Philosophy of biology has the potential to contribute to biology by improving scientific reasoning. However, this potential is largely unrealized because of the lack of awareness by most biologists of what philosophy can offer, because of deficits of biological expertise among most philosophers, and because of adherence to disciplinary norms in philosophy that render much work in philosophy of biology irrelevant to biologists. We believe that philosophy of biology will contribute little to biology without a change of practice. We provide guidelines ("comments" sensu Slobodkin 1975, "commandments" sensu Kornberg 2000, 2003, Francis et al. 2007) for how biologists can better engage with philosophy and for how philosophers can better engage with biology so as to create a "philosophical biology" that improves our biological understanding.

Research in molecular cell biology has typically been focused on identifying specific genes and proteins responsible for cellular phenomena. However, it is increasingly recognized that the function of many biomolecules is variable and context dependent, raising the question if specific components can adequately explain cellular mechanisms. Philosophers of biology have proposed an alternative perspective known as process ontology, posing that not objects or molecules, but processes are the fundamental units of living systems. Process ontology is gaining popularity in biological theory, but remains challenging to integrate into scientific practice. Here, we assess the applicability of the process perspective in the context of a concrete biological system, namely polarization in budding yeast. We identify relevant processes in yeast polarization at different timescales and examine how these processes affect our understanding of polarity. Using this case study, we demonstrate how the processual perspective evokes new kinds of scientific questions and provide concrete pointers for incorporating processual thought into cell biological research.

Drawing on a playful notebook entry from Hans Jonas’s student years, this article examines why Jonas consistently sidestepped Friedrich Schelling’s Naturphilosophie in his writings on philosophical biology. It begins by outlining the many affinities between the two thinkers, as noted in previous scholarship: both articulate an asubjective teleology, both understand organisms as self-individuating unities, and both reject mechanistic reductions of life. It then considers several possible explanations for Jonas’s dismissal of Schelling, arguing that their deepest point of divergence lies in their differing attitudes toward the anorganic realm. Whereas Schelling understands nature – organic and inorganic alike – as animated by a primordial, dynamic freedom, Jonas draws a sharp ontological boundary between living and nonliving matter: arguing that freedom originates only with metabolism, while the inorganic world is characterized by blind necessity and existential opacity. This split yields fundamentally different conceptions of the relationship between philosophy and nature, of action, and, ultimately, of what it means to live and act responsibly.

: <i>Life and Mind: Theoretical and Applied Issues in Contemporary Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences</i>

ABSTRACT Conceptual engineering, broadly speaking, involves improving our concepts via inclusion of new criteria, creating new concepts, and eliminating old concepts. However, what sorts of considerations count as improvements depends on the context. For example, some social concepts are also scientific concepts and play important roles in both domains. One way to engineer these concepts is to treat them as primarily scientific concepts answerable to scientific aims, but not answerable to ethical and social aims. Recently, however, philosophers have engaged in some conceptual work on the scientific concept of sex, and some authors have included ethical and social aims in their conceptual work (Watkins, Aja, and Marina DiMarco. 2025. “Sex Eliminativism.” Biology & Philosophy 40 (1): 2. and Richardson, Sarah S. 2022. “Sex Contextualism.” Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 14 (0)), and philosophers of science more broadly have done conceptual work emphasizing the purpose-sensitivity of our scientific concepts (Intemann, Kristen. 2015. “Distinguishing between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2): 217–32, Brigandt 2020). I propose a conditional argument: if philosophers of science believe that scientific concepts (including sex) ought to be sensitive to nonepistemic aims such that they may be eliminated, then the purpose-sensitive approach fails to provide support for this claim. While other proponents of aims approaches and similar views have not argued that ethical considerations should ‘trump’ other considerations, I argue that in some circumstances, plausibly, that ethical considerations should at least be permitted to trump other considerations or constrain the options, given reasonably high moral stakes as well as some epistemic considerations.

The article proposes that the concept offree will can be analysed outside the framework of traditional philosophical debates, withinthe context of philosophy of biology and discussions on spontaneous behaviour from anevolutionary perspective. The author argues that free will can be understood as a manifes-tation of nondeterministic behaviour, even in organisms possessing only rudimentary formsof consciousness. The paper references Björn Brembs’ model which describes spontaneousactivity as a nonlinear process. According to the author, this model aligns well with thebiological theory of behavioural variability. Björn Brembs’ thesis on behavioural variabilitystates that the spontaneous behaviour of animals (including humans) arises from nondeter-ministic processes and is the result of nonlinear mechanisms in biological systems. Accordingto Brembs, behavioural variability is not merely the outcome of random fluctuations orchaos but emerges from the intrinsic dynamics of biological systems, which can generatespontaneity in a systematic and predictable way within certain boundaries. Brembs’ modelsuggests that spontaneous activity is crucial for the survival of organisms, as it enables themto adapt and respond flexibly to changing environments, not relying solely on simple cause­‐and­‐effect determinism. These processes can be mathematically described as nonlinear,meaning that even small changes in initial conditions can lead to significant differences inbehaviour. As a result, behavioural variability becomes a biologically advantageous mecha-nism, enhancing an organism’s ability to explore its environment and avoid threats.

There has been a long-standing debate regarding the theory of “Species as Individuals (SAI)” within biological philosophy. Scholars such as Ghiselin, Hull, Mishler, and Brandon have played pivotal roles in defending this theory, demonstrating species as logical, historical, and causal entities in detail. However, the term “individual”, which has become exclusive to species, is actually used in a metaphorical sense. When combined with the aggregation phenomenon and integrative nature of species, the hypothesis of SAI can be inferred. Nevertheless, the theory of “Species as Classes (SAC)” also has a strong foundation. Scholars have proposed several reconciliation frameworks to address the issue of whether species are classes or individuals, arguing that species can be both classes and individuals. In fact, SAI can account for the integration and diachrony of species, which are products of processes and processes themselves, with similarity arising from genetic processes. Consequently, SAI exhibits stronger explanatory power, encompassing the content of SAC while achieving its transcendence. This thus forms a new theoretical framework: SAI = SAC + Process/Lineage Relationship + Systematicness/Causal Integration.

The article is dedicated to the study of concepts of goal-directedness in the philo­sophy of biology, such as teleology and teleonomy. The author analyzes the his­torical evolution of ideas of purposiveness in 20th-century philosophy of biology, critiques teleological approaches in the context of modern evolutionary theory, and explores contemporary biological thought. The article examines the concept of teleonomy proposed by Colin Pittendrigh, which interprets goal-directedness as a result of the internal organization of systems, excluding externally predeter­mined goals. The conceptual differences between teleology and teleonomy are highlighted. The main focus of the article is on the concept of autopoiesis de­veloped by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. This concept describes living systems as autonomous, self-reproducing structures that interact with their environment through the mechanism of structural coupling. The author provides a detailed examination of the ontology of structural determinism, asserting that the behavior of systems is determined by their internal structure, while exter­nal influences merely trigger structurally consistent changes. The article aims to demonstrate the genetic connection between Wiener’s cybernetic teleology, von Foerster’s second-order cybernetics – both sources of the theory of autopoiesis – and the concept of structural coupling of an autopoietic system with its environ­ment. It also seeks to reveal the teleonomy of autopoietic systems as manifested within the framework of the concept of structural determinism. The study shows that Maturana’s concept of structural coupling can be explained through the de­scription of negative feedback between the organism and the contingent external environment. It is demonstrated that neither structural determinism nor the con­cept of autopoiesis imposes an absolute prohibition on teleonomic descriptions of autopoietic systems, which is connected to the unique interpretation of causa­lity and organization of such systems in Maturana’s philosophy.

Recent studies in biology and ecology show striking convergences with process philosophy (PP). Biologists today are debating the real nature of evolution and of life itself, which is increasingly considered as a set of interrelated processes rather than a set of tangible species and material lineages. This perspective of focusing on changes can also be found with ecologists and environmental ethicists, whose studies feed into as well as draw on PP principles. Despite such connections, the PP-based approach has not yet been adopted in ecology or biology, and appears to be rarely used in practice. We face a problem: How to transform PP from an epistemological pillar into a useful ontological pillar in ecology and further on in biology? To answer, we developed here simple qualitative, discrete-event ecosystem models based on a process network representation instead of on a more tangible interaction network. Comparing rigorous models developed with a traditional materialist view, like those commonly used in ecology, with models built here on a PP-based view, provides a first illustration of the way PP could be concretely applied in and could benefit to ecology and biology, by directly handling processes. Hence, putting PP into practice suggests handling processes first, and then only deducing objects lasting in time and composing the system under study. We also show with examples that following PP principles may sometimes lead to different conclusions, despite handling the same material components of the system under study. Additionally, PP sheds new light on the age-old pattern/process debate and on some others in biology and ecology.

ABSTRACT In contemporary biology and philosophy of biology, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the nature of natural selection. Over recent decades, a wide variety of interpretations and approaches to natural selection have been proposed. In a recent paper, Wei (2024, “Natural Selection, Mechanism and Phenomenon.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 37:37–50.) critically examines current mechanistic accounts of natural selection. For this purpose, he focuses on a particular aspect of the mechanistic approach: a mechanism is always a mechanism for a phenomenon. Wei introduces two criteria that the phenomenon assigned to natural selection should fulfil and, on this basis, evaluates phenomena previously considered. Contrary to Pérez-González and Luque (2019, “Evolutionary Causes as Mechanisms: A Critical Analysis.” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 41:13.), Wei argues that the increase in the frequency of fitter traits cannot be considered the phenomenon for which natural selection is responsible. The aim of this paper is to analyse and engage with Wei’s critique. We contend that his arguments face significant challenges and do not substantially weaken the assignment of increasing the frequency of fitter traits.

We are all familiar with the phrases ‘philosophy of history’, ‘philosophy of biology’, etc. and we serve our purpose to analyze them in virtue of the code that every philosopher is familiar with, and this code has become more of a creed. Many names are available for this practice, such as; critical evaluation, theory or theoretical structure, the range of questions, methods or principles, etc. Now, if we overturn the phrase as in ‘philosophy of history’ to ‘history of philosophy’, it seems that we found something concrete, something Natural, which partially or absolutely transcends some of the intentions of philosophy. At the same time, every philosopher would insist that the term 'history' itself and its meanings are inherently groomed by philosophy itself. But indulging in this overturning, we believe, we could yield other possibilities that were almost blind to us until now. Thus, in this paper, we try to observe philosophy from the dilated lens of biology, ascertaining the true nature of philosophy; as being fundamental as life itself; as being a living world. This process, at the same time, also reciprocate to the capability of the methodology inherent in the theoretical biology, on its part to analyze and explicate the natural features of subjects like philosophy. Hence, we attempt to prove that philosophy is also the other name for Nature, by putting, and reiterating, it under the lens of biology.

This essay traces the philosophical development of the concept of organic life and nature from Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature through British Idealism to the twentieth-century thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Hans Jonas. It highlights how Hegel’s idea of the organism as a self-producing, purposive unity influenced later thinkers, directly or indirectly, shaping views of nature as inherently processual, relational, and teleological. By uncovering the Hegelian echoes in British Idealism and beyond, the essay argues for the continuing relevance of speculative conceptions of life and nature. This reconstruction offers new insights into contemporary philosophical biology and environmental ethics, suggesting that the categories of organism, purposiveness, and selfhood remain vital for rethinking the place of life within nature today.

This discussion note contrasts Richard Dawkins' genecentric neo-Darwinian theory of evolution with Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy to propose a philosophical critique of mechanistic evolutionary models. Dawkins' The Selfish Gene frames evolution as a struggle of selfish genes, with organisms as mere vehicles. Whitehead's process philosophy, however, reimagines evolution as a creative, relational process driven by creativity and subjective aim, where chaos fosters novelty. Drawing on the chaostability hypothesis, which posits that higher chaos enhances system stability, I argue that Whitehead's framework offers a holistic alternative to Dawkins' reductionism, emphasizing evolution as a dance of becoming. This note invites further exploration of evolution's metaphysical dimensions in the philosophy of biology.

Abstract The arterial vascularization and regenerative capacity of vital organs (brain, heart, and lungs) in modern humans remain surprisingly limited, challenging the expectation that natural selection would have optimized these critical traits. We aim to evaluate whether Darwinian processes have enhanced the arterial efficiency and regenerative potential in vital organs. Insights derived from a seminar at the Anatomy Department, College of Medicine, University of Baghdad (March 19, 2025), supplemented by the PubMed literature on comparative anatomy, vascular biology, and regenerative medicine. Vital organs exhibit sparse collateral circulation and minimal self-renewal compared with specific nonvital ones. This paradox suggests that either selective pressures have been insufficient, hidden trade-offs have constrained optimization, or alternative mechanisms (e.g., developmental bottlenecks or “deep-time” evolutionary trajectories) govern these traits. Hypotheses range from a current optimization plateau to prospective future enhancements and even non-Darwinian interpretations. In conclusion, the persistent vascular and regenerative limitations of the key organs imply that natural selection’s role may be constrained or redirected by unknown factors. Addressing this biological puzzle will require a multidisciplinary effort spanning comparative anatomy, molecular genetics, evolutionary theory, and philosophy of biology to determine whether these features reflect true stagnation, ongoing adaptation, or inherent constraints.

ABSTRACT A long-established consensus in the philosophy of biology holds that biological species are not natural kinds with intrinsic essences, despite what Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) thought. This anti-essentialist consensus has recently been challenged by Michael Devitt, who insists that it rests on a mistake. According to Devitt, philosophers of biology have failed to recognise the distinction between two quite different questions one can ask about species: the Category question and the Taxon question. The various ‘species concepts’ found in the biological literature are attempts to answer the former but are silent about the latter, Devitt claims, so do not conflict with essentialism, pace what philosophers of biology believe. By carefully attending to the logical relation between the Category and Taxon questions, Devitt’s claim that the anti-essentialist consensus rests on a mistake is shown to be untenable.

This paper begins with some brief intellectual autobiography, recalling my first engagement with philosophy of biology. The substantive part of the paper then focuses on the plurality of possible classifications central to the theses of scientific disunity and metaphysical disorder developed in my early career. After discussing this in terms of biological classification, and introducing the reasons for thinking of classifications as typically value-laden, I discuss two sets of human classifications bearing on normatively vital questions, those around sex and gender and those involved in the distinctions between human races.

This article argues for a formalist approach to biological individuality, bridging formalist ways of reading in cultural and literary studies with contemporary debates in the philosophy of biology. Central to this discussion is the idea that the question of what constitutes an individual, spanning across domains such as biology, politics, law, and literature, is essentially a question of form: the conditions by which we individualise enforce a specific pattern through which we interpret the world, whether it is the natural world, the social world, or the fictional world of a literary text. Taking this as a starting point, the article adopts a strategic formalist method as articulated by Caroline Levine, employing a close-reading method that asks how forms of individuality, whether they are phenomenal, theoretical, or cultural, operate as they move beyond their designated system of discourse; what they afford when they travel across dissimilar materials; and what occurs when they intersect with other forms, be they sociopolitical, poetic, or aesthetic. Considering literary and sociopolitical forms on the same plane of existence as theoretical forms of individuality enables a needed conversation on the affordances of forms in both the production of knowledge and in the cultural imagination.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the philosophical foundations of Goethe’s morphological studies, in particular his concept of the ‘archetypal plant', which can be described as the dynamic principle of a living surface that governs plant formation through alternating processes of expansion and contraction. The Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner claimed that Goethe’s approach offers a scientifically grounded approach to understanding organic form and development through what may be termed empirically based, productive intellectual intuition, namely the mental reconstruction of an organism’s formative principle and laws. Here it is shown that Goethe’s rational organicism, as elaborated by Steiner, provides a conceptual and methodological framework that suggests a solution to the long-standing problem of understanding organismic properties like autopoiesis, autonomy and agency. Yet, Goethe struggled to identify a comparable principle for animals. Steiner argued that animal life is determined by a psychological principle—a non-physical centre of sensation and movement that structures the organism in relation to its environment—and that this, too, can be grasped in productive intuition. The paper reconstructs the animal archetype by delineating its essential features: the relations between its interior and exterior, realized in sensory, nutritive and motor functions. The study concludes that Goethe’s rational organicism can serve as a methodological complement to the organicism of the current philosophy of biology.

Modularity in biological thought: Sketch of a unifying theoretical framework.

A Contribution to the Philosophy of Biology