abstract: A widespread view has it that, for Aristotle, perception's psychological and physiological aspects are phenomenal consciousness and its underlying material basis. I argue on the contrary that they are judgment/discrimination and receptivity: in virtue of our sense organs, we are receptive to objects of perception; in virtue of our souls, we judge or discriminate these objects. In effect, Aristotle divides perception's active and passive aspects between soul and body. I defend this view with special attention to Aristotle's claim that our senses receive form without matter in perception.

Thinking is a multifaceted process that encompasses logical, inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning, as well as planning, recalling past events and previous thoughts, imagining what may or may not happen, and experiencing and feeling affective states. The task of psychology is to explain what these thoughts are. How can physiological, biophysical, and neuronal processes in our bodies and brains be consciously perceived as an unceasing stream of thoughts that accompany us in conscious life? How do these processes differ in the mentioned aspects? Answering these questions without presenting a hypothesis on how perception and information processing are organized in the brain is impossible. This paper undertakes that task by developing a set of hypotheses that form the basis of a recently proposed reductive model of the conscious mind known as the Motivated Emotional Mind (MEM). The model accounts for the architecture of brain structures, the formation of neuronal representations of knowledge, and the dynamic interactions between the brain, sensory receptors, and effectors, all of which are integrated into a cohesive system by the body of the organism, or housing of the system. It also explains to what extent AI systems can exhibit phenomenal consciousness and what needs to be added to them to achieve it in the future.

ABSTRACT Illusionism holds that phenomenal consciousness, understood as the intrinsic qualitative character of experience, is an illusion generated by cognitive systems. While attractive in its parsimony, illusionism is often criticized as imcomplete: it denies qualia without explaining why the appear so compelling. This paper develops the Wet Room model as a constructive extenstion, arguing that illusionism requires a more explicit account of the cognitive architecture that generates phenomenal seeming. The model inverts John Searle’s Chinese Room argument. Where Searle claimed that syntax cannot yield semantics, the Wet Room shows that humans themselves are systems governed by biochemical syntax, and that semantics, understanding, and conscious experience are structural appearances produced by rule-following, self-modeling architecture The paper identifies three interacting layers of this architecture: biochemical code, predictive neural dynamics, and recursive narrative construction. These are anchored in emperical research, including studies of unconcious precursors of action, predicitive processing, genetic constraints on cognition, and clinical cases such as confabulation and blindsight. By supplying architectural mechanisms rather than merely reinterpreting experience, the Wet Room advances illusionsism into a constructive explanatory framework, explaining not only why qualia do not exist, but why they inevitably seem to.

The unbearable hardness of inferring being: Comment on "preliminaries to artificial consciousness" by Evers et al.

Why some physical systems are accompanied by subjective experience remains unresolved in neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Building on predictive processing and the Free Energy Principle, I propose that phenomenal consciousness (what-it-is-like-ness) arises when an information-processing system enters a regime of dynamic entropic closure: a metastable condition in which (i) internally generated predictions and (ii) incoming sensory signals are recursively coupled such that net informational entropy exchange with the environment is minimized while internal informational dynamics remain high. In this regime, inference loops become phase-coherent and self-referential, producing a persistent informational pattern-resonant closure-that constitutes awareness. The framework is compatible with, but conceptually distinct from, Integrated Information Theory and global-workspace style accounts. I formalize core constructs at the level of operational constraints, address objections regarding trivial closure and "stationarity," and derive falsifiable empirical predictions for neurophysiology.

ABSTRACT What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way. We then defend an alternative view of the temporal structure of experience from a variety of different objections. Along the way, we hope to illustrate the wider philosophical ramifications of the relationship between experience and time. What one thinks about the temporal structure of experience is, we believe, deeply interconnected with issues concerning whether consciousness is vague or precise, whether conscious states can be reduced to physical states, whether phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties, and whether phenomenal consciousness can “overflow” access consciousness. As we will see, even seemingly unrelated metaphysical questions, such as the debate between Humean and Non‐Humean accounts of natural necessity, bear on questions about the relationship between experience and time.

The phenomenal binding problem for neural networks.

Assessing theories of consciousness is a challenge. Normative scientific methodology, including falsification and prediction, is notoriously difficult when addressing phenomenal consciousness. For example, it is often less than obvious that the claimed predictions of theories reflect the actual essences of those theories. I suggest two ‘orthogonal’ approaches that, while not dispositive in principle, might be insightful in practice. The first is a comparison with other theories using what I call a ‘landscape of consciousness’ to discern commonalities and differences in their foundations, arguments, evidence, ways of thinking, and prospects of progress. The second is to explore the implications of theories with respect to big questions of sentience, including AI consciousness, virtual immortality, free will, meaning/purpose, and life after death. Of course, the implications of a theory, no matter what they are, cannot affirm or deny the veracity of that theory directly. However, just perhaps, the implications might offer insights indirectly. I apply both orthogonal approaches to superpsychism.

ABSTRACT Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f than,” “slightly f ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanatory burden: they must explain why some competent speakers seem confused about the meaning of “conscious.” We argue that the question does make sense: “conscious” sometimes functions as a minimal‐standard gradable adjective. But we will also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of “conscious.” Along the way, we address the objection that many gradable constructions involving “what it's like” expressions are infelicitous, distinguish two interpretations of “phenomenal consciousness,” and discuss how our semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees.

Natural born intelligence manifesto: Illustrating the dynamic perspective for consciousness.

The profound challenge of phenomenal consciousness – the subjective “what it’s like” to experience – persists as a central enigma in modern science. While neuroscience meticulously identifies neural correlates of consciousness, this essay contends that such findings may represent proximate manifestations rather than the fundamental nature of consciousness itself. Drawing a parallel with historical paradigm shifts, we argue that current scientific explanations might be inherently limited by their foundational assumptions and methodologies. The core critique centers on the “subset problem:” if consciousness is a superset encompassing brain structures, then attempting to define its totality solely through brain mechanisms (a subset) is intrinsically constrained. Scientific instruments, designed for the physical realm, prove inadequate for phenomena potentially transcending material dimensions, suggesting the existence of “rules beyond the brain.” Given science’s acceptance of abstract fundamentals such as information and mathematical structures – entities not reducible to physical objects – consciousness could similarly be a primary, abstract constituent of reality. This renders the “hard problem” a consequence of applying subset-oriented tools to a superset phenomenon. Furthermore, cosmological observations hinting at universal interconnectedness and singularities where physics breaks down suggest a deeper, unifying entity, whose intrinsic principles are not fully explicable by current physical theories. Analogous to inferring a black hole’s nature from its effects despite its unobservable interior, consciousness’s intrinsic subjectivity remains inaccessible to physical measurement. Ultimately, while science provides invaluable models for brain function, its existing framework may be fundamentally insufficient to fully elucidate the deepest nature of subjective experience, thereby necessitating a broader conceptual paradigm.

Many theories of consciousness propose that consciousness arises from neural computation in the brain. All information in a neural computer is physically encoded, but consciousness contains un-encoded information about local space. The information required for decoding does not reside in the brain. So consciousness cannot arise from encoded neural information; but it could arise from un-encoded information, such as an analogue model of local 3-D space. This paper proposes that the mammalian brain holds an analogue model of 3-D space, as a wave excitation in the thalamus. The wave stores information in a Fourier transform of space, like a hologram. Neurons couple to the wave, and the wave is the source of consciousness. Such a wave has not been detected in the brain; but there are reasons why it has not yet been detected, and there are reasons for a wave to have evolved. There is indirect evidence for a wave in the mammalian thalamus, and in the central body of the insect brain. This paper is an initial conceptual outline of a projective wave theory of consciousness, in which phenomenal consciousness arises solely from a wave excitation in the thalamus. Neuronal activity maintains the wave, but has no direct link to consciousness. Such a theory is capable of agreeing well with the spatial form of our conscious experience. It avoids the decoding problem of neural theories of consciousness, and has the potential for a positive Bayesian balance between the complexity of its assumptions and the data it fits; this is reason to investigate it further. The theory would explain why consciousness evolved, and be falsifiable. Many details of the theory remain to be worked out.

Abstract One of the more pressing questions regarding phenomenal consciousness concerns its teleological function. For example, is there a purpose for having qualitative experiences when it seems at least conceivable to live as a zombie void of rich sensory experiences? In this paper, I will discuss recent findings in the emerging field of neuroaesthetics, which could form a novel framework for addressing what I will refer to as the teleological problem of phenomenal consciousness. While still in developmental stages, neuroaesthetics is moving beyond its early incarnations as a science that exclusively studies how the human brain responds to artworks, and into a science that studies how and, importantly, why we have sensory and qualitative experiences. I will ultimately argue that neuroaesthetics, when scaffolded by evolutionary principles, is poised to contribute empirically grounded responses to the teleological problem of phenomenal consciousness.

On a confusion about there being two types of consciousness.

Selective attention, visual short-term memory (VSTM), and visual consciousness are longstanding core domains in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Recent findings using partial report and change detection paradigms suggest that VSTM involves multiple stages, each engaging distinct attentional processes. Crucially, the interplay between selective attention and VSTM lies at the heart of prominent theories of visual consciousness, such as the Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT) and the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), and underpins the distinction between phenomenal, linked to sensory memory, and access consciousness, linked to working memory. However, research in these domains has often progressed independently, lacking an integrated perspective. To advance understanding of their interactions, we conducted a PRISMA systematic review of behavioral and neuroimaging studies across Scopus, Web of Science, and PubMed. A total of 42 studies were included. Risk of bias was assessed using a modified version of the AXIS tool. Results indicate that selective attention is necessary for information to reach visual working memory. In earlier sensory memory stages, attentional manipulations impair performance under dual-task and spatial attention conditions but enhance it through feature-based prioritization. Neuroimaging findings support the involvement of temporal signatures associated with attentional modulation, phenomenal and access consciousness, and post-perceptual processes. Finally, results highlight a lack of empirical research directly addressing the role of attention in the encoding of sensory memory. Building on current evidence and drawing on the RPT and GNWT frameworks, we propose a four-stage model integrating VSTM stages, selective attention, and visual consciousness, laying the groundwork for future empirical and theoretical developments.

ABSTRACT The evolution of phenomenal consciousness remains a central challenge in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Although many argue that consciousness can be understood as a biological phenomenon, there is considerable disagreement about its origins. Competing theories range from early evolution views, which trace consciousness back to the Cambrian period around 540 million years ago, to latecomer theories, which associate it with complex cognition in mammals or humans. We argue that this divergence stems largely from unresolved debates about how to identify consciousness in extant animals. Which behavioural and neural properties we regard as evidence of consciousness directly impacts how we reconstruct its evolutionary history. These issues carry significant ethical implications for how we treat nonhuman animals. This paper maps the key positions in the debate, analyses their underlying disagreements and explores how evolutionary approaches might move the discussion beyond anthropocentric assumptions towards a more inclusive understanding of animal consciousness.

Simulating phenomenal consciousness using generative agents based on large language models

Explaining the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is crucial in the debate on the nature of consciousness. There are two competing strategies of how to approach this issue in the literature. Some assume that the intuition of dualism is a psychological illusion, others treat this intuition as a genuine cognitive problem which is not the result of an error. This article indicates the reasons for which the proposed theories of both types are not satisfactory and in addition articulates a new argument for the claim that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem. The source of the problem lies in the fact that psychophysical identities are not deducible from physical truths.

In the history of life, consciousness of sensory states with ‘phenomenal properties’—the basis of ‘sentience’—is, arguably, a late evolutionary development, which occurred long after conscious access to a ‘global mental workspace’ had become widely established as a strategy for cognitive information processing. In this article, I focus on phenomenal consciousness. I propose a step-by-step sequence by which the mental representation of sensory stimulation could have acquired phenomenal content through small changes in the brain. Also—addressing the question of evolutionary function—I point to the crucial psychological benefits to an animal of having a ‘phenomenally conscious self’. A thread running through the article is the phenomenon of ‘blindsight’, which I take to be a model for the non-phenomenal cognition that characterizes the majority of insentient animal species.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary functions of consciousness’.

An increasing number of authors are willing to attribute phenomenal consciousness to relatively simple organisms like insects. Yet it is not at all clear what functional role the substrates of consciousness would play. Here, we argue phenomenal consciousness is a consequence of how mobile animals with spatial senses and a capacity for goal-directed behaviour resolve the complex problem of action selection. To adjudicate between possible goals an animal must use sensory inputs, representations of internal state and stored knowledge of values to estimate expected value vectors for different options. Brains solve this problem by taking such heterogenous information and transforming it into a common framework—a phenomenal interface—and then using this to compute multi-objective Q-values. We use insects to flesh out the details of the phenomenal interface. A consequence of this type of processing is that it naturally generates a distinction between self and non-self and a first-person perspective in which external stimuli have a subjective value. We discuss the consequences of this theory for understanding the evolution and distribution of phenomenal consciousness and suggest an underappreciated problem that arises when thinking about how consciousness might have expanded and changed as it evolved from its simplest origins.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary functions of consciousness’.