations, attention, and scale. Contemporary developments in artificial intelligence introduce new conceptual conditions that challenge these inherited objections. Objective: This article aims to reassess the traditional impossibility objection to individual divine providence by examining how artificial intelligence reshapes assumptions about individualized supervision at scale. Method: The study adopts a theoretical and conceptual approach, drawing on philosophy of religion, cognitive systems theory, and selected theological frameworks. Conceptual analysis and interdisciplinary comparison are employed to evaluate the coherence of individualized supervision beyond anthropomorphic models of cognition. Results: The analysis indicates that artificial intelligence systems demonstrate the structural feasibility of individualized attention without reliance on conscious awareness or intentional agency. This finding weakens arguments that dismiss individual divine providence as logically incoherent based solely on scale or cognitive constraints. Conclusions: While artificial intelligence does not provide empirical evidence for divine supervision, it undermines the epistemic force of impossibility-based objections. The study concludes that individual divine providence may be reconsidered as conceptually coherent within contemporary philosophical discourse, reopening space for interdisciplinary dialogue between theology, philosophy, and emerging technologies.

The problem of evil and the problem of consciousness occupy central positions in the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind, respectively. On the face of it, these problems seem to be fundamentally distinct. The problem of evil is concerned with whether the existence of evil in the world undermines belief in the existence of God while the problem of consciousness concerns the nature of consciousness and how it can arise from physical processes in the brain. In this paper, however, I defend the following novel thesis: the problem of evil and the problem of consciousness are versions of the same problem, which I term the “problem of ontological expectation mismatch.” I argue that, by recognizing that they stem from the same root, we can gain a fresh perspective for evaluating existing approaches to both problems in a systematic manner. I conclude my discussion by utilizing this thesis to critically examine panpsychism, a response to the problem of consciousness that has recently gained significant popularity.

This study aims to examine how insights from the historical development of Christian epistemology can be internalized to formulate a contextual paradigm of Christian education in Indonesia. Employing a qualitative, literature-based methodology, this study draws on sources from historical theology, philosophy of religion, contemporary epistemology, and Christian education, analyzed through a historical-hermeneutical and theological-conceptual framework. The findings demonstrate an epistemological shift from rationalistic models toward a relational, contextual, and praxis-oriented understanding of faith, in which faith and reason are integratively related. It is concluded that the internalization of historical Christian epistemological insights provides a solid foundation for developing a contextual Christian education that emphasizes faith experience, dialogue with local culture, and transformative learning grounded in lived realities.

Within the philosophy of religion, this article contributes to political science by developing a conceptual interpretation of how leadership, authority, and belief coproduce institutional legitimacy within religious and political institutions, collectively referred to as “institutions of belief”—religious and political bodies whose functioning depends on shared doctrines and recognized sources of legitimacy. Building on classical thinkers and theorists, the paper makes explicit three interdependent moments: authority, belief, and leadership; shows how shifts in authority structures transform leadership patterns of belief; and identifies mechanisms through which crises of authority generate political instability or new charismatic developments. The article is primarily conceptual but indicates where illustrative contemporary cases, particularly from the Middle East, can ground the framework and suggests empirical strategies for future assessment. This work explores two main questions: first, how authority, belief, and leadership interact within belief institutions; and second, how changes in sources or structures of authority influence leadership styles and political outcomes. It is primarily conceptual and synthetic, tracing the histories of ideas, providing operational definitions derived from earlier discussions, and developing an analytical framework. This framework can be applied to current cases, such as examples from the Middle East, and translated into empirical markers for testing.

This article will bring together and explore the relations between four aspects of Wittgenstein’s remarks on, and his relation to, religious language. The first is his sense of the special role that religious language can play in the lives of people. The focus is not on traditional issues in the philosophy of religion—not the Ontological Proof of the existence of God; not any of Aquinas’ Five Ways; not the argument from Design or the Cosmological Argument; and not any other philosophico-religious matter concerning arguments for the existence or non-existence of any deity. His interests lie elsewhere. Second, we see that what Wittgenstein is centrally concerned with is the life-structuring power that religious language can possess and exert; it concerns both the sense-making power of pattern-lives in religious narratives and the metaphorical content of religious ways of thinking and perceiving. The third aspect is the distinctive, and in its way transcendental, way of seeing the world and existence sub specie aeternitatis, that is, under the aspect of eternity. Or, I will suggest, under the aspect of timelessness, or of having the sense of being above and outside of time. Wittgenstein said that he was not a religious person, but that he could not help but to see every problem from a religious point of view. In this third theme of the article, I will attempt to explicate what that remark can mean—how it reveals what Wittgenstein elsewhere in his work calls “a way of seeing.” And then fourth, this article will connect these three aspects to the special, non-pragmatic (and often in the above sense, transcendental) way that we view works of art. In his Notebooks of 1914-16, Wittgenstein wrote, “The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics.” At the close, I suggest that the way we learn to see the world through and within religious language (again, apart from any theological claim concerning divine existence or not) is parallel to one important way of seeing art—where the parallel is one that casts light from each side to the other. Along with some other works, my most central example in art will be the paintings of Morandi: in conveying an unmistakable sense of timelessness, they both convey, and in viewing them invite us to enact, the special way of seeing objects sub specie aeternitatis.

Religious pluralism has become one of the most contested issues in contemporary philosophy of religion and is generally discussed within the frameworks of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. This article provides a comparative analysis of religious pluralism in the thought of Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi, one of the leading Sufi figures of Islamic intellectual tradition, and John Hick, a prominent representative of modern philosophy of religion. Mawlana’s understanding of religion is grounded in the metaphysics of waḥdat al-wujūd (the unity of being) and in the moral-metaphysical dimension of divine love. For him, the infinite self-disclosures of the Absolute Being constitute the ontological foundation of religious diversity. Accordingly, Mawlana develops an inclusive and pluralistic perspective in which every faith is regarded as a partial manifestation of divine truth. Although he was well-versed in theological and philosophical debates, Mawlana did not follow the methods of theologians or philosophers when addressing such issues. For him, engaging in excessively abstract reasoning was not a valid path to truth. His conceptions of life, humanity, and religion are shaped by the idea of being. The vastness of being corresponds to his understanding of life and religion, for both emerge from and continue within the essence of existence. To Mawlana, the realm of being is too vast to be grasped by the senses, and its source lies deeper than both the material world and the realms of imagination and sensation. Although Mawlana’s reflections on religious diversity can be analyzed through the contemporary paradigms of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, it becomes clear that he transcends these frameworks through a more profound and holistic vision. The seemingly contradictory tendencies of exclusivity, inclusivity, and pluralism observed in Sufi discourse stem from the dialectic between the outer (ẓāhir) and inner (bāṭin) dimensions. Thus, the inclusive and pluralistic attitudes in Sufism are not mutually exclusive. Hick, on the other hand, constructs his pluralism on an epistemological basis, interpreting religious diversity as the plurality of human responses to the “Ultimate Reality” within the limits of human cognitive and cultural conditions. Drawing on Kant’s ontology and epistemology, Hick reinterprets the divine by postulating God as the “Ultimate Reality” at the center of his pluralistic framework. This distinction has generated major debates in theology and philosophy of religion, particularly concerning the possibility of revelation. According to Hick, there is a sharp distinction between Reality in itself and Reality as conceptualized and experienced through religious traditions—an indeterminacy that arises from metaphysical uncertainty. Each religion asserts absolute truth claims, yet these claims cannot be verified by any objective criterion. Therefore, no religious tradition can make a complete or final claim about the nature of Reality. The fundamental difference between the two approaches lies in their orientation: while Mawlana proposes a God-centered and religion-centered pluralism, Hick advocates an experience-centered one. The study concludes that Mawlana offers a more holistic framework that preserves the authenticity and socio-cultural dimensions of religion, whereas Hick’s model, though compatible with modern values such as liberalism and tolerance, risks undermining the essence of religion through its reductionist tendencies.

On June 12-13, 2025, the international conference Philosophy and Christianity. Past – Present – Future was held at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw (UKSW). The event was organized to mark the 60th anniversary of the philosophical journal Studia Philosophiae Christianae, founded in 1965 at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy of the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw (ATK, now UKSW). The conference gathered participants from academic centers in Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, and USA, who specialize in the philosophy of religion and related areas. The program included presentations by scholars representing various academic traditions, all focusing on the relationship between philosophy and Christianity from historical, contemporary, and future-oriented perspectives. ---------------------------------------- Received: 9/07/2025. Reviewed: 25/10/2025. Accepted: 12/11/2025.

This article continues the analysis of János Körmöczi’s work from the Keresztény Magvető’s 2024/3 issue. It examines how the relationship between János Körmöczi (1763–1836) and philosophy, as explored there, is reflected in his printed works. Since there are no modern editions of these works, this article’s interpretations are based on a detailed description of the content, supported by numerous quotations, which lead to new insights into the nature and sources of the texts. These are also suitable for presenting the profoundly philosophical nature of the Unitarian preaching tradition. The interpretations reveal the deliberate presence of contemporary European intellectual currents. In the 1799 synod greeting, the essentially Kantian (Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)) motivation is significantly modified by the omission of the thesis that the existence of religion can be derived exclusively from the moral nature of man. Another important feature is that, unlike Körmöczi’s other source, Christian Wilhelm Flügge (1772–1828), he does not consider irreligiousness to be the most important problem affecting humanity, but rather the persistent strong presence of superstition inherited from the Middle Ages. An analysis of the funeral speeches reveals an important difference: in these, the main danger is already the emergence of irreligious atheists. The conclusion emphasizes that further research may reveal where these texts fit into the development of Kant’s reception in Transylvania and Hungary. However, it is already clear that Körmöczi’s reflective following of the great Königsberg philosopher will not be a transition to following Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), and this is explained precisely by Körmöczi’s adherence to the strong Transylvanian tradition of rational philosophy of religion.

This article develops a philosophical explication of monotheism through fundamentality, using Rudolf Carnap’s method of explication and Karen Bennett’s concept of ‘building‑fundamentality.’ By examining how contemporary philosophers and theologians have struggled with defining monotheism in light of Second Temple Judaism’s complex theology, this article argues that understand‑ ing monotheism as the belief in one fundamental deity provides a more philosophi‑ cally robust framework than numerical definitions. This framework helps reconcile divine plurality in Jewish theology while offering new perspectives on polytheistic traditions and interfaith debates, thus contributing to broader discussions in the philosophy of religion and theology.

Traditional logical methods of analytical philosophy are poorly suited for analyzing statements expressing religious views, so analytical philosophy of religion often reduces to linguistic analysis of such statements. This method is often used to analyze theistic judgments. In this case, the explication of the social phenomenon of non-traditional religiosity becomes a very specific problem, as it involves analyzing judgments that express alternative views on the existence of religious objects. In addition, non-traditional religiosity may not be theistic, which takes us beyond the traditional discourse of analytical philosophy of religion. We believe that in order to solve this problem within the framework of an analytical approach, we must consider traditional and non-traditional religions within a common meta-discourse that includes alternative religious views as subsystems.

Abstract In this paper, I draw on feminist resources to argue that Christian analytic philosophers of religion have good reason not only to focus more thoroughly on the topic of love in their treatments of the divine nature but also to give it a substantial and transformative role in the divine nature. The way forward, I propose, involves three moves: (1) designate a place for love in the divine nature, (2) attend to feminist insights on love when doing so, and (3) consider how these interventions transform our understanding of God overall. I then begin this work. Starting with the first task, I consider two ways we might conceptualize love within the divine nature. On the first (which I call ‘the mutually conditioning approach’), love is assigned equal shaping power and, on the second (which I call ‘the orienting trait approach’), love is given enlarged shaping power in the divine nature. In comparing the two, I conclude that both have the good outcome of resulting in a transformed view of God. However, though the second option is more radical and metaphysically complex, we have good reason to prefer it to the first both from philosophical reflection on love’s nature and for its coherence with the Christian tradition. After clarifying how my argument relates to divine simplicity, I begin working towards accomplishing the second and third tasks by considering how the orienting trait approach applies to the topic of divine violence.

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to look deeper into the connection between divinities, and interpret how a shift in necessity of mortals is reflected through a shift in the attributes the divine were worshipped through. In this process, it becomes more clear as to how the people of ancient Greece viewed their gods and goddesses. Through comparing literary descriptions with archaeological evidence and artistic representations, a more realistic picture of life in ancient Greek cult worship and festivals emerges. In this, we can understand not only how mortals viewed their divinities, but how their worship acted as connections between people; through worship and communal gatherings the divine brought people together in extraordinary ways. This information is useful to anyone studying history, archaeology, mythology, and anthropology. This is also extremely relevant to the philosophy of religion. By looking past surface‐level assumptions and digging deeper into ancient literary descriptions, we possess the ability to uncover the deeper meaning that lies hidden within them. This studies the pantheon through time and space in conjunction with cultural, environmental, and social links that tie in with physical attributes. This anthropology of the gods as fluid figures is argued.

Can one who takes Scripture to be the word of God, and who takes their independent moral judgements to be reliable, reconcile such beliefs with Scriptural injunctions that appear to permit and require evil actions? That is the Problem of Divinely Prescribed Evil. An ethics-first solution takes our independent moral judgements to be reliable and attempts to reconcile them with seemingly divinely prescribed evil. Amir Saemi (2024) offers a prima facie promising ethics-first solution: take Scriptural injunctions to be not moral, but legal. In this paper, I critically examine this proposal. After raising worries about Saemi’s argument for his solution, I explore his analogy with the ethics and laws of war, raise three concerns for his solution, and present a dilemma which is, ultimately, an argument against Saemi’s solution. I end with some suggestions for further inquiry into this recalcitrant problem, and analytic philosophy of religion about Islam.

Aim: This study seeks to provide a set of philosophical and theological reflections on war and peace by engaging selected themes within the philosophy of religion. Adopting a novel and interdisciplinary perspective, the research aims to reframe the concepts of war and peace through a conceptually delimited framework, offering theoretical analyses and constructive proposals. Methods: Employing the method of literature review, the paper examines the legitimacy of war from moral, religious, and philosophical standpoints. It further analyzes the approaches of world religions to war and peace, the search for sustainable peace, and universal ethical perspectives related to conflict. The study presents and compares diverse views on war and peace within the discursive horizon of the philosophy of religion. Results: Through an analytical synthesis of diverse sources, this research discusses the concepts of militancy, just war theory, pacifism, and universal peace from a philosophical-theological perspective. Under the rubric of militancy, arguments in favor of the necessity of war are explored in light of scientific, ethical, and religious reasoning. Within the just war tradition, the study evaluates principles emphasizing the avoidance of war as a moral imperative and the limitation of harm where war becomes unavoidable. In the section on pacifism, the paper categorizes and analyzes absolute, conditional, and moderate forms of anti-war ethics. Theological analyses of universal peace underscore the notion that peace remains a highly endorsed moral aspiration. Among the central claims, peace is defended as a coherent life philosophy, positioned as a precondition for human freedom and dignity. Conclusion: Although religions may leave room for war in cases of absolute necessity, they do not promote it as a systematically divine imperative. Rather, religious encouragement for war is interpreted as a reflection of subjective theological interpretations and socio-political positioning. The study concludes that in contexts of both war and peace, religious discourse is often instrumentalized to legitimize underlying economic, political, or philosophical agendas. Originality: War and peace are not commonly addressed as core topics within the philosophy of religion. Framing them in this way provides a speculative and critical contribution to the field, demonstrating the broader ethical relevance of religion in contemporary global challenges.

Abstract Hegel indicates throughout his writings that the claims most pivotal to his system of philosophical science receive their proof only in logic itself. And yet, Hegel has surprisingly little to say in either the Encyclopaedia Logic or the Science of Logic itself about what he means by ‘proof’ or what sort of proof procedure it is that he thinks is suited to meet such a demand. In this paper, I develop an account of the proof procedure at work in the Logic by considering Hegel’s treatment of the traditional proofs of God’s existence (specifically, the ontological and the cosmological arguments) that he offers in the logical writings and in his Religionsphilosophie. I develop this account through the speculative reconstruction of the traditional arguments of natural theology that Hegel offers in his 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and the 1829 Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God where, I argue, these arguments are divested of their syllogistic form and reformulated on the model of conceptual mediation. In the end, I explain how this account of the Logic ’s proof procedure sheds light on two lingering interpretive issues in Hegel’s metaphysics: its relationship to the ontological argument and its solution to ‘the problem of beginning’.

Abstract Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) exercised a tremendous amount of influence on the philosophical compositions of G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). In the following, I concern myself with a specific effect of Kant’s third Critique on Hegel’s philosophical oeuvre , namely the consequential character of Kant’s ‘reflective judgment’ for the constitution and culmination of Hegel’s mature Religionsphilosophie . In the 1827 version of his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion , Hegel organizes the second main division of his religious phenomenology in lockstep fashion with the organization of Kant’s third Critique , specifically in accordance with the progression through beauty, sublimity, and teleology. I contend that Hegel appropriates Kant’s arrangement (and affiliated philosophical accoutrement ) in order to establish the phenomenological conditions for the possibility of Christian religious consciousness and – in particular – the third trinitarian figure of the Holy Spirit.

Abstract This is a brief introduction to a special issue highlighting the relevance of philosophy of science to many core topics in theology and philosophy of religion. Several points of intersection between knowledge production in the sciences and knowledge production in philosophy and theology are discussed.

The contemporary debate over the problem of evil in analytic philosophy of religion is prone to focusing solely on the problem as an abstract dialectical issue that only concerns philosophers. However, this focus on abstract solutions to the problem of evil can seem to be less compelling in the face of personally experienced suffering, and it has given rise to newer approaches to the problem of evil, including anti-theodicy, which is the idea that theodicy itself is morally problematic. To remedy these issues, theists must turn to rhetoric to supplement theodicy. George Campbell’s view of rhetoric provides great insights into possible solutions, showing how including biblical narratives in theodicy can provide more comprehensive and compelling explanations for why God allows evil.

In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the evil God challenge has been developed by several authors as a parody argument. Proponents of this challenge contend that, given the goods in our world, the hypothesis of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnimalevolent God or the Evil God is absurd. Similarly, they argue, we should conclude that the hypothesis of a good God is also absurd due to the evils present in our world. This paper argues that, with the aid of this challenge and other contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, one can make the case that a reintroduction of Manichaeism into philosophy of religion is worthwhile. This argument will propose that, considering our total evidence, the Good-God and the Evil-God demonstrate a similar level of support. Additionally, under a reconstructed Manichaean hypothesis, good and evil are seen as mutually explanatory. Furthermore, the natural order can be understood within this framework. Therefore, the Manichaean hypothesis could serve as a viable alternative to monotheistic theism; it can account for the co-existence of good and evil and is compatible with the observed order in nature.