R. Rawdon Wilson, In Palamedes’ Shadow: Explorations in Play, Game, & Narrative Theory (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990). xi, 317. $39.95 (U.S.) Rawdon Wilson’s title refers to a panel on an Attic black figure vase that depicts Palamedes standing over and observing Achilles and Ajax absorbed in a board game. Palamedes invented such games as a distraction for the Troy-bound heroes becalmed at Aulis. Wilson’s book, an exploration of “some phases of the analogy between games and literary texts, and . . . between play and both textual production and reception” (8), deals with a similar distraction/fascination, where the stake is meaning. A Renais sance scholar, Hispanicist, and student of postmodernist fiction, Wilson draws on narrative examples from The Faerie Queene and Don Quijote to Thomas Pynchon and Magic Realism. Sophisticated theoretical critique is accompanied by illuminating practical criticism. Wilson also engages in the poststructuralist/postmodernist device of incorporating outright fiction and ostensible anecdote in his discourse, and in the propaedeutic technique of leading the reader through mazes of false reasoning to arrive by negations at correct analyses. He anatomizes pertinent concepts of game and play meticulously. To generalize, games are closed rule-governed procedures, de terministic in nature, while play is open and stochastic. He concludes that literary texts are more play-like than game-like, for conventions, the rules of the literary game, exist as much to be violated as observed. Specific works may be modelled on games (chess and Through the Looking Glass) or incor porate games (ombre in The Rape of the Lock), and Wilson looks closely at the godgame, as Fowles terms it in The Magus, in which a victim is subject to the deceits of a master illusionist. The godgame is not an end in itself, however, but constitutes for the victim and/or reader a cognitive initiation. Altogether, the textual game is not a zero-sum affair but generates its own payoff in access to new meaning. Wilson canvasses several contemporary theoretical approaches to the ques tion of game and play in literature, principally those of Derrida and Bakhtin. Indeed, the chief contribution of In Palamedes’ Shadow to the development of theory is an effort to reconcile the central categories of these major fig ures. Derrida’s jeu libre, Wilson reminds us, is a fundamental condition of language that affects all writing inescapably, rendering it radically unsta ble, subject to a perpetual semantic Brownian motion that mocks authorial intention and critical interpretation. In contrast, while Bakhtin’s “carnival might well describe Derrida’s own wordplay . . . in dialogic terms, indicating how meaning can be created out of the agon between distinct monologic and incomplete utterances, carnival opposes free play” (66). It posits a possible 243 wholeness where Derridean play is committed to incompleteness. Neverthe less, Bakhtinian carnival fascinates Wilson as partaking of the character of both play and game, random movement and deliberate moves. The point of textual “gamefulness” is to excite and liberate the reader’s imagination. Wilson contemplates how little is required on the part of the text to stimu late the reader into extrapolating complex fictional worlds, in other words, to enter into a ludic mode that escapes the monologism of the familiar. Prob lems arising with the concept of intertextuality bring the Bakhtin/Derrida debate to a head. In the system of Derridean play, intertextual allusion escapes authorial intentionality, whereas with Bakhtin, it is a matter of au thorial decision. This is the crux: “The [intertextual] system plays through texts, and though it may be discerned . . . it cannot be controlled. The constitutive intentionality that Bakhtinian translinguistics ascribes to tex tual interplay must be an illusion.” But this is unacceptable in the face of the power of the Bakhtinian argument; thus “The ineluctable problem for the articulation of a theory of play in literature is whether one may have both Bakhtin and Derrida, free play and dialogism, within a single inclusive model” (211). Wilson is a good reader of Bakhtin, but he has not followed through sufficiently on the implications of Bakhtin’s admittedly problematic state ments regarding the dialogic principle. Briefly, putting the case in terms that borrow from science, dialogy and monology are in an asymmetric rela...
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