Stefan Glaser’s scholarly work covers a wide range of topics, from the philosophy of punishment – or, more broadly, the philosophy of criminal law – through core issues in criminal law dogmatics, to discussions devoted to the regulations concerning the imposition of penalties, specific crimes, and finally, matters of international criminal law. He also studied procedural issues. In each of these areas, he published a significant number of works, including monographs and commentaries. In his research, he took into account both the philosophical perspective and criminological issues. He applied the dogmatic method with expertise and precision. He addressed issues of fundamental importance to criminal law and criminal procedure. In many respects, he highlighted the shortcomings of existing legal regulations, gaps and regulatory imprecisions, and sought satisfactory solutions to problems that troubled theorists and posed difficulties for practitioners. His works on the philosophy of punishment and the philosophy of criminal law, analysed from the perspective of the philosophy of punishment, are of particular significance, as are his writings on the foundations of liability for joint perpetration in the commission of crime. In his analysis of punishment, he sought to reconcile two opposing approaches: the retributive approach and the utilitarian approach. Although he clearly favoured retributivism, he also recognised certain advantages of the utilitarian approach. In seeking a kind of compromise between these competing approaches, he pointed to proportionate punishment of the perpetrator as the fundamental purpose and meaning of punishment. At the same time, he did not rule out the preventive, protective and rehabilitative functions of punishment. He stipulated that these functions could only be implemented on a subsidiary basis, provided that they did not violate the essential nature of punishment. In the area of liability for joint perpetration, he primarily focused on the paradoxes of the model developed by Juliusz Makarewicz. Recognising the limitations of liability for incitement and assistance, he advocated indirect perpetration as a means of resolving doubtful cases. He justified its place in the Polish criminal law system on the grounds of logic, criminal policy needs, and the preservation of certain elements of accessory liability in the Polish concepts of incitement and assistance. In this respect, he was clearly opposed to the position of the concept’s originator, Makarewicz. Regarding liability for causative forms of complicity, he drew attention to the consequences of the erroneous omission of a provision in the general part of the Criminal Code that establishes the basis for liability for joint perpetration. He consistently argued that, for this reason, under the provisions of the 1932 Criminal Code, it was impossible to apply the extra-statutory concept of joint perpetration to attribute liability in cases currently referred to as parallel co-perpetration. In both areas, Glaser’s views remain relevant today, constituting an important addition to analyses of criminal law.

ABSTRACT Nigerian Asuwada epistemology, formulated from Yoruba poetry by sociologist Akinsola Akiwowo, is a theoretical framework of sociation. Recognizing the sanctity of the individual, it recognizes the interdependence of the individual and society, while the earth is seen as a heaven for cultivating goodness through individual iwa (character). Aisuwa (alienation) is seen as social pathology that causes a breakdown in family or society. When this occurs, ifogbontayese (remaking the world through wisdom) provides a method of social change. Asuwada theory is contrasted with features of the criminal justice system in the U.S. Plea bargaining, mandatory minimum, three-strikes, and life without parole sentencing are examined as manifestations of aisuwa (alienation), as are sentencing laws in the U.S. that exist as outliers in Western countries, indefensible by normal concepts in the philosophy of law. Finally, restorative justice frameworks described by Braithwaite, Claessen, Sered, and Zehr are examined. Sered’s definition of accountability is discussed as a humanizing theory that, like asuwada theory, requires sociation rather than merely isolation and destruction. Restorative justice, a framework that builds and heals, requiring agency from the offender, is contrasted with the futility of mass incarceration, which meets neither the needs of the offender, victim, or society at large.

The monograph under review, “The Line: AI and the Future of Personhood” by J. Boyle, addresses the issue of the moral, legal, and anthropological boundaries of personhood in the context of the rapid development of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and ongoing debates surrounding non-human subjects. The author examines the criteria on which culture and law draw a distinction between a person and a non-person, a subject and an object, and among humans, animals, machines, and hybrid biotechnological entities. The book is of interest to researchers in philosophical anthropology, AI ethics, philosophy of law, bioethics, and contemporary culture.

ABSTRACT This article explores how disciplinary sanctions imposed on legal professionals can be given a coherent moral justification. Drawing inspiration from the philosophy of criminal law, it develops a modified form of legal moralism based on role morality rather than common morality. The theory is intended to provide disciplinary authorities with normative guidance on what may legitimately be defined as a disciplinary offence, as well as limits on what must not be classified as such. Four challenges that any plausible version of legal moralism must meet are identified and addressed. The article argues that legal moralism, traditionally grounded in a deontological conception of morality, can be coherently connected with consequentialist reasoning, represented here by utilitarianism. Utilitarianism can serve as its ultimate justification. Furthermore, the paper proposes a version of legal moralism that rests on a consequentialist conception of morality. In this case, however, utilitarians have little reason to prefer such an approach over the direct application of the principle of utility. The article concludes that legal moralism, properly reconstructed, provides a philosophically robust foundation for understanding and justifying disciplinary sanctions.

Introduction: The use of nominee accounts is an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in the practice of financial crimes, such as money laundering, tax evasion, and the financing of other criminal acts. The nominee account is basically used to disguise the identity of the actual beneficial owner, thus posing a serious challenge in the enforcement of criminal responsibility.Purposes of the Research: This study aims to analyze the concepts and foundations of legal philosophy, especially justice, legal certainty, and usefulness in the enforcement of criminal liability for the use of nominee accounts in Indonesia and Pakistan, as well as compare the positive legal arrangements that apply in the two countries.Methods of the Research: This research uses normative legal research methods with approaches to legal philosophy, legislation, and comparative law.Results Main Findings of the Research: The findings of the study show that philosophically, the enforcement of criminal liability against nominee accounts in Indonesia and Pakistan is based on efforts to realize substantive justice by penetrating the formalities of legal ownership to reveal the true beneficial owners. From the perspective of legal certainty, both Indonesia and Pakistan still face challenges due to the lack of an explicit and comprehensive regulation of nominee accounts, so law enforcement often relies on the interpretation of other criminal norms, such as money laundering and banking crimes. Meanwhile, from the aspect of utility, regulation and law enforcement of nominee accounts are directed to maintain financial system stability, prevent abuse of the banking system, and protect the interests of the community and the state. Legally positive, Indonesia regulates criminal liability related to nominee accounts indirectly through the Money Laundering Act, banking regulations, and policies related to beneficial ownership, while Pakistan regulates it through an anti-money laundering legal framework and financial sector regulations that emphasize ownership transparency and due diligence obligations. This comparison shows that although the two countries have similar normative approaches, the difference lies in the explicit level of regulation and effectiveness of their implementation. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the philosophical foundation and harmonize legal arrangements to ensure the enforcement of fair, definite, and beneficial criminal liability for the practice of using nominee accounts.

The article is devoted to the theoretical and legal analysis of the concept of «source of law» as one of the most debatable categories of the general theory of law and philosophy of law. Despite the fact that this term has been used in legal science for over two millennia, a single generally accepted definition has not yet been developed, which causes both theoretical contradictions and practical difficulties in the field of lawmaking and law enforcement. The relevance of the study is determined by the European integration course of Ukraine, the dynamic updating of national legislation and the need for its harmonization with the standards of the European Union, which requires a clear understanding of the nature and hierarchy of sources of law. The article systematizes and critically analyzes the main scientific approaches to understanding the concept of «source of law» that have been formed in domestic and foreign legal doctrine. It is established that philosophical, sociological and positivist approaches offer fundamentally different answers to the question of what exactly generates law and gives it binding force. The contribution of leading foreign jurists: J.-L. Berghel, L. Fuller, G. Berman, as well as domestic scientists to the development of this issue is analyzed. It is substantiated that the ambiguity of the term «source of law» is not accidental, but reflects the true complexity and multidimensionality of the phenomenon of law itself. As a result of the study, three main meanings of the concept of «source of law» are identified: ideal (legal consciousness, natural law, legal ideology), material (socio-economic conditions of social life, factors of law formation) and formal-legal (external forms of expression and consolidation of legal norms). It is proved that each of these meanings reflects a certain aspect of legal reality and cannot be considered as self-sufficient without taking into account the others. Special attention is paid to the formal-legal meaning, which acquires the greatest practical significance, since it allows to determine the hierarchy of legal acts and the mechanisms of their application. At the same time, reducing the sources of law exclusively to their formal manifestations is recognized as a methodologically limited approach that does not take into account the value-ideological, social and subjective factors of law-making. It is concluded that the study of the sources of law has a pronounced practical significance for the development of the legal system of Ukraine in the context of European integration.

Before Emil Lask wrote The Logic of Philosophy (1911) he outlined the main theses of his future philosophical project in The Philosophy of Right (1905): critique of the “two worlds theory”, the problem of pre-reflective cognition, the emphasis on the role of “pre-scientific” pre-theoretical reality. But how, according to Lask, does the transition from “pre-legal” to “legal” reality take place? The Philosophy of Right criticises the “two worlds theory”, interpreted in the spirit of Platonism, as a mixing of value and reality in the natural law and historism. Lask claims that such a shift can be avoided in the critical philosophy of law. Instead of choosing between absolutisation of extra-historical legal norm and absolutisation of historical factuality the critical philosophy of law works with the real world as a “semi-finished product” (Halbfabrikat) which corresponds to the meanings of culture. In the “semi-finished product” the realm of right is partly “scientific” and partly “pre-scientific”, which makes the question of transition from the “pre-legal” to “legal” reality particularly important. The transition is revealed through the creation of legal concepts, in which their pre-scientific formation (vorwissenschaftliche Begriffsbildungen) and the teleological principle, which is responsible for the selection of the pre-legal empirical substrate of right that can become legal, play a significant role. The Philo­sophy of Right and The Logic of Philosophy are seen as keys to understanding each other. Therefore the “two-storied building” metaphor used in The Logic of Philosophy to explain the two levels of cognition can be applied to the concept of right. I arrive at the conclusion that the philosophical-legal practice of norm formation, according to Lask, involves “two necessities”: the necessity of recognising the pre-scientific element in right and the necessity of converting it into a “scientific” one. Thus, normativity in the philosophy of right, according to Lask, is not introduced from “above-outside”, but is formed in a “semi-finished product” of the right itself.

There is no consensus among philosophers, including philosophers of law, whether the present generation has duties to future generations or whether future generations have rights for which the present generation is accountable. Where the moral or legal argument is advanced that we do have duties to future generations in view of their rights, that argument reasonably includes concern for the abolition of nuclear weapons. There is ample moral warrant (e.g., from the moral philosophy of John Rawls) and legal warrant (e.g., from the legal assessment of the International Court of Justice) in the present (1) to account for such duties and (2) for those of our generation to take requisite action that protects the rights of future generations against nuclear catastrophe. Hence, there is a reasonably defensible moral and legal argument in favor of nuclear disarmament.

This review presents a scholarly analysis of Professor Ilham Rahimov’s monograph “Crime and Punishment in World Religions.” The work examines a comparative-legal study of the nature of crime and punishment in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, employing historical-religious, cultural-anthropological, and normative-value approaches. The review highlights the key arguments of the monograph, including the religious roots of criminal-law prohibitions, the moral-ethical nature of punishment, and the universal norms of conduct underlying various traditional legal systems. The significance of Rahimov’s contribution to contemporary jurisprudence, religious studies, and the philosophy of law is emphasized.

The research paper aims to study The Rise of Artificial Intelligence: A Boon or a Bane under Legal Regime. It will examine how the Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the real world refers in various domains and across various fields to boost innovation with transformative technology. The jurisprudential aspect highlights the philosophy of law concerning Artificial Intelligence along with its fundamental principles and moral values. It will analyse AI as a catalyst for progressing in today’s current era which symbolises the capacity of human intellect with AI through development in the modern day. AI as a positive footprint in the society understands the interaction of humans and AI. It will also examine the AI as a loss of human touch and its values where there is a gap between emotional connection between AI and human. The growing privacy challenges with regard to breach of personal data is a threat to human world. It will analyse the ethical and legal concerns of AI systems with lack of privacy and data protection. The growing dependence of AI poses challenges in security concerns. It will understand the AI in legal profession while providing legal services. It contrasts AI with major countries like The United States, The United Kingdom and The European Union as a comparative analysis. It will examine that how AI is truly a boon or a bane.

Several philosophers of law have been drawing attention to the role of <i>moral perception</i> in modern legal practices. While perception-oriented approaches to law represent a minority view, I show that they offer a fruitful perspective on what is at stake with the emergence of Artificial Legal Intelligence (ALI). Specifically, I argue that facilitating <i>moral perceptual progress</i> is one of modern law's vital aspirations, baked into its <i>origin story</i> as well as some of its <i>content</i> and <i>processes</i>. I argue that this aspiration threatens to be disrupted by ALI, which increasingly permeates the space of modern law. While my argument lands on a predominantly pessimistic assessment of ALI developments, I will conclude by speculating about potential positive ways in which ALI technologies may also support moral perceptual process.

Philosophical aspects of the methodology of administrative law are studied, systems of philosophical understanding of the norms of administrative law are analysed as a factor that forms the basis for the development of the administrative law science, elements of the social life influence on the development of administrative law norms are determined. Attention is focused on such an aspect of the administrative law philosophy as the protection of law and order and ensuring security, which form the sectoral features of the norms of administrative law implementation. The lack of an applied research base for the philosophy of administrative law, the poorly developed theory and practice of introducing the findings of science into the practical legal field, legal nihilism in legislative work and the decrease in the number and qualifications of scientific personnel increase the degree of threats and risks to the development of the science of administrative law. It is noted that at the current stage of development, the philosophy of law science already has an arsenal of methods that can be used in the process of forming ideas about administrative law and methods of learning administrative law. In fact, we are talking about modern paradigms of administrative law, which determine the ways of development of this science through the prism of various teachings and existing scientific developments. The formation of own scientific school of the philosophy of administrative law and the implementation of the results of scientific acquisitions in practical legal life are the basis for the proper development of the administrative law science.

Contemporary law is considered a social science with important positivist features, this image being comforted by the technical nature of judicial procedures and codes of laws of all kinds. Although it recognizes its "relationships" with the philosophy of law and even with the political theology, current legal science prefers to make few references to these areas of reflection, considering them fictional narratives that are not relevant to the functioning of a concrete legal system. Although most branches of law are currently well anchored in the positivist paradigm, recourse to philosophy becomes necessary again when we deal with subjects such as the genesis of the legal order and the state or when the administration of justice is a judgment on competing (even contradictory) societal values. In such areas of reflection and action, law manifests itself as a philosophical approach, and in some places as an ideological one.

This essay aims to examine certain aspects of Robert Alexy’s conception of the philosophy of law, based on his view about the “nature of legal philosophy”. With regard to the employed research method, the approach is a hermeneutic one, meaning that it closely follows one of Alexy’s articles. The theoretical framework is based on the following elements: the question of the nature of legal philosophy connects two problems (the general nature of philosophy and the special character of “legal philosophy”); reflexivity as the main trait for the concept of philosophy; philosophy as general and systematic reflection about what there is (metaphysics qua ontology), what ought to be done or is good (ethics), and how knowledge about both is possible (epistemology); three dimensions of philosophy (critical, analytic, synthetic or holistic); four theses (1.legal philosophy is not confined to certain special problems connected with law; 2. there are specific problems of legal philosophy;3. there is a special relation between legal philosophy and other provinces of practical philosophy;4. legal philosophy can be successful only if it comes up to the level not only of one or two of these theses but to that of all three). As a result, from Alexy’s point of view the character of legal philosophy is determined by the choice between the comprehensive ideal (thesis 4) and the restrictive maxim (a thesis contradictory to thesis 4) much more radically than by the choice between legal positivism and nonpositivism.

This study explores the application of substantive justice principles in Indonesia’s criminal justice system through the lens of natural law philosophy. Natural law demands a paradigm shift from rigid legal formalism toward an approach that emphasizes moral, humanitarian, and contextual justice values. Within this framework, law is not merely seen as a set of written rules, but as an expression of universal moral principles derived from human reason. The thoughts of philosophers such as John Rawls, Aristotle, and Jeremy Bentham reinforce the urgency of substantive justice, particularly in protecting vulnerable groups, restoring social balance, and achieving public benefit. This research employs a qualitative method with juridical and philosophical approaches, focusing on analyzing the role of law enforcement officials in implementing substantive justice through criminal sentencing. The findings reveal that the prevailing legalistic approach hinders the realization of substantive justice. Major obstacles include unequal access to justice, low integrity among law enforcers, and the dominance of retributive punishment. Although restorative justice practices are beginning to emerge, their implementation remains limited and inconsistent. The study recommends strengthening legal aid for vulnerable groups, internalizing ethical values in legal education and training, and developing policies aligned with substantive justice principles. Collaboration between the state, civil society, and academia is essential to building a criminal justice system that is not only repressive but also transformative and capable of serving as a means of social restoration that upholds human dignity.

This essay offers a critical examination of Bruno Leoni’s philosophy of law, focusing on three interconnected dimensions: the formation of legal rules through individual claims, the representation of legal sources as a spontaneous order emerging from adjudication, and the liberal political theory underlying this framework. The paper advances a twofold argument. First, while Leoni’s conception of law as an order arising from jurisdictional practice convincingly captures an important strand of legal spontaneity, it remains descriptively incomplete and epistemically inadequate insofar as it systematically obscures the political and constitutive dimension of law. In particular, it fails to distinguish between claims operating within an established legal framework and claims that redefine that framework by resolving conflicts over values and power. Second, the article argues that in contemporary contexts marked by private infrastructural powers, digital platforms, and systemic environmental externalities, the realization of individual freedom – central to Leoni’s normative project – requires precisely those forms of positive and regulatory law that his theory sought to marginalize. Reconsidering Leoni in light of Hayek, Schmitt, and ordoliberal thought, the essay concludes that no genuine spontaneous legal order can exist without a complementary decisional and regulatory dimension capable of addressing structural power and safeguarding both freedom and justice.

This essay outlines the academic path of Bruno Leoni from the years of apprenticeship as a voluntary assistant of Giole Solari and Pietro Vaccari up to the professorship in Philosophy of Law in 1942 and the call as extraordinary professor of Doctrine of the State in the Faculty of Political Sciences of Pavia at the end of that same year, when he was carrying out his military service as an officer. The armistice of 8 September 1943 temporarily interrupted his career. Until the Liberation he worked in the I.S.9 section of the Allied secret services which dealt with the rescue and possible evacuation of prisoners or stragglers. Leoni will complete some risky missions. Returning to civilian life in 1946, he began his teaching activity in Pavia in the Faculty of Law since the activity of all the faculties of Political Science, born as fascist, had been suspended. In 1948, in a normalized situation, he was finally able to occupy his chair and was also elected dean of the Faculty. He immediately began to build the architecture, introducing new disciplines and enhancing interdisciplinarity. It also intends to update and de-provincialize the Faculty, making it responsive to the needs of public administration and other social institutions and establishing research relationships with international academies and research centers. For these purposes he also founded the magazine “Il Politico” (1950), the first in Italy in which politics was addressed in scientific terms. The magazine marked a turning point in the life of the Faculty of Political Science in Pavia and brought it into the midst of the scientific and cultural debate of the time. On the one hand, Leoni’s approach was welcomed with great consensus and participation by the students and some of the teachers and on the other hand it found resistance from a certain number of colleagues and from the Rector of the University himself, with whom he came into conflict. In 12 years the Faculty, under his leadership, had grown in number and quality and had gained prestige and visibility. For this reason, in 1960, Leoni did not expect his re-election as dean to be questioned. Instead, this is how it happened. This outcome saddened him greatly. He began traveling at the invitation of the most prestigious universities and moved away from Pavia, even though he continued to fulfill his academic obligations. His death on May 28, 1967 came as a shock. However, his Faculty continued to renew his memory and made his legacy bear fruit, starting with “Il Politico”, which is still published today.

The present conceptual paper addresses selected issues concerning the emergent pluridisciplinary research topic on survivals—an essential part of the phenomenon of nomostasis—with particular emphasis on its theoretical underpinnings and methodological implications. It argues that the concept of a “legal survival” should be understood as a legal form (a legal institution, i.e. a set of functionally interconnected legal norms, a legal concept, a legal principle, or a legal rule) which had emerged in an earlier socio-economic, political or ideological-cultural context, and had had a specific function within that context but did not disappear despite a profound change of that context. A systemic transformation, such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, from capitalism to state socialism, or back to capitalism, is a paradigmatic example of such a profound change of context, though not the only possible one. The paper addresses the ontology of legal survivals, drawing attention to the distinction between written law and legal practice, and formulates three tentative propositions concerning the theory of legal survivals: (1) the law of juristic inertia, which emphasises that lawyers tend to use old forms to express new content; (2) the law of functional adaptation of legal forms, which emphasises that old legal forms may be used to fulfil entirely new social functions; and (3) the law of decontextualisation of legal form, which emphasises that law oftentimes becomes entirely detached from its changing social context, even to the extent of becoming an irritant. Finally, the paper addresses the question of the methodology of studying legal survivals, arguing that it calls for a broadly inclusive pluridisciplinary approach, uniting the methods typical of legal history, comparative law, sociology of law and legal anthropology, with an overarching role for legal theory and the philosophy of law.

This study aims to philosophically analyze the position of Fiqh within the structure of Islamic knowledge, specifically regarding the duality of Islamic Law between Sharia (which is absolute) and Fiqh (which is the product of Ijtihad, or relative). This research employs the philosophy of science approach, focusing on three pillars: ontology (nature), epistemology (method), and axiology (value). Ontologically, Fiqh serves as a bridge connecting the metaphysical reality of Divine law with empirical human actions, thereby rejecting Western reductionism. Epistemologically, Fiqh is validated through the integrative methodology of Ijtihad (combining reason and revelation), consequently producing a plurality of laws (ikhtilaf) in subsidiary matters (furu'iyyah). Axiologically, Fiqh finds its justification in the ultimate objective, which is the Maqasid Sharia (the realization of public benefit). It is concluded that Fiqh occupies a central position as a dynamic and adaptive discipline in social and transactional matters (muamalah), yet remains firmly rooted in the foundational principles of Tauhid guaranteed by the Sharia, thereby providing a significant contribution to the holistic structure of Islamic knowledgeKeywords : Axiology, Epistemology, Fiqh, Maqasid Sharia, Ontology, Philosophy of Law, Sharia.

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. sat on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1889, when, in the case of Claflin v Claflin, he joined the decision that a trust may not be modified if the intention of the testator would be undermined. Claflin rejected Lord Cottenham’s reasoning in Saunders v Vautier that, under certain circumstances, beneficiaries may compel the termination of the trust and transfer the property to them. Claflin v Claflin and Saunders v Vautier are perhaps the two most famous cases in Anglo-American Equity. Through a detailed examination of manuscripts, this article offers a comparative expansion of the US and English histories, and particularly considers the role played by Holmes. Re-enactment theory offers the possibility of creating, or reliving, the intellectual process that led to Claflin, thus revealing a significant moment in the history of US federalism.