East Asia's Order Research Articles

Japan's Annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom and the Change in the East Asia Order - Focused on the Political Relations with the Korean Peninsula -

오키나와에는 19세기 후반까지 중국적 세계질서에 적극적으로 참여하면서 ‘비무장의 섬’으로서 독특한 정체성을 간직하고 있던 유구왕국이 존재하고 있었다. 그러나 유구왕국은 19세기의 위기상황 속에서 일본의 메이지 정부에 의해 강제로 병합되고 말았다. 유구병합에 관한 일본 측 연구는 상당히 많이 축적되어 있다. 하지만 한반도 정황과의 상관관계에 주목하는 시각은 거의 찾아보기 어렵다. 본 연구는 유구왕국의 해체가 동아시아 질서가 변동하는 과정에서 특히 한반도 ‘안과 밖’의 정치적 상황 변화와 어떻게 맞물리게 되는지 고찰하는 것을 그 목적으로 한다.<BR> 중국적 세계질서의 변동은 아편전쟁이라는 외부로부터의 충격에서 비롯되었다. 하지만 동아시아 삼국 간의 구체적인 관계 변동은 메이지 유신이라는 일본 국내의 정치변동을 기점으로 본격적으로 가시화되었다고 할 수 있다. 일본의 메이지 신정부는 중국적 세계질서의 가장 약한 고리에 해당하는 유구왕국을 기점으로 거대한 전환기 동아시아 질서의 재편을 모색하게 된다. 1870년대 일본에 의한 유구왕국의 해체과정은 몇 차례의 단계를 거치면서 치밀하게 진행되었으며, 예측 가능한 반발과 갈등의 소지는 가급적 사전에 봉쇄되었다. 메이지정부는 ‘국제적’ 분쟁으로 비화할 수밖에 없는 유구문제를 교묘하게 ‘내정’ 개혁의 문제 혹은 ‘지방’ 제도의 개혁문제로 환원시켜 가면서 분쟁의 여지를 애매하게 흐리게 하는 방식으로 유구를 병합해 나갔다. 일본에 의한 유구병합은 19세기의 거대한 전환기 동아시아 국가간 권력정치양상이 구체화되는 과정에서 나타난 중대 사건으로서 기존의 중국적 세계질서가 근간에서부터 변동하였으며 아울러 더욱 큰 폭으로 변화할 것임을 시사 해주는 국제정치적 사건이었다.<BR> 이러한 일본의 유구병합 과정은 중국 측의 위기의식을 급격하게 심화시켜 놓았다. 이에 따른 중국의 위기감의 증대는 조선에 대한 간섭과 압박의 심화, 즉 기존의 전통적인 한중 양국관계의 변질로 나타날 조짐을 보이고 있었다. 일본의 유구병합이후 나타난 중국 측 위정자들의 권고와 자기 내부의 문건들에는 기존의 중국적 세계질서 패러다임이 근간에서부터 동요되고 있으며, 조선은 향후 동아시아 국가 ‘간’ 패러다임 변환의 핵심적 이슈가 될 것이라는 전망과 함께 조선에 대한 압박이 어떠한 방식으로 이루어져야 할 것인지가 진지하게 논의되고 있었다.<BR> 이후 동아시아 갈등의 축은 본격적으로 ‘조선문제’로 이전되게 된다. 조선의 입장에서 보면, 유구병합의 시점을 기점으로 하여 제국주의적 시대상황에서 구미열강-중국-일본이라는 삼중적 압박에 놓이게 되었다고 할 수 있다. 아울라 국내적으로는 정책결정자들의 위기의식이 고조되어 이에 대한 해법을 놓고 정치적 모색과 갈등이 급격하게 상호 상승하는 상황이 연쇄적으로 나타나게 된다. 이러한 사실은 1870년대 진행된 유구병합과 1880년대 나타난 조선정부의 개혁추진, 그리고 국제정치적 맥락에서 ‘조선문제’가 부상하게 되는 과정이 마치 하나의 도미노처럼 긴밀히 맞물려 진행되었음을 보여주는 것이기도 했다.

Reorienting East Asia: Ten Years after the Financial Crisis

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. This paper argues that the financial crisis marked the passing of the post-war order in East Asia. It was an order in which the United States provided political support for regime stability, Japan provided financial wherewithal for investment and enormous entrepreneurial talent had been provided by the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia-and all of this in the context of the sequestration of the People's Republic of China. By the end of the last century, however, all of that had changed. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the influence of the United States and Japan has declined markedly, only to be replaced by the rising influence of China. The paper discusses the post-1997 East Asia by looking at the changing political order in the area, new patterns of trade and investment as well as demography-the new and old overseas Chinese and their relationship to their 'homeland'. Finally, the paper discusses how the economies in the region-Korea, for instance-are adjusting to the new Chinese regional order.

East Asia in a unipolar international order and Europe’s role in the region

This article attempts to explore the post-Cold War international system in which regional orders intermingle their influence. It pays special attention to regional conflicts in East Asia in the new era and what roles global powers could play to maintain regional stability. I will first examine the characteristics of the new global order after the end of the bipolarity. I will then focus on American foreign policy in the new international system in the context of its dealing with major global events that have strategic implications for its relations with other major global powers. As to discussions of regional orders, this article focuses on East Asia, where conflicts between states have not evaporated despite the relaxation of the global Cold War confrontation. What makes this area special is the involvements of many great powers and less-powerful nations that could somehow easily manipulate the seniors into the conflicts to their favour. While the regional order in East Asia is being shaped by the post- Cold War international order, the region’s peace and conflicts will in turn significantly influence global order. Finally, I will argue that dealing with problems in East Asia should acquire involvements of powers that would give necessary momentum to the existing participants to solve conflicts by the means of multilateralism. The European Union (EU) is often forgotten for its role in contributing to world order, and the EU should be taken seriously by the powers in East Asia as a possible player in maintaining the regional peace. I conclude that both global and regional security depend on continuing US unipolarity, strengthened by the co-operation of the EU in the form of multilateralism. By the same token, US unilateralism without a EU counter-balancing it, only invites potential challengers, such as China, to threaten the US’s preponderant position, thereby destabilising world peace.

Disrupting or Maintaining the Marine Legal Order in East Asia?

Disrupting or Maintaining the Marine Legal Order in East Asia? Get access Zou Keyuan Zou Keyuan Senior Research Fellow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Chinese Journal of International Law, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 449–498, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.cjilaw.a000441 Published: 01 September 2002

The ASEANization of Regional Order in East Asia: A Failed Endeavor?

Abstract: This article explores the extent to which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has succeeded in winning assent for its proposed principles and norms for interstate conduct, and recognition as an equal pole in an emerging regional order. The basic argument is that notwithstanding substantial evidence of ASEAN’s central role in key regional institutions and parallels between the ASEAN experience and those of other multilateral regional organizations, one cannot assume the ASEANization of East Asia’s regional order to be entrenched or irreversible. To demonstrate this, the article examines the challenges to the ASEANization of regional order in the security realm as posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. Beijing has largely responded positively to ASEAN’s policy of engagement as regards confidence-building measures, but has been ambiguous about the extent to which it adheres to ASEAN’s normative framework in the pursuit of Chinese policy objectives in the South China Sea. By contrast, Washington squarely challenges the ASEAN framework. Concerning ASEAN’s struggle for recognition, neither China nor the United States appears prepared to accept ASEAN’s centrality or even equality in other than formal terms in the future regional security architecture, since such status runs counter to the two powers’ own identity claims and security interests.

Establishment of a New Economic Order in East Asia and Sino-Japanese Economic Relations

Precis: Profound changes have taken place in the postwar economic and political situation in East Asia. The East Asian countries have developed structures to match [those of developed countries] and complementary economic relations. This and the enhancement of the idea of becoming an economic center in the strategies of countries concerned have led to regionwide economic cooperation and created favorable conditions for establishment of a new in the East Asian economy. This is a new horizontal order built on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and common development. In the building of this new order, the major powers have an obligation and their contributions are important. Naturally, we are not talking about the international contribution idea based on big-power control, but advocating internationalism and opposing narrow nationalism. The crux is proper handling of economic relations between developed and developing countries in the course of sincere cooperation. Especially important is th...

Korea in the post-cold War Era

As mentioned earlier, the Korean peninsula remains unfortunately one of the last vestiges of the Cold War. And it is essentially up to the 70 million Korean people in the South and the North to wash away the undesirable legacies of the old regimes, to institute a solid structure of peace and stability on their land, and to lay the foundation for unification. And this task must be achieved at the latest by the end of this century. A new order is now emerging in East Asia. The unification of Korea is essential for this new order to evolve. To this end, the Republic of Korea will exert every effort to reach modus vivendi with the North at the earliest time and to put into effect the agreements and commitments made at the conference table. The resolution of the nuclear issue is of utmost importance in creating an environment in which both sides will be able to deal with each other with reasonable mutual trust and confidence. While seeking the process of reconciliation and reunification, the Republic of Korea hopes to play, even modestly, a positive role in the shaping of a new order of peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia. It will continue to cooperative closely with the United States and Japan, and will endeavor to promote its growing relations with China and Russia and other countries of the CIS. The eradication of the Cold War legacies on the Korean peninsula and its outcome will be one of the basic barometers for the future shape of a new order in East Asia. Korea will work vigorously toward this end in the belief that by so doing Korea will become an important factor in the emergence of the new order in East Asia.

Contesting the Centre: International Sources of Japanese National Identity

Any state wishing to place itself in the context of its international environment must have a conception of the structure of that environment, a vision of the way international order operates, and of the way it ought to operate. When states order the same physical international space according to differing conceptual frameworks, international conflict is often the result. It could be argued, for example, that the deterioration in relations between the United States and Japan in the period between the Washington naval conference and the opening of the Pacific war was the inevitable consequence of the two powers' mutually irreconcilable sets of assumptions about the structure of international order, both about how it did work, and about how it should work. Leaving aside the question of whether either of these visions was correct, it is beyond doubt that Japan's vision of international order was one that was both hierarchical and Japan-centred. This vision found expression in Prince Konoe's 'New Order in East Asia', and the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', and in countless pronouncements intended as much for domestic as for international propaganda. The pre-modern sources of this conception of Japan's place in the world, however, have not been clearly enough delineated, and to the extent they have been examined, it has been principally as a problem in the history of ideas, rather than as an exploration of the interaction between empirical diplomatic experience and ideas themselves.

Japan's Advance into Indochina, 1940: The French Response

The sudden collapse of France in June 1940 presented Japan with a golden opportunity to exploit French discomfiture and remove several obstacles to its New Order in East Asia. Indeed, the military extremists, who had been temporarily held in check since the humiliation caused by the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939, could no longer be restrained. By seizing Indochina, Japan would be in a strong position to force an end to its interminable struggle with China on its own terms. The large quantity of supplies that had flowed through Indochina to Chinese forces — a situation that had greatly embittered the Japanese and had slowly poisoned Franco–Japanese relations during the past three years — could be brought to a halt. Chiang Kai-shek, further isolated and confronted with the loss of one of his few remaining channels of supply, might be finally forced to give up the fight. Moreover, Indochina could provide Japan with significant supplies of rubber, tin, coal, and rice and thus go a long way toward ending its dependence upon foreign sources for these strategic raw materials. Finally, the strategic location of Indochina meant that it could serve admirably as an advanced base from which the Japanese could strike out against the Far Eastern possessions of the other Western colonial powers — the East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines.

Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: Cooperation versus Effacement

Contemporary Asian history, measured in terms of its recurrent campaigns to supplant Western imperialism as the guiding force of Asia's destiny, began abruptly in January 1915 with the Japanese twenty-one demands on China. At stake in the demands was not only Japan's compulsion to control China, but also its desire to lead a pan-Asian movement subversive of the cultural divinity and political hegemony claimed by the West. Although the Japanese program affected the interests of all of the Western powers, none was more fundamentally threatened than Great Britain. The British Empire was in large measure an Asian empire; in China, after a century of diplomatic wars and warlike diplomacy, it had its best Far Eastern market and its most cherished, though much overrated, field for commercial and missionary enterprise.' The role that Britain played in the diplomatic struggle touched off by the Japanese demands, however, has escaped precise definition.} By using the files of the British Foreign Office, it is now possible to measure the effectiveness with which Britain met Japan's initial bid to lay the foundations of a new order in east Asia.3 The diplomacy of the twenty-one demands has generally been described against the immediate background of the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1914. Undeniably, the involvement of the Western powers in the European war did give Japan, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, British foreign secretary from 1905 to 1916, an immense and unique opportunity to realize the fraternal alliance with China that it had long envisioned.4 A truer perspective on the significance of the Japanese de-

Book Review: Japan's New Order in East Asia. Its Rise and Fall, 1937–1943.

Book Review: Japan's New Order in East Asia. Its Rise and Fall, 1937–1943.

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall 1937-45

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall 1937-45

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45.

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45.

Book Reviews: A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution, Natural Right and History, The Age of Absolutism, 1660–1815, Hitler's Europe. Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45, European Parliamentary Procedure, Politics in Post-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic, Administration Et Politique En Allemagne Occidentale, the

Book Reviews: A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution, Natural Right and History, The Age of Absolutism, 1660–1815, Hitler's Europe. Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45, European Parliamentary Procedure, Politics in Post-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic, Administration Et Politique En Allemagne Occidentale, the

Japan's New Order in East Asia, Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45.

Japan's New Order in East Asia, Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45.

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45. By &lt;italic&gt;F. C. Jones&lt;/italic&gt;, Reader in History, University of Bristol. [Issued under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 498. $6.10.)

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45. By &lt;italic&gt;F. C. Jones&lt;/italic&gt;, Reader in History, University of Bristol. [Issued under the joint auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 498. $6.10.)

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45

: Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45 . F. C. Jones.

: Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45 . F. C. Jones.

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall 1937–45

Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall 1937–45

Review: Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45, by F. C. Jones

Book Review| October 01 1954 Review Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45F. C. Jones Harold M. Vinacke Harold M. Vinacke Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1954) 23 (10): 160. https://doi.org/10.2307/3024395 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Harold M. Vinacke; Review. Far Eastern Survey 1 October 1954; 23 (10): 160. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3024395 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.