Passion Of Fear Research Articles

Passions, virtue, and rational life

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalists argue that moral norms are natural norms that apply to human beings. A central issue for neo-Aristotelians is to determine what belongs to the good human life; the question is complicated, since we take up a diversity of different lives, many of which seem good, and it seems unclear what the human species-characteristic life really is. The Aristotelian tradition gives some guidance on this question, however, because it describes us as rational animals with intellectual and appetitive powers; the perfection of those powers is what makes us good qua human. This is especially well spelled out in Thomas Aquinas; he takes moral virtues of courage and temperance to be perfections of our sense appetites, a power of going for things presented as good through our senses. These virtues thereby shape our passions, specifically the passions of fear, daring and concupiscent love, which are a result of the sense appetites pursuing what appears as good. This view provides a framework for virtue, which can then be taken as the perfections of distinct powers shared by all human beings, though actualized in a variety of ways. In this article, I will focus on the passion of fear, which I here describe, following Aquinas, as a movement of sense appetite away from evils that are difficult or impossible to avoid. My focus will be on showing that this passion is necessary, irreplaceable by our cognitive powers, and that the underlying sensitive appetites that produce fear must be perfected for any human being to count as good.

Reimagining the Romantic Imagination: Embodied, Proto-Cognitive Psychologies in Joanna Baillie'sIntroductory DiscourseandOrra

In the Biographia Literaria, Coleridge describes the primary imagination as a divinely inspired, supreme faculty of the mind – “a repetition in the finite of the eternal act of creation of the infinite I AM.” This spiritually understood, disembodied, deistic interpretation of the brain's creative center has come to signify the Romantic dualist perspective of the imagination; however, contemporary research in the fields of Romanticism and Cultural Cognitive Studies suggests that there may be a considerable amount to learn from reconsidering Romantic era notions of an embodied psychology. In that spirit, this essay will seek a new paradigm for an embodied, Romantic imagination, considering it from the perspective of the Scottish playwright, poetess, and theorist, Joanna Baillie. Through careful analysis of the Introductory Discourse, her preface to the inaugural Series of Plays on the Passions (originally published in 1798), and Orra, her tragedy on the singular passion of fear, as well as through the use of cognitive literary theory, I will demonstrate how Joanna Baillie proto-cognitively envisions the imagination as a significant means through which the embodied mind relates to and understands the world.

Teletrauma

This paper seeks to trace the notion of distance in Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry, by first indicating how the critical distance between Burke and Kant can be rethought in terms of an intrapersonal distance within both; then, as a second move, by looking at Burke’s general theory of the passions as it differs from that of Locke; and thirdly, by moving to the more specific question of how the passion of fear or terror is related to both pain and the sublime – an investigation which in turn necessitates a focus on the way attention figures as a duplicitous shifter between an-aesthesis and suffering. Interestingly enough, while Burke conceptualizes the sublime as a passion based on mediation or distance, and therefore distinguishes it from “simple” fear, later it turns out that fear itself is far from being a “simple” notion for immediacy, since immediate danger or threat still presupposes a mere apprehension of pain, rather than pure pain itself. This double distance (between fear and the sublime, as well as between fear and pain), puts fear in an intermediate position, which is more traumatic than that of the sublime, but which contains an element of distance with relation to pain, and is therefore a form of “teletrauma,” an amalgam of an-aesthesis and suffering. Being thus positioned between the sublime and pain, fear appears as the site of contamination, where detachment and involvement merge. In this respect, it may serve as a conceptual tool for a critical rethinking of the problematic nature of both aesthetic distance and perceptual immediacy.

Jules Verne's Metaphor of the Iron Cage

Max Weber's concept of the iron cage has become a byword in the scholarly world since the publication in 1930 of Talcott Parsons’ translation of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. What is less well-known is that Jules Verne had earlier used the iron cage metaphor in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea (1869) to reveal the paradoxes of modernity. Roland Barthes criticized Verne's vision of modernity as bourgeois and positivistic, pointing out his narrow-minded enthusiasm for futuristic technology. In this essay, I argue that Verne's originality lies precisely in his equivocal attitude towards modernity with its high technology. Verne, I suggest, does not reject technological modernity, but by dissecting it he reveals its propelling forces, high demands and price. He shows that the Enlightenment's Rule of Reason is, in the end, governed by the ancient passions of fear, bitterness and the thirst for revenge. It is this combination that makes the human condition tragic. Verne's Homeric imagination creates an epic hero—Captain Nemo—who personifies the remarkable alliance of modern science and ancient heroism.

Two principles of despotism: Diderot between Machiavelli and de la Boëtie

One of the key concepts in XVIII century political thought was despotism. Also Diderot utilised this complex idea. According to him, who followed Hobbes and Montesquieu, despotism was the result of the love of power, which was able to bring forth the passion of fear in the society. In this sense, Machiavelli belonged to this line of reflection: like that of Hobbes, his system was intended to show the danger of despotism and to learn the true foundation of natural law. But rethinking this paradox Diderot was led to elaborate a new theory of despotism, no longer based on the mechanism of power. His interpretation of Machiavelli – and Hobbes – had opened up a new perspective, which did not move from the enigma of power – Machiavelli's and Hobbes’ chief concern – but from the nature of subjection. Along this path Diderot came across de la Boëtie's Discours de la servitude volontaire, which explained the origin of despotism in a different way. Despotism was not the result of the passion of fear, but of that of interest. The discussion of these two different ideas of despotism led Diderot to a new perspective from which he answered the problem of liberty in an original way.

All God's Children Got Values

The experts have apparently agreed that it wasn't values that lost us the last election. It was passion, and above all, it was the passion of fear. But maybe frightened people look for strong leaders, whose strength is revealed in their firm commitment to a set of values. Fear politics and value politics may turn out to be closely related. So what is wrong with the liberal-left? Do we really look weak, uncommitted, value-free-tacking to the wind, whichever way it blows? And is this just a matter of appearance, a failure of public relations; so that what we need is a little rhetorical uplift, cosmetic surgery, some improvement in our posture? Stand straighter! Talk tough!

La pédagogie de la crainte dans l’histoire du salut selon Thomas d’Aquin (Collection “Recherches,” vol. 15) by André Guindon, O. M. I.

670 BOOK REVIEWS in world W is subsequent to his disappearance from world V-presupposes the correlative spatial relation of W to V. For many, the speculative nature of Hick's discussion of pareschatologies will prove disconcerting, particularly when the possibilities seem so numerous and incapable of definitive determination. Other readers will find the book intriguing, a well-documented resource for the exploration of the many facets of the problem which Hick has considered. Though one need not accept Hick's own view of the- afterlife, the book lays out the issues clearly enough to provide a reasonable point from which to proceed in other directions. BRUCE R. REICHENBACH Augsburg College Minneapolis, Minnesota La pedagogie de la crainte dans l'histoire du salut selon Thomas d'Aquin (Collection "Recherches," vol. 15). By ANDRE GUINDON, 0. M. I. Paris/Tournai: Desclee - Montreal: Bellarmin, 1975. Pp. 4~4. Broche. In this excellent study, Andre Guindon has undertaken to examine the theme of the contrast between Old and New Law, as lex timoris and lex amoris, throughout St. Thomas's works. The (Old) Law having been described by Paul as " our pedagogue," we thus have to do with how the " Law of Fear " exercises its pedagory in the history of the race and of the individual. But in making this chronological exploration of St. Thomas's writings, the author presents us with a rathm- thorough investigation of the notions of fear developed by St. Thomas, showing how these kinds of fear are woven into the fabric of man's journey towards God. Guindon displays considerable knowledge of the writings of St. Thomas, and a most salutary respect for St. Thomas's own interests, plans, methods, and vocabulary. He also shows clearly the social nature of scholarship, making ample and careful use of others' work, and skillfully criticizing their work. Moreover, he expresses himself with clarity. The result is a book which is an extremely useful source of information, and also to anyone who takes the time to ponder it a most suggestive and stimulating aid to reading St. Thomas. It should in tum give rise to much further study. (It is a pity there are no indices.) But the book has faults. The ones which I regard as most serious have to do with the notions of fear and reverence. In part I, St. Thomas is set apart from his fellow-theologians as the one who has taken his stand with evil as the object of fear. He is shown as using the varieties of evil, malum poenae and malum culpae, to explain the varieties of fear as they pertain BOOK REVIEWS 671 to the moral life (pp. 47-51). Now, in ST 2-U9.l and 2 (cf. Guindon, pp. 244-245), St. Thomas, somewhat later in his life, presents these same doctrines, ending the second article with the statement: "As to whether malum culpae can be feared, that was discussed above, when the passion of fear was treated." This is a reference to ST 1-2.42.8, and anyone reading it will find he has much to ponder as to whether or not malum culpae can really be an object of fear. This, I submit, is a central problem for the Thomistic discussion of fear. Yet we catch only a hint of this problem from Guindon, and only in the most indirect way (cf. pp. 859-860). Also, while Guindon stresses the importance of reverence as that act of the Gift of the Spirit called " fear " which remains even in patria, and as the operation of the gift of fear exercised even by Jesus, consideTed as the one who is without sin (p. 246) , it does not seem to me that he provides an adequate discussion of the texts. ST 2-2.19.11 takes its stand on the object of fear being malum possibile. Fear can remain in patria only to the extent that malum possibile remains. The evil described as "not to submit to God " will remain in patria " as possible for nature, impossible for blessedness," in contrast to the situation in via where it is " altogether possible." St. Thomas is describing two modes of the possible; only...