The ruling stated that if children and adolescents expose their bodies in everyday life and sexualize them by secretly filming them, then videos depicting such acts constitute child and adolescent sexual exploitation material. There is no doubt that the sexuality of children and adolescents is a value that must be absolutely protected. However, the protection of this value and the punishment of perpetrators are distinct issues. In other words, punishing perpetrators is an exercise of the state's power to punish and therefore cannot deviate from the principle of legality. Therefore, criminal laws must be interpreted strictly, and expansionary or analogical interpretations are not permitted. According to Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the Youth Protection Act, child and youth sexual exploitation material refers to material that depicts children, youth, or people or representations that can clearly be recognized as children or youth performing any of the acts listed in each item of Paragraph 4 or engaging in other sexual acts. Here, it must “express” “content that performs any of the acts listed in each item of Paragraph 4 or engages in other sexual acts.” The subject decision seems to have focused on “performing any of the acts listed in each item of Paragraph 4,” but in fact, it should not stop at performing such acts, but must recognize and express that they are such acts. The subject decision violated the principle of strict interpretation in that the content must be expressed, not just expressed. Furthermore, the subject judgment did not approach the issue from the perspective of interpreting the elements of the crime, but only emphasized the necessity of punishment. The factual circumstances of the subject judgment reveal that the body was exposed during everyday life is different from typical sexual abuse or exploitation, and there is no room for mental immaturity or impulsive tendencies to be involved. Above all, it cannot be considered a sexual act. Therefore, it is difficult to view it as falling under Article 2, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph d of the Youth Protection from Sexual Abuse Act, which defines “an act of touching or exposing all or part of the body, causing sexual shame or disgust to the general public.” The absence of any provision in the law punishing the “sexual objectification” of a crime, regardless of where it is located, refraining from allaying concerns about penal populism. Adding the requirement of “sexual acts” to the definition would further clarify the inherent concepts of “sexual exploitation” and “sexual abuse” in child and youth sexual exploitation materials, and solidify the boundaries of criminality.

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the constitutional principle of proportionality, as expressed in Article 31(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, within the context of substantive criminal law, and to highlight the tension between this principle and criminal policy in practice. The author argues that although the principle should serve as a superior norm limiting the state’s interference with individual freedoms, it is systematically marginalized in the legislative reality. The analysis focuses on the decision-making mechanisms accompanying the process of criminalization, with particular emphasis on the phenomena of penal populism, public opinion pressure, and electoral logic. The article posits that in a democratic system, criminal law is increasingly used to serve short-term political goals at the expense of constitutionally required rationality and proportionality.

Criminal justice policy in Indonesia continues to be dominated by the deterrence paradigm, which emphasizes the deterrent effect of severe punishment. This is evident in the increasing overcrowding of correctional institutions, which are operating at more than twice their normal capacity, and the high rate of recidivism. This study aims to review the direction of Indonesia's criminal justice policy by examining the interaction between three main paradigms, namely deterrence, rehabilitation, and restorative justice, in the context of national social and political change. Using a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical design based on socio-legal research, this study analyzes legal documents, official institutional data, and interviews with legal experts and practitioners from the period 2015–2024. The results of the study show that Indonesian criminal policy is still influenced by penal populism and political pressure, although there are indications of a shift towards a more humanistic paradigm through the application of restorative justice. However, this transition is still partial and faces institutional resistance and resource constraints in its implementation in the field. This study concludes that the success of criminal policy reform in Indonesia requires political balance in penal policy, namely a balance between political power, public interest, and human values in the formulation of criminal law. These findings are expected to serve as a conceptual basis for the renewal of a more just, effective, and sustainable criminal justice system.

This paper examines the growing entanglement between penal populism, the pervasive influence of social media, and the erosion of the presumption of innocence—a foundational principle in democratic legal systems. Penal populism, characterized by a political tendency to promote harsher punishments and swift justice in response to public sentiment rather than empirical evidence, increasingly relies on social media platforms as tools for shaping and amplifying public outrage. In this context, individuals are often "tried" in the court of public opinion before due process unfolds, leading to reputational damage and societal exclusion even in the absence of a legal conviction. The paper explores how viral accusations, cancel culture, and algorithmic amplification contribute to a punitive ethos in which the boundaries between justice and vengeance are blurred. Social media not only fuels mass mobilizations and emotional reactions but also alters perceptions of crime and punishment, shifting from retributive justice anchored in law to performative condemnation rooted in spectacle. Moreover, this phenomenon exacerbates systemic inequalities, as marginalized groups are disproportionately affected by extrajudicial moral judgments. By drawing on interdisciplinary literature in criminology, media studies, and legal theory, the paper argues that the digital age demands renewed safeguards for legal fairness and individual dignity. It concludes by proposing normative and institutional responses aimed at reasserting the presumption of innocence and resisting the corrosive effects of punitive populism amplified through digital platforms.

This research examines the critical intersection of judicial decision-making, social media influence, and legal education regarding premeditated mutilation cases in Indonesia. Utilizing a hybrid normative-legal and socio-legal methodology, the study analyzes sentencing disparities under Article 340 of the Criminal Code and Law Number 1 of 2023. Findings reveal that systemic inconsistencies arise from a widespread failure to evaluate perpetrator motives and an increasing susceptibility to "penal populism" driven by the "no viral, no justice" phenomenon. Furthermore, the prevailing formalistic model of Indonesian legal education fails to equip jurists with necessary ethical and sociological reasoning to withstand digital public pressure. Consequently, this study advocates for a transformative shift toward Clinical Legal Education (CLE) and the implementation of standardized sentencing guidelines. Such reforms are essential to restore judicial integrity, fulfill the 2035 Judicial Road Map, and ensure that substantive justice prevails over procedural formalism within the evolving Indonesian criminal justice legal system.

Histories of mass incarceration in Britain are normally structured around a moment of rupture in the early 1990s, when penal populism took off and prison numbers started to climb. But for Britain's black and Irish communities, expansive incarceration had been the norm since at least the 1970s. What then connects these two phenomena? How was the longer history of targeted incarceration related to this broader penal turn? Generations of activists answered this question by arguing that the state first trialled techniques of coercion on marginalized groups, before rolling them out to everyone else. But this simple, sequential logic cannot do justice to the messy web of connections between these two historical processes. Rather than trial-then-roll-out, hyper-incarceration and mass-incarceration appear as separate projects that intersect in various ways during the 1990s: in the imagery used to justify the penal turn, in the continued targeting of Britain's West Indian communities, and in the slow brutalization of the British state. The penal turn was not the inevitable sequel to earlier experiments. What this history instead reveals is the variegated and often contradictory ways that different projects of racialization and incarceration intersect at different historical moments.

Northern Ireland’s sentencing policy, while sharing commonalities with other Anglo-American jurisdictions, remains distinct due to its complex socio-political history and post-conflict legal framework. In response to evolving public expectations, the Department of Justice has recently undertaken a comprehensive review of sentencing policy, resulting in proposed reforms that reflect the unique challenges of a small jurisdiction with a legacy of sectarian violence. This article provides a socio-legal analysis of these reforms, critically evaluating their contextual drivers, practical implications, and potential long-term impacts. A central theme of this analysis is Northern Ireland’s restrained approach to penal populism, which has set it apart from significant parts of the common law world, including the United States, Great Britain, and Australia, where punitive attitudes have led to escalating incarceration rates. Drawing on the concept of ‘penal populism’ developed by Bottoms and Pratt, this article explores how Northern Ireland has, to date, resisted the widespread adoption of punitive rhetoric in criminal justice policymaking. However, recent trends suggest a shifting landscape, including a rising prison population and an emerging ‘tough on crime’ public discourse. This article examines key proposals from the sentencing review, including the introduction of formal sentencing principles and purposes and the decision to reject a sentencing guidelines council in favour of enhanced judicial discretion through the Court of Appeal. It argues that these reforms reflect both caution and inadvertent radicalism as policymakers attempt to balance increasing demands for harsher sentencing with the enduring complexities of Northern Ireland’s legal and political environment.

ABSTRACT This study examines individual-level punitiveness, defined as support for harsher criminal sanctions, across eight societies categorised under Cavadino and Dignan's political-economic typology: neoliberalism, conservative corporatism, social democratic corporatism, and oriental corporatism. Using a publicly available dataset with responses from approximately 300 individuals in each society, this study explores how punitive attitudes vary across regimes and whether the variations align with state-level punitiveness, particularly incarceration rates. The findings reveal that citizens of societies belonging to conservative corporatism exhibit the highest individual-level punitiveness, followed by social democratic corporatism, neoliberal and oriental corporatism regimes. This pattern contrasts with state-level punitiveness, in which neoliberalism is the most punitive. We conclude with a discussion on the indirect relationship between public opinion and penal policy, as well as its implications for penal populism.

ABSTRACT The retention of capital punishment in China has long garnered public support. In addition to the frequently cited cultural and societal factors (such as cultural particularity and the overall number of crimes), previous research has yet to address whether and how the notion of human rights shapes the attitudes of Chinese citizens towards the death penalty. Through a random sample survey at an influential university of political science and law in China, this study indicates that the support of future political and legal elites for the death penalty decreases when alternatives are presented. It is also shown that the human rights index is a vital factor influencing college students’ attitudes towards capital punishment, which manifests the achievements of human rights education and death penalty reform in China. The mediation effect analysis further demonstrates that students from urban areas are more apt to oppose the abolition of the death penalty due to a lower identification with human rights. Based on these empirical findings, this study reflects on the debate between penal populism and penal elitism. Research and policy implications are also discussed.

Sentencing reform in Australia over the past 50 years has reflected ideological conflicts and deeper structural transformations in the economy and in society. It is a tale of two paradigms, one which is inclusive, participatory and rehabilitative, the other punitive and populist. This article identifies many of the positive changes over that period such as the recognition of the role of victims in the criminal justice system, the introduction of diversion programs, restorative justice and problem-oriented courts, the growth of trauma-informed sentencing and the creation of sentencing advisory councils. It also notes the rise of the prison population. The influence of penal populism has produced mandatory sentencing laws, restrictions on parole and post-release dispositions for those deemed to be too dangerous to be released into the community. Finally, it notes the possible role of artificial intelligence in sentencing.

The global shift away from the death penalty has elevated lifelong imprisonment as a primary alternative, prompting a critical examination of its conceptual, legal, and human rights dimensions. This exploration navigates through diverse legal definitions and cultural interpretations, emphasizing the increasing adoption of lifelong imprisonment following the decline of the death penalty. In that regard, the dichotomy between penal populism and evidence-based crime policy adds a critical perspective on the influence of public sentiment on criminal justice discourse. While penal populism often prioritizes public opinion over empirical evidence, an evidence-based approach underscores the importance of careful consideration, analysis, and reliance on scientific research in shaping legal policies. Finally, the nuanced approach to lifelong imprisonment recognizes its potential for rehabilitation and reintegration, balancing ethical considerations, evolving trends, and the imperative to protect human rights. This article emphasizes the multidimensional nature of lifelong imprisonment, encompassing ethical dilemmas, evolving paradigms, and the imperative to navigate these complexities with a commitment to justice and human rights.

In the global political landscape, as far-right parties gain prominence, populist rhetoric advocating for harsher justice and security policies is becoming increasingly prevalent. Proponents of this rhetoric base their discourse on “alarming” violence and crime rates and discredit more liberal approaches, as well as research that deconstruct those Manichean visions. In this introduction, we ask what tangible contributions qualitative and ethnographic methods can offer to the field of justice and security studies. We explain why and to what extent qualitative methods are essential to accurately represent the reality of justice and security and to help deconstruct overly simplistic interpretations of justice and security. Ultimately, this article contends that these methodologies are crucial, now more than ever, for dismantling narratives driven by penal populism.

The issue of prisoners’ right to vote has been a bone of contention between the UK and the European Court of Human Rights ever since the 2005 Hirst decision when the Court decided that the blanket ban on prisoners voting was a violation of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European origin of the decision was especially grating for many British politicians, and very quickly a bipartisan rejection of it arose in the UK Parliament. The ECtHR’s decision came under harsh criticism from all governments between then and 2022, as well as from the press. The criticism often focused on the perceived erosion of the UK Parliament’s sovereignty and revolved around the question of whether the right to vote for prisoners should be seen as a fundamentally national issue of penal policy, or as an international human rights issue. This article will explore political parliamentary discourse on this issue through a qualitative analysis of debates in the House of Commons on the Hirst decision and subsequent attempts at legal reforms. During this twelve-year-long standoff, politicians in the House of Commons often took up the issue as a way to signal their Euroscepticism, frequently conflating the Council of Europe and the EU. Many arguably engaged in a form of penal populism, pitting “law-abiding citizens” against convicted criminals (an unpopular minority) protected by “elite” foreign judges. For the three main parties, the issue could either represent a convenient diversion from their internal divisions on Brexit, or on the contrary, an embarrassing topic with the potential of creating further internal divisions.

Penal Populism in India: The Expansion of the Death Penalty and the Rise of Extrajudicial Justice

The article explains the main characteristics of penal populism as one very interesting criminological phenomenon and the basic manifestations of penal populism in some amendments and provisions of the Criminal Code of Serbia. This is especially reflected in some areas of criminal-justice legislation: 1) Introducing the prohibition of mitigating the penalty for certain types of criminal offences; 2) Introducing the institute of multiple recidivism; 3) Significant limitation on possibilities of suspended sentencing; 4) Prescribing a lifetime imprisonment, in combination with introducing a legal prohibition on release on parole for certain categories of offenders sentenced to this penalty. The paper also explains that the current Criminal Code of Serbia has been frequently amended and supplemented by numerous amendments. Some of these amendments of the Criminal Code of Serbia, culminating in the amendments from 2019, also contain elements of penal populism. The authors present an argumentative critique of the superfluous elements of penal populism within the Serbian Criminal Code, which are also evident in some of the proposed amendments. That tendency is also not in accordance with the prevailing understandings of modern criminal law, criminology, penology, or criminalistic doctrine, nor, more importantly, is such an approach of the legislator in line with the current state of crime rates and the need to respond to it in an adequate manner. The article explains that populist penal provisions prescribed in the Serbian Criminal Code, as well as in the proposed amendments to the country's criminal legislation, directly contradicts Serbia's official efforts to strengthen the system of alternative criminal sanctions aimed at reducing prison overcrowding. Moreover, in certain respects, it conflicts with the restorative justice framework that Serbia has adopted. These contradictions provide a compelling reason to reconsider several provisions of the Criminal Code. Authors especially conclude that a judge in a country characterized by the rule of law must still have the strength to resist such "public expectations" and to make his decision in accordance with the law and according to his free conviction and of course, the judge must also resist the influence of criminal populism promoted in the media or by some politicians, even other public figures/persons, etc., but a special problem arises when elements of criminal populism penetrate in the criminal legislation.

Penal populism is an approach in which the criminal justice system policy makers and practitioners formulate and implement dramatic and popular criminal policies to draw public opinion regardless of scientific findings. Populism may penetrate substantive criminal rules, and in this regard, severe penalties might be approved by lawmakers. Penal populism has its own traces in ceremonial laws as well; the laws that provide the best context to implement the populism actions and policies and thus provide the best condition for this phenomenon to shape. The practitioners of the criminal justice system may consider fast and dramatic trials and immediate and public enforcement of the sentences in their agenda under public pressure or political propaganda.

This paper critically reflects on the normative and practical meaning and purpose of life sentences and long-term prison sentences, which essentially resembles life sentences in their effect. The analysis provides in-depth knowledge about current trends in the global abolitionist movement, showcasing the current opinio iuris on the jus cogens status of the safeguards against the death penalty. Fully subscribing to said opinio iuris, the authors discuss its likely implications in terms of a future rise in life sentences, focusing on their meaning and relation to long-term prison sentences. This is not only a matter of normative definition but also an important issue in comparative penology that empirically investigates the imposition of life sentences. To test their assumptions about the dubious labelling of essential life sentences as ordinary (long-term) prison sentences, a normative analysis of the current legal framework in nine European states (Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Germany, France, and Switzerland) is presented in this paper. Preliminary findings show that what is labelled ‘life sentence’ in one jurisdiction tends to be a far less severe punishment than the sanction’s name might imply when compared to ‘ordinary (long-term) prison sentence’ in another jurisdiction. However, the matter is far more complex, as numerous states apply the so-called ‘security confinement’ as a security measure. Nevertheless, the authors find that in their effects, such security measures, although not labelled as sanctions, come dangerously close to actual sanctions such as life and long-term prison sentences, thereby normatively undermining current European human rights standards. Since there appears to be a rise in such ‘false labelling’, the phenomenon is considered in the context of penal populism and, in conclusion, discussed as a matter of the very foundations that criminal law builds upon in an attempt to suggest normative and practical solutions.

Amidst the aftermath of the controversial war on drugs during Duterte's presidency in the Philippines, this study seeks to understand characteristics of Filipino punitiveness. The institutionalization of state violence, historical context of authoritarian rule, and societal acceptance of extreme measures prompt an examination of public attitudes toward crime, punishment, and violence in the Philippines. This study used survey data on Filipino respondents and identified five distinct punitiveness clusters using latent class analysis. This study employed Kruskal–Wallis (KW) tests and chi-squared tests to explore factors associated with differences in cluster characteristics. The analysis found that the extremely punitive group exhibited significantly higher levels of satisfaction with President Marcos Jr., a strong preference for authoritarian detachment, and lower trust in institutions compared to the other clusters. They support harsher penal policies including informal or extralegal methods such as torture, social cleansing, and use of violence to attain social progress. This study confirms the convergence of punitiveness and penal populism, where highly punitive citizens endorse strong leaders and extralegal measures that result in atrocities.

ABSTRACT Since the 2000s, Brazilian federal prosecutors increasingly worked on corruption and white-collar crime (WCC) cases. While scholars have focused on how this engagement impacted politics, few works examine its implications for the country’s penal field. In the context of the mass incarceration of working-class and racialized groups, does prosecutors’ focus on the powerful promote penal change or continuity? Using this issue’s concepts of professional trajectories, professional projects, and contexts, I investigate how prosecutors built their expertise on criminal law, how this process shaped their penal discourses and practices, and how these contrast with the country’s penal context. Empirically, I analyze prosecutors’ CVs and discourses on an anti-corruption bill. I find that prosecutors invested heavily in academic specialization and international training in criminal law, focusing on WCC. With this move, they created a new professional project, which breaks with traditional racialized tough-on-crime discourses and proposes measures to increase accountability for the powerful, seeking to “democratize punishment.” However, some of these discourses and practices reproduce traditional punitive approaches embedded in the Brazilian penal context, such as penal populism and the disavowal of procedural rights. Although prosecutors built their professional trajectories around corruption and WCC, their professional project may incidentally harm marginalized defendants.

Is Punitiveness Really There in South Korea?: Punitiveness and Penal Populism in Theoretical Contexts