Philosophy Of Action Research Articles

Phenomenological Preconditions of the Concept of Film-as-Philosophy

This article surveys influential views on the topic of film-as-philosophy, principally the positions of Bruce Russell, Thomas Wartenburg, Noël Carroll, and Stephen Mulhall. Historically, this conversation has been restricted to a somewhat conservative view initiated by Russell and defended by others, according to which the film medium is fundamentally incapable of generating positive philosophical achievement in purely cinematic (i.e. medium-specific) fashion. One of my interests is to show how the dialogue initiated by Russell suffers from relying on overly restrictive notions of what philosophy is and the ways in which it occurs. A goal of the article is to articulate the phenomenological suppositions embedded in the very concept of film-as-philosophy, particularly insofar as the concept seems to assume a phenomenological model that unites screen and viewer. I argue that the origins of the debate overlook the aspect in which films do not engage in philosophical activity completely in their own right, but that instead, this occurrence is essentially predicated upon the participative aspect of the viewer experience. In the course of summarizing each of the leading positions, I describe how the history of the debate has gradually anticipated an appreciation of the phenomenological manner in which screen and viewer co-instantiate philosophy’s occurrence through film. I defend Mulhall’s position and devote some space to drawing out the manner in which his argumentation regarding film-as-philosophy supposes a fundamental screen-viewer dynamic that is phenomenological in nature.

Iniciando em Hegel para compreender a fenomenologia e o existencialismo

The author intend to make considerations about Hegel’s System that can to emphasize your importance for a dialogue with thinkers contemporary for him and others most recent; especially, phenomenological and existentialism thinkers, since some main points such as essence, existence, phenomenon, death and concepts like Me, world, finitude; From the author point of view the Hegel’s thought can contribute to increase the actual Philosophy about theses essential matters and questions; in special way, the author still defend a new reading of the hegelian’s text from the perspective of a Metaphysical founded in a non-material basis. For such, the author support the heart of the text in the frame of quotations constant and systematic retrieved from the Hegel’s work.

Les deux sources du bonheur humain: contemplation intellective et vision de Dieu. Avicenne, Albert le Grand

This contribution aims at putting forth two different receptions of the Aristotelian conception of the intellectual contemplation as the unique source of human happiness. As it is defined in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle understands intellectual contemplation as a philosophical activity, based on the same model as the divine activity of the prime mover. Following Aristotle, Avicenna defines beatitude in pure philosophical terms, thus excluding any religious requisite or divine intervention. Albert the Great appears to be extremely dependent from Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s influences but includes theological contemplation based on the lux gloriae for human beatitude. Beyond the historical interest, this paper hopes to provide an insight into the relationship between terrestrial happiness and celestial beatitude and to show how philosophy and theology interact to construe such a relation.

Genitalidad e (im)potencia del pensamiento: Heidegger, Deleuze, Agamben

This paper reports how according to Heidegger, Deleuze, and Agamben, both the notion of thinking and of philosophical activity, far from meaning the same, involve fundamental differences. However, our reading of the three authors also proposes to discover a common affiliation related to the contrast between “doxa” and “thinking”; Heidegger’s, Deleuze’s and Agamben’s are three ways by which we can understand the “birth” or “emergence” of thinking as an experience or activity that should not be understood as stemming from the field of communication or re-presentation. All these considerations converge finally in the subtle quality of thought as liminal “pow-er” that, according to each author, must also be understood in its paradoxical quality of “impotence”, quality much closer to the experience of in-corporation as an event (Heidegger); to the pre-supposed, non-discursive moment –and simultaneously con- stituent– of either philosophical, artistic, or scientific “creation” (Deleuze); or to the pure enjoyment of power, as the experience of a type of “deprivation”, both positive and unlimited, as well as eluding any “function” (Agamben).

Socrates Ex Machina: The Preamble of Plato’s Laches (178a1-181d7)

The preamble to Plato's Laches is an integral part of the whole dialogue. It puts forward the fundamental beliefs of Socrates' interlocutors in an intelligent way, while highlighting the ideological confusion caused by their uncritical acceptance of traditional beliefs. Thus, Socrates' interlocutors are brought to an insoluble impasse. Plato offers a way out of this impasse by introducing the figure of Socrates, who emerges as the literary instrument of Plato's criticism of Athens' educational system. Socrates' elenchus shows that the only way to achieve the real benefit, the benefit to the soul, is to lead a life of philosophical activity in pursuit of the truth.

The Methodological Turn in Philosophy

Controversies have always characterized philosophy as expression of its typical critical attitude that depends on the complexity of the fundamental philosophical issues. Traditionally these discrepancies regarded the answers given to certain questions and, therefore, the content of the opposite doctrines, as all legitimately belonging to philosophy. With modernity the determination of the correct method of thinking becomes the necessary precondition for philosophizing and represents the core of the philosophical activity itself. As a consequence people adopting a certain method of thinking often qualify as non-philosophical the discourse of those who do not belong to their methodological school, independently of the content of the doctrine they defend. This dominance of the methodological concern, on the contrary, has produced the discovery and deepening of several “thinking methods,” whose plurality must be considered a wealth and not a reason for skepticism, since it can offer to philosophy the tools for better coping with the increasing complexity of its fundamental issues.

Oxford Philosophy in the 1950s

AbstractDuring the period roughly of the 1950s Oxford was generally regarded as the most important center of philosophy in the world, the one where the most interesting philosophical activity was going on. It was indeed so distinctive that the very name ‘Oxford Philosophy’ meant not just the philosophy that happened to be practiced in Oxford but a special kind of philosophy that gave a central importance to the study of language as the major topic of philosophical investigation. It is not an exaggeration to describe this period as a golden age of Oxford Philosophy. Quite by coincidence, my initial stay in Oxford from 1952–1959 happened to be during the high watermark of Oxford Philosophy.

Ein Brief aus Chile

Abstract In this “Letter from Chile” I describe and comment the main features of philosophical activity in Chile. My perspective is related to my own academic experience: that of a Chilean academic, who earned his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin, worked in that same university for six years as an Assistant Professor (wissenschaftlicher Assistent), and has been an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago for the last eleven years. The first part of the text offers a review of the historical development of philosophy in Chile. Afterwards, I refer to the current situation of our academic philosophy, analyzing various aspects: issues, currents, institutions, publications, research system, among others. Finally, I outline, from the above, some assessments and a general diagnosis of the present situation of philosophy in my country.

Forward to the Past

Forward to the Past Dimitri Gutas Qu’est-ce que la philosophie islamique? (What is Islamic philosophy?). By Christian Jambet . Folio Essais 547 . Paris : Gallimard , 2011 . Pp. 472 . isbn 978-2-070-33647-0 . “Quaint” may be just about the most charitable thing that could be said about Qu’estce que la philosophie islamique? (What is Islamic philosophy?) by Christian Jambet, an opaque and turbid book that presents itself as scholarship and purports to answer the question of its title. Put in the terms of this general question, the subject is vast and complicated, especially since it has been at the forefront of scholarly discussion for some time now, and its treatment accordingly requires maximum procedural clarity, precise depiction of historical contexts and definition of terms, and strict delimitation of objectives. But this book does nothing of the sort and, situating itself quite beyond the pale, contributes nothing to the discussion. For already from the very beginning Jambet despairs of his subject because, he claims, Islamic philosophy is an inchoate mass that cannot be identified. He says, in effect, Islamic philosophy is a philosophy that cannot be found, and is an activity that is encountered where one does not expect it, even among those who deny or reprove it. . . . There are no stable periodizations, no definitive list of names and works, no well-defined border that is guaranteed by the universal agreement of opinions.1 Although Jambet acknowledges that to understand Islamic philosophy properly one has to conduct minute studies of the logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics of the philosophers, he abstains from such an activity and proposes instead to engage in “a preliminary reflection upon the finality of philosophical activity, finality of forms that it assumes and acts that it performs, both in understanding and in action.”2 He proposes to do this by following as leitmotif “the theological questions that are asked at the center of systematic philosophy,” and this not by summarizing the content of the philosophical sciences as they were and are in the Islamic world but by “examining the predicative connection between philosophy and Islam in the common expression ‘Islamic philosophy.’ ”3 What led him to this approach, he confesses, is his “recurring astonishment faced with a philosophy that situates itself in a religious context.”4 It is clear, then, that Jambet’s project is to analyze how philosophy in the Islamic world relates to the religion of Islam—a creditable project, to be sure, had it not posed itself as being an answer to the question “What is Islamic Philosophy?”; the question should instead have been, “How does philosophy relate to the religion of Islam in the Islamic world?” Through this legerdemain—quite beneath standards of scholarly procedure—Jambet equates philosophy with Islamic religion, as, he confesses, [End Page 1042] “une philosophie qui se situe dans un contexte religieux” (p. 20). Now this amazing statement can be understood in only two ways. (1) It is a nonsensical tautological statement: since philosophy was practiced and written in the Islamic world, it is by definition in a “religious context,” which applies to all philosophy—Greek philosophy also was practiced and written in a religious context since the Greeks also had a religion, et cetera—but I would doubt that this is what Jambet means. (2) It is thus impossible to understand this statement in any other way than that for Jambet Islamic philosophy is Islamic religion, to the exclusion of all subjects treated in it. For if we take the parts of philosophy traditionally treated in Arabic—logic, various parts of natural science (all the way from its principles, like the notions of time and motion, to meteorology, zoology, and botany), the mathematical sciences, metaphysics (in the Aristotelian sense, in which it was practiced in Arabic philosophy), and the practical sciences—it beggars reason to try and find “un contexte religieux” for them. So what his statement above means is that he does not consider all these parts of traditional philosophy as parts of Islamic philosophy. Jambet has thus managed to write a book about “what is Islamic philosophy” by eliminating, by definition, from consideration most of its parts—indeed all the philosophical parts—and...

What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?

Most of us have settled views about various intellectual debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince one's opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? This article argues that the surprising answer to this question is no—you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find those reasons compelling. The article then briefly looks at some implications of this conclusion.

An Interpretation and Extension of Sellars's Views on the Epistemic Status of Philosophical Propositions

This article examines Wilfrid Sellars's views on the epistemic status of philosophical propositions. It suggests that according to Sellars philosophical propositions are normative and practically oriented. They do not form a theory for the description of reality; their function is, rather, that of motivating actions which aim at changing reality. The article argues that the role of philosophical propositions can be illuminated if they are understood as a special kind of (proposed) “material” rules of inference, provided that the latter are construed as being firmly entrenched in practice. To this end, a distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” anomalies is drawn to better elucidate—and in some cases criticize and further expand—Sellars's position on the relation between the theoretical and practical dimensions of philosophical activity. In this connection, the Weberian notion of the “disenchantment of the world” is used to throw light on the relation between these two dimensions.

Dos dilemas judiciales en Ronald Dworkin.

Desde disciplinas jurídicas contemporáneas como la teoría de la argumentación jurídica sobresale el trato de los denominados casos difíciles como asunto de metodología. Así, tras afrontar nociones formalistas y antiformalistas del Derecho, la tradición jurídica de Occidente no ha logrado responder de manera unívoca a la solución de los casos difíciles. En la práctica del Derecho sobresalen por su complejidad casos constitucionales difíciles, cuyo tratamiento no estriba en el procedimiento mecanicista de la decisión judicial, frente a lo que sobresalen disciplinas auxiliares como la Tópica Jurídica, de Viehweg y el uso de los razonamientos dialécticos ante a los casos constitucionales difíciles. Como lo pensó Dworkin, lo anterior supone que persiste una actividad filosófica en la función judicial, al menos respecto a la solución de los casos difíciles.

Sobre un posible sentido de la invocación al Aér en "Nubes" de Aristófanes

In the comedy The Clouds, from the comic poet Aristophanes, the Aér is mentioned three times, twice by Socrates and one by Strepsiades. Translators, commentators and critics have always considered that when this element was mentioned, it referred to the cosmological doctrines of the philosophers of the phýsis, especially of the physikós Diogenes of Apolonia. According to the testimonies of Plato, Socrates would have developed, at the same time or even with preference to the philosophical activity, the practice of spirituality, exercising and developing control and breathing concentration techniques. The Clouds also offers testimonies to elucidate this aspect of Socrate’s historic personality.

Introduction to International Symposium on Richard Rorty

This issue of Contemporary Pragmatism is devoted to reassessing the figure of Richard Rorly, as an intellectual and a person, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of lus death. In May 2013 in Buenos Aires a diverse group of scholars came together for a symposium organized by Graduate Program of Philosophy and the History of Science at the Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero (UNTREF), which we had the honor to coordinate, along with Michael Williams, the invaluable help of Cesar Lorenzano and Veronica Tozzi, and the support of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP).The symposium was an opportunity to honor the memory of the author of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in the presence of former students, friends, colleagues, and scholars of lus work, from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Pera, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. In a spirit that himself would have appreciated, also paramount was a critical engagement with his work and its importance both within and outside philosophy for nearly 50 years. This issue contains some of the contributions presented at the symposium and evidences the ongoing relevance of Rortian ideas and texts for a wide range of philosophical areas, including epistemology, political philosophy, etlucs, philosophy of language, aesthetics, and philosophy of science, to name only a few. Rorty continues as a great heir of classical pragmatist tradition and its philosophical spirit of not being tied to fashion or committed to excessive specialization.The articles that follow aie organized into two sections, one directed toward epistemological issues, and one attuned to topics of practical philosophy, with emphasis on political philosophy, ethics, philosophy of history and the links between literary and philosophical activity. What follows is a brief outline of the articles.The first section opens with Richard J. Bernstein's, 'So Much the Worse for your Old Intuitions, Start Working up Some New Ones', the newest entry in the senes of theoretical interventions that the author of Beyond Relativism and Objectivism has been developing since at least the 1980's on the work of Ins friend and former colleague at Yale. Tins time, Bernstein focuses on Rorty's critique of the foundational role of intuitions, as pre-linguistic entities that serve as epistemological givens and as basic beliefs that allow for resolving philosophical disagreement. Bernstein deploys Ins analysis of these ciitical arguments and resumes Ins interrogation of Rortian antirepresentationalism, which claims a needless all or nothing choice between two conceptions of rationality, an algorithmic one and an incommensurabilitist one.In Roity and Dewey on Warrant, Angel Faema traces similarities and differences between the thought of and John Dewey, whose work was always considered by the author of Contingency, Irony Solidarity as an essential background of Iris project but with whom he also remained in disagreement on some specific insights. The text stresses the Rortian ambivalence with Dewey, but also emphasizes the nodal points of coincidence that both philosophers have about the concept of epistemological warrant. Faema's dialectical strategy is to bring both philosophers together through a questioning of Robert Brandom's criticisms of classic pragmatism.In How to Be a Pragmatist Without Surrendering to Naturalism, Eleonora Cresto presents the various ways in which Rorty is assumed to be a naturalist and draws attention to the possibility of reaching, from Darwinian premises, an uncritical form of naturalism that embodies serious difficulties for an account of the phenomenon of rationality from a first person point of view. Consequently, she defends the idea that there is a sense in which it is true that reason cannot be naturalized, and that it can be deployed from a pragmatist perspective perfectly compatible with Rortian antirepresentationalism. …

Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt , Band 1, 8.-10. Jahrhundert (Philosophy in the Islamic world, volume 1, Eighth to tenth centuries) edited by Ulrich Rudolph, with the assistance of Renate Würsch (review)

Reviewed by: Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt, Band 1, 8.-10. Jahrhundert (Philosophy in the Islamic world, volume 1, Eighth to tenth centuries) edited by Ulrich Rudolph, with the assistance of Renate Würsch Tony Street Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt, Band 1, 8.-10. Jahrhundert (Philosophy in the Islamic world, volume 1, Eighth to tenth centuries). Edited by Ulrich Rudolph, with the assistance of Renate Würsch. Completely revised, new edition, edited by Helmut Holzhey. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, established by Friedrich Ueberweg. Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2012. Pp. xxxv + 612. Hardcover SFr. 200, €167.50, isbn 978-3-7965-2632-9. Philosophie in der Islamischen Welt, Band 1, 8.-10. Jahrhundert, edited by Ulrich Rudolph, is the first in a series of four volumes devoted to the history of philosophy in the Islamic world from earliest times down to today.1 Part of a larger project that has been under way, in one way or another, for 150 years, this volume marks an epochal moment in the study of Arabic philosophy. Never before in the field has [End Page 515] there been a summary exposition so comprehensive, bibliographically rich, and conceptually well-defined. This volume will henceforth be the first port of call for those setting out to work on the three centuries that saw the inception of Arabic philosophy. The series could not have had a more promising beginning. This volume, then, covers the eighth to tenth centuries c.e., volume 2 will cover the eleventh and twelfth, volume 3 the thirteenth to eighteenth, and volume 4 the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The introduction to this, the first volume, is intended to serve as an outline of the goals and methods of the entire series, and is in itself a minor masterpiece. Distinguishing three significant earlier paradigms of research into Arabic philosophy (Renan’s, ‘Abdarrāziq’s, and Corbin’s) and taking lessons from their respective shortcomings, Rudolph has decided to adopt an open-ended account that resists the tendency to stop at 1198 (the death of Averroes), and that considers output from everywhere in the Islamic world (rather than just from Iran, for example), but which isolates falsafa as a distinct scholarly tradition that can be considered apart from the Islamic sciences that developed alongside it such as jurisprudence and theology. (There is, indeed, a short essay concluding the introduction [pp. xxx–xxxii] in which cogent reasons are given for taking falsafa to be distinct from theology.) The work especially of Gutas and Endress drives the introduction of a new paradigm of research, built around the recognition in the 1980s of the pre-eminence of Avicenna (d. 1037) (dealt with in the next volume), whose philosophy continued to be developed for several centuries after his death. One of the reasons why the older paradigms of research offered limited coverage of philosophical activity in the Islamic world comes down to how narrowly the term “philosophy” has been understood. Because due weight is given here to the fact that philosophy is an essentially contested notion (though nonetheless capable of being broadly defined [p. xxv]), preconceived accounts of what constitutes philosophy in the Islamic world (e.g., that it be necessarily derived from Greek antecedents, or expressive of an Islamic specificity) are set to one side. In the same spirit, the editor has also decided to evade the question of how best to designate the object of study (whether as Arabic philosophy or Islamic philosophy), and has instead adopted a neutral solution that dates back at least as far as Gardet and Anawati: the series is—as declared in the title—on philosophy in the Islamic world. I confess that I am slightly uneasy with this decision, though it may be that I have failed to learn the lessons of history set out earlier in the introduction. I understand the problem of using “Arabic philosophy” (my own preferred term): it might be taken to exclude work since the thirteenth century in Persian and other vernaculars. It would be inexcusable for the present series not to cover, say, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Asās al-Iqtibās (a major work on logic written in Persian in...

LA FILOSOFÍA COMO MODO DE SABER Aristóteles, Metafísica, A, 1 y 2, (980 a 21 - 983 a 24).

Intentamos desarrollar los elementos básicos en los que se funda la definición aristotélica de filosofía a la que las más de las veces se recurre como si fuera comprensible de suyo y suficiente para una adecuada comprensión del filosofar. Teniendo en cuenta el texto aristotélico abordamos la reflexión en torno a la filosofía desde dos perspectivas principales: como modo de saber superior según el entendimiento común del griego, entendida como σοφία, y como modo superior de saber teorético propiamente dicho, como φιλοσοφὶα. Para ello consideraremos los distintos modos de saber partiendo de las condiciones naturales que los hacen posibles y deteniéndonos en cada uno de ellos en particular. Concluiremos con una definición provisional de filosofía según Aristóteles, en cuanto que la dilucidada no es la única posible para el estagirita.

The political and conception of the self – a Wittgensteinian approach to political thought/ Polityka bez podmiotu – wittgensteinowska perspektywa w myśli politycznej

AbstractThe paper proposes to examine the variety of ways political theorists understand the political importance of Wittgenstein’s thought. Any analysis of Wittgensteinian political philosophy start from different understanding of this philosophy of language and possible ends of philosophical activity. However, each attempt to interpret the significance of Wittgenstein’s work to political thought anticipates or is linked to a particular conception of the self, a particular conception of the human being that is not easy to reconcile with the Wittgenstein of Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations. For that reasons any Wittgensteinian approach to political thought should make an attention to the way Wittgenstein discusses on the self, the “I”, the way we use the word “I”.

Нижегородская легенда о В. Г. Короленко: полифония мифа и контекста

In the article the author researches social and communicative image of writer – the part of his literary identity. In the focus of attention are origin and features of functioning of Nizhny Novgorod's legend about Korolenko. The author analyzes perception of writer by both general population and literati, for example M. Gorky and S. Yeleonsky. At that time V. Korolenko published anticorruption article in local newspapers, as volunteer helped to fight hunger (1893) and he traveled across region of Nizhny Novgorod. In his literary work he reflected these activities. As well it was a reason, why peasants and the urban poor began to see a “mysterious prince” at him. We found several reasons of prince’s image appearance: 1) surname Korolenko sounds like “korolevich” (prince in Russian), 2) it correlates with actual philosophy of populism and 3) it reflects archetypal conception of just ruler, defending the truth and travelling incognito through his kingdom. As well V. Korolenko himself used the story of the prince errant. For example in the story “The blind musician” the main character Peter explored the world together with blind beggars and as a result he had got psychological transformation. F. Batyushkov the critic compared this scene with the Bible story of “Proud king Haggai”. So the author of this article showed and commented features of writer’s public perception within the framework of literary history and archetypical story. As a result we have an objective view of the perception of Korolenko by his contemporaries and the whole writer’s social role in 1880 – 1890's.

Metaxological ‘Yes’ and Existential ‘No’: William Desmond and Atheism

This article explores and critically assesses the metaxological account of a philosophy of God professed by William Desmond. Postmodern reflection on the philosophy of God has a tendency to focus on the 'signs' of God and urges for a passive acceptance of these signs. Desmond argues, contrary to this tendency, for a mindful togetherness of philosophical activity and religious passivity. After exploring Desmond's thought on this topic, I move to assess his 'metaxological yes' to God as the agapeic origin from an existential point of view. Initially it seems that his 'yes' is somewhat strained as it burdens itself with an excessive task of having faith into something that is beyond determination. I illustrate this insight by referring to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra.' Nietzsche's existential 'No' toward transcendence is a consequence of a mindful confrontation with the excesses as play.

Russell Versus The Happiness Industry

72 Reviews RUSSELL VERSUS THE HAPPINESS INDUSTRY Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa stratoflampsacus@aol.com Tim Phillips. Bertrand Russell’sThe Conquest of Happiness; a Modern-Day Interpretation of a Self-Help Classic. Oxford: Infinite Ideas, 2010. Pp. 118. 978-1906821 -27-2 (pb). us$11.95. German translation as Bertrand Russells Eroberung des Glücks in a “Business Classics” series (gabal Verlag, 2012). he popular writing Bertrand Russell undertook to make money has long roused the indignation of those interested in his more technical specialized work, and his 1930 The Conquest of Happiness ranks among the more extreme examples of this pot-boiling genre. Ludwig Wittgenstein denounced Russell’s Conquest of Happiness as a “vomitive.” And the best ways of understanding Russell’s own assessments of his book are unclear, owing to the various sentiments his biographers report. According to Ronald Clark, he said: “… The Conquest of Happiness … I am not very proud of”;1 whereas Caroline Moorehead reports “he was later to say that, of all his books, he felt this had done the most good”.2 In his autobiography, Russell allows us how he wrote The Conquest of Happiness at a stage in his life “when I needed much self-command and much that I had learned by painful experience if I was to maintain any endurable level of happiness.”The emotional challenges to which he was subjected at the time he wrote the book “introduced an intolerable tension into every moment of daily life.” Beacon Hill School, which Russell had started with his second wife, Dora, in 1927, was in such dire straits financially by 1930 that Russell was compelled to resort to much popular writing and lecturing in order to remain solvent. In 1930, Dora gave birth to a daughter fathered by the American journalist Grif- fin Barry.This marked the beginning of the end to Russell’s marriage to Dora. Add to the foregoing Russell’s strained relations with Wittgenstein, when the ______ 1 The Life of Bertrand Russell, p. 448. 2 Bertrand Russell, p. 383. q= Reviews 73 former was asked to be one of the examiners for Wittgenstein’s phd at Cambridge . Although the phd was awarded and Wittgenstein secured a grant to conduct research at Trinity College, Cambridge for five years, Russell and Wittgenstein’s interaction at the time resulted in an end to their friendship. In general, however much control Russell may have had over matters at earlier points in his life, 1930 was a time he was largely at the mercy of unstable circumstances.The repose and leisure on which he had depended for his philosophic activity were not then available to him. Personal problems came to the fore and he was more prone to depression than usual. About The Conquest of Happiness, written primarily with the American market in mind, he remarked to the publisher Stanley Unwin: “I think they [Americans] mostly share Al Capone’s ideas of happiness, which are in a somewhat different vein from mine.”The book became a bestseller in America. Tim Phillips writes on business, technology, social change and innovation, and he has published more than a dozen expositions of other famous authors’ works. His book Bertrand Russell’s The Conquest of Happiness is a faithful tour through this Russell classic. Phillips provides a readable account of the original ’s lucid points. The treatment is certainly not pretentious or obfuscatory, as it abounds with examples of Russell’s points from contemporary pop culture . It features corroborating quotations from other authors and is salted with some results of modern surveys. Bertrand Russell’s The Conquest of Happiness has good reminders of the differences between the nature of Russell’s times and lifestyle and that of our own, the most notable being the absence during Russell’s day of a happiness industry. Nowadays, we are bombarded with “self-help” books “encouraging us to obsess about ourselves or manipulate others” (p. 9). Moreover, when Russell wrote The Conquest of Happiness, “the idea of an antidepressant pill was as likely as someone walking on the moon and the idea that people could ‘suffer from stress’ was thirty years into the future. For all...