Output-based Allocation Research Articles

Potential impact of (CET) carbon emissions trading on China’s power sector: A perspective from different allowance allocation options

Abstract In Copenhagen climate conference China government promised that China would cut down carbon intensity 40–45% from 2005 by 2020. CET (carbon emissions trading) is an effective tool to reduce emissions. But because CET is not fully implemented in China up to now, how to design it and its potential impact are unknown to us. This paper studies the potential impact of introduction of CET on China’s power sector and discusses the impact of different allocation options of allowances. Agent-based modeling is one appealing new methodology that has the potential to overcome some shortcomings of traditional methods. We establish an agent-based model, CETICEM (CET Introduced China Electricity Market), of introduction of CET to China. In CETICEM, six types of agents and two markets are modeled. We find that: (1) CET internalizes environment cost; increases the average electricity price by 12%; and transfers carbon price volatility to the electricity market, increasing electricity price volatility by 4%. (2) CET influences the relative cost of different power generation technologies through the carbon price, significantly increasing the proportion of environmentally friendly technologies; expensive solar power generation in particular develops significantly, with final proportion increasing by 14%. (3) Emission-based allocation brings about both higher electricity and carbon prices than by output-based allocation which encourages producers to be environmentally friendly. Therefore, output-based allocation would be more conducive to reducing emissions in the Chinese power sector.

Output-Based Emissions Allowances and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off

Emissions trading with output-based allocation (OBA) of emissions allowances is gaining popularity as a means to address sectoral equity issues related to the use of market-based instruments in pollution control. Using a dynamic general equilibrium framework, this paper assesses the potential equity-efficiency trade-off between OBA and alternative emissions trading systems, with special attention to the heterogeneity among energy-intensive industries. Because abatement is achieved at a higher marginal cost with OBA, it is less efficient than emissions trading systems in which permit revenues are used to reduce payroll taxes. Nonetheless, the implicit output subsidy in OBA improves the distributional outcome of the abatement policy to the benefit of energy-intensive industries as a whole. The simulation results also suggest that energy-intensive industries that do not produce energy would be the main beneficiaries of OBA. In the new carbon-constrained environment, energy intensive industries that produce energy could not benefit significantly from OBA.

Historic versus output-based allocation of GHG tradable allowances: a comparison

Two ways of allocating greenhouse gas (GHG) allowances are compared: historic allocation (HA) based solely on past information, and output-based allocation (OBA) based on an allocation proportional to the current output level. The advantages and problems of each allocation method are considered and compared. It is essential to distinguish the sectors sheltered from international competition (e.g. power generation) from the exposed sectors. In the sheltered sectors, OBA entails a much higher overall cost because it provides too little incentive to reduce the production of the polluting goods. HA does not suffer from this drawback but its distributional impact is highly unfair. Hence in these sectors neither of these two ways of freely allocating allowances can be supported, and auctioning should be favoured. However, in the exposed sectors, OBA is an option worth considering because it reduces carbon leakage, although it also suffers from some drawbacks compared with auctioning.

Historic versus output-based allocation of GHG tradable allowances: a comparison

Two ways of allocating greenhouse gas (GHG) allowances are compared: historic allocation (HA) based solely on past information, and output-based allocation (OBA) based on an allocation proportional to the current output level. The advantages and problems of each allocation method are considered and compared. It is essential to distinguish the sectors sheltered from international competition (e.g. power generation) from the exposed sectors. In the sheltered sectors, OBA entails a much higher overall cost because it provides too little incentive to reduce the production of the polluting goods. HA does not suffer from this drawback but its distributional impact is highly unfair. Hence in these sectors neither of these two ways of freely allocating allowances can be supported, and auctioning should be favoured. However, in the exposed sectors, OBA is an option worth considering because it reduces carbon leakage, although it also suffers from some drawbacks compared with auctioning.

Household Incidence of Pollution Control Policies: A Robust Welfare Analysis Using General Equilibrium Effects

This study assesses the incidence of pollution control policies on households. In contrast to previous studies, we employ an integrated framework combining a multisector general equilibrium model with a stochastic dominance analysis using household-level data. We consider three policy instruments in a domestic emission trading system: (i) an output-based allocation of permits (OBA); (ii) the use of the proceeds of permit sales to reduce payroll taxes (RPT): (iii) and the use of these proceeds to reduce consumption taxes instead (UCS). The general equilibrium results suggest that the return to capital is more negatively affected than the wage rate in all simulations, since polluting industries are capital intensive. Abstracting from pollution externalities, the dominance analysis allows us to conclude that all three policies have a normatively robust negative (positive) impact on welfare (poverty). Formal dominance tests indicate that RPT first-order welfare dominates OBA over all values of household incomes. UCS also first-order poverty dominates RPT for any choice of poverty line below $CAN 18,600, and poverty dominates for any poverty line (and thus welfare dominates) at the second order. Finally, while the three pollution control policies do not have a numerically large impact on inequality (in comparison to the base run), statistical tests indicate that inequality increases significantly more with OBA and RPT than with UCS.

Simplifying Climate Change Legislation: Output-Based Allocations

An output allowance system is quintessentially American, solidly based on market forces and rewarding power entrepreneurs for “doing the right thing.” Yet the system allows markets to set the price.

Concilier compétitivité industrielle et politique climatique

Résumé Nous comparons quatre propositions d’évolution du système européen de quotas échangeables ( seqe ) de gaz à effet de serre : vente des quotas aux enchères, allocation des quotas proportionnellement à la production courante ( app ), vente aux enchères avec ajustement aux frontières ( eaf ) et allocation hybride avec enchères dans les secteurs protégés de la concurrence internationale et app dans les autres. Nous développons un modèle d’équilibre partiel de l’ ue -27 comportant trois secteurs couverts par le seqe – le ciment, l’acier et l’électricité – plus l’aluminium, touché indirectement via le prix de l’électricité. Le taux de fuite de CO 2 va de 8 % en cas de vente aux enchères à – 2 % en eaf et varie beaucoup entre secteurs. Le coût économique agrégé est le plus élevé en app et le plus faible en eaf .

Changing the Allocation Rules in the EU ETS: Impact on Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency

We assess five proposals for the future of the EU greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS): pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), auctioning with border adjustments (AU-BA), and finally output-based allocation in sectors exposed to international competition combined with auctioning in electricity generation (OB-AU). We look at the impact on production, trade, CO2 leakage and welfare. We use a partial equilibrium model of the EU 27 featuring three sectors covered by the EU ETS – cement, steel and electricity – plus the aluminium sector, which is indirectly impacted through a rise in electricity price. The leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU emissions, ranges from around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BA and varies greatly among sectors. Concerning the overall economic cost, OB appears to be the least efficient policy, even when taking into account its ability to prevent CO2 leakage. On the other hand, this policy minimises production losses and wealth transfers among stakeholders, which is likely to soften oppositions. GF and AU are the most efficient policies from an EU perspective, even when leakage is accounted for. From a world welfare perspective and whatever the emission reductio

Output-Based Allocation of Emissions Permits for Mitigating Tax and Trade Interactions

The allocation of tradable emissions permits has important efficiency as well as distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are taken into account. We compare different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors (lumpsum grandfathering, output-based allocation (OBA), auctioning) and among sectors (historical emissions or value-added shares). The output subsidies implicit in OBA mitigate tax interactions, unlike grand-fathering. OBA with sectoral distributions based on value added is similar to revenue recycling with auctioning. OBA based on historical emissions supports heavier polluters, more effectively counter-acting carbon leakage, but at higher welfare costs. Less energy-intensive sectors are also sensitive to allocation rules.

Efficiency and Sectoral Distributional Impacts of Output-Based Emissions Allowances in Canada

Abstract Emissions trading with output-based allocation (OBA) of emissions allowances is gaining popularity as a mean to address sectoral distribution issues related to the use of market-based instruments in pollution control. Using a dynamic general equilibrium framework, this paper assesses the potential trade-off between efficiency and uneven sectoral distributional effects. It compares OBA and other alternative emissions trading systems, with special attention to the heterogeneity among energy-intensive industries. Because abatement is achieved at a higher marginal cost with OBA, it is less efficient than emissions trading systems in which permit revenues are used to reduce payroll taxes. Nonetheless, the implicit output subsidy in OBA improves the sectoral distributional outcome of the abatement policy to the benefit of energy-intensive industries as a whole. The simulation results also suggest that energy-intensive industries that do not produce energy are the main beneficiaries of OBA. In the new carbon-constrained environment, energy intensive industries that produce energy could not benefit from OBA.

Efficiency and Sectoral Distributional Impacts of Output-Based Emissions Allowances in Canada

Emissions trading with output-based allocation (OBA) of emissions allowances is gaining popularity as a mean to address sectoral distribution issues related to the use of market-based instruments in pollution control. Using a dynamic general equilibrium framework, this paper assesses the potential trade-off between efficiency and uneven sectoral distributional effects. It compares OBA and other alternative emissions trading systems, with special attention to the heterogeneity among energy-intensive industries. Because abatement is achieved at a higher marginal cost with OBA, it is less efficient than emissions trading systems in which permit revenues are used to reduce payroll taxes. Nonetheless, the implicit output subsidy in OBA improves the sectoral distributional outcome of the abatement policy to the benefit of energy-intensive industries as a whole. The simulation results also suggest that energy-intensive industries that do not produce energy are the main beneficiaries of OBA. In the new carbon-constrained environment, energy intensive industries that produce energy could not benefit from OBA.

CO<SUB>2</SUB> abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based allocation

A recurring concern raised by the European GHG Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the fear of losses to EU industry through competition: both loss in domestic production and loss in profits. This article analyses how production and profits in the European cement industry may be affected by different approaches to the allocation of emissions allowances. We analyse two contrasting methods for the allocation of free allowances. With ‘grandfathering', the number of allowances a firm gets is independent of its current behaviour. With ‘output-based allocation', the number of allowances is proportional to the firm's current production level. Whereas almost all the quantitative assessments of the EU ETS assume grandfathering, the real allocation methods used by Member States, notably because of the updating every 5 years and of the special provisions for new plants and plant closings, stand somewhere between these two polar extremes. We study the impacts of these two contrasting allocation methods by linking a detailed trade model of homogeneous products with high transportation costs (GEO) with a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM). The two allocation approaches have very different impacts on competitiveness and emissions abatements. Grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers is enough to maintain aggregate profitability (EBITDA) at its business-as-usual level, but with significant production losses and CO2 leakage. For an output-based allocation over 75% of historic unitary (tCO2/tonnecement) emissions, the impact on production levels and EBITDA is insignificant, abatement in the EU is much lower, but there is almost no leakage. Policy makers need to recognize to what extent different allocation approaches may change the impacts of emissions trading, and adopt approaches accordingly.

CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based allocation

A recurring concern raised by the European GHG Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the fear of losses to EU industry through competition: both loss in domestic production and loss in profits. This article analyses how production and profits in the European cement industry may be affected by different approaches to the allocation of emissions allowances. We analyse two contrasting methods for the allocation of free allowances. With ‘grandfathering’, the number of allowances a firm gets is independent of its current behaviour. With ‘output-based allocation’, the number of allowances is proportional to the firm's current production level. Whereas almost all the quantitative assessments of the EU ETS assume grandfathering, the real allocation methods used by Member States, notably because of the updating every 5 years and of the special provisions for new plants and plant closings, stand somewhere between these two polar extremes. We study the impacts of these two contrasting allocation methods by linking a detailed trade model of homogeneous products with high transportation costs (GEO) with a bottom-up model of the cement industry (CEMSIM). The two allocation approaches have very different impacts on competitiveness and emissions abatements. Grandfathering 50% of past emissions to cement producers is enough to maintain aggregate profitability (EBITDA) at its business-as-usual level, but with significant production losses and CO2 leakage. For an output-based allocation over 75% of historic unitary (tCO2/tonnecement) emissions, the impact on production levels and EBITDA is insignificant, abatement in the EU is much lower, but there is almost no leakage. Policy makers need to recognize to what extent different allocation approaches may change the impacts of emissions trading, and adopt approaches accordingly.

Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview

Abstract The European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) has an efficient and effective market design that risks being undermined by three interrelated problems: the approach to allocation; the absence of a credible commitment to post-2012 continuation; and concerns about its impact on the international competitiveness of key sectors. This special issue of Climate Policy explores these three factors in depth. This policy overview summarizes key insights from the individual studies in this issue, and draws overall policy conclusions about the next round of allocations and the design of the system for the longer term. • Allocations for 2008–2012. Allocations defined relative to projected ‘business-as-usual’ emissions should involve cutbacks for all sectors, in part to hedge against an unavoidable element of projection inflation. Additional cutbacks for the power sector could help to address distributional and legal (State aid) concerns. Benchmarking allocations, e.g. on best practice technologies, could offer important advantages: experience in different sectors and countries is needed, given their existing diversity. However, a common standard for new entrant reserves should be agreed across the EU, based on capacity or output, not on technology or fuel. Maximum use of allowed auctioning (10%) would improve efficiency, provide reassurance, and potentially help to stabilize the system through minimum-price auctions. These measures will not preclude most participating sectors from profiting from the EU ETS during phase II. Companies can choose to scale back these potential profits to protect market share against imports and/or use the revenues to support longer term decarbonization investments, whilst auction revenues can be used creatively to support broader investments towards a lowcarbon industrial sector in Europe. • Post-2012 design. Effective operation during phase II requires a concrete commitment to continue the EU ETS beyond 2012 with future design addressing concerns about distribution, potential perverse incentives, and industrial competitiveness. Declining free allocation combined with greater auctioning offers the simplest solution to distributional and incentive problems. For its unilateral implementation to be sustainable under higher carbon prices over longer periods, EU ETS post-2012 design must accommodate one of three main approaches for the most energy-intensive internationally traded sectors: international (sectoral) agreements, border-tax adjustments, or output-based (intensity) allocation. If significant free allocations continue, governments may also need to follow the example of monetary policy in establishing independent allocation authorities with some degree of EU coordination. Such reform for the post-2012 period would require the Directive to be fundamentally renegotiated in relation to allocation procedures. Such renegotiation is neither feasible nor necessary for phase II operation. Rather, phase II should be a period in which diverse national approaches build experience, whilst the profits potentially accruing to participating sectors can be used to protect market share and jump-start their investments for a globally carbonconstrained future.

Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview

The European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) has an efficient and effective market design that risks being undermined by three interrelated problems: the approach to allocation; the absence of a credible commitment to post-2012 continuation; and concerns about its impact on the international competitiveness of key sectors. This special issue of Climate Policy explores these three factors in depth. This policy overview summarizes key insights from the individual studies in this issue, and draws overall policy conclusions about the next round of allocations and the design of the system for the longer term. • Allocations for 2008–2012. Allocations defined relative to projected ‘business-as-usual’ emissions should involve cutbacks for all sectors, in part to hedge against an unavoidable element of projection inflation. Additional cutbacks for the power sector could help to address distributional and legal (State aid) concerns. Benchmarking allocations, e.g. on best practice technologies, could offer important advantages: experience in different sectors and countries is needed, given their existing diversity. However, a common standard for new entrant reserves should be agreed across the EU, based on capacity or output, not on technology or fuel. Maximum use of allowed auctioning (10%) would improve efficiency, provide reassurance, and potentially help to stabilize the system through minimum-price auctions. These measures will not preclude most participating sectors from profiting from the EU ETS during phase II. Companies can choose to scale back these potential profits to protect market share against imports and/or use the revenues to support longer term decarbonization investments, whilst auction revenues can be used creatively to support broader investments towards a lowcarbon industrial sector in Europe. • Post-2012 design. Effective operation during phase II requires a concrete commitment to continue the EU ETS beyond 2012 with future design addressing concerns about distribution, potential perverse incentives, and industrial competitiveness. Declining free allocation combined with greater auctioning offers the simplest solution to distributional and incentive problems. For its unilateral implementation to be sustainable under higher carbon prices over longer periods, EU ETS post-2012 design must accommodate one of three main approaches for the most energy-intensive internationally traded sectors: international (sectoral) agreements, border-tax adjustments, or output-based (intensity) allocation. If significant free allocations continue, governments may also need to follow the example of monetary policy in establishing independent allocation authorities with some degree of EU coordination. Such reform for the post-2012 period would require the Directive to be fundamentally renegotiated in relation to allocation procedures. Such renegotiation is neither feasible nor necessary for phase II operation. Rather, phase II should be a period in which diverse national approaches build experience, whilst the profits potentially accruing to participating sectors can be used to protect market share and jump-start their investments for a globally carbonconstrained future.

On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances

This paper derives optimal schemes for the free allocation of emission allowances in a dynamic context. We consider emissions- and output-based allocation rules which allow for updating of the basis of allocation over time and thereby do not rely on historical data only. We show that such dynamic schemes do not necessarily induce inefficient outcomes. In closed trading systems with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances proportionally to past emissions are first-best. However, in open trading systems where allowances can be traded with outsiders, first-best allocation schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions while second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both past emission and output levels.

Output-based allocation as a form of protection for internationally competitive industries

Policies adopted by Annex B Parties to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are likely to increase costs for industries vulnerable to international competition in domestic or export markets. Domestic emissions trading, by enabling the aggregate emissions target to be met at least cost, helps to reduce the adverse impacts on these industries. An output-based allocation of allowances reduces the output decline due to imposition of the emissions trading program relative to a lump-sum (historic) allocation and so helps reduce the adverse impacts on these industries. The effectiveness of an output-based allocation in maintaining production must be assessed empirically because it depends on the characteristics of all of the firms covered by the trading program as well as other factors. Modeling results for a possible emissions trading program for Alberta confirm the expected impacts of an output-based allocation and indicate that the effectiveness varies across industries. While encouraging greater production, an output-based allocation lowers profits relative to a lump-sum allocation and leads to a different distribution of costs. Other policy options for reducing the output decline in industries vulnerable to international competition include lump-sum allocations or auctioned allowances combined with assistance programs for emission reduction actions or a requirement to meet “world best” emission performance standard. These policy options should be compared with an output-based allocation in terms of effectiveness, total cost and other impacts, before a policy is adopted.

Combining rate-based and cap-and-trade emissions policies

Rate-based emissions policies (like tradable performance standards, TPS) fix average emissions intensity, while cap-and-trade (CAT) policies fix total emissions. This paper shows that unfettered trade between rate-based and cap-and-trade programs always raises combined emissions, except when product markets are related in particular ways. Gains from trade are fully passed on to consumers in the rate-based sector, resulting in more output and greater emissions allocations. We consider several policy options to offset the expansion, including a tax, an “exchange rate” to adjust for relative permit values, output-based allocation (OBA) for the rate-based sector, and tightening the cap. A range of combinations of tighter allocations could improve situations in both sectors with trade while holding emissions constant.

Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European-wide emission trading system, we examine the trade-off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output-based and emissions-based allocation rules. We show that the emissions-based allocation rule is more costly than the output-based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy-intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions-based allocation vis-a-vis output-based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.

Internal markets and health care efficiency: a multiple-output stochastic frontier analysis.

This paper has two purposes. The first purpose is methodological and aims to extend previous work on efficiency analysis by implementing a multiple-output stochastic ray frontier production function model. This model generalizes the single-output stochastic frontier model to multiple-input, multiple-output technologies and allows simultaneous estimation of technical efficiency and analysis of influential variables on efficiency. The second, empirical, purpose is to test for existence and magnitude of the effect of purchaser/provider split combined with new reimbursement schemes on technical efficiency in the Swedish public hospital system. The analysis is carried out with a panel data set covering the total population of 26 Swedish County Councils from 1989 to 1995. Our empirical results support the frontier model specification and indicate that output-based reimbursement improves technical efficiency. The potential saving in costs due to a switch from budget-based allocation to output-based allocation is estimated to be almost 10%.